China's Role in India's Hindu Nationalist Discourse

China’s Role in India’s Hindu

Nationalist Discourse

Rush Doshi

118 | Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies

“Hindu naonalism risks pushing India into war with China,” blared the headline from China’s

naonalist tabloid, Global Times.

Meanwhile, in Washington, a wide-ranging network of

analysts opmisc on U.S.-India es similarly argue that India’s naonalist polical forces

will push the country further away from Beijing and likely closer to Washington. These

are bold claims about the ways in which naonal identy will intersect with great power

polics. But are they correct?

That queson is now more urgent than ever. The Bharya Janata Party’s (BJP) sweeping

victory in the May 2019 elecons shows that Hindu naonalism is the potent polical force

reshