Report Providing an Assessment of the Current State of the Market for Natural Catastrophe Insurance in the United States
i
I. TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION ..........................................................1
II. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .....................................................3
A. Natural Catastrophes and Insurance ...........................................3
B. Homeowner Insurance .....................................................3
C. Flood Insurance ..........................................................3
D. Earthquake Insurance ......................................................4
E. Reinsurance .............................................................4
F. Mitigation ..............................................................4
III. NATURAL CATASTROPHES AND INSURANCE ................................6
Box 1: Catastrophe Models ..............................................7
A. Natural Hazards in the United States ..........................................8
Box 2: Examples of Natural Catastrophe Databases ...........................10
B. Property Insurance and Natural Catastrophes ...................................13
IV. HOMEOWNER INSURANCE ................................................15
A. Homeowner Insurance Policy Forms. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
B. Homeowner Insurance Premiums ............................................18
C. Impact of Natural Catastrophes on Homeowner Insurance .........................18
Box 3: Insurance Claims Adjusters ........................................19
D. Homeowner Insurance Market ..............................................19
E. Residual Market ........................................................20
1. Wind Pools ..........................................................20
Box 4: Fair Access to Insurance Requirements (FAIR) Plans .....................22
2. Florida Citizens Property Insurance Corporation .............................23
3. Louisiana Citizens Property Insurance Corporation ...........................24
V. FLOOD INSURANCE ......................................................27
A. National Flood Insurance Program ...........................................27
Box 5: Flood Insurance Rate Mapping .....................................30
1. Aordability .........................................................31
Box 6: Community Rating System Program .................................33
2. Flood Insurance Market ................................................33
3. Challenges to the NFIP ................................................36
4. Private Flood Insurance ................................................36
VI. EARTHQUAKE INSURANCE ................................................38
A. Overview of Earthquake Insurance ...........................................38
B. State Approaches to Promote Earthquake Insurance ..............................41
Box 7: State Approaches to Promote Availability of Earthquake Insurance
(except California) ....................................................43
C. California Earthquake Authority ............................................44
D. Reinsurance ............................................................46
1. Availability of Reinsurance ..............................................47
2. Aordability of Reinsurance .............................................48
Report Providing an Assessment of the Current State of the Market for Natural Catastrophe Insurance in the United States
ii
VII. MITIGATION .............................................................49
A. Benets of Mitigation .....................................................50
B. Mitigation and Insurance ..................................................50
1. Identifying Mitigation Activities ..........................................50
2. Incentivizing Mitigation ................................................51
Box 8: Government Role in Mitigation ....................................52
VIII. CONCLUSION ............................................................57
IX. GLOSSARY ................................................................59
Report Providing an Assessment of the Current State of the Market for Natural Catastrophe Insurance in the United States
1
I. INTRODUCTION
Section 100247 of the Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012 (Biggert-Waters Act) calls on the Federal
Insurance Oce (FIO) to conduct a study and submit to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Aairs
of the Senate and the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives a report (Report) providing
an assessment of the current state of the market for natural catastrophe insurance in the United States, including an
assessment of:
1) e current condition of, as well as the outlook for, the availability and aordability of insurance for natural
catastrophe perils in all regions of the United States;
2) e current ability of States, communities, and individuals to mitigate their natural catastrophe risks,
including the aordability and feasibility of such mitigation activities;
3) e current state of catastrophic insurance and reinsurance markets and the current approaches in providing
insurance protection to dierent sectors of the population of the United States;
4) e current nancial condition of State residual markets and catastrophe funds in high-risk regions,
including the likelihood of insolvency following a natural catastrophe, the concentration of risks within
such funds, the reliance on post-event assessments and state funding, and the adequacy of rates; and
5) e current role of the federal government and state and local governments in providing incentives for
feasible risk mitigation eorts and the cost of providing post-natural catastrophe aid in the absence of
insurance.
1
To support its study and this Report, FIO consulted extensively with stakeholders, including insurers, consumer
advocates, and a broad range of other federal agencies and state insurance regulators, including consulting with state
insurance regulators, representatives of the insurance and reinsurance industries, and the National Academy of Sci-
ences. With each individual or group, FIO discussed the aspects of the study for which the individual or group had
expertise or interest. In speaking with state regulators, FIO learned about the various state insurance markets and
state-based programs to support the availability of natural catastrophe insurance. When speaking with the National
Academy of Sciences, FIO learned of the Academy’s pending study on the aordability of ood insurance as men-
tioned in Section (V)(A)(1) of this Report. On April 24, 2013, FIO published a notice in the Federal Register (the
FRN)
2
seeking comment from the National Academy of Sciences, state insurance regulators, consumer organizations,
representatives of the insurance and reinsurance industries, policyholders, and the public on the considerations and
factors listed in the Biggert-Waters Act. In addition, FIO requested comments on:
1) Whether a consensus denition of a “natural catastrophe” should be established and, if so, the terms of the
denition;
2) e percentage of residential properties in high-risk geographic areas of the United States that are insured
for earthquake or ood damage, and the reasons why many such properties lack insurance coverage;
3) e role of insurers in providing incentives for risk mitigation eorts;
4) Current approaches to insuring natural catastrophe risks in the United States;
5) Current and potential future federal, state, and regional partnerships that support private, direct insurance
coverage for natural catastrophes;
6) e potential for privatization of ood insurance in the United States; and
7) Such other information that may be necessary or appropriate for the Report.
3
Nearly 50 comments were submitted to FIO in response to the FRN.
4
1 Pub. L. No. 112-141, 126 Stat. 916, 967-68.
2 Study and Report to Congress on Natural Catastrophes and Insurance, 78 Fed. Reg. 24, 310 (April 24, 2013).
3 78 Fed. Reg. at 24, 311.
4 Comments on the FRN available at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/o/reports-and-notices/Pages/closed.aspx.
Report Providing an Assessment of the Current State of the Market for Natural Catastrophe Insurance in the United States
2
e Report focuses primarily on natural catastrophe risks that may require signicant economic resources to restore
homes following a natural catastrophe event, and the specic insurance products covering damages caused by natural
catastrophes, i.e., homeowner insurance, ood insurance, and earthquake insurance. e current reinsurance market
and, in particular, its support for homeowner insurance also is discussed. In addition, the Report addresses the
importance of mitigation in reducing the risk of losses arising from natural catastrophes, and the role of the insurance
industry in encouraging and incentivizing the mitigation of those risks.
Due to the breadth and complexity of insurance and mitigation in relation to natural catastrophes, the Report, by ne-
cessity, addresses the key ndings of FIO and oers a high-level overview of these issues. e Report identies many
sources for readers to consult in order to learn more about the many nuanced and technical aspects of insurance to
protect against natural catastrophes.
Report Providing an Assessment of the Current State of the Market for Natural Catastrophe Insurance in the United States
3
II. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
A. Natural Catastrophes and Insurance
e Report rst provides an brief overview of natural catastrophes and related eects on people, communities, and
the insurance industry. e United States is vulnerable to a broad array of natural catastrophes. Between 1953 and
2015, Presidents have issued over 2,200 major disaster declarations that have aected each of the fty states, the Dis-
trict of Columbia, and the territories. e number of Presidential major disaster declarations has generally increased
over time, as have the overall costs and insured losses associated with natural catastrophes.
Natural catastrophes impose signicant burdens on people, communities, and property insurers. From an insurance
underwriting perspective, these challenges include the accurate understanding and pricing of exposure to the low
probability / high cost risk of natural catastrophes. To address these underwriting challenges, property insurers rely
on specially-developed catastrophe models to identify how to price policies in dierent geographic areas.
B. Homeowner Insurance
Homeowner insurance generally covers losses resulting from a wide array of hazards, including some forms of natural
catastrophes. Typically, homeowner insurance satises mortgage lender requirements for the property to be cov-
ered by insurance for losses resulting from re, wind, and hail. In 2013, 373 insurance groups wrote homeowner
insurance in the United States, totaling more than $8.2 billion in written premium. e Report rst provides basic
background and discusses homeowner insurance policy forms and premiums. Policy forms set out the details of cov-
erage, including the limits on the amount that an insurer will pay the policyholder. e coverage details included in
a policy form, including the amount of the deductible, can have a direct impact on the premiums for the policy. Not
surprisingly, premiums are highest in states most at risk for hurricanes and tornadoes.
e Report next assesses the ways that homeowner insurers manage the risk of natural catastrophes. Some insurers
reduce risk by decreasing exposure in specic high risk geographic areas or by imposing moratoria on new business
or, in some circumstances, by exiting a market completely. Insurers also manage risk through coverage exclusions,
such as for losses resulting from earthquakes and oods, and special deductibles for specialized losses like hurricanes.
ese risk management measures vary by state and between insurers.
In addition, the Report provides an overview of states’ residual markets for homeowner insurance, programs that
assist in the oering of insurance in high-risk areas. For areas more likely to experience a natural catastrophe,
insurers have withdrawn from certain areas resulting in a lack of supply despite consumer demand. Beach Plans
and Wind Pools (Wind Pools)—which exist in Alabama, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Texas—
are state-mandated private associations of all insurers writing property insurance in a particular state that provide
wind-only coverage in specic high risk areas. Additionally, some states have established residual markets to serve as
insurer of last resort for homeowners that cannot nd multiple peril insurance coverage in the standard market.
C. Flood Insurance
Homeowner and other forms of property insurance typically exclude coverage for losses caused by ooding, resulting
in the need for stand-alone ood insurance policies. For that reason, the Report addresses ood insurance separately.
Due to the high frequency and damages associated with ooding, many private insurers withdrew decades ago from
the ood insurance market. e National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), an insurance program administered by
the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), was established in 1968 to provided ood insurance coverage
in the United States. e NFIP makes ood insurance available to property owners and renters in more than 21,000
participating communities which meet NFIP requirements regarding oodplain management. Most NFIP ood
insurance is sold through the Write-Your-Own (WYO) Program, in which participating private insurers write and
service NFIP policies while the underwriting risk of the policy is assumed by the federal government.
e Report next discusses aordability and the NFIP. Flood insurance premiums from the NFIP vary based on a
number of factors, including ood risk, coverage limits, and deductibles. NFIP premium rates can be discounted to
reect reduced ood risk resulting through a community’s participation in the NFIP’s Community Rating System
Report Providing an Assessment of the Current State of the Market for Natural Catastrophe Insurance in the United States
4
(CRS), a voluntary incentive program that recognizes and encourages activities that exceed the minimum oodplain
management. Additionally, subsidized rates are available for certain policyholders, such as those with homes con-
structed before 1975 or the eective date of a Flood Insurance Rate Map (FIRM).
e Report then addresses current challenges faced by the NFIP. Prior to 2005, premiums collected by the NFIP
largely covered losses caused by ooding. However, due to the statutory structure of the NFIP that has promoted the
oering of subsidized premiums, NFIP premiums have, by design, never been nancially adequate in the aggregate.
As a result, as of December 31, 2014, the NFIP has a debt of $23 billion, which is owed to the U.S. Department
of the Treasury (Treasury). e NFIP requires periodic reauthorization by Congress, with the next reauthorization
required by September 30, 2017.
e Report also notes the limited private ood insurance market. While the NFIP is the largest writer of ood
insurance, some private insurers do oer certain limited ood insurance products. Members of Congress and other
policymakers have continued to express interest in the privatization of the NFIP, as well as trying to encourage private
reinsurance as a means of reducing the exposure to the federal government to the NFIP’s relatively large risk prole.
D. Earthquake Insurance
Earthquake insurance typically covers losses caused by an earthquake and by any aftershocks that occur within 72
hours of the earthquake. e Report addresses earthquake insurance in a separate section because, like ood insur-
ance, it is typically excluded from homeowner insurance and only oered as an endorsement or a stand-alone policy.
Deductibles associated with earthquake insurance generally range from two to 25 percent, with higher deductibles
in earthquake-prone states. Despite the prospect of catastrophic losses, the take-up rate for earthquake insurance is
extremely low across the country.
e Report then discusses approaches taken by some states to promote earthquake insurance. In particular, the Re-
port focuses on the approach taken by California, which in the 1980s enacted a law requiring insurers to armatively
oer earthquake insurance along with any homeowner insurance policy. Following huge insured losses in 1994,
many insurers severely restricted new sales of homeowner insurance or exited the California market. In response,
California created the California Earthquake Authority (CEA), a public instrumentality made up of homeowner in-
surers that write stand-alone earthquake insurance policies for homeowners, renters, and condominium-unit owners.
Participating insurers are responsible for selling and adjusting policies for their policyholders and, in return, receive
agent commissions and reimbursement of administrative expenses by CEA.
E. Reinsurance
Reinsurance is an important tool used by insurers to manage exposure to natural catastrophe risk. rough reinsur-
ance, insurers writing homeowner insurance, earthquake insurance, and other property insurance are able to diversify
risk exposure. e Report addresses the availability and aordability of reinsurance, noting that it is a global industry
that is currently capitalized at record levels. In recent years, additional reinsurers, alternative reinsurance solutions,
and increased industry capacity have reduced the volatility historically associated with property catastrophe reinsur-
ance pricing.
F. Mitigation
Finally, the Report addresses the issue of mitigation. Like insurance, mitigation serves as part of a broader risk
management approach to reduce the cost natural catastrophes impose on homeowners, communities, insurers, and
governments. e Report rst discusses the benets of mitigation, which include a reduction in the overall burden
of natural catastrophes by reducing the severity of damage to property or business operations as well as the secondary
and indirect losses caused by displaced individuals, closed businesses, and diminished communities. e Report then
addresses the ways in which insurers use mitigation as a means of loss prevention or reduction and as an underwriting
indicator of the security or resilience of an insured property. Federal, state, and local governments also incentiv-
ize mitigation. To overcome at least some of the obstacles to homeowner mitigation eorts, such as cost, nancial
incentives are necessary to promote mitigation eorts. Within the federal government and together with a broad
group of stakeholders, FIO continues to support eorts to promote the eective coordination of private and public
Report Providing an Assessment of the Current State of the Market for Natural Catastrophe Insurance in the United States
5
sector work relating to mitigation. is work also supports the resilience priorities of President Obama, exemplied
by Executive Order 13653, which, among other things, established a State, Local, and Tribal Leaders Task Force on
Climate Preparedness and Resilience, and Executive Order 13690, which established a Federal Flood Risk Manage-
ment Standard that requires all future federal investments in and aecting oodplains to meet an increased level of
resilience.
Report Providing an Assessment of the Current State of the Market for Natural Catastrophe Insurance in the United States
6
III. NATURAL CATASTROPHES AND INSURANCE
e Biggert-Waters Act does not dene “natural catastrophe” or “natural catastrophe insurance,” and dierent sectors
and experts have developed alternative denitions.
5
However, the terms “disaster” and “major disaster” are dened
in federal regulations. e Robert T. Staord Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Staord Act) denes a
major disaster as “any natural catastrophe (including any hurricane, tornado, storm, high water, winddriven water,
tidal wave, tsunami, earthquake, volcanic eruption, landslide, mudslide, snowstorm, or drought), or, regardless of
cause, any re, ood, or explosion, in any part of the United States, which in the determination of the President
causes damage of sucient severity and magnitude to warrant major disaster assistance … to supplement the eorts
and available resources of States, local governments, and disaster relief organizations in alleviating the damage, loss,
hardship, or suering caused thereby.”
6
Tracking the Staord Act denition, for the purposes of this Report, FIO
uses the term “natural catastrophe” to describe an event caused by one or more natural occurrences (including any
hurricane, tornado, storm, high water, winddriven water, tidal wave, tsunami, earthquake, volcanic eruption, land-
slide, mudslide, snowstorm, drought, ood, or re) that causes serious disruption of the functioning of a community
and involve widespread economic and human losses. Natural catastrophes occur as a result of a community’s expo-
sure to an event that is widespread, as opposed to a localized incident that involves one or only several properties.
e impact of a natural catastrophe exceeds the capacity of the aected area to cope and recover within the limits of
its own resources. Governments and insurers may provide the resources needed for the aected area to recover and
rebuild.
In addition to the enormous toll imposed on people and property, natural catastrophes present operational and nan-
cial challenges for property insurers. Following a natural catastrophe, insurers must address a large number of claims,
with individuals and communities reasonably expecting the claims resolution process to be ecient and fair in order
to nance property repairs or rebuilding, purchase replacements of personal property, and nance the cost of living
expenses or business interruption while the damaged property is uninhabitable or unusable.
In addition, natural catastrophes are “fat-tailed” events where “the probability of an event declines slowly relative to
its severity;” therefore, “the premium must be much higher than the expected loss because the insurer has to provide
a large amount of capital in case of catastrophic events.”
7
Moreover, a natural catastrophe causes widespread losses
with many policyholders simultaneously suering losses, a circumstance referred to as “correlated losses.” Fat-tails
and correlated losses make natural catastrophes “dicult to insure, since they imply a larger risk of insolvency for the
insurer.”
8
e diculties in predicting and pricing for natural catastrophes were demonstrated in 1994 when, in the
aftermath of Hurricane Andrew, nine homeowner insurers became insolvent.
9
Given the unique characteristics of natural catastrophes, insurers cannot rely on traditional models to estimate risk
and set prices; instead, specially-developed catastrophe models are now used to estimate natural catastrophe risk.
10
rough the use of catastrophe models, insurers are able to: (1) identify geographic areas with accumulating cor-
5 e Insurance Services Oce (ISO)’s Property Claim Services (PCS) denes catastrophes as events that cause $25 million
or more in direct insured losses to property and aect a signicant number of policyholders and insurers. Munich
Reinsurance Company (Munich Re) maintains a natural disaster database called NatCatSERVICE. A “great natural
catastrophe” in the NatCatSERVICE is recognized when “the aected region’s ability to help themselves is clearly
overstretched and supraregional or international assistance is required.” e Insurance Information Institute (III) denes
the term “catastrophe” in the property insurance industry as a natural or man-made disaster that is unusually severe.
6 42 U.S.C. § 5122.
7 Tristan Nguyen, Insurability of Catastrophe Risks and Government Participation in Insurance Solutions, Background Paper
prepared for the Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction 2013, e United Nations Oce for Disaster Risk
Reduction, available at http://www.preventionweb.net/english/hyogo/gar/2013/en/bgdocs/Nguyen,%202012.pdf.
8 Carolyn Kousky, Managing the Risk of Natural Catastrophes: e Role and Functioning of State Insurance Programs, Resources
for the Future Discussion Paper 10-30, at 2 (2010).
9 Robert Strauss, Catastrophe and the Capital Markets, Wharton Magazine (1998), available at http://whartonmagazine.
com/issues/summer-1998/catastrophe-and-the-capital-markets/.
10 Patricia Grossi and Howard Kunreuther, Catastrophe Modeling: A New Approach to Managing Risk, at 25 (Springer 2005).
Report Providing an Assessment of the Current State of the Market for Natural Catastrophe Insurance in the United States
7
related risks; (2) identify geographical regions in which to enter the insurance markets to diversify risks; (3) calculate
risk-based premiums for property depending on location; (4) identify policy modications to lower the risk of loss;
and (5) assess overall capital requirements.
11
ese models help insurers with the essential features of insurance un-
derwriting: the process of choosing what policies to write, for which policyholders, and at what price.
Box 1: Catastrophe Models
e use and advancement of catastrophe models increased following Hurricane Hugo (1989), the Loma
Prieta Earthquake (1989), and Hurricane Andrew (1992). Development of these models continues and,
as of today, the three main proprietary catastrophe modeling rms, AIR Worldwide, Risk Management
Solutions, and EQECAT, develop models that that are licensed by insurers, reinsurers, rating agencies, and risk
managers.
12
Catastrophe models allow insurers to better answer several key questions: where future natural
catastrophes can occur; how large future catastrophic events can be; the expected frequency of events; and
the potential damage and insured loss.
13
Using a stochastic event set and specic information about insured
structures and policy provisions, catastrophe models estimate for a given insurer the average annual loss, the
probable maximum loss and/or the probability that losses will exceed the acceptable risk level of the insurer.
Catastrophe models, therefore, can assist an insurer in addressing the amount of insurance coverage the insurer
is willing to oer, the price of coverage, the concentration of coverage in a geographic region, and the need of
an insurer to further diuse risk through reinsurance.
Insurers’ use of catastrophe models has been a subject of some debate. Critics have raised concerns about
the transparency of catastrophe models while proponents have noted that the use of catastrophe models
helps stabilize the availability and the cost of homeowner insurance.
14
States have taken various approaches
to the regulatory oversight of catastrophe models. e Florida Commission on Hurricane Loss Projection
Methodology (Florida Commission), established in 1995, reviews specic natural catastrophe models and
adopts ndings regarding the accuracy and reliability of a natural catastrophe model; an insurer must
employ and may not modify or adjust the models found by the Florida Commission to be accurate or
reliable when determining hurricane loss factors to be used in the rate lings of the insurer.
15
Several state
insurance regulators outside of Florida rely on the ndings of the Florida Commission when evaluating the
use of natural catastrophe models in their own states.
16
e Louisiana Department of Insurance requires an
insurer using a catastrophe model to support premium rates to le an extensive interrogatory completed by
the modeling company.
17
In Maryland, an insurer must le with the Maryland Insurance Administration a
description of the catastrophe model(s) the insurer uses, and arrange to have the vendor(s) explain the model(s)
to the Insurance Commissioner as well as to the People’s Insurance Counsel.
18
As the science of catastrophe
modeling continues to evolve, examination of the public policy regarding the validity of the elements used in
catastrophe models and the use of catastrophe models in rating will continue.
11 Lloyd’s Market Association, Catastrophe Modelling: Guidance for Non-Catastrophe Modellers (June 2013).
12 Insurance Information Institute, Catastrophe Modeling: A Vital Tool in the Risk Management Box (February 1, 2008).
13 Casualty Actuarial Society, Fundamentals of Catastrophe Modeling: CAS Ratemaking & Product Management Seminar,
Catastrophe Modeling Workshop (March 15, 2010), available at http://www.casact.org/education/rpm/2010/handouts/
cmwa-hess.pdf.
14 See presentations and audio from the National Association of Insurance Commissioner’s Public Hearing Regarding
Catastrophe Modeling and the Use of Short-Term vs. Longer Term Horizons, available at http://www.naic.org/
committees_c_catastrophe.htm.
15 Fla. Stat. § 627.0628.
16 e NAIC Catastrophe Computer Modeling Handbook (2010) acknowledges that model validation and update ndings
are largely based on the standards of the Florida Commission.
17 Bulletin 2013-04 and associated documents, available at http://www.ldi.louisiana.gov/industry/regulatory-forms/
bulletin-2013-04-catastrophe-model-interrogatories.
18 Md. Ins. Code Ann. § 19-211.
Report Providing an Assessment of the Current State of the Market for Natural Catastrophe Insurance in the United States
8
A. Natural Hazards in the United States
Every region of the United States is vulnerable to natural catastrophes. e number of major disaster declarations
issued under the Staord Act provides a reasonable estimate of the number of natural catastrophes by year and across
all states.
Between 1953 and 2014, Presidents have issued over 2,200 major disaster declarations. All 50 states and the District
of Columbia have had major disaster declarations at one or more points during this 61 year period. e number of
Presidential major disaster declarations per year has generally increased over time, as seen in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Presidential Major Disaster Declarations by Year, 1953-2014
e size and geographic diversity of the United States makes it a country subject to a broad array of potential natural
catastrophe causes. For the period 1953 to 2014, 10 states accounted for approximately a third of all major disaster
declarations: Alabama, Arkansas, California, Florida, Kentucky, Louisiana, Missouri, New York, Oklahoma, and
Texas.
19
Natural hazards in these 10 states include severe storms, ooding, hurricanes/tropical storms, tornadoes,
wildres, and earthquakes.
States located in the West have relatively higher risk of earthquake. For the period 1974 to 2003, nearly 60 per-
cent of all earthquakes with a magnitude of 3.5 or greater were in Alaska and 23 percent in California.
20
Of the 20
earthquakes with a magnitude of 7.5 or greater in the United States during that period, 12 were in Alaska, four in
California, three in Missouri, and one in Hawaii. In fact, 16 states—Alaska, Arkansas, California, Hawaii, Idaho,
Illinois, Kentucky, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Washington, and Wyo-
ming—have a relatively high likelihood of experiencing a damaging earthquake and at some point(s) in history have
experienced earthquakes with a magnitude 6 or greater.
21
Recently updated U.S. National Seismic Hazard Maps show
19 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Disaster Declarations by Year and Disaster Declarations by State/Tribal Government,
available at https://www.fema.gov/disasters/grid/year.
20 U.S. Geological Survey, Top Earthquake States, available at http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/states/top_states.
php.
21 Id.
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
Major Disaster Declarations
Source: Federal Emergency Management Agency
1953
1956
1959
1962
1965
1968
1971
1974
1977
1980
1983
1986
1989
1992
1995
1998
2001
2004
2007
2010
2013
Report Providing an Assessment of the Current State of the Market for Natural Catastrophe Insurance in the United States
9
that “42 of the 50 states have a reasonable chance of experiencing damaging ground shaking from an earthquake
[with]in 50 years.”
22
States located along the Gulf Coast and the Atlantic Coast are at the greatest risk for hurricanes and tropical storms.
23
Parts of the Southwest and the Pacic Coast are at risk of heavy rains and oods from hurricanes formed o Mex-
ico.
24
e average annual normalized damage caused by hurricanes for the period 1900 to 2005 for the lower 48
states was approximately $10 billion per year.
25
Reliable data regarding the impact of natural catastrophes allow for local, state and federal policymakers, insurers,
and consumers to make informed judgments about the insurance of natural catastrophe risk. e insurance industry
maintains catastrophe databases, tracking the frequency and severity (economic loss) of catastrophes over time (see
Box 2.) e data publicly available from these databases corroborate the increased frequency of natural catastrophes
also reected in the number of Presidential major disaster declarations. Figure 2 provides one example of the ob-
served general increase in the number of natural catastrophes. Figure 2 also shows that most natural catastrophes in
the United States between 1980 and 2014 were caused by meteorological hazards such as hurricanes/tropical storms
and tornadoes.
26
22 U.S. Geological Survey, New Insight on the Nation’s Earthquake Hazards, available at http://www.usgs.gov/blogs/features/
usgs_top_story/new-insight-on-the-nations-earthquake-hazards/.
23 FEMA, America’s PrepareAthon: Be Smart, Know Your Hazard, available at http://www.community.fema.gov/connect.ti/
AmericasPrepareathon/view?objectId=3222032.
24 Ready.gov, Hurricanes, available at http://www.ready.gov/hurricanes.
25 Roger A. Pielke Jr., Joel Gratz, Christopher W. Landsea, Douglas Collins, Mark A. Saunders, and Rade Musulin,
Normalized Hurricane Damage in the United States: 1900-2005, Natural Hazards Review, at 29 (February 2008).
26 Munich Re, NatCat SERVICE Loss Database for Natural Catastrophes Worldwide (2014).
Report Providing an Assessment of the Current State of the Market for Natural Catastrophe Insurance in the United States
10
Box 2: Examples of Natural Catastrophe Databases
Estimating the future risk of loss from natural catastrophes depends on accurate data about prior natural
catastrophe events, including the number of natural catastrophe events, the geographic area(s) aected by
each natural catastrophe event, and the amount of economic and insured losses. Insurance analytics rms,
catastrophe modelers, and reinsurers are among the entities in the insurance industry that have developed
comprehensive natural catastrophe databases that insurers may use to estimate the future risk of loss for natural
catastrophes. ese databases may dier in part due to the specic denition used to determine if an event
qualies as a natural catastrophe and what is included in the calculation of economic or insured losses.
e Insurance Services Oce’s Property Claim Services (referred to as PCS), an insurance analytics rm,
denes a catastrophe to determine when an event caused by a natural or man-made peril should be included
in its catastrophe database. An event is designated as catastrophic if the event causes $25 million or more in
insured property losses (excluding loss estimates for ood covered by the NFIP and workers’ compensation
losses) and aects a signicant number of policyholders and insurers.
27
Natural perils include hurricanes,
tornadoes, winter storms, severe weather, freezing, earthquakes, hail, re, and volcanic eruptions, while man-
made perils include terrorism.
Munich Reinsurance Company, a reinsurer, assigns events caused by a natural peril to one of seven categories
ranging from a small scale loss event to a great natural catastrophe.
28
e event may be assigned to a category
based on overall losses and/or fatalities. Munich Re estimates the amount of economic loss from known
insured losses taking into consideration the type of natural hazard, the characteristics of the impacted
area such as population density and building quality, and the lines of insurance (including NFIP) aected
by losses.
29
In its analyses, Munich Re groups natural catastrophes based on the hazard (i.e., geophysical,
meteorological, hydrological, or climatological).
27 See Insurance Services Oce, Everything You Need to Know about the PCS Catastrophe Loss Index (2013); Gary Kerney
Catastrophe Claims, PCS Verisk Insurance Solutions (June 2013); and Charles E. Boyle, “PCS Shows How Cat Loss
Estimates are Made, and Why ey’re Important,” Insurance Journal (September 20, 2013).
28 Munich Re, NatCatSERVICE Loss Database for Natural Catastrophes Worldwide (2011).
29 Munich Re, Topics Geo Annual Review: Natural Catastrophes, at 14-15 (2005).
Report Providing an Assessment of the Current State of the Market for Natural Catastrophe Insurance in the United States
11
Figure 2: Number of Natural Disasters by Type of Event in the United States (1980-2014)
50
100
150
200
250
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
Climatological events
(Extreme temperature, drought, forest re)
Hydrological events
(Flood, mass movement)
Meteorological events
(Tropical storm, extratropical storm, convective
storm, local storm)
Geophysical events
(Earthquake, tsunami, volcanic activity)
Source: Munich Reinsurance Company, Geo Risk Research, NatCatSERVICE
Report Providing an Assessment of the Current State of the Market for Natural Catastrophe Insurance in the United States
12
Figure 3 shows the total number of natural catastrophes each year between 1980 and 2014 alongside the total
amount of overall and insured losses. It illustrates that the number of natural catastrophes bears little relationship to
the severity (economic losses) of natural catastrophes. Insured losses are less than total overall losses in any given year.
e three years with the highest overall losses were 2005 (Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma), 2012 (Superstorm
Sandy), and 1994 (Northridge, California earthquake) whereas the three years with the highest overall insured losses
were 2005, 2012, and 2004 (Hurricane Charley). As discussed in Sections IV and VI of the Report, homeowners are
more likely to purchase insurance to protect against the losses caused by wind from hurricanes, tropical storms, and
tornadoes, than against the losses caused by earthquakes.
Figure 3: Total Number of Natural Disasters and Total Losses* from Natural Disasters
in the United States from 1980-2014 (in Dollars)
Population growth and the rising concentration of population and property in vulnerable, disaster-prone areas are
frequently cited as causes for the increasing cost of natural catastrophes. Approximately 40 percent of the U.S. pop-
ulation lives in counties located directly on the Atlantic, Pacic, and Gulf coasts; collectively these areas are expected
to experience continued population growth.
30
Given the increased population density in coastal areas, “many storms
that hit in the earlier part of the 20th century would cause orders of magnitude more damage today” and, based on
estimates using current densities, 28 “historical hurricanes” that hit between 1900 and 2008 would each cause more
than $10 billion in insured losses were they to occur today.
31
For hurricanes, “[a]voiding huge losses will require
either a change in the rate of population growth in coastal areas, major improvements in construction standards, or
30 PCI, Natural Catastrophe Guidebook 2014, at 29 (2014).
31 M. Karen Clark & Co., Historical Hurricanes that Would Cause $10 Billion or More of Insured Losses Today, at 2 and 5,
(August 2012).
50
100
150
200
250
0
50,000
100,000
150,000
200,000
250,000
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
Number of Events
Insured Losses
Overall Losses
* Dollar losses valued as of 2014 adjusted to ination based on Country Consumer Price Index.
Source: Munich Reinsurance Company, Geo Risk Research, NatCatSERVICE
Report Providing an Assessment of the Current State of the Market for Natural Catastrophe Insurance in the United States
13
other mitigation actions.”
32
For example, if the 1906 San Francisco earthquake had occurred in 2008, that natural
catastrophe would have caused approximately $54 billion in economic loss due to building damage;
33
and if a major
earthquake similar to the 1811 New Madrid, Missouri earthquake were to occur in 2009 it was estimated to cause
losses up to nearly $300 billion in eight states, with the greatest losses in Tennessee and Missouri.
34
B. Property Insurance and Natural Catastrophes
Property insurance consists broadly of two components: primary insurance and reinsurance. Primary insurers oer
direct insurance protection to individuals, families, and businesses for property losses including those caused by nat-
ural catastrophes, whereas reinsurers oer insurance protection to insurers. Homeowner insurance and commercial
property insurance are examples of policies sold by primary insurers intended to protect policyholders from various
perils, including in the event of a specied natural catastrophe. Primary insurers oering homeowner insurance have
been found to react dierently to natural catastrophes than those oering commercial property insurance.
Homeowner insurance, which is purchased by individuals, generally pays for damage caused to the structure of the
home, the contents of the home, and other structures on the property by specied perils including wind, re, and
hail. As the primary source of families’ property protection, homeowner insurance is discussed in detail in Section IV
of the Report.
Commercial property insurance, which is purchased by businesses, generally pays for damage caused to a building,
outdoor signs, furniture and equipment, and inventory by specied perils including wind, re, and hail.
When compared to insurers oering homeowner insurance, commercial property insurers are less likely to modify
the underwriting standards used in a particular area by exiting a market following a severe natural catastrophe. Two
factors may account for the observed dierence in behavior between insurers oering homeowner and commercial
property insurance: (1) greater geographic diversity in the portfolios of commercial property insurers; and (2) dier-
ences in regulatory oversight by regulators of personal and commercial policies.
35
Regulatory oversight of insurers varies by the type of insurer and the line of insurance. Homeowner or commercial
property insurance may be sold by admitted insurers (insurers licensed by the state insurance regulator where the
property is located) or non-admitted insurers (insurers licensed only in the state or country of the insurer’s domicile
and not where the property is located). Typically, state insurance regulators oversee the insurance policy provisions
and premium rates oered by admitted insurers but not by non-admitted insurers. While regulatory oversight varies
by state, homeowner insurance policies sold by admitted insurers are more intensely regulated than commercial prop-
erty insurance. Consequently, admitted commercial property insurers and non-admitted insurers have more freedom
to modify underwriting standards and rates, adopt new policy provisions, or exit geographic areas with accumulating
correlated risks by choosing not to oer new policies in a geographic area or non-renewing existing policies in a geo-
graphic area than admitted insurers oering homeowner insurance.
e ways in which primary insurers manage exposure to the risk of natural catastrophe aects the availability and af-
fordability of property insurance, particularly residential property insurance covering the losses caused by wind, hail,
re, earthquake, and ood. When admitted insurers exit a market by no longer writing new policies or non-renew-
ing existing policies in a geographic area, some states have reacted to tighter insurer underwriting standards by estab-
lishing an alternative form of insurance known as a residual market mechanism. As discussed more fully in Sections
32 Roger A. Pielke, Jr., Joel Gratz, Christopher W. Landsen, Douglas Collins, Mark A. Saunders, and Rade Musulin,
Normalized Hurricane Damage in the United States: 1900-2005, Natural Hazards Review, at 38 (February 2008).
33 B. Rowshandel, M. Reichle, C. Wills, T. Cao, M. Petersen, D. Branum, and J. Davis, Estimation of Future Earthquake
Losses in California, California Geological Survey, at 2 (2008), available at ftp://ftp.consrv.ca.gov/pub/dmg/rgmp/CA-
Loss-Paper.pdf.
34 Amr S. Elnashai, eresa Jeerson, Frank Fiedrich, Lisa Johanna Cleveland, and Timothy Gress, Impact of New Madrid
Seismic Zone Earthquakes on the Central U.S.A., Volume 1, MAE Center Report No. 09-03, at vi (October 2009).
35 Patricia Born and Barbara Klimaszewski-Blettner, Should I Stay or Should I Go? e Impact of Natural Disasters and
Regulation on U.S. Property Insurers’ Supply Decisions, e Journal of Risk and Insurance, Vol. 80, No. 1, 1-36 (2013).
Report Providing an Assessment of the Current State of the Market for Natural Catastrophe Insurance in the United States
14
IV and VI of the Report, residual markets may compete with admitted and non-admitted insurers or complement
the insurance market for natural catastrophes by allowing admitted insurers to exit certain geographic areas from time
to time in order to avoid the risk from natural catastrophes.
e second broad component of property insurance is reinsurance, commonly described as “insurance for insurance
companies.” Under a reinsurance contract, a reinsurer agrees to indemnify an insurer for all or part of the losses
that may be incurred on one or more underlying insurance policies. Reinsurance helps support the availability and
aordability of property insurance in the United States and is discussed in detail in Section VII of the Report. e
availability and aordability of reinsurance aects the extent to which primary insurers write insurance covering
losses caused by natural catastrophes. As explained in FIO’s December 2014 report on e Breadth and Scope of the
Global Reinsurance Market and the Critical Role such Market Plays in Supporting Insurance in the United States, primary
insurers diversify risk by transferring a signicant percentage of natural catastrophe risk to the reinsurance market.
36
While, at times, reinsurance may become less available and more expensive following natural catastrophes such as
what happened after Hurricane Andrew, reinsurance has remained available and aordable in recent years even fol-
lowing natural catastrophes such as Superstorm Sandy.
36 Missouri Department of Insurance, Financial Institutions and Professional Registration, Final Report of the Missouri
Earthquake Insurance Task Force, at 17 (December 19, 2008); Sebastian von Dahlen and Goetz von Peter, Natural
Catastrophes and Global Reinsurance–Exploring the Linkages, BIS Quarterly Review, at 29 (December 2012), available at
http://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1212e.pdf.
Report Providing an Assessment of the Current State of the Market for Natural Catastrophe Insurance in the United States
15
I V. HOMEOWNER INSURANCE
Homeowner insurance is a term that is commonly used but often misunderstood. A homeowner insurance policy
is a contract through which, in exchange for the payment of a premium, an insurer agrees to indemnify an insured
against damage to the covered property that arises out of the perils covered in the policy. A homeowner insurance
policy is a multiple peril policy, meaning the policy covers losses caused by more than one hazard. In addition to
protection against damage to the covered property, such policies also typically provide protection against liability
claims for injuries and damages the homeowner might cause to third parties.
37
Modern homeowner insurance policies are the legacy of single line re policies rst oered in the early 1900s.
38
ese early homeowner insurance policies covered damage only in the event of re.
39
If damage occurred by any
peril other than re, a homeowner with this type of policy needed to obtain recovery from another property protec-
tion mechanism. A homeowner would purchase separate policies for theft, windstorm, and liability in order to have
the kind of comprehensive coverage available today. Changes to state insurance laws in 1949 authorized insurers to
oer multiple peril homeowner policies. In 1950, the Insurance Company of North America led the rst multiple
peril homeowner insurance policy in the United States with the Pennsylvania Insurance Department.
40
e coverage
provided by the rst multiple peril homeowner insurance policies were described as “Fire, Extended Coverage, eft,
Personal Liability, and Medical Payments.”
41
e sale of multiple peril homeowner insurance policies grew rapidly
between 1950 and 1960, increasing from $30,000 in written premium in 1950 to over $760 million in 1960.
42
In
2014, written premium for homeowner insurance policies in the country surpassed $8.6 billion.
43
Typically, a mortgage lender requires the borrower to obtain residential property insurance to protect the lender’s
interest against losses caused by re, wind, and hail.
44
Homeowner insurance policies generally satisfy the lender’s
requirements. Statistics on multiple peril homeowner insurance are available; however, statistics for other types of
homeowner insurance are combined with similar types of commercial insurance policies and, therefore, more dicult
to compile and analyze. For purposes of this Report, the primary focus is the market for multiple peril homeowner
insurance policies.
Homeowner insurance coverage includes losses caused by wildre, tornadoes, and hurricanes/tropical storms. While
homeowner insurance is available across the United States, pricing in areas at risk for hurricanes/tropical storms has
experienced market volatility. As discussed below, in some states, market volatility has not resulted in an availability
problem, with homeowner insurance available through the admitted or non-admitted insurance market; in other
states, states have established residual market mechanisms to ensure the availability of homeowner insurance.
A. Homeowner Insurance Policy Forms
Generally, an insurer is required to obtain approval from the state insurance regulator for all of the homeowner insur-
ance policy forms that the insurer intends to use in that state. Insurers may have multiple versions of its homeowner
policy forms on le with a state’s insurance regulator that may be used in the state. An insurer can develop its own
homeowner insurance policy forms or choose to adopt and use forms developed by an insurance advisory organiza-
tion. One such advisory organization is the Insurance Services Oce (ISO) which develops standardized homeowner
37 A multiple peril policy provides a range of coverages under one policy and is normally cheaper than if all coverages under
the policy had been purchased separately.
38 As its name suggests, a single line policy provides insurance coverage for a single peril.
39 Frederic J. Hunt, Jr, Homeowners—e First Decade, Proceedings of the Casualty Actuarial Society, at 12 (May 1962),
available at https://www.casact.org/pubs/proceed/proceed62/62012.pdf.
40 Id. at 14.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 33.
43 SNL.
44 For the insurance requirements for loans sold to Fannie Mae, see Fannie Mae, Fannie Mae Single Family 2012 Servicing
Guide, available at https://www.fanniemae.com/content/guide/svc031412.pdf.
Report Providing an Assessment of the Current State of the Market for Natural Catastrophe Insurance in the United States
16
insurance policy forms that insurers may adopt and use in each state. Insurers generally adopt and use forms from an
advisory organization because the forms contain standardized and widely-accepted insurance terms and conditions.
An insurer that develops proprietary forms uses language, terms, and conditions specic to the insurer, although the
insurer typically oers homeowner policies with coverages and exclusions similar to those in the ISO forms.
Seven main types of homeowner policy forms are available from ISO. e policies oer various combinations of
coverages and exclusions, as described in Figure 4. While most types of ISO homeowner policy forms are oered
throughout the United States, the HO-3 Special Form is the most commonly purchased type of homeowner policy,
accounting for 81.9 percent of all owner-occupied exposures countrywide in 2012.
45
Homeowner insurance coverages and exclusions vary by type of policy purchased. One way that a homeowner may
enhance the coverage in a homeowner insurance policy is by purchasing an endorsement. For example, while all
owner-occupied homeowner insurance policy forms provide coverage for loss to personal property, most policy forms
include coverage limits for certain kinds of property. e ISO HO-3 Special Form includes a limit of $1,500 for loss
by theft of jewelry.
46
Many insurers will allow a homeowner to increase coverage for theft of jewelry above the limit
available in the standard policy if the homeowner purchases a scheduled personal property endorsement. Endorse-
ments are purchased for a premium that is separate and in addition to the homeowner insurance policy premium.
Limits on the amount that an insurer will pay for loss or damage in the event of a covered loss can vary by insurer
and the method of loss calculation selected by a homeowner. A homeowner insurance policy generally refers to two
dierent methods for calculating how much an insurer may pay for a loss: actual cash value (ACV) and replacement
cost value (RCV). ACV is the value of the real property or dwelling, less depreciation. RCV is the cost to replace
personal property or to rebuild a dwelling to the same condition it was in before the loss. In many cases, ACV will
pay for a loss, but may not pay enough to fully replace the property or repair the damage. Some homeowner insur-
ance policies provide for ACV for covered personal property and RCV for the covered dwelling,
47
while other home-
owner insurance policies provide for ACV for all covered losses. Many insurers sell a personal property replacement
cost endorsement, for an additional premium.
Deductibles, a means for risk-sharing between the insurer and homeowner, have been a fundamental part of home-
owner insurance policies since the rst multiple peril homeowner insurance policies were issued in 1950.
48
e
amount of the liability of an insurer for a claim is reduced by the amount of the applicable deductible, which is borne
by the insured. Traditionally, deductibles have been set at a dollar amount selected by the homeowner and specied
on the declarations page of the homeowner policy. Today, some insurers oer or require deductible amounts that are
a percentage of the coverage limits under the policy. In general, the higher the deductible, the less a homeowner will
pay in premium for the coverage. In order to limit exposure to losses, homeowner insurance policies may include a
specic hurricane, named storm, or windstorm and hail deductible. ese are percentage deductibles based on the
insured value of the home; the deductibles generally range from one percent to ve percent and also vary by state.
Hurricane deductibles are discussed more fully in section (IV)C.
45 National Association of Insurance Commissioners, Dwelling Fire, Homeowners Owner Occupied, and Homeowners Tenant
and Condominium/Cooperative Unit Owner’s Insurance: Data for 2012 (January 2015).
46 ISO Form Number HO 00 03 05 11, added January 2010.
47 Id.
48 Frederic J. Hunt, Jr., Homeowners—e First Decade, Proceedings of the Casualty Actuarial Society, at 20 (May 1962).
Report Providing an Assessment of the Current State of the Market for Natural Catastrophe Insurance in the United States
17
Figure 4: Homeowner Policy Coverages
Peril
Type of Policy
DW
Dwelling Fire
HO-1
Basic Form
HO-2
Broad Form
HO-3
Special Form
HO-4
Tenants Form
HO-5 Comprehensive
Form
HO-6
Unit-Owners Form
Fire or lightning
• • • • • • • • • • • •
Windstorm or hail
• • • • • • • • • • • •
Explosion
• • • • • • • • • • • •
Riot or civil commotion
• • • • • • • • • • • •
Damage caused by aircraft
• • • • • • • • • • • •
Damage caused by vehicles
• • • • • • • • • • • •
Smoke
• • • • • • • • • • • •
Vandalism
• • • • • • • • • • • •
eft
• • • • • • • • • •
Falling objects
• • • • • • • •
Weight of ice, snow, or sleet
• • • • • • • •
Accidental discharge or over-
ow of water or steam
• • • • • • • •
Sudden and accidental
tearing apart, cracking,
burning, or bulging of a
steam or hot water heating
system, an air condition or
automatic re protective
sprinkler system, or an
appliance for heating water
• • • • • • • •
Freezing
• • • • • • • •
Sudden and accidental
damage from articially
generated electrical current
• • • • • • • •
Volcanic eruption
• • • • • • • •
All perils except ood,
earthquake, war, nuclear
accident, intentional loss,
collapse, mold, wear and tear,
seepage, settling, and other
perils specically excluded
• • •
• Coverage for the Dwelling • Coverage for Personal Property/Contents
Report Providing an Assessment of the Current State of the Market for Natural Catastrophe Insurance in the United States
18
B. Homeowner Insurance Premiums
Homeowner insurance premiums vary depending on the location, characteristics of the property to be insured, and
the deductibles, as well as coverage terms. e states traditionally most at risk for hurricanes and tornadoes (Florida,
Louisiana, Mississippi, Oklahoma, and Texas) had the highest average homeowner insurance premiums in 2014.
49
Across the country, the overall increase in average homeowner insurance premiums was higher in 2011 (7.6 percent)
than in 2010 (3.3 percent), partly in response to higher natural catastrophe losses in 2011.
50
An increase in home-
owner insurance premiums, particularly in states where insurers already charged relatively higher premiums, may
make it more dicult for some homeowners to aord homeowner insurance.
C. Impact of Natural Catastrophes on Homeowner Insurance
Homeowner insurers manage exposures to natural catastrophe risks in a variety of ways. One strategy used by insur-
ers is to decrease exposure to risk of loss in areas that are subject to natural catastrophes. Insurers decrease exposure to
the risk of loss by imposing moratoria on any new business in certain geographic markets or by exiting a market com-
pletely. For example, in 2009, one insurer ceased writing new business in Florida and in the same year non-renewed
11,000 homeowner insurance policies in ve coastal counties located in Texas. In 2011, another insurer announced
that it was exiting the Florida market due to the risk of natural catastrophes. e ease with which insurers can enter
and exit a market varies by state. For example, some states require notice regarding an insurer’s withdrawal to be
given to the state insurance regulator 180 days prior to the withdrawal.
51
Insurers also respond to increased risk in the homeowner insurance market through coverage exclusions and spe-
cial deductibles. For example, most homeowner insurance policies exclude losses associated with earthquakes and
ooding. In addition, although included in homeowner insurance policy provisions since the 1990s, concurrent
causation clauses have been the subject of much debate following both Hurricane Katrina and Superstorm Sandy. At
times, a covered peril (such as wind) may combine with an excluded peril (such as earth movement) to cause damage
to a home; this is referred to as concurrent causation. Unless prohibited by state law, an insurer typically includes
anti-concurrent causation clauses in homeowner insurance policies to limit the insurer’s liability for losses caused by
excluded perils.
52
Insurers began to implement hurricane deductibles in coastal states in the mid-1990s after Florida’s 1992 Hurricane
Andrew demonstrated to insurers that losses from hurricanes could be much higher than previously anticipated.
53
A
hurricane deductible is specied as a percentage of the total coverage limit for the hurricane. Hurricane deductibles
may also provide an incentive to homeowners to mitigate against hurricane damages. Generally, hurricane deduct-
ibles may only, by virtue of state law, be invoked by the insurer if the National Weather Service declares a tropical
storm, hurricane watch or warning, or denes a hurricane’s intensity.
54
Today, 19 states and the District of Columbia
regulate hurricane deductibles in some manner, specifying the conditions under which a hurricane deductible may be
triggered under homeowner insurance policies in that state. e state-based regulatory system allows for homeowner
insurance forms to include conditions that trigger a hurricane deductible in one state, but which may not necessarily
do so in a neighboring state for the same storm.
49 ValuePenguin, Average Cost of Homeowners Insurance (2014), available at http://www.valuepenguin.com/average-cost-of-
homeowners-insurance.
50 Insurance Information Institute, Why Are Homeowners Insurance Rates Rising? (June 7, 2012), available at http://www.
iii.org/article/why-are-homeowners-insurance-rates-rising; Insurance Information Institute, Homeowners and Renters
Insurance, available at http://www.iii.org/fact-statistic/homeowners-and-renters-insurance.
51 See Md. Code Ann. Ins. § 27-606.
52 Insurers may not include anti-concurrent causation clauses in policies issued in California, North Dakota, Washington,
and West Virginia.
53 Insurance Information Institute, Hurricane and Windstorm Deductibles (November 2014), available at http://www.iii.org/
issue-update/hurricane-and-windstorm-deductibles.
54 Id.
Report Providing an Assessment of the Current State of the Market for Natural Catastrophe Insurance in the United States
19
Actions by insurers to reduce exposure to risk have resulted in homeowner insurance policy coverages and exclusions
that vary considerably from state-to-state and between insurers. For the average homeowner, provisions of insurance
policies may be dicult to understand, or time may not allow for close examination of all policy provisions. As a
result, homeowners may not always fully understand or appreciate the scope of coverage exclusions.
Box 3: Insurance Claims Adjusters
Once a policyholder noties the insurer of a loss, the insurer assigns one or more insurance claims adjuster(s) to
assist with processing the claim.
55
e insurance claim adjuster inspects the property to determine the extent
of the damage which may be covered under the policy. In 34 states and the District of Columbia, insurance
claims adjusters must be licensed by the applicable insurance regulator, and those licensing requirements vary.
Some states recognize reciprocity of an insurance claim adjuster’s license in the insurance adjuster’s home state
while others do not. Following a natural catastrophe, insurers may need to quickly increase the number of
insurance claims adjusters licensed and authorized to operate in a state in order to handle the claim volume
and the need to deliver resources promptly. In some states, the licensing requirements may pose practical
diculties to timely deploy additional insurance claims adjusters. Recognizing this, in 2013 the New York
Superintendent of the Department of Financial Services notied insurers that “[t]he Superintendent might
implement an expedited process for issuing temporary independent and public adjuster licenses for adjusters
in good standing from other states” to “help ensure an adequate supply of qualied adjusters to aected
areas promptly when large number of losses would create a spike in demand for adjusters.”
56
Other states (for
example, Mississippi, Rhode Island, and Utah) have established emergency insurance claims adjuster licenses
while others (for example, Alabama, Louisiana, and South Carolina) waive the licensure requirement for
emergency adjusters.
57
Natural catastrophes often reveal the challenges of resolving a high volume of property claims in a
concentrated area. Adjusters are the nexus between an insurer and a homeowner; therefore, they should be
held to appropriate standards of conduct. For this reason, measures to increase the number of adjusters eligible
to work in an area devastated by a natural catastrophe remains a topic of increasing interest.
58
D. Homeowner Insurance Market
e United States has a robust and growing homeowner insurance market, although – as discussed in Section IV.C
– availability is a concern in certain geographic regions. In 2013, 373insurance groups, many with more than one
company, wrote homeowner insurance in the United States.
59
Nationally, the top ve insurers by premium volume of
homeowner multiple peril insurance in 2014 were State Farm (19.9 percent), Allstate (8.9 percent), Liberty Mutual
(6.6percent), Farmers (5.9 percent), and USAA (5.4percent). Figure 5 shows the direct premium written (total
premium received by an insurer during a calendar year) and direct losses paid (total amount paid for claims during
55 See, e.g., Oklahoma Insurance Department, After the Disaster: plan. prepare. prevent., available at http://www.ok.gov/oid/
documents/080414_AD-brochure.pdf.
56 New York Department of Financial Services, Insurance Circular Letter No. 8 (October 28, 2013), available at http://www.
dfs.ny.gov/insurance/circltr/2013/cl2013_08.htm.
57 State by state insurance claims adjuster licensing requirements, based on a 2014 state survey, are available from
AdjusterPro™, available at http://www.adjusterpro.com/insurance-adjuster-career/states/index.html.
58 See Claims Licensing Advancement for Interstate Matters Act, H.R. 2998, 114
th
Congress.
59 Kelleen Arquette, Towers Watson, U.S. Homeowners Market: Casualty Actuarial
Society Spring Meeting (May 2013), available at https://www.google.com/
url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CB4QFjAA&url=https%3A%2F%2Fcas.confex.
com%2Fcas%2Fspring13%2Fwebprogram%2FHandout%2FPaper2214%2FCAS%2520Spring%2520M
eeting%25202013%2520-%2520Homeowners%2520Protability%2520-%2520Kelleen%2520Arquette.
pdf&ei=g0MkVYruArWasQSy5YGgDQ&usg=AFQjCNGk1Q76QIucxOB9si_tuhXylwEqZg.
Report Providing an Assessment of the Current State of the Market for Natural Catastrophe Insurance in the United States
20
a calendar year) for all U.S. insurers that provided homeowner multiple peril insurance from 1997 through 2014.
Although direct premium written increased steadily over this period, direct losses paid varied year-to-year. e years
with the largest direct losses incurred correspond to years with major hurricanes: Hurricane Katrina in 2005; Hurri-
cane Ike in 2008; and Hurricane Irene in 2011.
Figure 5: Homeowner Multiple Peril Direct Premium Written and Direct Losses Paid
(In Dollars)
E. Residual Market
As noted earlier, strategies taken by insurers to manage exposures to natural catastrophe risk can aect the
availability of property insurance. To address the issue of availability, ve coastal states have created programs to sell
insurance covering damage caused by high winds in the highest-risk areas. ese are known as Beach Plans or Wind
Pools (Wind Pools).
60
Wind Pools typically provide wind-only coverage in specic coastal territories of a state that
may be dened by zip code, county, or other geographic indicator. Florida and Louisiana have established residual
markets oering homeowner multiple peril insurance that would also cover damage caused by high winds.
1. Wind Pools
Wind Pools are state-mandated private associations of all insurers writing property insurance in a particular state.
Wind Pools may assess insurers to cover losses that exceed premiums and other funds. Insurers in North Carolina,
Alabama, and Mississippi “can lower their assessments by writing more policies in coastal counties.”
61
Of the more than 660,000 Wind Pool insurance policies sold in 2013, close to 90percent were sold in Mississip-
pi, North Carolina, and Texas.
62
Texas accounted for 44 percent of the total direct written premium for all Wind
Pools, with $472 million.
63
With just over $1 billion in direct written premium in 2013, the market size of Wind
Pools is relatively small. However, the number of Wind Pool policies issued has steadily increased from just over
340,000 policies issued in 2008 to over 660,000 policies issued in 2013.
64
e exposure of Wind Pools to loss has
60 Currently, ve states have established Wind Pools: Alabama, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Texas.
61 Carolyn Kousky, Managing the Risk of Natural Catastrophes: e Role and Functioning of State Insurance Programs, Resources
for the Future Discussion Paper 10-30, at 20 (2010).
62 Property Insurance Plans Services Oce, Inc. referred to herein as PIPSO.
63 Id.
64 Id.
0
10,000,000
20,000,000
30,000,000
40,000,000
50,000,000
60,000,000
70,000,000
80,000,000
90,000,000
100,000,000
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
Direct Premiums Written
Direct Losses Paid
Source: SNL Financial
Report Providing an Assessment of the Current State of the Market for Natural Catastrophe Insurance in the United States
21
also increased over the last ten years, growing from $30billion in 2004 to $193 billion in 2013, an increase of 543
percent.
65
Following Hurricane Celia in 1970, the Texas Windstorm Insurance Association (TWIA) was created in 1971.
TWIA provides coverage for wind and hail perils when an insurer excludes such coverage from a homeowner or com-
mercial property policy issued in coastal areas.
66
e TWIA is a pool of all property and casualty insurers authorized
to provide coverage in Texas and, as an insurer of last resort, oers coverage generally less extensive and more expen-
sive than coverage oered by private insurers. By statute, the Texas Commissioner of Insurance is required to develop
incentive programs to encourage insurers to voluntarily write wind and hail coverage. Together with the Board of
Directors of TWIA, the Texas Commissioner of Insurance is working to depopulate TWIA – that is to decrease the
number of policyholders with active policies issued by TWIA and move policyholders from TWIA to the private
market for homeowner insurance.
67
To promote sound construction and mitigation practices, an owner of a property located in a coastal county served
by TWIA must have the property inspected when undertaking certain construction projects such as building new
structures, re-roong, additions, repairs, or alterations. e inspection must be completed by the Texas Commis-
sioner of Insurance in order for the property owner to obtain or maintain TWIA coverage, and if a property does not
meet the appropriate building code, the policyholder must pay a 15 percent surcharge on the insurance premium.
68
In general, TWIA must le proposed rates with the Texas Department of Insurance each year. Texas law limits
insurance rate average increases for TWIA to not more than 10 percent each year unless the Texas Commissioner of
Insurance determines that a higher increase is necessary due to catastrophic events.
69
If rates are led at least 30 days
in advance, and the rate change is 5 percent or less than the current rate, or if the individual class rate change is less
than 10 percent of the current rate, the rate changes do not need the Commissioner’s prior approval.
70
In the event losses occur, a number of funding mechanisms are available to TWIA to fund the payment of claims fol-
lowing a natural catastrophe event. TWIA must deposit excess revenue in the Texas Catastrophe Reserve Trust Fund
(Catastrophe Reserve Fund). When reserves in the Catastrophe Reserve Fund are exhausted, up to $1 billion each in
Class 1 and Class 2 public securities and up to $500 million in Class 3 public securities are used to fund losses. Class
1 public securities are paid by TWIA premiums; Class 2 public securities are 70 percent paid by non-refundable pre-
mium surcharges to coastal property and casualty policyholders and 30 percent paid by member insurer assessments;
and Class 3 public securities are paid by insurer assessments.
TWIA submits an annual statutory nancial report which, as of December 31, 2014, shows that TWIA reported
$1.1 billion in net admitted assets, $1.1 billion in liabilities, and that it did not have a surplus.
71
TWIA reported
approximately $367 million of earned premium, incurred losses and loss adjustment expense of negative $13.9
million, and $109 million of operating expenses – resulting in an underwriting gain of $272 million during the
twelve months ending December 31, 2014.
72
TWIA estimates $3.25 billion would be needed to fund 98 percent of
all modeled natural catastrophe events. For 2014, TWIA expected to have a shortfall of approximately $1.2 billion
65 Id.
66 See generally, Texas Windstorm Insurance Association Website, available at http://www.twia.org.
67 Texas Windstorm Insurance Association, Biennial Report to the 84
th
Legislature, at 13 (December 30, 2014), available at
http://twia.org/Portals/0/Documents/TWIA_Biennial_Report_84th_Texas_Legislature.pdf.
68 Carolyn Kousky, Managing the Risk of Natural Catastrophes: e Role and Functioning of State Insurance Programs, Resources
for the Future Discussion Paper 10-30, at 10 (2010).
69 Texas Ins. Code Ann. § 2210.359.
70 Id.
71 Texas Windstorm Insurance Association, Statutory Financial Statements and Supplemental Information Years Ended
December 31, 2014 and 2013, available at https://www.twia.org/about-us/nancials.
72 Texas Ins. Cod Ann. § 2210.352.
Report Providing an Assessment of the Current State of the Market for Natural Catastrophe Insurance in the United States
22
in funding if the $3.25 billion threshold were met. TWIA has $217 million in the Catastrophe Reserve Fund, $1
billion in Class B Public Securities, $500 million in Class 3 Public Securities, and $1.45 million in reinsurance.
73
In 2008, Hurricane Ike, the fourth costliest hurricane in the United States, made landfall in Texas, causing insured
losses totaling $9.8 billion in that state, exclusive of ood losses.
74
For damages caused by Hurricane Ike, TWIA
received more than 93,000 claims resulting in losses and loss adjustment expenses of approximately $2.6 billion.
75
Given TWIA’s estimated shortfall, if a windstorm of a magnitude similar to Hurricane Ike were to aect Texas in the
near future, it is likely that additional assessments on policyholders in the state would be needed to cover all claims.
Box 4: Fair Access to Insurance Requirements (FAIR) Plans
Before 1968, some states sought to address the problem of availability of insurance in urban areas through
Urban Area Plans.
76
Generally speaking, Urban Area Plans assisted insurers in determining whether to extend
coverage to a property owner by providing for the inspection of a property to be insured and preparation
of a report on the condition of the property.
77
e purpose of the inspection was to distinguish between
properly maintained properties and those with hazards that reduced insurability.
78
While the Urban Area
Plans addressed some of the insurance needs of those living in the thirteen states in which the insurers were
operating, President Lyndon Johnson’s 1967 National Advisory Panel on Insurance in Riot-Aected Areas
79
sought to address the insurance crisis in cities across the country by recommending the establishment of state-
regulated FAIR Plans,
80
envisioned to be substantial expansions of Urban Area Plans.
81
In another example
of the role of the federal government in the insurance sector, the Urban Property Insurance Protection and
Reinsurance Act of 1968 established the framework for FAIR Plans for the states.
82
FAIR Plans provide
insurance to any property owner denied insurance by admitted homeowner insurers.
As of 2014, 32 states and the District of Columbia have FAIR Plans. In most cases, insurers writing
homeowner insurance in the state are assessed to cover losses incurred by the plan exceeding premiums and
investment income. Some FAIR Plans provide coverage only for losses caused by re, while approximately 50
percent provide coverage more typical of a standard homeowner insurance policy. FAIR Plans premiums
73 Texas Windstorm Insurance Association, 2014 Annual Report Card, at 21 (May 30, 2014), available at http://www.twia.
org/Portals/0/Documents/2014_TWIA_Annual_Report_Card_CAT_Plan.pdf.
74 Insurance Information Institute, Texas Hurricane Insurance: Fact File, available at http://www.iii.org/article/texas-
hurricane-insurance-fact-le.
75 Texas Department of Insurance, Texas Windstorm Insurance Association Overview, available at http://www.tdi.texas.gov/
alert/whatsnew/2015/twia-overview.html.
76 On December 1, 1967, Urban Area Plans were in eect, formally or informally, in thirteen states: California, Delaware,
Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and
Wisconsin. Some plans covered only a specied city or area; others applied statewide. See e President’s National
Advisory Panel on Insurance in Riot-Aected Areas, Meeting the Insurance Crisis of Our Cities, at 56 (January 1968).
77 Inspections of properties were conducted by the local rating (inspection) bureau. Id.
78 Id.
79 On July 27, 1967, President Johnson appointed the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (Advisory
Commission) to investigate the origins of civil disorders across the nation and to make recommendations for measures
to prevent or contain them in the future. Deciding that a separate and expert group could deal more expeditiously with
the insurance problems of urban core residents and business owners, the Advisory Commission, after consulting with
the President, appointed the National Advisory Panel on Insurance in Riot-Aected Areas on August 10, 1967. e
Advisory Panel was asked by the Advisory Commission to seek answers to questions raised by the diculties and high costs
of obtaining insurance in areas where riots occurred or might be a threat. e recent disorders had served to highlight
problems of availability of insurance that had long existed as a corollary to urban blight. Id. at ii.
80 Id. at 87.
81 Id.
82 Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, Pub. L. 90-448, 82 Stat. 476.
Report Providing an Assessment of the Current State of the Market for Natural Catastrophe Insurance in the United States
23
are generally higher than those of private insurers, and applicants must demonstrate they have been denied
coverage in the standard market. FAIR Plans may turn down applicants for specied reasons such as
vacant property, poor physical condition, or a structure not having been built in accordance with building
codes.
83
With breadth of coverage and geographic reach, some FAIR Plans promote access to homeowner
insurance to property owners located in areas more prone to natural catastrophes, such as coastal properties
in Massachusetts. e market share of FAIR Plans rose from approximately 3 percent in 2004 and reached a
peak of approximately 6 percent in 2007.
84
Since 2007, the market share of FAIR plans has stabilized, which
likely indicates a competitive homeowner insurance market.
2. Florida Citizens Property Insurance Corporation
Florida has borne the brunt of several of the most devastating hurricanes in U.S. history. Following Hurricane An-
drew and subsequent hurricanes, some insurers exited Florida’s homeowner insurance market.
85
Florida addressed the
decrease in availability of homeowner insurance by establishing publicly supported insurance programs. e Florida
Citizens Property Insurance Corporation (Florida Citizens), a not-for-prot, tax exempt, government entity, began
operations in Florida in August 2002 with the mission to provide insurance to residential and commercial property
owners otherwise unable to obtain coverage.
86
In 2007, Florida enacted legislation rolling back Florida Citizens’ rates
and freezing rates going forward. In 2009, legislation was passed to limit annual premium increases to any policy
issued by Florida Citizens to 10 percent.
87
Florida Citizens is the largest insurer oering homeowner multiple peril
insurance in the state, with 9.1 percent of the market in 2014, down from 19.9 percent, 19.5 percent, and 14.5 per-
cent, respectively, for 2011, 2012, and 2013, and also down from 10.3 percent of the market a decade ago in 2004.
According to Florida Citizens, a catastrophic event could exhaust Florida Citizens’ reserves and capital resources
and leave it without sucient funds to pay all claims.
88
State law requires that Florida Citizens charge assessments
until any decits are eliminated. Assessments are charged in three tiers: (1)policyholders of Florida Citizens may be
assessed a one-time assessment up to 45 percent of the premium; (2)policyholders of both admitted and non-admit-
ted insurers may be assessed up to two percent of the remaining shortfall; and (3)an emergency assessment of one or
more years on all insurers’ policyholders, including Florida Citizens, up to 30 percent of premium until the decit is
eliminated.
89
However, “[t]he 2004 and 2005 hurricanes led the state legislature to appropriate $715 million to low-
er the necessary assessments, and the rest of the decit will be paid o over 10 years using emergency assessments.”
90
Like TWIA, Florida Citizens is required to help return its policyholders to the private market or to depopulate its
program when possible. Insurers accepting Florida Citizens policyholders agree to oer the same or better coverage
83 American Insurance Association, What are ‘Residual Markets’ for Property Insurance?, available at http://www.aiadc.org/
AIAdotNET/docHandler.aspx?DocID=295953; PIPSO, Inc., 2013 Compendium of Property Insurance Plans (2013).
84 PIPSO, 2013 Compendium of Property Insurance Plans (2013).
85 See Michael Adams, State Farm wants to Increase Homeowners Business in Florida…a Bit, Insurance Journal (March 6,
2014); Anna Maria Andriotis, Home Insurance Goes rough the Roof, Market Watch e Wall Street Journal (March 9,
2012).
86 Florida Citizens Property Insurance Corporation, Our Mission, available at https://www.citizensa.com/about/
generalinfo.cfm.
87 Id.
88 Florida Citizens Property Insurance Corporation, available at http://citizensa.com.
89 Id.
90 Carolyn Kousky, Managing the Risk of Natural Catastrophes: e Role and Functioning of State Insurance Programs, Resources
for the Future Discussion Paper 10-30, at 8 (2010).
Report Providing an Assessment of the Current State of the Market for Natural Catastrophe Insurance in the United States
24
than the policyholder had with Florida Citizens at the same or lower cost.
91
Between 2003 and 2013, the eort
to depopulate resulted in a reduction of approximately 2 million policies and $529 billion in exposure.
92
In 2013,
the Florida Commissioner of Insurance Regulation approved the removal of 908,000 policies and an additional 1.1
million policies in 2014. Approximately 35 percent of those approved for removal accepted a policy with a private
insurer. Of the 1.1 million policies approved for removal from Florida Citizens in 2014, over 416,000 policies
were transferred to other insurers.
93
For 2015, the Florida Commissioner of Insurance Regulation has approved the
removal of more than 632,000 policies from Florida Citizens as of May 2015 with approximately 111,000 policies
thus far transferred to the private insurance market.
94
e ongoing depopulation process is expected to bring Florida
Citizens policy count down to 2005 levels.
95
e interest shown by private insurers in writing additional property
insurance policies has been attributed to a number of factors, including that premiums charged by Florida Citizens
have reached levels adequately reecting the risk of loss to the property, as well as the stabilization of reinsurance
costs.
96
In its December 31, 2014, nancial reports, Florida Citizens reported net admitted assets of $14.3 billion, $6.8 bil-
lion of liabilities, and $7.5 billion of surplus. Additionally, it reported approximately $1.5 billion in earned premi-
um, $640 million of incurred losses and loss adjustment expenses, and $374 million in operating expenses – resulting
in an underwriting gain of approximately $363 million for the twelve months ending December 31, 2014. Florida
is a state at high risk of experiencing natural catastrophes; seven of the ten most costly hurricanes in United States
history have made landfall in the state.
97
Between 2004 and 2005, six of the costliest hurricanes in the United States
aected the state, resulting in $2.7 billion and $3.7 billion, respectively, in loss and loss adjustment expenses for
Florida Citizens. Recent eorts by Florida Citizens to depopulate have put the insurer in such a position that were
Florida to again experience two successive years of hurricanes of a magnitude similar to the 2004 and 2005 hurricane
seasons it would likely not have to charge further assessments. However, in 2014, Florida Citizens’ total exposures
were $201 billion, which leaves the insurer at considerable risk of not being able to meet its obligations.
98
e position of the Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund (Cat Fund), the state-run reinsurance fund that provides
reimbursement to insurers for a portion of catastrophic hurricane losses, was strengthened in April 2015 when the
Governor of Florida and the 3-member Florida Cabinet authorized the purchase of up to $2.2 billion of additional
protection. is authority allows the Cat Fund to purchase up to $1 billion of reinsurance and to raise an additional
$1.2 billion from the issuance of bonds, thereby shifting Cat Fund risks away from the state to the private sector.
99
3. Louisiana Citizens Property Insurance Corporation
Similar to Florida, Louisiana established a residual market to address availability concerns in coastal communities.
e Louisiana Citizens Property Insurance Corporation (Louisiana Citizens) began operations in 2004 and provides
91 Florida Oce of Insurance Regulation, Florida Insurance Commissioner McCarty Amends Citizens’ Take-Out Procedures and
Requires Policyholder Notication of Oers from Private Insurance Companies (March 12, 2008), available at http://www.
oir.com/PressReleases/viewmediarelease.aspx?id=1644.
92 Florida Citizens Property Insurance Corporation, Depopulation/Policy Takeout Information, available at https://
www.citizensa.com/about/depopinfo.cfm?type=stats&show=pdf&link=/shared/depop/documents/
ExposureRemoved2003-2014.pdf.
93 Florida Oce of Insurance Regulation Press Release, Oce Approves Removal of up to 79,397 Policies from Citizens
(February 10, 2015).
94 Florida Oce of Insurance Regulation Press Release, Oce Approves Removal of up to 30,050 Policies from Citizens (May 7,
2015).
95 SNL, Upcoming Citizens Takeouts Highlight Perceived Attractiveness of Florida Market (November 11, 2014).
96 Id.
97 Insurance Information Institute, Florida Hurricane Insurance: Fact File, available at http://www.iii.org/article/orida-
hurricane-insurance-fact-le.
98 Florida Citizens Property Insurance Corporation, Policies In-Force Report (Report Run January 15, 2015).
99 S. Bousquet, Florida Cabinet approves buying $2.2 billion more in catastrophe insurance, Tampa Bay Times (April 14, 2015).
Report Providing an Assessment of the Current State of the Market for Natural Catastrophe Insurance in the United States
25
insurance for property owners unable to purchase coverage from the voluntary market. Louisiana Citizens operates
two programs, the Louisiana Insurance Underwriting Plan, which is a Wind Pool, and the Louisiana Joint Reinsur-
ance Plan, which is a FAIR Plan, both of which oer residential and commercial policies. Louisiana’s Wind Pool
provides coverage in the area of the state most vulnerable to hurricanes while the FAIR Plan provides coverage to the
rest of the state.
100
Louisiana Citizens was the tenth-largest insurer writing homeowner multiple peril insurance in
Louisiana in 2014 with 1.8 percent of the market.
To support its role as an insurer of last resort, Louisiana Citizens charges rates in excess of those charged by the
private market.
101
Specically, Louisiana Citizens rates must be actuarially justied and must exceed by at least 10
percent the highest average rate for the 10 insurers with the greatest total direct written premium in the state.
102
In
addition, Louisiana Citizens’ rates include the premium tax amount imposed on other insurers, which is retained by
Louisiana Citizens as a state contribution.
103
If premiums, investments, and reinsurance do not cover losses, Louisiana Citizens has the authority to assess insurers
in an amount of up to 10 percent of industry premium for the assessable lines of business.
104
Insurers may recoup
any assessment amount from policyholders over the course of the next year. Assessments paid by policyholders may
be claimed as a credit against Louisiana state income taxes.
105
If more funds are necessary to cover the decit, Louisi-
ana Citizens may issue revenue assessment bonds in the capital markets.
106
Louisiana Citizens would then declare an
emergency assessment each year to provide debt service on the bonds until the bonds are retired.
Due to the catastrophic nature of the 2005 hurricane season, Louisiana Citizens issued $978 million in revenue as-
sessment bonds to cover the decit.
107
An emergency assessment to repay the bonds began in 2007 and will continue
until 2025.
108
If collections on the assessment exceed bond requirements, the excess may be used to reduce future
assessment percentages or may be used to retire the bonds before maturity.
109
Similar to TWIA and Florida Citizens, Louisiana Citizens is required to depopulate on an annual basis, and in 2013
it removed approximately 14,000 policies through this process.
110
Further depopulation eorts in 2014 resulted in
the transfer of over 10,000 to the private insurance market.
111
Louisiana provides nancial incentives to insurers
writing policies for policyholders previously covered by Louisiana Citizens.
112
is initiative proved successful as the
market share of Louisiana Citizens decreased from approximately 7 percent in 2005 to 1.8 percent in 2014.
113
100 Louisiana Citizens Property Insurance Corporation, Plan of Operation, at 12, available at http://www.lacitizens.com/
pdfs/LCPICPlanofOperation.pdf.
101 La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 22:2303.
102 Id.
103 Louisiana Citizens Property Insurance Corporation, Plan of Operation, at 15 (December 2, 2003), available at http://
www.lacitizens.com/Pdfs/LCPICPlanofOperation.pdf.
104 Louisiana Citizens Property Insurance Corporation, Assessment Information Center Overview, available at http://www.
lacitizens.com/Static_Content/LA%20Citizens%20Assessment%20Information%20Center/Overview.mht.
105 Id.
106 La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 22:2307 (G).
107 Louisiana Citizens Property Insurance Corporation, Louisiana Citizens’ Assessment Information Center: 2006 Bond Issuance
Information, available at http://www.lacitizens.com/LA_Citizens_Assessment_Information_Center.aspx.
108 Id.
109 Louisiana Citizens Property Insurance Corporation, Louisiana Citizens’ Assessment Information Center Overview, available at
http://www.lacitizens.com/LA_Citizens_Assessment_Information_Center.aspx.
110 SNL, Interest Said to Emerge in Texas Windstorm Depopulation (July 14, 2014).
111 Louisiana Department of Insurance Ocial Press Release, Deadline to Claim Expiring Citizens Rebate Approaching,
December 4, 2014.
112 Id.
113 SNL.
Report Providing an Assessment of the Current State of the Market for Natural Catastrophe Insurance in the United States
26
Louisiana Citizens’ nancial reports, as of December 31, 2014, show a reported $1 billion in net admitted assets, $1
billion in total liabilities, and a negative $23 million in surplus. Louisiana Citizens reported approximately $115 mil-
lion of earned premium, $117 million of incurred losses and loss adjustment expense, and $27 million of operating
expenses – resulting in an underwriting loss of $29 million – during the twelve months ending December 31, 2014.
In 2001, the Louisiana legislature created the Louisiana Property and Casualty Insurance Commission (LPCIC) to
review and examine the availability and aordability of property and casualty insurance. Each year, the LPCIC com-
pletes a report on the availability and aordability of automobile, homeowner, and workers’ compensation insurance
in the state. In its 2012-2013 report, the LPCIC concluded that while homeowner insurance premiums in the state
are high, “Louisiana has avoided overreliance on Louisiana Citizens and continues to attract new insurers and suc-
cessfully depopulate Louisiana Citizens.”
114
In its 2013-2014 report, the LPCIC noted that because Louisiana has the
second highest average homeowner insurance premium rates in the country, high homeowner insurance rates present
challenges to current residents and those contemplating a move to Louisiana.
115
e LPCIC further noted that the
continued depopulation of Louisiana Citizens is a sign of an improving market.
116
e 2014-2015 report noted that
during a public meeting, the Louisiana Commissioner of Insurance described the property insurance market in the
state as “more robust and competitive now than it was before [Hurricane] Katrina.”
117
In fact, the size of Louisiana’s
residual market fell steadily from 6.4 percent to 2.3 percent, one indication of a competitive private homeowner
insurance market in the state.
118
114 Louisiana Department of Insurance, Louisiana Property and Casualty Insurance Commission Annual Report 2012-2013,
at 7, available at http://www.ldi.louisiana.gov/docs/default-source/documents/propertycasualty/lpcic/Documents/
annualreport12-13.pdf?sfvrsn=7.
115 Louisiana Department of Insurance, Louisiana Property and Casualty Insurance Commission Annual Report 2013-2014,
at 2, available at http://www.ldi.louisiana.gov/docs/default-source/documents/propertycasualty/lpcic/Documents/
annualreport12-13.pdf?sfvrsn=7.
116 Id.
117 Louisiana Department of Insurance, Louisiana Property and Casualty Insurance Commission Annual Report 2014-2015, at 6,
available at http://www.ldi.louisiana.gov/docs/default-source/documents/propertycasualty/lpcic/Documents/lpcic-
annual-report-2014-15.pdf?sfvrsn=0.
118 SNL.
Report Providing an Assessment of the Current State of the Market for Natural Catastrophe Insurance in the United States
27
V. FLOOD INSURANCE
Flooding, as the most common, destructive, and costly form of natural catastrophe in the United States, presents
signicant insurance challenges.
119
Between 1980 and 2013, oods caused more than $260 billion in damage in the
United States.
120
Losses caused by ooding are generally excluded from homeowner insurance policies. Consequent-
ly, most consumers seeking to purchase insurance for ood risk must purchase a standalone insurance policy. Until
the Great Mississippi Flood of 1927, private insurers largely covered ood losses. However, following a number of
devastating events and company failures, the number of insurers oering private ood insurance declined due to the
frequent and catastrophic nature of ooding as well as the diculty in modeling the risk. Without access to ood in-
surance, the “primary recourse for ood victims was government disaster assistance.”
121
In response, Congress created
the NFIP in 1968. e NFIP is administered by FEMA in the Department of Homeland Security and is the largest
source of ood insurance for property owners. Flood insurance coverage that is separate from the NFIP is available
in certain geographic areas; however, only a small number of private insurers oer this coverage. As discussed below,
while the NFIP has made ood insurance available to millions of Americans, it has faced signicant nancial chal-
lenges in recent years due to large losses incurred following Hurricanes Katrina and Irene, and Superstorm Sandy.
A. National Flood Insurance Program
In response to the shrinking market for private ood insurance, Congress passed and President Johnson signed the
National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 (1968 Act),
122
which created the NFIP. rough the NFIP, the federal govern-
ment made ood insurance available to individuals who lived in communities that voluntarily adopted and enforced
certain oodplain management regulations such as appropriate building and development codes. However, as of
1972 when Tropical Storm Agnes made landfall, “only a few thousand communities participated in the NFIP and
only 95,000 policies were in force.” At the time, Tropical Storm Agnes “cost the Nation more in disaster assistance
than any previous disaster.”
123
In recognition that “providing subsidized ood insurance for existing buildings was not a sucient incentive for
communities to voluntarily join the NFIP nor for individuals to purchase ood insurance,”
124
Congress passed the
Flood Disaster Protection Act of 1973 (1973 Act).
125
Among other reforms to the NFIP, the 1973 Act prohibited
regulated lending institutions from making, increasing, or renewing “any loan secured by improved real estate or a
mobile home located or to be located in an area that has been identied by the Secretary [of Housing and Urban De-
velopment] as an area having special ood hazards and in which ood insurance has been made available under the
National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, unless the building or mobile home and any personal property securing such
loan is covered for the term of the loan by ood insurance.”
126
is provision is commonly referred to as the Manda-
tory Purchase Requirement and remains in eect today. e Mandatory Purchase Requirement can be satised with
119 Federal Emergency Management Agency, What to Know, What to Do, available at https://www.oodsmart.gov/
oodsmart/pdfs/What_to_Know_What_to_Do.pdf.
120 Council on Environmental Quality, FACT SHEET: Taking Action to Protect Communities and Reduce the Cost of Future
Flood Disasters (January 30, 2015), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/ceq/Press_Releases/
January_30_2015.
121 Lloyd Dixon, Noreen Clancy, Seth A. Seabury, and Adrian Overton, e National Flood Insurance Program’s Market
Penetration Rate: Estimates and Policy Implications, RAND Corporation prepared under subcontract to the American
Institutes for Research as part of the Evaluation of the National Flood Insurance Program, at xii (February 2006).
122 Pub. L. No. 90-448, Title XIII (1968), see also 42 U.S.C § 4011.
123 Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Flood Insurance Program–Program Description (2002), available at
http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1447-20490-2156/npdescrip_1_.pdf, at 3.
124 Id.
125 Pub. L. No. 93-234, 87 Stat. 975.
126 Until 1979, before being transferred to the newly created FEMA, the NFIP was administrated by the Department of
Housing and Urban Development. See Executive Order 12127 § 1-104 (1979), available at http://www.archives.gov/
federal-register/codication/executive-order/12127.html, also see 42 U.S.C § 4012a(b).
Report Providing an Assessment of the Current State of the Market for Natural Catastrophe Insurance in the United States
28
either a ood insurance policy through the NFIP or a qualifying policy through a private insurer.
127
e 1973 Act
also prohibited “Federal agencies from providing nancial assistance for acquisition or construction of buildings and
certain disaster assistance in the oodplains in any community that did not participate in the NFIP by July 1, 1975,
or within [one] year of being identied as ood-prone.”
128
e NFIP makes ood insurance available to property owners located in more than 21,000 participating communi-
ties throughout the United States. In order to participate in the NFIP, a community must complete an application
and agree to “adopt and enforce a oodplain management ordinance to reduce future ood risks to new construction
in Special Flood Hazard areas.”
129
FEMA identies and maps ood-prone areas in participating communities. If a
community does not elect to participate in the NFIP, a resident may not purchase a ood insurance policy through
the NFIP. With the exception of nonparticipating communities, a building owner or homeowner may not generally
be denied the option to purchase ood insurance from the NFIP.
Pursuant to the 1968 Act, the NFIP requires periodic reauthorization by the U.S. Congress. e NFIP was most
recently reauthorized until September 30, 2017 by the Biggert-Waters Act.
130
As of December 31, 2014, approxi-
mately 5.3 million NFIP policies were in eect, providing approximately $1.3 trillion of coverage.
131
In addition, as
of December 31, 2014, the NFIP owed $23 billion to the U.S. Department of the Treasury (Treasury).
132
e NFIP oers ood-related insurance coverage for residential, multifamily, and non-residential properties, as well
as for renters. e NFIP has three policy forms: (1) the Standard Flood Insurance Policy Dwelling Form (Dwelling
Form), which is used to insure one to four family residential buildings and single family dwelling units in a condo-
minium building; (2) the General Property Form, which is used to insure ve or more family residential buildings
and non-residential buildings; and (3) the Residential Condominium Building Association Policy Form, which is
used to insure residential condominium association buildings.
133
All three of these policy forms cover damage direct-
ly caused by a ood.
e NFIP denes a ood as “general and temporary conditions of partial or complete inundation of two or more
acres of normally dry land area or of two or more properties … from:
• Overow of inland or tidal waters;
• Unusual and rapid accumulation or runo of surface waters from any source;
• Mudow; or
• Collapse or subsidence of land along the shore of a lake or similar body of water as a result of erosion or
undermining caused by waves or currents of water exceeding anticipated cyclical levels that result in a ood
as dened above.”
134
127 Id.
128 Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Flood Insurance Program–Program Description, (2002), at 3.
129 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Answers to Questions About the NFIP, FEMA F-084, at 1 (March 2011), available
at http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1438-20490-0889/f084_atq_11aug11.txt.
130 42 U.S.C § 4026.
131 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Monthly Policy Statistics as of 11/30/2014, available at http://bsa.npstat.fema.
gov/reports/1011.htm.
132 Information obtained from U.S. Department of the Treasury Oce of Government Financial Policy.
133 Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Flood Insurance Program Summary of Coverage, FEMA F-679, at
1 (November 2012), available at http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1620-20490-4648/f_679_
summaryofcoverage_11_2012.pdf. See also, Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Flood Insurance Program
Summary of Coverage for Commercial Property, at 1 (July 2013), available at https://www.oodsmart.gov/oodsmart/
pdfs/NFIP_Summary_of_Coverage.pdf.
134 Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Flood Insurance Program Summary of Coverage, FEMA F-679 at 1
(November 2012), available at http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1620-20490-4648/f_679_
summaryofcoverage_11_2012.pdf.
Report Providing an Assessment of the Current State of the Market for Natural Catastrophe Insurance in the United States
29
e Dwelling Form provides coverage for the building property and/or personal property contents of the building.
Under the Dwelling Form, the maximum coverage for the building property is $250,000. Flood losses to the build-
ing property may be valued on the basis of replacement cost value (RCV) if the building is a single-family dwelling,
the policyholder lives in the building at least 80 percent of the year, and the building coverage is at least 80 percent
of the full replacement cost of the building or the maximum available for property under the NFIP. If ood losses do
not meet these requirements, the building property is valued on the basis of actual cash value (ACV).
Coverage for building property includes: the building structure and foundation, the electrical and plumbing sys-
tem, central air conditioning equipment, furnaces, water heaters, refrigerators, stoves, permanently installed carpets,
permanently installed paneling, wallboard, bookcases, cabinets, window blinds, detached garages, and debris removal.
Some coverage for building property below the lowest elevated oor is also included -- such as foundation walls, cen-
tral air conditioners, drywall for walls and ceilings, nonammable insulation, electrical outlets, fuel tanks, furnaces,
hot water heaters, heat pumps, and sump pumps.
135
135 Id.
Report Providing an Assessment of the Current State of the Market for Natural Catastrophe Insurance in the United States
30
Box 5: Flood Insurance Rate Mapping
e 1968 Act authorized the Administrator
136
of the National Flood Insurance Program to “(1) identify and
publish information with respect to all ood plain areas, including coastal areas located in the United States,
which have special ood hazards…, and (2) establish ood-risk zones in all such areas and make estimates
with respect to the rates of probable ood-caused loss for the various ood-risk zones for each of these areas.”
137
Flood maps are used to establish ood insurance rates, develop regulations for land-use planning and building
codes, and for ood preparation for communities at risk.
Today, FEMA is responsible for creating and updating Flood Insurance Rate Maps (FIRMs) for participating
communities throughout the United States. FIRMs are used to inform communities and policyholders of
the local ood risk, assist in oodplain management, identify areas where Mandatory Purchase Requirements
are applicable, and determine the cost of ood insurance. FEMA creates and updates FIRMs by watersheds,
identifying Special Flood Hazard Areas (SFHA) consisting of dierent ood-risk zones based on individual
risk characteristics, all of which have a 1 percent
138
or greater chance of ooding in any given year. Mapping
activities for watersheds are prioritized based on a number of factors including population. As a result, many
rural and tribal communities have experienced delays in mapping, or have out-of-date FIRMs that do not
reect the most current and accurate risk.
To increase the accuracy of FIRMs, and to ensure public awareness of ood risk, FEMA works in a
collaborative process with local communities and residents; including allowing communities to review,
appeal, and adopt FIRMs prior to maps taking eect. Following the adoption of new or updated FIRMs,
communities and individuals continue to be able to revise FIRMs through Letters of Map Revisions or Letters
of Map Amendment. Between 2003 and 2008, “FEMA engaged in a large-scale eort to collect new ood
data in unmapped areas, update existing data, and digitize ood maps.”
139
FIRMs in populated areas are
generally up-to-date; however, in many unpopulated areas the FIRMs have not been updated.
140
Maps must be “continually maintained and updated to reect natural and development-related changes.”
141
While the science and technology to improve ood mapping for rivers and inland waterways is well
established, coastal ood models continue to evolve.
142
e Biggert-Waters Act established a new Technical
Mapping Advisory Council, made up of 20 members, including the Administrator of FEMA and senior
ocials from across the federal government, to review and provide the Administrator of FEMA with
recommendations on matters related to the national ood mapping program, including how to improve, in a
cost-eective manner, the accuracy of FIRMS and mapping standards and guidelines.
143
136 While the 1968 Act authorized the Federal Insurance Administrator, today this responsibility has been transferred to the
Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management Agency. See Executive Oce of the President, Executive Order
12127 § 1-104 (1979), available at http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/codication/executive-order/12127.html.
137 42 U.S.C. § 4101(a).
138 SFHA represent areas that have a 1 percent or higher chance of ooding in any given year, however during the span of a
30-year mortgage, a property in the SFHA has a 26 percent chance of being ooded at least once. See Federal Emergency
Management Administration, Managing Floodplain Development rough e National Flood Insurance Program, at 80
(2007), available at http://www.fema.gov/pdf/oodplain/is_9_complete.pdf.
139 e National Academies, Mapping the Zone: Improving Flood Map Accuracy, at 1 (2009), available at http://dels.nas.edu/
resources/static-assets/materials-based-on-reports/reports-in-brief/improving_ood_maps_nal.pdf.
140 eodoric Meyer, Why So Many Flood Maps Are Still Out of Date, ProPublica (July 8, 2013), available at http://www.
propublica.org/article/why-so-many-ood-maps-are-still-out-of-date.
141 e National Academies, Mapping the Zone: Improving Flood Map Accuracy, at 2 (2009)
142 Id. at 3.
143 42 U.S.C. § 4101a.
Report Providing an Assessment of the Current State of the Market for Natural Catastrophe Insurance in the United States
31
Consumers may also purchase coverage for the contents of the building up to a maximum amount of $100,000.
Contents coverage includes items such as clothing, furniture, curtains, portable and window air conditioners, clothes
washers and dryers, and food freezers. Contents are always valued on the basis of ACV.
144
A separate deductible applies to building property and contents. NFIP policyholders may prefer a higher deductible
to decrease ood insurance premiums; however, policyholders must consider whether they have the ability to pay the
deductible in addition to losses above the coverage limits.
rough the NFIP’s Write-Your-Own (WYO) Program, participating private insurers write and service NFIP policies
in the name of the issuing insurer; however, the full risk of the policy is assumed by the federal government through
the NFIP. Under the WYO Program, private insurers “underwrite policies and process claims while the federal gov-
ernment retains responsibility for underwriting losses.”
145
In exchange for this service, the WYO Program insurers re-
ceive commissions, operating expense allowances, and incentive bonuses. All NFIP policyholders, irrespective of the
WYO Program insurer issuing and servicing the policy, receive the same coverage at a price governed by NFIP rules
and regulations. In addition to the WYO Program, the NFIP also sells ood insurance to some consumers through
agents licensed with the NFIP Direct program.
146
1. Aordability
Flood insurance premiums from the NFIP vary based on a number of factors, including: ood risk as identied on
Flood Insurance Rate Maps (FIRMs), coverage limits, deductibles, time of original building construction, and the
community’s participation in the Community Rating System (CRS) Program. e annual premium for residences
located in a low to moderate ood risk area can be as low as $129 per year.
147
e NFIP does not provide a table for
premiums for residences located in high ood risk areas; however, one source suggests annual premiums for residenc-
es in high ood risk areas can range from $750 to several thousands of dollars for $100,000 of coverage.
148
e location of the NFIP-insured property is among the most important underwriting factors aecting the premium
charged. Other important underwriting factors include the specic policy limits as well as the date of construction.
Homes constructed after December 31, 1974, or on or after the eective date of the initial FIRM for the community
in which the property is located, are considered post-FIRM construction. Homes constructed prior to December
31, 1974, or before the eective date of the initial FIRM for the community in which the property is located, are
considered pre-FIRM construction and are eligible for subsidized rates. Certain NFIP policyholders with post-FIRM
construction may qualify for rates calculated in accordance with so-called “grandfather rules,” which allow policy-
holders to pay ood insurance premiums based on previously identied risk factors and are available for buildings
that complied with the FIRM in eect at the time of construction and for continuously insured policyholders that
would otherwise receive a higher premium rate following a map revision.
149
In order to strengthen the NFIP’s nancial position and increase the ability to fund future claims, the Biggert-Waters
Act reformed the NFIP to eliminate over time the subsidized rates for both pre-FIRM properties and grandfathered
policies. However, before these reforms could be implemented, Congress passed the Homeowner Flood Insurance
Aordability Act of 2014 (HFIAA),
150
which delayed and in some cases eliminated many of the rate reforms under
the Biggert-Waters Act.
144 Id.
145 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Answers to Questions About the NFIP, FEMA F-084, at 3 (March 2011), available
at http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1438-20490-0889/f084_atq_11aug11.txt.
146 Federal Emergency Management Agency, NFIP Flood Insurance Manual Eective October 1, 2014, available at https://
www.fema.gov/media-library/assets/documents/97901.
147 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Policy Rates, available at https://www.oodsmart.gov/oodsmart/pages/
residential_coverage/policy_rates.jsp.
148 Greene National Flood Brokerage Website, available at http://www.nationaloodinsurance.com/NFIP/premium.htm.
149 Id.
150 Pub L. No. 113-89, 128 Stat. 1020 (2014).
Report Providing an Assessment of the Current State of the Market for Natural Catastrophe Insurance in the United States
32
e Biggert-Waters Act, as amended by HFIAA, also authorized the National Research Council of the National
Academy of Science to study the aordability of NFIP premiums.
151
In March of 2015, the National Research
Council released the rst of two reports, entitled Aordability of National Flood Insurance Program Premiums: Report
1 (Aordability Report), as part of the required study on aordability.
152
e Aordability Report notes the impor-
tance of establishing a clear and measurable denition of “aordability.” In order to design a program to provide
more targeted assistance to certain NFIP policyholders, the NFIP must be able to identify which policyholders
should receive assistance, how assistance is provided, and how much assistance a policyholder should receive. Addi-
tionally, the Aordability Report lays out a number of options for delivering assistance to enhance ood insurance
aordability. ese options include: increasing the availability of mitigation eorts through loans and means-test-
ed grants; promoting higher deductibles; and implementing a voucher program to administer direct payments to
cost-burdened policyholders.
e National Research Council is scheduled to release a second report in the fall of 2015 which will propose analyt-
ical procedures FEMA may use to conduct an analysis of various policy options. Following the release of the second
report, FEMA is required to submit to Congress an aordability framework to “address, via programmatic and regu-
latory changes, the issues of aordability of ood insurance sold under the [NFIP], including issues identied in the
aordability study required [to be completed by the National Academy of Sciences].”
153
151 e National Academies, Project Information: Aordability of NFIP Premiums, available at https://www8.
nationalacademies.org/cp/projectview.aspx?key=49584.
152 National Academy of Science, Aordability of National Flood Insurance Program Premiums: Report 1, available at http://
www.nap.edu/catalog/21709/aordability-of-national-ood-insurance-program-premiums-report-1.
153 Pub L. No. 113-89 § 9(a), 128 Stat. 1024 (2014).
Report Providing an Assessment of the Current State of the Market for Natural Catastrophe Insurance in the United States
33
Box 6: Community Rating System Program
e NFIP’s CRS is a program implemented since 1990 by FEMA to recognize, encourage, and incentivize
communities that voluntarily participate in oodplain management activities that exceed the minimum
requirements under the NFIP to “reduce and avoid ood damage to insurable property, strengthen and
support the insurance aspects of the NFIP, and foster comprehensive oodplain management.”
154
Communities that elect to participate in the CRS are placed into a Class, from 9 to 1,
155
based on the points
awarded for engaging in any of 19 creditable activities within four categories (public information activities,
mapping and regulations, ood damage reduction activities and warning and response).
156
Based on the Class
in which a community is placed and the risk classication of property in the community, policyholders within
that community are entitled to a discount on ood insurance premiums of up to 45 percent.
As of December 31, 2014, 1,510 communities participated in the CRS.
157
Roseville, California is the only
community currently in Class 1, entitling its residents to as much as a 45 percent discount on ood insurance
premiums.
158
ree additional communities (Tulsa, Oklahoma; King County, Washington; and Pierce
County, Washington) have been rated as Class 2 communities, entitling residents to as much as a 40 percent
discount on ood insurance premiums.
159
2. Flood Insurance Market
As of December 31, 2014, the NFIP had 5,268,278 residential and non-residential ood insurance policies in force
for a combined exposure of approximately $1.27 trillion.
160
ese policies are spread across the United States, with
policies in all 50 states, the District of Columbia and the ve U.S. territories. Figure 6 shows the distribution of
NFIP policies (and the amount of insurance in-force) by state. While NFIP policies have been written in every state,
a signicant concentration (approximately 60 percent of total in-force policies) is located in states along the Gulf of
Mexico: Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas.
161
154 Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Flood Insurance Program Community Rating System
Coordinator’s Manual, at 9 (2013), available at http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1406897194816-
fc66ac50a3af94634751342cb35666cd/FIA-15_NFIP-Coordinators-Manual_2014.pdf.
155 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Community Rating System Fact Sheet, at 1 (March 2014), available at http://
www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1395661546460-d6859e8d080fba06b34a6f1a4d0abdba/NFIP_CRS_March%20
2014%20508.pdf.
156 Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Flood Insurance Program Community Rating System
Coordinator’s Manual, at 12, available at http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1406897194816-
fc66ac50a3af94634751342cb35666cd/FIA-15_NFIP-Coordinators-Manual_2014.pdf.
157 Information obtained from Federal Emergency Management Agency and includes communities participating in the
program that are not eligible for discounts due to their failure to achieve the points needed to be categorized as class 9 or
higher.
158 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Community Rating System Fact Sheet, at 1 (March 2014), available at http://
www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1395661546460-d6859e8d080fba06b34a6f1a4d0abdba/NFIP_CRS_March%20
2014%20508.pdf.
159 Id.
160 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Monthly Policy Statistics as of 11/30/2014, available at http://bsa.npstat.fema.
gov/reports/1011.htm.
161 Id.
Report Providing an Assessment of the Current State of the Market for Natural Catastrophe Insurance in the United States
34
Figure 6: NFIP Policies and Insurance In-Force in Dollars (as of December 31, 2014)
State Policies In-Force Insurance In-Force State Policies In-Force Insurance In-Force
Alabama 56,393 12,595,263,100 Montana 6,114 1,203,598,700
Alaska 3,014 752,518,800 N Mariana Islands 7 1,401,000
American Samoa 1 7,700 Nebraska 11,919 2,074,393,900
Arizona 36,289 8,551,207,100 Nevada 13,318 3,340,129,500
Arkansas 19,981 3,202,596,900 New Hampshire 9,039 1,940,481,100
California 234,308 63,502,264,000 New Jersey 237,358 57,663,467,400
Colorado 23,644 5,849,271,700 New Mexico 15,247 2,956,961,700
Connecticut 41,854 10,475,303,000 New York 188,872 50,694,407,200
Delaware 25,035 6,703,573,000 North Carolina 135,511 32,647,826,600
District of Columbia 2,435 464,473,300 North Dakota 12,278 3,160,768,100
Florida 1,947,504 467,726,078,700 Ohio 40,038 6,888,441,800
Georgia 92,745 23,370,401,000 Oklahoma 16,522 3,146,855,200
Guam 236 46,481,400 Oregon 32,021 7,532,764,800
Hawaii 60,656 13,214,888,400 Pennsylvania 69,262 13,509,949,800
Idaho 6,569 1,511,985,300 Puerto Rico 13,609 1,872,737,700
Illinois 47,105 8,910,870,100 Rhode Island 15,496 4,042,557,100
Indiana 27,976 5,081,702,900 South Carolina 190,470 51,522,875,500
Iowa 15,641 2,887,885,400 South Dakota 5,249 1,150,158,100
Kansas 12,100 2,075,760,600 Tennessee 31,276 7,258,687,800
Kentucky 23,484 3,685,898,400 Texas 600,610 157,322,649,200
Louisiana 472,542 113,775,025,600 Utah 4,243 1,026,071,700
Maine 9,178 2,081,430,900 Vermont 4,315 920,090,200
Maryland 72,285 16,372,584,800 Virgin Islands 1,712 321,173,200
Massachusetts 59,151 15,671,731,300 Virginia 112,156 28,040,186,000
Michigan 24,623 4,365,408,500 Washington 42,610 10,173,181,900
Minnesota 11,990 2,632,706,200 West Virginia 19,435 2,634,582,300
Mississippi 70,635 16,220,933,000 Wisconsin 15,383 2,820,381,600
Missouri 24,531 4,312,734,400 Wyoming 2,303 531,674,400
Total Policies In-Force: 5,268,278 Total Insurance In-Force: $1,272,439,439,000
Source: FEMA Monthly Policy Statistics as of 12/31/2014
e NFIP oers coverage for single-family residences, multi-family residential properties, and non-residential
properties. As shown in Figure 7, approximately 69 percent of all NFIP policies provide coverage for single family
residences. Large multi-family properties (more than 4 families) accounted for 21 percent of NFIP policies, with
non-residential policies and smaller multifamily properties (2 - 4 families) approximately splitting the remaining 10
percent of NFIP policies.
162
162 Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Flood Insurance Program Write Your Own System Report Description as of
11/30/2014, available at http://bsa.npstat.fema.gov/reports/w2rpcnta.htm.
Report Providing an Assessment of the Current State of the Market for Natural Catastrophe Insurance in the United States
35
Figure 7: Number of Policies In-Force by Occupancy Type (as of December 31, 2014)
Nationally, the top ve WYO insurers in 2014 were Wright National Flood Insurance Company (20.4 percent),
Assurant, Inc. (12.6 percent), Allstate Corporation (10.2 percent), Hartford Financial Services (9.7 percent), and
Nationwide Mutual Group (8.2 percent). Figure 8 shows the amount of total written premiums and total payments
by the NFIP over the period 1990 to 2014. Total written premiums grew continuously over this period. e years
with the largest payments for ood claims correspond to the years with major hurricanes or tropical storms: 2005
(Hurricane Katrina), 2008 (Hurricane Ike), and 2012 (Superstorm Sandy).
Figure 8: NFIP Net Written Premiums ($000) and Total Claims Payments ($000)
3,617,002
254,537
1,106,279
290,460
0
500,000
1,000,000
1,500,000
2,000,000
2,500,000
3,000,000
3,500,000
4,000,000
Single Family
Dwelling
2-4 Family Dwelling Other Residential Non-Residential
Source: NFIP Write Your Own System Report Description as of 12/31/2014
0
2,000,000
4,000,000
6,000,000
8,000,000
10,000,000
12,000,000
14,000,000
16,000,000
18,000,000
20,000,000
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014
Net Written
Premiums
Total Claims
Payments
Source: FEMA
Report Providing an Assessment of the Current State of the Market for Natural Catastrophe Insurance in the United States
36
3. Challenges to the NFIP
a. Solvency
Due to the large losses from Hurricane Katrina in 2005, Hurricane Irene in 2011, and Superstorm Sandy in 2012,
the NFIP has relied heavily on the authority to borrow from the Treasury, as authorized by the 1968 Act. Prior to
2004, the NFIP’s borrowing authority was limited to $1.5 billion. Following the large losses resulting from the
severe weather events since Hurricane Katrina, Congress has increased the NFIP’s borrowing authority to ensure that
the NFIP is able to pay claims. As of December 31, 2014, the NFIP’s borrowing authority was $30.425 billion.
163
Based on funds provided by Treasury to the NFIP, as of December 31, 2014, the NFIP owed the Treasury $23 bil-
lion.
164
Congress and the NFIP are exploring ways to maintain aordability and availability of ood insurance.
b. Superstorm Sandy
Following Superstorm Sandy, some NFIP policyholders, in addition to disputing the cost of repairs for ood damage
(see Box 3), disputed the denial of coverage for ood claims, the basis of which were engineering reports establishing
that perils other than ood were the cause of ood damage.
165
In November 2014, “allegations of altered [engineer-
ing] reports prompted a federal judge overseeing more than 1,000 hurricane related lawsuits in the New York City
area to order all drafts of the engineering reports be turned over, saying he believed such revisions could be ‘wide-
spread.’”
166
In response to “allegations of questionable engineering practices,” FEMA agreed to assist “policyholders
to reach settlement and resolution of ood claims currently in litigation.”
167
c. Congressional Action
In order for the NFIP to continue oering ood insurance, Congress needs to periodically reauthorize the 1968 Act.
Currently, the NFIP is operating under a 5-year reauthorization that will expire on September 30, 2017.
168
Prior to
the passage of the Biggert-Waters Act, the NFIP operated from 2008 to 2012 through a series of short-term exten-
sions.
On multiple occasions, Congress failed to reauthorize the NFIP before one of the short-term extensions expired,
causing the NFIP to lapse temporarily.
169
During these lapses in the NFIP, banks, credit unions, and other federally
insured lenders were unable to originate or renance loans for properties located in the SFHA. As a result, each day
of a lapse in the NFIP was estimated to either delay or cancel 1,332 home sale closings.
170
4. Private Flood Insurance
While the NFIP is the largest provider of ood insurance in the United States, some private insurers do oer prima-
ry and excess insurance coverage for ood-related damage that is separate from the WYO Program. Primary ood
insurance coverage provides policy terms similar to the NFIP. Excess ood insurance coverage, typically oered by
non-admitted insurers, provides policy coverage above the limits specied in the policyholder’s primary ood insur-
ance policy.
163 42 U.S.C. § 4016(a).
164 Information obtained from U.S. Department of the Treasury Oce of Government Financial Policy.
165 Chen, David, Hurricane Sandy Victims Say Damage Reports Were Altered,” New York Times (February 16, 2015).
166 Id.
167 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Hurricane Sandy NFIP Claims, available at https://www.fema.gov/hurricane-
sandy-np-claims.
168 42 U.S.C. § 4026.
169 In 2010, the NFIP lapsed three times, for a total of 49 days: (1) on March 1, 2010; (2) from March 29, 2010 to April 14,
2010; and (3) from June 1, 2010 to July 1, 2010. See amendments to 42 U.S.C. § 4026.
170 Selma Hepp, National Association of Realtors, Lapses of the National Flood Insurance Program Jeopardize Home Sales,
Economist’s Outlook Blog, available at http://economistsoutlook.blogs.realtor.org/2011/08/08/lapses-of-the-national-
ood-insurance-program-jeopardize-home-sales/.
Report Providing an Assessment of the Current State of the Market for Natural Catastrophe Insurance in the United States
37
e indebtedness to Treasury of the NFIP has increased the interest of policymakers in the privatization of the NFIP
and increased interest by participants in the private ood insurance market.
171
Historically, insurers have been reluc-
tant to enter the private ood insurance market due to the potential for large correlated losses which, in combination,
increase the likelihood that losses will exceed premiums in years with major oods. Recently however, insurers have
oered to increase the private ood insurance market if the insurers can charge risk-based prices for ood insurance
without competition from the NFIP’s subsidized rates.
172
While some insurers do believe that the private ood insur-
ance market could expand, most believe that the federal government will need to continue to play a role in making
ood insurance available and aordable.
In addition to the interest in expanding the primary private ood insurance market, Congress has also identied
private reinsurance as a mechanism to limit the federal taxpayer exposure presented by the risk prole of the NFIP.
With the objective of shifting risk away from the federal government and to the private sector, the Biggert-Waters Act
authorized the NFIP to “secure reinsurance of coverage provided by the ood insurance program from the private
market at rates and on terms determined by the Administrator to be reasonable and appropriate, in an amount su-
cient to maintain the ability of the program to pay claims.”
173
FEMA continues to explore this possibility.
171 Public Law 112-141, § 100232(a), 126 Stat. 953 (2012).
172 See generally Government Accountability Oce, Flood Insurance: Strategies for Increasing Private Sector Involvement (January
2014), available at http://gao.gov/assets/670/660309.pdf; Deloitte Center for Financial Services, e potential for ood
insurance privatization in the U.S.: Could carriers keep their heads above water? (2014), available at http://www2.deloitte.
com/content/dam/Deloitte/us/Documents/nancial-services/us-fsi-the-potential-for-ood-insurance-privatization-
in-the-us-040114.pdf.
173 42 U.S.C. § 4055(a)(2).
Report Providing an Assessment of the Current State of the Market for Natural Catastrophe Insurance in the United States
38
VI. EARTHQUAKE INSURANCE
roughout the Unites States, earthquake insurance is not “generally required by mortgage lenders as a loan condi-
tion, and lenders rarely require earthquake insurance.”
174
While earthquake insurance is generally available, the Utah
Insurance Department notes “few [insurers] actively market the coverage.”
175
Relatively few homeowners have pur-
chased earthquake insurance, and the percentage of homeowners with earthquake insurance has been declining since
2012.
176
e low take-up rate may be explained by the cost and the coverage limitations for earthquake insurance,
homeowners’ perception of earthquake risk, and, unlike ood insurance, the voluntary nature of this coverage.
A. Overview of Earthquake Insurance
Insurers began oering earthquake insurance with a ve percent deductible as an independent product in 1916. Few
policies were written, however, which was explained by consumer perception at the time that most earthquake-related
damage would be caused by re.
177
Today, earthquake insurance may be purchased as an endorsement to a property
insurance policy (if available) or as a separate policy. In general, earthquake insurance “provides protection from the
shaking and cracking that can destroy buildings and personal possessions”
178
caused by a natural earthquake, pays for
living expenses if the policyholder cannot live in the home while the home is being repaired, and pays for the cost
of removing debris.
179
Earthquake insurance does not cover losses caused by re or water as a result of burst gas or
water pipes resulting from an earthquake, as these losses are covered under other provisions of a typical homeowner
insurance policy.
180
Earthquake insurance typically covers losses caused by the earthquake and by any aftershocks that
occur within 72 hours of the earthquake.
181
Insurers may impose a waiting period of 10 to 30 days before earthquake
insurance coverage becomes eective for a new applicant,
182
and insurers typically will institute a short-term moratori-
um on the sale of new earthquake insurance policies or endorsements in the locality of a recent earthquake.
183
Except
in Pennsylvania, earthquake insurance policies typically exclude damage caused by man-made earthquakes, which
may include earthquakes triggered by hydraulic fracturing and waste-water injection wells. In April 2015, then
Acting Insurance Commissioner Teresa Miller of the Pennsylvania Insurance Department issued a bulletin directing
insurers issuing homeowner insurance policies with earthquake endorsements that exclude coverage for earthquakes
triggered by human activity to not enforce the exclusions.
184
174 California State Senate Committee on Insurance Informational Hearing, Catastrophic Risk in California: Are Homeowners
and Communities Prepared?, at 8 (May 14, 2014), available at http://sins.senate.ca.gov/sites/sins.senate.ca.gov/
les/14.05-14.Background.Catastrophic%20Risks%20in%20California.PDF.
175 Utah Insurance Department, Earthquake Insurance in Utah, available at https://insurance.utah.gov/auto-home/home/
earthquake.php.
176 Insurance Information Institute, Earthquakes: Risk and Insurance Loss (August 2014), available at http://www.iii.org/
issue-update/earthquakes-risk-and-insurance-issues.
177 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Earthquake Insurance: A Public Policy Dilemma, at 2 (1985), available at http://
www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1600-20490-8046/fema_68.pdf.
178 Insurance Information Institute, Earthquakes: Risk and Insurance Loss,(August 2014), available at http://www.iii.org/
issue-update/earthquakes-risk-and-insurance-issues.
179 National Association of Insurance Commissioners, A Consumer’s Guide to Earthquake Insurance, at 3 (2011), available at
http://www.naic.org/documents/consumer_guide_earthquake.pdf.
180 Id.
181 Id.
182 Utah Insurance Department, Earthquake Insurance in Utah, available at https://insurance.utah.gov/auto-home/home/
earthquake.php.
183 Oregon Insurance Division, Earthquake Insurance, available at http://www.oregon.gov/DCBS/insurance/gethelp/
homeowner/Pages/earthquake.aspx.
184 Pennsylvania Insurance Department, 45 Pa.B. 1916 (April 11, 2015).
Report Providing an Assessment of the Current State of the Market for Natural Catastrophe Insurance in the United States
39
Earthquake insurance typically has a deductible ranging from two percent to 25 percent of the coverage limits,
185
which generally applies to coverage for both the home and for personal property.
186
A deductible does not usually
apply to coverage for additional living expenses.
187
In high-risk states, insurers may require a deductible of at least 10
percent.
188
e largest writer of earthquake insurance, the California Earthquake Authority (CEA), has a standard 15
percent deductible.
189
Figure 9 shows the low take-up rate for the voluntary purchase of earthquake insurance in the United States.
190
One
study found that homeowners who do not purchase earthquake insurance “perceive the risk to be suciently low
such that they are not worried about the consequences.”
191
After an earthquake, homeowners perceive the risk of an
earthquake more acutely, and take-up rates increase. is phenomenon was evident, for example, after the 1971 San
Fernando Valley, California earthquake, which stimulated a dramatic increase in the purchase of earthquake insur-
ance.
192
Figure 9: Percentage of American Homeowners with Earthquake Insurance, 2014
Region Percentage
Mid-West 7%
Northeast 2%
South 6%
West 10%
All Regions 7%
Source: Insurance Information Institute
Anecdotal evidence suggests that cost, high deductibles, and a low perception of risk account for the low take-up rate
for earthquake insurance even in areas with the greatest risk of a catastrophic earthquake event. A 2008 report on
earthquake insurance in Missouri, “the third largest market for earthquake insurance coverage in the United States,
after the states of California and Washington,”
193
noted that the annual premium for a $150,000 home is $175.50
and the typical deductible ranges from 20 to 25 percent. In California, earthquake insurance premiums range from
$800 to $5,000 per year and, for a home with the median sale price of $400,000 and the standard CEA deductible
185 Insurance Information Institute, Earthquakes: Risk and Insurance Loss, (August 2014), available at http://www.iii.
org/issue-update/earthquakes-risk-and-insurance-issues; Washington State Oce of the Insurance Commissioner,
Earthquake Insurance, available at http://www.insurance.wa.gov/your-insurance/home-insurance/earthquake/.
186 Id. See also National Association of Insurance Commissioners, A Consumer’s Guide to Earthquake Insurance, at 5 (2011),
available at http://www.naic.org/documents/consumer_guide_earthquake.pdf.
187 Oregon Insurance Division, Earthquake Insurance, available at http://www.oregon.gov/DCBS/insurance/gethelp/
homeowner/Pages/earthquake.aspx.
188 Insurance Information Institute, Earthquakes: Risk and Insurance Loss, (August 2014), available at http://www.iii.org/
issue-update/earthquakes-risk-and-insurance-issues.
189 California Earthquake Authority, CEA Financial Update to U.S. Treasury Federal Insurance Oce, at 21 (February 2013).
190 Insurance Information Institute, Earthquakes: Risk and Insurance Loss, (August 2014), available at http://www.iii.org/
issue-update/earthquakes-risk-and-insurance-issues.
191 Howard Kunreuther, Mitigating Disaster Losses through Insurance, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 12:171-187, at 176
(1996).
192 Id.; Federal Emergency Management Agency, Earthquake Insurance: A Public Policy Dilemma, at 3 (May 1985), available at
http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1600-20490-8046/fema_68.pdf.
193 Missouri Department of Insurance, Financial Institutions and Professional Registration, Final Report of the Missouri
Earthquake Insurance Task Force, at 13 (December 19, 2008), available at https://insurance.mo.gov/Contribute%20
Documents/EQReport12-19-08.pdf.
Report Providing an Assessment of the Current State of the Market for Natural Catastrophe Insurance in the United States
40
of 15 percent, the homeowner would be required to bear the rst $60,000 in repairs.
194
For some homeowners, the
aforementioned premiums may seem aordable; for others, “the cost of premiums and deductible only seems justied
in the worst-case scenario.”
195
Nationally, the 2014 top ve writers of earthquake insurance for homeowners and businesses were the CEA
(21.7 percent), Zurich Insurance Group (8.3 percent), State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance (8.2 percent), Trav-
elers Companies, Inc. (4.9 percent), and American International Group (4.8 percent).
196
Figure 10 shows the direct
premiums written for earthquake insurance nationally for the period 1997 to 2014.
Of the nine largest writers of homeowner insurance, eight oer earthquake insurance. Of these eight, not
all oer earthquake insurance in every state or in all areas of a given state. For example, two of the largest writers of
homeowner insurance nationally do not oer earthquake insurance in Missouri; another insurer oers earthquake in-
surance in Missouri but not in Southeast Missouri; and one of the largest providers of homeowner insurance nation-
ally does not oer earthquake insurance in Washington.
197
In California, six of the nine largest writers of homeowner
insurance nationally oer earthquake insurance through the CEA.
198
194 Andrew Balnkstein, Why do so Few California Homeowners have Earthquake Insurance?, NBC News (October 17, 2014),
available at http://www.nbcnews.com/news/investigations/why-do-so-few-california-homeowners-have-earthquake-
insurance-n227711.
195 Id.
196 SNL.
197 Missouri Department of Insurance, Earthquake Insurance, available at http://insurance.mo.gov/consumers/home/
EQTable.php; Washington State Oce of the Insurance Commissioner, Authorized Earthquake Insurance Companies,
available at http://www.insurance.wa.gov/your-insurance/home-insurance/earthquake/earthquake-insurance-
companies/.
198 California Earthquake Authority, Participating Insurance Companies, available at http://www.earthquakeauthority.com/
index.aspx?id=53.
Report Providing an Assessment of the Current State of the Market for Natural Catastrophe Insurance in the United States
41
Figure 10: Earthquake Insurance Direct Premiums Written ($000) and Direct Losses Paid
(In Dollars)
B. State Approaches to Promote Earthquake Insurance
States most at risk for earthquakes have taken a variety of steps to encourage insurers to oer earthquake insurance.
Arkansas and California have enacted legislation designed to ensure the availability of earthquake insurance. ree
states—Kentucky, Illinois, and Missouri—have promulgated laws or taken regulatory action to improve awareness of
the availability of earthquake insurance. In four states – Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky and Ohio – the FAIR Plan (see
Box 4) oers earthquake insurance.
With respect to earthquake insurance, California illustrates the ongoing tension between aordability and accessibili-
ty. A California Supreme Court decision in the 1980s that, according to one analyst, “could have opened up home-
owners policies to earthquake-caused losses”
199
led insurers to seek legislative relief culminating in the enactment of a
law requiring insurers to armatively oer earthquake insurance for homes at the time of initial purchase or renewal
of a homeowner insurance policy and clarifying that homeowner insurance excludes earthquake damage.
200
Between
1985 and 1989, the number of California homeowners with earthquake insurance increased from 7 percent to 20
percent; the increase in the take-up rate for earthquake insurance occurred even though the deductible increased from
5 percent to 10 percent.
201
e insured losses from the Northridge earthquake far exceeded insurers’ estimation of the impact of a major earth-
quake: “[i]nsurers anticipated perhaps $3 billion in claims from an earthquake like that, but wound up paying out
199 Daniel P. Marshall, III, e Creation of the California Earthquake Authority, at 3 (November 15, 2002).
200 Section 2 of Chapter 916, Statutes of California, 1984, and Cal. Ins. Code §10081.
201 Californians Question Cost of Quake Coverage, Knight-Ridder Financial (November 2, 1989), available at http://www.joc.
com/californians-question-cost-quake-coverage_19891102.html.
Source: SNL Financial
0
500,000
1,000,000
1,500,000
2,000,000
2,500,000
3,000,000
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
Direct Premiums Written
Direct Losses Paid
Report Providing an Assessment of the Current State of the Market for Natural Catastrophe Insurance in the United States
42
more than $15 billion for claims on homes and businesses.”
202
Farmers Insurance Group “said it paid out three times
as much for Northridge as it had collected in earthquake premiums for 30 years.”
203
In 1994, 20th Century Insur-
ance reported a “shocking $340 million rst-quarter loss brought on by more than 41,000 earthquake claims” and
exited the earthquake and homeowner insurance markets.
204
Unable to manage risk by limiting the issuance of new
earthquake insurance policies or non-renewing earthquake insurance without scaling back homeowner insurance
policies, by 1995-1996 “some 93 percent of the homeowners market had severely restricted the sale of new policies or
had stopped writing.”
205
202 Joseph B. Treaster, Why Insurers Shrink from Earthquake Risk, New York Times (November 21, 1999), available at http://
partners.nytimes.com/library/nancial/sunday/112199personal-earthquake.html.
203 Id.
204 omas Mulligan, 20
th
Century Insurance to End Quake Policies: e Decision, made after company was hit be $600 million
in claims, aects 240,000 customers, Los Angeles Times (June 10, 1994).
205 Daniel P. Marshall, III, e Creation of the California Earthquake Authority, at 5 (November 15, 2002).
Report Providing an Assessment of the Current State of the Market for Natural Catastrophe Insurance in the United States
43
Box 7: State Approaches to Promote Availability of Earthquake Insurance (except California)
Due to the proximity to the New Madrid Seismic Zone, states in the middle of the country have tailored
local approaches to earthquake insurance. For example, Arkansas enacted legislation in 1999 designed to
ensure the availability of earthquake insurance. e legislation recognized the risk of a major earthquake
in Arkansas with a potential for unavailability of residential earthquake insurance that could be addressed
through a market assistance program and, if an insurer does not participate in the market assistance program,
a publicly-run insurer, the Arkansas Earthquake Authority.
206
Insurers writing homeowner, farm owner, and
re and allied lines are required to notify policyholders who do not have residential earthquake insurance of
the availability of earthquake insurance through the market assistance program, or, in the event an insurer
does not participate in the market assistance program, the Arkansas Earthquake Authority.
207
e Arkansas
Insurance Department reviews the status of the earthquake insurance market.
208
e market assistance
program remains operational and thus the Arkansas Earthquake Authority has not been authorized to issue
earthquake insurance policies.
e Kentucky Department of Insurance directed homeowner insurers to “have an endorsement for earthquake
insurance available if requested” and specied the maximum deductible for three regions: 20 percent for the
counties in the far west; 15 percent for counties in the near west; and 10 percent in the eastern counties.
209
Moreover, the Kentucky Department of Insurance prohibits the imposition of a moratorium on the issuance of
earthquake insurance policies following a minor earthquake, i.e., a seismic event less than 4.0 on the Richter
scale.
210
Both Illinois and Missouri require homeowner insurers to notify applicants regarding the availability of
earthquake insurance for residential property located in the New Madrid Seismic Zone.
211
e FAIR Plans in Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, and Ohio oer earthquake insurance.
212
Illinois’s FAIR Plan,
for example, oers earthquake insurance only upon request as an endorsement to the dwelling property and
homeowner policy with a standard 5 percent deductible.
213
In order to stabilize the California homeowner insurance market, the legislature enacted a number of measures in
1995. First, it authorized the sale of a “mini-policy” providing coverage limited to the dwelling with not more than a
15 percent deductible, contents coverage of no less than $5,000, and $1,500 in additional living expenses.
214
Sec-
ond, it authorized the establishment of the CEA – a publicly run, privately nanced earthquake insurer discussed in
further detail in Section VI.C, below.
206 Arkansas 82
nd
Regular Session, Act 1343, House Bill 1835 (1999).
207 Id.
208 Arkansas Insurance Department, Bulletin No. 5-2007: Earthquake Coverage Market Analysis Revised Reporting Form
(November 16, 2007), available at http://insurance.arkansas.gov/legal/Bulletins/5-2007.pdf.
209 Kentucky Department of Insurance, Bulletin 98-2: Personal Lines Property Insurance for Earthquake Damage (March 13,
1998), available at http://insurance.ky.gov/Documents/bul9802.pdf.
210 Id.
211 215 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/143.21c.; Mo. Rev. Stat. § 379.975
212 Id.; Missouri Department of Insurance, Financial Institutions and Professional Registration, Final Report of the Missouri
Earthquake Insurance Task Force, at 21 (December 19, 2008).
213 Illinois FAIR Plan, Consumer FAQs, available at https://www.illinoisfairplan.com/about/faq#earthquake.
214 1995 Regular Session, Chapter 939 (California Assembly Bill No. 1366).
Report Providing an Assessment of the Current State of the Market for Natural Catastrophe Insurance in the United States
44
C. California Earthquake Authority
According to California law, the California Department of Insurance regulates the CEA as a private insurer that has
the authority to issue policies once the Insurance Commissioner certied the following: that insurers representing
70 percent of the market committed to participate in the CEA; that the CEA had secured reinsurance in an amount
equal to at least 200 percent of the capital contributions committed by insurers electing to participate in the CEA;
and that the Internal Revenue Service ruled the CEA to be tax-exempt.
215
Any homeowner insurer electing to partic-
ipate in the CEA satises California’s statutory requirement to oer earthquake insurance.
216
e CEA began writing
earthquake insurance for homeowners, renters, and condominium-unit owners in 1996, and today California has a
robust homeowner insurance market.
217
e CEA may only oer earthquake insurance in the state of California.
218
e CEA is a public instrumentality of
the State of California governed by a board consisting of the Governor, the Treasurer, and the Insurance Commis-
sioner; the Speaker of the Assembly and the Chairperson of the Senate Committee on Rules serve as non-voting,
ex-ocio board members.
219
e CEA is exempt from federal income tax
220
and the state premium tax,
221
and its
funds may not be used to meet the general obligations of the state unless the CEA has been terminated.
222
In ad-
dition, the CEA’s policies are not protected by the California Insurance Guaranty Association, and thus the CEA is
not subject to guaranty fund assessment.
223
CEA’s federal tax exemption allows it to hold premiums in a catastrophic
insurance reserve, a feature not available to other private insurers.
224
Homeowner insurers may join the CEA by making an initial capital contribution in an amount equal to $1 billion
multiplied by the insurer’s market share.
225
Each participating insurer is responsible for selling policies to the partic-
ipating insurer’s homeowner insurance policyholders and adjusting claims after an earthquake and, in return, is paid
for agent commissions and administrative expenses by CEA.
226
Participating insurers may be assessed, in the aggre-
gate, up to $1.78 billion if the CEA needs additional funds to pay claims following a major earthquake.
227
According
to the CEA, 21 insurers participated in 2015.
228
215 Ocial California Legislative Information, Conference Report Committee Analysis AB 2086 1995, available at http://www.
leginfo.ca.gov/pub/95-96/bill/asm/ab_2051-2100/ab_2086_cfa_960707_214004_sen_oor.html.
216 California Insurance Code §10089.41.
217 California Department of Insurance, Residential Property Insurance Report, available at http://www.insurance.
ca.gov/0400-news/0200-studies-reports/0250-homeowners-study/.
218 Cal. Ins. Code §10089.6.
219 Cal. Ins. Code §§10089.7, 10089.21.
220 California State Senate Committee on Insurance Informational Hearing, Catastrophic Risk in California: Are Homeowners
and Communities Prepared, at 4 (May 14, 2014), available at http://sins.senate.ca.gov/sites/sins.senate.ca.gov/
les/14.05-14.Background.Catastrophic%20Risks%20in%20California.PDF.
221 Cal. Ins. Code §10089.44.
222 Id.
223 Cal. Ins. Code §10089.34.
224 Id.; California State Senate Committee on Insurance Informational Hearing, Catastrophic Risk in California: Are
Homeowners and Communities Prepared, at 7 (May 14, 2014), available at http://sins.senate.ca.gov/sites/sins.senate.
ca.gov/les/14.05-14.Background.Catastrophic%20Risks%20in%20California.PDF.
225 Cal. Ins. Code §10089.15.
226 Id.; California State Senate Committee on Insurance Informational Hearing, Catastrophic Risk in California: Are
Homeowners and Communities Prepared, at 4 (May 14, 2014), available at http://sins.senate.ca.gov/sites/sins.senate.
ca.gov/les/14.05-14.Background.Catastrophic%20Risks%20in%20California.PDF.
227 Cal. Ins. Code §10089.31.
228 California Earthquake Authority, Participating Insurers, available at www.earthquakeauthority.com/insurancepolicies/
Pages/participatinginsurers.aspx.
Report Providing an Assessment of the Current State of the Market for Natural Catastrophe Insurance in the United States
45
e earthquake insurance policies oered by the CEA have a standard 15 percent deductible with policy limits based
on the underlying limits of the homeowner insurance policy; for an additional premium, a homeowner may lower
the policy deductible to 10 percent.
229
Homeowners may elect to purchase an earthquake insurance policy without
coverage for personal property or loss of use.
230
Only residential properties “located within 20 miles of the fault or on
poor soil condition” are considered susceptible to losses above a 15 percent deductible threshold.
231
Premium rates
must be actuarially sound and “established based on the best available scientic information for assessing the risk of
earthquake frequency, severity, and loss.”
232
e CEA is required to provide a 5 percent discount for homes that have
been retrotted to withstand earthquake shake damage.
233
As of December 31, 2013, the CEA had $9.9 billion in claims-paying capacity.
234
Sources of funds to pay claims
include CEA’s available capital derived from participating insurer capital contributions, premiums, and investments;
its 2006 Revenue Bond; reinsurance; and post-event assessments on participating insurers.
235
In 2013, the CEA had
841,836 earthquake insurance policies and approximately $569 billion in written premium, representing approxi-
mately 76 percent of all residential earthquake insurance policies in California and 63 percent of all written premium
for California residential earthquake insurance.
236
e percentage of California residential property insurance policies with earthquake insurance has declined steadily
since 1997, as seen in Figure 11. Between 1997 and 2011, the average premium for earthquake insurance increased.
To address the aordability of CEA’s earthquake insurance, legislation was introduced in Congress in 2013 to create a
federal guarantee of limited borrowing for the CEA.
237
229 California Earthquake Authority, Financial Statements, at 3 (December 31, 2013 and 2012), available at http://www.
earthquakeauthority.com/whoweare/nancialstrength/SiteAssets/Pages/FinancialStatements/2013%20GASB%20
Audited%20Financial%20Statements.pdf.
230 Id. at 5.
231 Id.
232 Cal. Ins. Code §10089.40.
233 Id.
234 California Earthquake Authority, Financial Statements, at 3 (December 31, 2013 and 2012) available at http://www.
earthquakeauthority.com/whoweare/nancialstrength/SiteAssets/Pages/FinancialStatements/2013%20GASB%20
Audited%20Financial%20Statements.pdf.
235 California Earthquake Authority, CEA Financial Update to U.S. Treasury Federal Insurance Oce (February 2013).
236 Calculated based on data in the California Department of Insurance, Earthquake Premium and Policy Count Data Call:
Summary of 2013 Residential and Commercial Market Totals, available at http://www.insurance.ca.gov/0400-news/0200-
studies-reports/0300-earthquake-study/upload/EQEXP2013.pdf.
237 United States Congress, Summary of S.1813—Earthquake Insurance Aordability Act of 2013, available at https://www.
congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/senate-bill/1813; Oce of Senator Dianne Feinstein, Feinstein, Boxer Push for Hearing
on Earthquake Insurance Aordability Act, (September 11, 2014), available at http://www.feinstein.senate.gov/public/
index.cfm/press-releases?ID=5b063ec4-043d-40c8-954d-c293825febb7.
Report Providing an Assessment of the Current State of the Market for Natural Catastrophe Insurance in the United States
46
Figure 11: Average Premium Earthquake Insurance Policy in Dollars and Percent Residential
Insurance Market with Earthquake Insurance, California 1997-2013
While the CEA has stabilized the California homeowner insurance market and helps to ensure the availability of
earthquake insurance, if lenders were to require borrowers to purchase earthquake insurance as a condition for
obtaining a loan, as is true for ood insurance, California could face an availability crisis. While not presently a
concern, CEA’s authorizing statute states that if the Federal National Mortgage Association and the Federal Home
Loan Mortgage Corporation require earthquake insurance for residential structures as a condition of receiving a loan,
the CEA must cease writing new earthquake insurance policies 180 days after the eective date of the requirement
238
“because introducing mandatory residential earthquake insurance in California would exceed the current nancial
capacity and capabilities of the CEA.”
239
D. Reinsurance
Reinsurance helps support the availability and aordability of natural catastrophe insurance in the United States.
Without reinsurance, insurers likely would have diculty oering some lines of insurance in catastrophe-prone areas
due to concerns about loss concentration from a single event. While the price of reinsurance may inuence primary
insurance rates, a dollar-for-dollar relationship between prices for the two sectors does not exist because multiple
factors can contribute to insurance and reinsurance rates.
Reinsurance is a commercial agreement whereby one insurer (the reinsurer) indemnies another insurer (the “ce-
dent”) for all or a part of the losses under policies of insurance issued by the cedent. Among other reasons, cedents
purchase reinsurance to protect against a large accumulation of losses from natural catastrophes. Typically, cedents
purchase reinsurance for natural catastrophes from one or more reinsurers through “per occurrence” excess of loss
238 California Insurance Code §10089.59.
239 Id.; California State Senate Committee on Insurance Informational Hearing, Catastrophic Risk in California: Are
Homeowners and Communities Prepared, at 8 (May 14, 2014), available at http://sins.senate.ca.gov/sites/sins.senate.
ca.gov/les/14.05-14.Background.Catastrophic%20Risks%20in%20California.PDF.
Source: California Residential and Earthquake Insurance Coverage Study
0.00%
5.00%
10.00%
15.00%
20.00%
25.00%
0.00
100.00
200.00
300.00
400.00
500.00
600.00
700.00
800.00
900.00
1000.00
Average Premium in USD
Percent Earthquake Policies
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
Report Providing an Assessment of the Current State of the Market for Natural Catastrophe Insurance in the United States
47
contracts, or contracts by which the reinsurer becomes obligated only after the primary insurer pays losses of an
agreed upon amount. Recently, alternative risk transfer solutions have developed that allow cedents to access cap-
ital market participants through non-traditional reinsurance mechanisms. e emergence of these new sources of
risk-transfer capacity has improved the availability and aordability of property catastrophe reinsurance.
For a more detailed discussion on the reinsurance sector, see FIO’s report on the Breadth and Scope of the Global Rein-
surance Market and the Critical Role Such Market Plays in Supporting Insurance in the United States.
240
1. Availability of Reinsurance
Reinsurance is a global industry; many participants operate on a cross-border basis, which serves to diversify geo-
graphic exposure to risk. Four large reinsurance groups – Munich Re, Swiss Re, Hannover Re, and the Lloyd’s mar-
ket – account for more than $70 billion in global gross written annual premium, while the next 46 largest reinsurers
combined write $86 billion.
241
Global reinsurance capitalization is currently at record levels.
During the 1990s and 2000s, the growth of the Bermuda reinsurance market played a prominent role in support-
ing the continued availability of reinsurance following major U.S. natural catastrophes. rough the formation of
new companies established in successive “waves,” the reinsurance market replenished capital that was depleted due
to catastrophes. For example, in 1992 and 1993, following Hurricane Andrew, eight new reinsurers were formed in
Bermuda, with approximately $4 billion in combined capital.
242
Another Bermuda growth spurt occurred follow-
ing the September 11 terrorist attacks, when at least 10 new reinsurers were established, with combined capital of
approximately $8.9 billion.
243
A third wave of Bermuda reinsurers occurred in response to Hurricanes Katrina, Rita,
and Wilma in 2005, when investors infused the Bermuda reinsurance market with $8 billion in equity capital sup-
porting eleven new reinsurers.
244
With 15 of the 40 largest reinsurance groups currently domiciled in Bermuda, the
island continues to have a leading role in the property catastrophe reinsurance market supporting U.S. insurers.
245
In the 2000s, alternative means for cedents to protect against losses from catastrophes increased in popularity.
During a time when equity markets and other reinsurers were infusing capital into new unaliated and aliated
reinsurance companies, insurers were also looking to alternative reinsurance instruments, such as catastrophe bonds
(cat bonds), as an additional avenue for risk capacity and diversication. is trend continues. Recently, manag-
ers of hedge funds, pension funds, and other equity funds (collectively referred to herein as “capital markets”) have
increasingly looked to the reinsurance market as a means of diversifying portfolios, capitalizing on cyclical trends in
reinsurance pricing, and improving investment yield.
Although expansion into other market segments is now occurring, alternative reinsurance solutions have primari-
ly been geared toward property catastrophe risks, which oer a relatively short time horizon to maturity, allowing
investors to participate in contracts of a few years or less and evaluate returns soon after contract expiration. Property
catastrophe models have evolved in sophistication so that capital markets are able to assess the levels of assumed natu-
ral disaster risk with improved reliability.
240 Unless otherwise noted, this section is primarily based on FIO’s report, e Breadth and Scope of the Global Reinsurance
Market and the Critical Role Such Market Plays in Supporting Insurance in the United States (2014), available at http://www.
treasury.gov/initiatives/o/reports-and-notices/Documents/FIO%20-%20Reinsurance%20Report.pdf.
241 A.M. Best, Global Reinsurance—Segment Review (September 2014).
242 J. David Cummins, e Bermuda Insurance Market: An Economic Analysis, at 6 (May 6, 2008).
243 Id. at 8.
244 Id.
245 Standard & Poor’s Rating Services, Global Reinsurance Highlights 2014, at 76 (October 2014), available at https://media.
ratings.standardandpoors.com/documents/GRH_2014_Final.pdf. Recently, several consolidations among Bermuda
reinsurers have been announced.
Report Providing an Assessment of the Current State of the Market for Natural Catastrophe Insurance in the United States
48
e growth in new reinsurers and alternative reinsurance instruments over the past two decades has contributed to
greater availability of natural catastrophe reinsurance. For example, whereas the total amount of cat bonds
246
issued
in 1998 was $874 million, reinsurance brokerage rm Guy Carpenter & Company estimates a total of $8 billion in
cat bonds issued as of year-end 2014.
247
Aon Beneld, another reinsurance brokerage rm, reports that total global
reinsurance capital in 2014 reached a new peak of approximately $575 billion, a gure that includes $64 billion in
alternative capital.
2. Aordability of Reinsurance
In recent years, additional reinsurers, alternative reinsurance solutions, and increased industry capacity have reduced
the volatility historically associated with property catastrophe reinsurance pricing. Property catastrophe reinsurance
pricing, which may be compared based on the ratio of premium to limit (i.e., “rate-on-line”), varies on a year-over-
year basis. Historically, spikes in pricing of property catastrophe reinsurance have been most pronounced in years
following signicant natural catastrophes. For example, reinsurance pricing increased by approximately 100 percent
on a year-over-year basis twice in the United States during the past 14 years, following Hurricane Andrew in 1992,
and again following the 2005 hurricane season.
Comparable pricing spikes have not occurred in the U.S. property catastrophe reinsurance market since that time.
Indeed, the record level of reinsurance capitalization recently has softened reinsurance prices. Following Superstorm
Sandy in 2012, which was the third most costly U.S. natural catastrophe,
248
reinsurance renewal prices did not experi-
ence a dramatic increase similar to those following the 1992 and 2005 storms. Increases in reinsurance capital, along
with other factors, have continued to place downward pressure on reinsurance pricing. As reported in January 2014,
the year-over-year U.S. catastrophe reinsurance premiums declined by 15 percent. e trend continued with respect
to reinsurance renewals throughout 2014. Guy Carpenter reports that reinsurance prices at January 1, 2015, contin-
ued to fall across all geographies and lines of business.
249
Despite the current availability and aordability of property catastrophe reinsurance, questions remain about the
long-term pricing and capacity of this market. e downward pressures on reinsurance pricing, and other factors,
have prompted the major rating agencies to announce negative outlooks for the reinsurance industry. e long-term
commitment of alternative capital sources has not yet been tested. Lastly, several recent high-prole consolidations
involving prominent reinsurers in early 2015 illustrate continued evolution of the reinsurance market.
246 A cat bond is a structured debt instrument that transfers risk from a sponsor (i.e., an insurer) to investors (i.e., the capital
markets) under terms and conditions similar to a reinsurance contract. See, A.M. Best Methodology, Rating Natural
Catastrophe Bonds, at 1 (August 2012).
247 Guy Carpenter, Chart: Q1 Cat Bond Issuance Reaches Historic Volume (June 24, 2015), available at http://www.
gccapitalideas.com/2015/06/24/chart-rst-quarter-issuance-reaches-historic-volume/.
248 Insurance Information Institute, Hurricane Sandy Fact File (October 2014), available at http://www.iii.org/article/
hurricane-sandy-fact-le-october-2014.
249 Press Release, Guy Carpenter & Co., January 1, 2015 Renewals See Lower Pricing and Broader Coverage for Clients, Reports
Guy Carpenter (January 7, 2015).
Report Providing an Assessment of the Current State of the Market for Natural Catastrophe Insurance in the United States
49
VII. MITIGATION
Natural catastrophes impose a toll on people and property. Although insurance serves to transfer a portion of natural
catastrophe risk from one party to another party, risk transfer does not, in itself, reduce the overall cost of a natural
catastrophe. It is the reduction of risk, or mitigation, which decreases damage and losses. For example, a 2007 study
of Florida homeowners after Hurricane Charley discovered that homes meeting wind-resistant construction standards
instituted after Hurricane Andrew reported nearly 60 percent fewer insurance claims and 40 percent less damage than
homes built before those standards were enacted.
250
Similarly, a hail-loss study covering more than 300,000 homes in
115 zip codes found that homes with impact-resistant roofs had 40 percent fewer insurance claims and a 55 percent
reduction in losses.
251
For this reason, both the public sector and the insurance industry view risk mitigation as “the
starting point for managing the impact of natural catastrophes,”
252
and as a means to lessen the burdens of natural
catastrophes on individuals, insurers, and government. Although mitigation cannot eliminate natural catastrophes,
it can help make property owners and communities more resilient to damage and less susceptible to losses resulting
from natural catastrophes.
Mitigation includes all actions “to reduce loss of life and property by lessening the impact of disasters.”
253
Mitigation
begins with identifying and understanding the risks in a given area and then taking individual or community-wide
steps, such as elevating or moving buildings prone to ooding or establishing and enforcing building codes, to
reduce those risks. Mitigation has the support of federal, state, and local governments because it provides signicant
economic benets to society.
254
e insurance industry also encourages mitigation measures as a way to benet both
policyholders and insurers. Nevertheless, individuals often fail to take steps to make homes more resilient to natural
hazards because of an underestimation of the risk and concerns about related mitigation costs.
255
Supporting eorts to improve mitigation and resilience is a priority of President Obama. In 2013, President Obama
issued Executive Order 13653, which ordered federal agencies to “promote: (1) engaged and strong partnerships and
information sharing at all levels of government; (2) risk-informed decisionmaking and the tools to facilitate it; (3)
adaptive learning, in which experiences serve as opportunities to inform and adjust future actions; and (4) prepared-
ness planning.”
256
e Executive Order also established a State, Local, and Tribal Leaders Task Force on Climate
Preparedness and Resilience to inform federal eorts on these issues.
257
In 2015, President Obama issued Executive
250 Cassandra R. Cole, David A. Macpherson, Kathleen A. McCullough, e Catastrophic Storm Risk Management Center,
A Comparison of Hurricane Loss Models, at 6 (April 2010).
251 Institute of Building and Home Safety, Commercial Roofs—e Importance of Roofs to Loss Reduction, available at https://
www.disastersafety.org/commercial_maintenance/commercial-roofs-the-importance-of-roofs-to-loss-reduction/.
252 Sean McGovern, Comment of Lloyd’s, at 2 (June 24, 2013), available at http://www.regulations.
gov/#!documentDetail;D=TREAS-DO-2013-0001-0018.
253 Federal Emergency Management Agency, What is Mitigation?, available at http://www.fema.gov/what-mitigation. See
also 44 CFR § 201.2 (dening “hazard mitigation” as “sustained action taken to reduce or eliminate the long-term risk to
human life and property from hazards”).
254 Henry Green, Comment of National Institute of Building Sciences, at 2 (June 24, 2013); see also Multihazard Mitigation
Council, NATURAL HAZARD MITIGATION SAVES: An Independent Study to Assess the Future Savings from Mitigation
Activities, National Institute of Building Sciences (2005).
255 Howard Kunreuther, “Disaster Mitigation and Insurance: Learning from Katrina,” Annals, AAPSS, 604, at 209 (March
2006), available at http://opim.wharton.upenn.edu/risk/downloads/06-05-HK.pdf.
256 Executive Oce of the President, Executive Order — Preparing the United States for the Impacts of Climate Change
(November 1, 2013), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-oce/2013/11/01/executive-order-preparing-
united-states-impacts-climate-change.
257 Id.
Report Providing an Assessment of the Current State of the Market for Natural Catastrophe Insurance in the United States
50
Order 13690, which established a Federal Flood Risk Management Standard. is standard requires all future feder-
al investments in and aecting oodplains to meet an increased level of resilience.
258
A. Benets of Mitigation
Mitigation results in fewer losses, safer and more resilient communities, fewer public funds spent on disaster recovery,
and more aordable insurance.
259
Accordingly, mitigation provides signicant economic benets for the nation as a
whole. A 2005 study by the National Institute of Building Science’s Multihazard Mitigation Council found that “a
dollar spent on hazard mitigation provides the nation about $4 in future benets.”
260
ese benets include reduced
property damage to buildings and infrastructure, reduced direct and indirect business interruption loss, reduced en-
vironmental damage, reduced injuries and loss of life, and reduced costs of emergency response.
261
From the federal
government’s perspective, “the Federal Treasury can redirect an average of $3.65 for each dollar spent on mitigation
from disaster relief costs and tax losses avoided.”
262
e Department of Homeland Security’s 2014 National Prepared-
ness Report states that “[n]ationwide, mitigation eorts reduced the cost of natural disasters by an estimated $3.2
billion in scal year 2013, exceeding Federal targets by over 30 percent.”
263
For similar reasons, mitigation activities are benecial to the insurance industry. Actions that increase policyholder
resilience to natural hazards “have the potential to reduce the damage that natural catastrophes inict on people,
property, and communities and, in turn, reduce both insured losses and the cost of insurance.”
264
Some approaches
used by insurers to support mitigation are discussed below.
B. Mitigation and Insurance
e insurance industry values mitigation as a means of loss prevention or reduction and as an underwriting indicator
of the security or resilience of an insured property. e insurance industry seeks to inform homeowners as to avail-
able mitigation measures and, through price signals and nancial incentives, to encourage policyholders to invest in
these measures. However, the ability of insurers to inuence policyholder behavior in this way is limited due to the
cost of mitigation measures and the inability of most homeowners to assess eectively the risk of natural catastrophes.
1. Identifying Mitigation Activities
e insurance industry invests signicant funds in the Insurance Institute of Business & Home Safety (IBHS), which
identies mitigation measures that strengthen homes and business structures against natural catastrophes such as
ood, hail, hurricane, wildre, and earthquake,
265
much as the National Highway Trac Safety Administration does
258 Executive Oce of the President, Executive Order — Establishing a Federal Flood Risk Management Standard and
a Process for Further Soliciting and Considering Stakeholder Input (January 30, 2015), available at https://www.
whitehouse.gov/the-press-oce/2015/01/30/executive-order-establishing-federal-ood-risk-management-standard-
and-.
259 United Nations Environment Programme Finance Initiative, Principles for Sustainable Insurance, Harnessing the full
potential of the insurance industry in disaster risk management (2015), available at http://www.unep.org/leadmin/
documents/insurance_industry_disaster_risk_management.pdf.
260 Henry Green, Comment of National Institute of Building Sciences, at 2 (June 24, 2013); see also Multihazard Mitigation
Council, NATURAL HAZARD MITIGATION SAVES: An Independent Study to Assess the Future Savings from Mitigation
Activities, National Institute of Building Sciences (2005).
261 Multihazard Mitigation Council, NATURAL HAZARD MITIGATION SAVES: An Independent Study to Assess the Future
Savings from Mitigation Activities, National Institute of Building Sciences, at 2 (2005).
262 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Mitigation’s Value to Society (2010), available at http://www.dhses.ny.gov/oem/
mitigation/documents/mitigations-value-to-society.pdf.
263 Department of Homeland Security, National Preparedness Report, at 37 (March 30, 2014).
264 Sean McGovern, Comment of Lloyd’s, at 2 (June 24, 2013), available at http://www.regulations.
gov/#!documentDetail;D=TREAS-DO-2013-0001-0018.
265 Insurance Institute for Business & Home Safety, About IBHS & Disastersafety.org, available at https://www.disastersafety.
org/about/.
Report Providing an Assessment of the Current State of the Market for Natural Catastrophe Insurance in the United States
51
for automobiles.
266
A research facility in South Carolina “allows IBHS to demonstrate the eectiveness, aordability
and nancial value of stronger building codes and better-built structures; identify eective solutions to building vul-
nerabilities; strengthen the relationship between theoretical and real building performance; and validate and improve
current scientic bases for designing and installing building products and systems.”
267
rough its website (www.di-
sastersafety.org), IBHS makes mitigation recommendations available to property owners. Generally, IBHS focuses on
aordable options, such as mitigating wildre risk by clearing combustible materials from buildings,
268
or mitigating
against high winds by using 8d ring shank nails instead of 6d common nails and staples to provide stronger support
for a roof.
269
ese recommendations are consistent with information provided by FEMA and others.
270
Although
some mitigation measures, such as clearing brush from the area around a house, are aordable, other measures, such
as elevating homes to avoid ood damage, may be cost prohibitive for many homeowners.
271
2. Incentivizing Mitigation
As noted in Section IV of this Report, an evaluation of natural catastrophes and weather-driven risks is a basic part of
the underwriting process for property insurance.
272
e assessment of mitigation measures taken by a homeowner is
an ordinary function of this underwriting process, one that varies from in-person inspections to high-level modeling.
For example, insurers for Colorado homeowners sometimes perform onsite inspections of wildre risks to identify
mitigation steps “to help save [] homes and keep them insurable.”
273
On the other end of the spectrum, mitigation
266 National Highway Trac Safety Administration, About NHTSA, available at http://www.nhtsa.gov/About (“NHTSA was
established by the Highway Safety Act of 1970 and is dedicated to achieving the highest standards of excellence in motor
vehicle and highway safety. It works daily to help prevent crashes and their attendant costs, both human and nancial.”).
267 Insurance Institute for Business & Home Safety, About IBHS & Disastersafety.org, available at https://www.disastersafety.
org/about/.
268 “Defensible space is the natural and landscaped area around a home or other structure that has been modied to reduce
re hazard. Defensible space gives your home a ghting chance against an approaching wildre. Creating defensible space
also reduces the chance of a structure re spreading to the surrounding forest and other homes.” Colorado State Forest
Service, Protecting Your Home from Wildre: Creating Wildre-Defensible Zones, available at http://csfs.colostate.edu/pdfs/
FIRE2012_1_DspaceQuickGuide.pdf.
269 Insurance Institute of Business & Home Safety, IBHS Issues Re-Roong Guidance for Shingle Roofs in Hurricane-Prone Areas,
available at http://disastersafety.org/ibhs-news-releases/ibhs-issues-re-roong-guidance-for-shingle-roofs-in-hurricane-
prone-areas-3/.
270 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Mitigation Ideas (January 2013); Colorado State Forest Service, Protecting
Your Home from Wildre: Creating Wildre-Defensible Zones, available at http://csfs.colostate.edu/pdfs/FIRE2012_1_
DspaceQuickGuide.pdf.; Earthquake Country Alliance, available at http://earthquakecountry.org/step1/.
271 Axis Builders, Cost to Raise a House in NJ, available at http://www.njhouseraising.com/index.php/cost-to-raise-your-
home; LBI House Raising, Frequently Asked Questions, available at http://lbihouseraising.com/faqs/ (“e cost for the
average house raising package is approximately $45k-$50K.”). See also Elizabeth Harris, Going Up A Few Feet, and Hoping
to Avoid a Storm’s Path, New York Times (April 14, 2013) (“Government ocials and industry professionals estimate it
most often costs from $10,000 to $100,000, and perhaps even more, to lift a house, depending on its size, weight and how
it was built. at range does not include the cost of a new foundation, a new set of stairs or any other expenses that might
be encountered down that rabbit hole.”).
272 Elise Farnham, International Risk Management Institute, e Underwriting Submission—Homeowners Insurance (March
2009), available at http://www.irmi.com/expert/articles/2009/farnham03-personal-insurance.aspx (“When analyzing
the location of the premises, the underwriter will evaluate the surrounding environment and placement of the risk.
Multiple massive storms in the Midwest have caused underwriters to look beyond the obvious coastal hurricane zones to
consider more carefully other weather-driven risks of loss: tornadoes, ice storms, and high winds, to name a few.”).
273 State of Colorado, Wildre & Insurance, available at http://cdn.colorado.gov/cs/Satellite?blobcol=
urldata&blobheadername1=Content-Disposition&blobheadername2=Content-Type&blobheadervalue1=inline
%3B+lename%3D%22Wildres+%26+Insurance.pdf%22&blobheadervalue2=application%2Fpdf&blobkey
=id&blobtable=MungoBlobs&blobwhere=1251815248829&ssbinary=true.
Report Providing an Assessment of the Current State of the Market for Natural Catastrophe Insurance in the United States
52
measures are analyzed in catastrophe modeling,
274
which (as explained in Box 1) insurers use to predict the size, fre-
quency, and severity of natural catastrophes and make decisions regarding (i) the concentration of insurance risk and
(ii) the pricing of insurance in a geographic area. In these models, the presence of mitigation measures like hurricane
shutters and wind-rated roof shingles are used as variables in assessing modeled loss costs.
275
Box 8: Government Role in Mitigation
276
Both federal and state governments provide nancial incentives to encourage mitigation against natural
hazards. For example, FEMA oers grants through dierent programs, including the NFIP and the Staord
Act, to assist individuals in mitigating risks associated with ooding. ese grants can be used to elevate
existing homes that are below the baseood elevation, and also can be used to allow local governments to
purchase homes that are at the greatest risk of ooding and to preserve open space for natural ood mitigation.
In FY 2014, FEMA provided over $115 million in ood mitigation-related funds, impacting approximately 539
properties and resulting in an estimated $230 million in reduced claims payments.
277
FEMA also provided
$1.6 billion through the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program in scal years 2012 and 2013,
278
which provides
funding “to states and local governments to implement long-term hazard mitigation measures after a major
disaster declaration.”
279
Other funding is available for individuals and state and local governments from the
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development
280
and the Small Business Administration.
281
e U.S.
Government Accountability Oce has concluded that “the demand for mitigation funds currently exceeds
appropriated amounts.”
282
In addition, the federal government is committed to encouraging risk mitigation for its own programs and
structures. On January 30, 2015, in support of the Climate Action Plan, President Obama signed Executive
Order 13690, which established the Federal Flood Risk Management Standard – “a exible framework to
increase resilience against ooding and help preserve the natural values of oodplains [by ensuring] that
agencies expand management from the current base ood level to a higher vertical elevation and corresponding
horizontal oodplain to address current and future ood risk and ensure that projects funded with taxpayer
dollars last as long as intended.”
283
In 2013, President Obama established the State, Local, and Tribal Leaders
274 Cassandra R. Cole, David A. Macpherson, Kathleen A. McCullough, e Catastrophic Storm Risk Management Center,
A Comparison of Hurricane Loss Models, at 8 (April 2010).
275 Id. at 17.
276 For additional information on federal and state eorts to incentivize mitigation, see Department of Homeland Security,
National Preparedness Report (March 30, 2014); Center for American Progress, Disastrous Spending: Federal Disaster-
Relief Expenditures Rise Amid More Extreme Weather (April 2013); Congressional Research Service, Congressional Primer
on Responding to Major Disasters and Emergencies (April 30, 2014); Mathew Babcock, Columbia Law School Center for
Climate Change Law, State Hazard Mitigation Plans & Climate Change: Rating the States (November 2013); Ellen Vaughn
and Jim Turner, Environmental and Energy Study Institute, e Value and Impact of Building Codes (September 30, 2013);
and Insurance Institute for Business & Home Safety, Rating the States: An Assessment of Residential Building Code and
Enforcement Systems for Life Safety and Property Protection in Hurricane-Prone Regions (January 2012).
277 Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Flood Insurance Program Report to Congress (2014).
278 Department of Homeland Security, 2014 National Preparedness Report, at 44 (March 30, 2014), available at http://
www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1409688068371-d71247cabc52a55de78305a4462d0e1a/2014%20NPR_
FINAL_082914_508v11.pdf.
279 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Hazard Mitigation Grant Program, available at https://www.fema.gov/hazard-
mitigation-grant-program.
280 HUD, Community Development Block Grant Program—CDBG, available at http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/
program_oces/comm_planning/communitydevelopment/programs.
281 Small Business Administration, Disaster Loan Program, available at https://www.sba.gov/content/disaster-loan-program.
282 General Accountability Oce, Overview of GAO’s Past Work on the National Flood Insurance Program, at 6 (April 9, 2014).
283 Executive Oce of the President, Executive Order 13690: Establishing a Federal Flood Risk Management Standard and a
Process for Further Soliciting and Considering Stakeholder Input (January 30, 2015).
Report Providing an Assessment of the Current State of the Market for Natural Catastrophe Insurance in the United States
53
Task Force on Climate Preparedness and Resilience to inform federal eorts on these issues.
284
In addition,
the Mitigation Framework Leadership Group, “an interagency and intergovernmental body that facilitates
information exchange and coordinates policy implementation,” will continue to coordinate federal, state, local
and tribal eorts relating to mitigation.
285
To become eligible for federal disaster mitigation funding from FEMA, states must have a State Hazard
Mitigation Plan,
286
which is designed to limit the costs of hazard events, including natural catastrophes,
through state-wide plans that coordinate pre-disaster mitigation activities.
287
Local jurisdictions must also
maintain hazard mitigation plans to qualify to receive federal disaster mitigation funding from FEMA.
States and localities also support mitigation measures through, for example, sustainable land use policies
and the passage and enforcement of up-to-date building codes. Such measures result in safer, more resilient
communities, and are part of the overall risk picture assessed by insurers during underwriting and rate-setting.
Certain state and local governments also provide nancial incentives through grant programs and tax
incentives to support mitigation measures. For example, South Carolina established the South Carolina Safe
Home Program for homes with an assessed or insured dwelling value of $300,000 or less to provide up to
$5,000 for roof, exterior doors, and exterior window retrots to mitigate hurricane losses, with a dollar-for-
dollar match requirement that is waived for homes valued at $150,000 or less that are owned by low-income
homeowners.
288
South Carolina also oers two types of income tax credits for fortication measures or
retrots increasing structural resistance to hurricane, winds, and oods.
289
Other states that provide nancial
incentives for mitigation measures include Alabama,
290
Colorado,
291
Florida,
292
and Louisiana.
293
Certain
localities in Alabama also provide incentives through building permit rebates.
294
Each of these examples
illustrate the recognition by state and local governments that eective mitigation measures can reduce damage
to people and property, and decrease the cost of recovery and reconstruction.
284 Executive Oce of the President, Executive Order13653: Preparing the United States for the Impacts of Climate Change
(November 1, 2013).
285 Department of Homeland Security, Mitigation Federal Interagency Operational Plan, at 22-23 (July 2014). e Director of
the Federal Insurance Oce sits on the Mitigation Framework Leadership Group.
286 42 U.S.C. § 5165, et seq.
287 Mathew Babcock, Columbia Law School Center for Climate Change Law, State Hazard Mitigation Plans & Climate
Change: Rating the States, (November 2013).
288 South Carolina Department of Insurance, Omnibus Coastal Property Insurance Reform Act of 2007 Presentation, at 15
(2013), available at http://www.naic.org/documents/committees_c_catastrophe_2013_south_carolina_presentation.
pdf.
289 South Carolina Department of Insurance, State Income Tax Credits for Fortication Measure, available at http://www.
doi.sc.gov/593/State-Income-Tax-Credit-for-Forticatio.
290 Ala. Code § 40-18-15.5 (2012).
291 Oce of Governor John Hickenlooper, Gov. Hickenlooper announces grants for wildre mitigation (August 15, 2013),
available at http://www.colorado.gov/cs/Satellite/GovHickenlooper/CBON/1251645176385; Colorado Department
of Revenue, Taxpayer Service Division, Income 65: Wildre Mitigation Measures Subtraction, (December 2013), available at
http://www.coloradorli.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/CO-Dept-of-Rev-FYI-Wildre-Mitigation-Measures.pdf.
292 Florida Division of Emergency Management, Residential Construction Mitigation Program, available at http://www.
oridadisaster.org/Mitigation/RCMP/index.htm.
293 Louisiana Department of Insurance, Residential Property Storm Mitigation Incentives, available at http://www.ldi.louisiana.
gov/docs/default-source/documents/publicaairs/consumerpublications/storm-mitigation-incentives.pdf?sfvrsn=8.
294 City of Orange Beach, Alabama, Ordinance No. 2012-1145 (2012), available at http://www.cityoforangebeach.com/
pages_2011/pdfs/ordinances/2012/2012-1145_Building_Codes_2012_Adopted.pdf.
Report Providing an Assessment of the Current State of the Market for Natural Catastrophe Insurance in the United States
54
e underwriting process results in risk-based homeowner insurance premiums, which “provide signals to individ-
uals as to the hazards they face.”
295
High deductibles for properties at risk to natural catastrophes also “provide[] a
nancial incentive for the policyholder to implement cost eective risk mitigation measures in order to keep losses as
low as possible below the full deductible amount.”
296
rough these signals (i.e., higher premiums and deductibles),
insurers inform homeowners of the cost of risks, including natural catastrophe risk. Homeowners may respond to
these signals and reduce insurance-related costs, by engaging in mitigation.
Insurers further encourage mitigation through nancial incentives, although these incentives are largely mandated by
state law. Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana mandate premium discounts for homes meeting IBHS home con-
struction and retrot standards and programs (known as FORTIFIED standards).
297
Similarly, the North Carolina
Rate Bureau’s 2010 rate ling included FORTIFIED wind mitigation incentives.
298
Other states mandate premium
discounts for hurricane mitigation measures that are not specically tied to FORTIFIED standards, including Flor-
ida,
299
Maryland,
300
New York,
301
Rhode Island,
302
and South Carolina.
303
Residual markets provide similar nancial
incentives, which can help defray the increased costs of the insurance available through these markets. e Georgia
Underwriting Association provides credits for wind coverage if a home was constructed to FORTIFIED standards,
304
and the Alabama Insurance Underwriting Association oers premium discounts for property owners who meet FOR-
TIFIED standards or otherwise engage in wind mitigation.
305
Communities may also act to reduce insurance costs for homeowners by engaging in community-wide mitigation,
such as the passage and enforcement of up-to-date building codes. Community-wide mitigation projects are easier
for underwriters to assess and, therefore, such actions can result in “adjusted insurance premiums” on a wide scale.
306
For example, ISO, which creates standardized rating programs and insurance forms that are approved by state regula-
tors and may be adopted by insurers, gathers and assesses information on risk mitigation activities such as storm shut-
295 Howard Kunreuther and Erwann Michel-Kerjan, Managing Catastrophic Risks through Redesigned Insurance:
Challenges and Opportunities, at 17 (July 30, 2012), available at http://opim.wharton.upenn.edu/risk/library/
J2013Kunreuther+Michel-Kerjan_Managing-Cat-Risks-through-Redesigned-Insurance.pdf.
296 Lloyd’s, Managing the Escalating Risks of Natural Catastrophes in the United States, at 16-17 (2011).
297 Insurance Institute of Business & Home Safety, Frequently Asked Questions: Fortied Home, available at https://www.
disastersafety.org/fortied/fortied-home-frequently-asked-questions-2/.
298 Insurance Institute of Business & Home Safety, Fortied Home™: Hurricane Financial Incentives, available at http://www.
disastersafety.org/wp-content/uploads/FORTIFIED-Home-Incentives_IBHS.pdf.
299 Florida Oce of Insurance Regulation, Premium Discounts for Hurricane Loss Mitigation, available at http://www.oir.
com/Sections/PandC/HurricaneLossMitigation.aspx.
300 Maryland Insurance Administration, Bulletin 09-08 (April 2009), available at http://www.mdinsurance.state.md.us/sa/
docs/documents/insurer/bulletins/bulletinpc09-08-windstorm.pdf.
301 Id.
302 Insurance Information Institute, Hurricane and Windstorm Deductibles (November 2014), available at http://www.iii.org/
issue-update/hurricane-and-windstorm-deductibles.
303 South Carolina Department of Insurance, Omnibus Coastal Property Insurance Reform Act of 2007 Presentation, at 15
(2013), available at http://www.naic.org/documents/committees_c_catastrophe_2013_south_carolina_presentation.
pdf.
304 Insurance Institute of Business & Home Safety, Fortied Home™: Hurricane Financial Incentives, available at http://www.
disastersafety.org/wp-content/uploads/FORTIFIED-Home-Incentives_IBHS.pdf.
305 Alabama Insurance Underwriting Association, About the Alabama Insurance Underwriting Association, available at https://
aiua.org/pages/about.
306 Sean McGovern, Comment of Lloyd’s, at 2 (June 24, 2013), available at http://www.regulations.
gov/#!documentDetail;D=TREAS-DO-2013-0001-0018.
Report Providing an Assessment of the Current State of the Market for Natural Catastrophe Insurance in the United States
55
ters and seismic retrotting in creating its Building Code Eectiveness Grading Schedule (BCEGS).
307
e BCEGS
sets classications that, if adopted by insurers, provide communities with reductions in insurance rates.
308
ese signals and incentives are intended to “encourage [individuals] to engage in cost-eective mitigation measures
to reduce their vulnerability to catastrophes.”
309
However, many “residents in hazard-prone areas do not undertake
loss prevention measures voluntarily.”
310
is reluctance has several sources. Although IBHS has noted that “eective
mitigation against a variety of natural hazards is both aordable and cost-eective,” others have acknowledged that
“incentives in the form of insurance savings cannot fully reimburse all mitigation eorts,”
311
leaving nancial burdens
on policyholders. e combination of upfront costs associated with mitigation and family budget constraints pro-
vides a simple explanation of “why individuals fail to mitigate in the face of transparent risk.”
312
Further, policyholder
concerns about home resale value relative to the cost of mitigation also inuence the decision not to invest in mitiga-
tion measures.
313
In addition, research suggests that homeowners in areas prone to natural catastrophes, particularly
natural catastrophes caused by hurricanes or tropical storms and earthquakes, underestimate the probability of a
disaster occurring and estimate the potential benets of mitigation investments only over a short-time horizon of one
to two years.
314
Many believe that private and public sector eorts to encourage and incentivize mitigation should be collaborative
to more eciently encourage homeowners to undertake mitigation measures, resulting in long-term savings for
themselves, the insurance industry, and the nation as a whole.
315
To this end, President Obama’s Climate Action
Plan includes a commitment to engagement between the federal government and the insurance industry “to explore
best practices for private and public insurers to manage their own processes and investments to account for climate
change risks and incentivize policyholders to take steps to reduce their own exposures to these risks.”
316
Following a
roundtable discussion between senior Administration ocials and industry executives in June 2014, representatives
of the insurance industry released a joint statement expressing support for, among other things, “resilience and pre-
event property loss mitigation” and the goal of “[s]upporting and utilizing research and targeted incentives (such as
307 Insurance Services Oce, How Do Building Code Eectiveness Classications Aect Insurance Pricing?, available at http://
www.isomitigation.com/bcegs/0000/bcegs0004.html#q4.
308 Insurance Services Oce, What Determines a Municipality’s Code Eectiveness Classication?, available at http://www.
isomitigation.com/bcegs/0000/bcegs0003.html#q4.
309 Howard Kunreuther and Erwann Michel-Kerjan, Managing Catastrophic Risks through Redesigned Insurance:
Challenges and Opportunities, at 17 (July 30, 2012), available at http://opim.wharton.upenn.edu/risk/library/
J2013Kunreuther+Michel-Kerjan_Managing-Cat-Risks-through-Redesigned-Insurance.pdf.
310 Howard Kunreuther, Disaster Mitigation and Insurance: Learning from Katrina, Annals, AAPSS, 604, at 209 (March 2006),
available at http://opim.wharton.upenn.edu/risk/downloads/06-05-HK.pdf.
311 Lauren Pachman, Comment of American Academy of Actuaries (June 24, 2013), available at http://www.regulations.
gov/#!documentDetail;D=TREAS-DO-2013-0001-0045.
312 Howard Kunreuther and Erwann Michel-Kerjan, Managing Catastrophic Risks through Redesigned Insurance:
Challenges and Opportunities, at 17 (July 30, 2012), available at http://opim.wharton.upenn.edu/risk/library/
J2013Kunreuther+Michel-Kerjan_Managing-Cat-Risks-through-Redesigned-Insurance.pdf; see also Sean McGovern,
Comment of Lloyd’s, at 2 (June 24, 2013), available at http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=TREAS-
DO-2013-0001-0018 (noting that “individuals may be limited by the large, upfront expense of mitigation”).
313 Howard Kunreuther, Disaster Mitigation and Insurance: Learning from Katrina, Annals, AAPSS, 604, at 209 (March 2006),
available at http://opim.wharton.upenn.edu/risk/downloads/06-05-HK.pdf.
314 Howard Kunreuther and Erwann Michel-Kerjan, Managing Catastrophic Risks through Redesigned Insurance:
Challenges and Opportunities, at 17 (July 30, 2012), available at http://opim.wharton.upenn.edu/risk/library/
J2013Kunreuther+Michel-Kerjan_Managing-Cat-Risks-through-Redesigned-Insurance.pdf.
315 See, e.g., Lloyd’s, Managing the Escalating Risks of Natural Catastrophes in the United States, at 8 (2011); Lauren Pachman,
Comment of American Academy of Actuaries (June 24, 2013); Alan Manness, Comment of State Farm, at 2 (June 24,
2013); Debra Ballen, Comment of IBHS, at 6 (June 24, 2013); Chris Hackett, Comment of Property Casualty Insurers
Association of America (June 24, 2013).
316 Executive Oce of the President, e President’s Climate Action Plan, at 13-14 (June 2013).
Report Providing an Assessment of the Current State of the Market for Natural Catastrophe Insurance in the United States
56
tax credits, loans, or grants) to promote eective loss mitigation, in order to reduce current and future risk to people,
property, natural features, ecosystems, and critical infrastructure.”
317
FIO continues to support eorts within the fed-
eral government and with a broad group of stakeholders to promote the eective coordination of private and public
sector work relating to mitigation.
317 Joint Statement of American Insurance Association, Insurance Institute for Business & Home Safety, National Association
of Mutual Insurance Companies, Property Casualty Insurers Association of America, and Reinsurance Association of
America (September 23, 2014), available at https://www.disastersafety.org/news/joint-statement-september-23-2014/.
Report Providing an Assessment of the Current State of the Market for Natural Catastrophe Insurance in the United States
57
VIII. CONCLUSION
In light of the complexity of insurance and mitigation in relation to natural catastrophes, this Report provides
high-level overview of the issues. Every region of the United States is vulnerable to natural catastrophes. In general,
the number of natural catastrophe events per year and the associated economic losses are increasing and, as a result,
attention to natural catastrophe insurance programs has increased as well.
Current approaches to providing natural catastrophe insurance protection to dierent sectors of the population of the
United States include homeowner insurance, ood insurance, and earthquake insurance. Without these insurance
products, repairs that must be made to a property due to damage from a natural catastrophe must be paid for by the
property owner – either alone or, in some cases, with government assistance. Encouraging homeowners to pur-
chase appropriate insurance coverage and maintaining market conditions conducive to private insurance for natural
catastrophes enhances the role of private capital in post-event recovery and reconstruction. In addition, by providing
funds to help rebuild communities, insurance can reduce the impact of natural catastrophes by increasing participa-
tion by private industry in the protection of collateral pledged for mortgage and business loans.
Consumer demand – or lack of demand – for natural catastrophe insurance may be partly explained by perceptions
of natural catastrophe risk and partly by mortgage loan requirements. Generally, mortgage lenders require borrowers
to maintain hazard insurance which may be satised by a standard homeowner insurance policy. Mortgage lenders
require certain residential properties to maintain ood insurance, but this does not apply to residential properties
located outside the geographic areas at greatest risk for ooding as identied in the latest FIRM. Mortgage lenders
do not require earthquake insurance in any state or the District of Columbia.
e availability of insurance for natural catastrophe perils in the United States is related to the costs that natural ca-
tastrophes present to insurers and how insurers manage that risk. One way insurers manage natural catastrophe risk
is to limit risk exposure through reinsurance. In the past, primary insurers writing homeowner or earthquake insur-
ance have encountered diculty in the ability to purchase reinsurance for natural catastrophes. Currently, capitaliza-
tion in the reinsurance market is at record high levels. Reinsurance availability helps insurers write more homeowner
insurance and earthquake insurance throughout the United States.
Insurers also manage natural catastrophe risk by increasing premiums and by applying more restrictive underwriting
standards, both of which aect the aordability and can limit the availability of new homeowner insurance policies
in geographic areas with correlated losses. In response, most states along the Atlantic, Gulf, and West coasts estab-
lished residual markets for homeowner insurance. Generally, if the premiums charged in the residual market do not
cover losses, an assessment may be levied on insurers writing in the state, thereby shifting the nancing of some of the
insured losses to all policyholders in the state. Florida, Louisiana, and Texas each has adopted depopulation policies
to move homeowners out of the state’s Wind Pool, and into homeowner insurance oered by private insurers.
Insurers may manage certain natural catastrophe risks by completely avoiding certain areas or risks, thus aecting the
availability of insurance in some high-risk areas. For example, most homeowner insurance policies exclude coverage
for ood and few insurers oer a ood endorsement or standalone ood policy. e NFIP, established in 1968 to
make ood insurance available, historically collected premiums sucient to cover ood losses. is changed with
Hurricane Katrina, however, as the unprecedented ood losses resulting from that storm exceeded all NFIP funds.
e actions of policymakers may aect the availability of insurance in dierent ways. For example, when Califor-
nia enacted laws requiring insurers writing homeowner insurance to oer earthquake insurance, thereby restricting
insurers’ ability to manage earthquake exposure, some insurers stopped writing new homeowner insurance policies in
that state.
Ultimately, insurance transfers natural catastrophe risk from one party to another, but cannot eliminate or reduce
that risk. Homeowners, businesses, insurers, and local, state, and federal governments all have an interest in mit-
igation to reduce the damage caused by natural catastrophes. Insurers have an important role to play in helping
homeowners understand the risk of living in certain geographic areas and how to diminish that risk through specic
mitigation activities.
Report Providing an Assessment of the Current State of the Market for Natural Catastrophe Insurance in the United States
58
As President Obama has explained: “We’re going to need to get prepared. [We must] protect critical sectors of our
economy and prepare the United States for the impacts of climate change that we cannot avoid. States and cities
across the country are already taking it upon themselves to get ready… And we’ll partner with communities seeking
help to prepare for droughts and oods, reduce the risk of wildres, protect the dunes and wetlands that pull double
duty as green space and as natural storm barriers.”
318
318 White House Oce of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet: Executive Order on Climate Preparedness (November 1,
2013), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-oce/2013/11/01/fact-sheet-executive-order-climate-
preparedness.
Report Providing an Assessment of the Current State of the Market for Natural Catastrophe Insurance in the United States
59
IX. GLOSSARY
1968 Act National Flood Insurance Act of 1968
1973 Act Flood Disaster Protection Act of 1973
ACV Actual Cash Value
Aordability Report Aordability of National Flood Insurance Program Premiums: Report 1
Biggert Waters Act e Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012
Catastrophe Reserve Fund Texas Catastrophe Reserve Trust Fund
Cat bonds Catastrophe Bonds
CEA California Earthquake Authority
CRS Community Rating System
Dwelling Form Standard Flood Insurance Policy Dwelling Form
FAIR Plans Fair Access to Insurance Requirements Plans
FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency
FIO Federal Insurance Oce
FIRMs Flood Insurance Rate Maps
Florida Citizens Florida Citizens Property Insurance Corporation
Florida Commission Florida Commission on Hurricane Loss Projection Methodology
FORTIFIED standards IBHS home construction and retrot standards and programs
FRN Treasury Federal Register Notice, April 24, 2013
HFIAA Homeowner Flood Insurance Aordability Act of 2014
IBHS Insurance Institute of Business & Home Safety
ISO Insurance Services Oce
Louisiana Citizens Louisiana Citizens Property Insurance Corporation
LPCIC Louisiana Property and Casualty Insurance Commission
Munich Re Munich Reinsurance Company
NFIP National Flood Insurance Program
PCS ISO Property Claim Service
e Report FIO Report on the state of the U.S. market for natural catastrophe insurance
RCV Replacement Cost Value
SFHA Special Flood Hazard Areas
Staord Act Robert T. Staord Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act
Treasury U.S. Department of the Treasury
TWIA Texas Windstorm Insurance Association
UNISDR United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction
Wind Pools Beach Plans or Wind Pools
WYO Program Write-Your-Own Program
Report Providing an Assessment of the Current State of the Market for Natural Catastrophe Insurance in the United States
60
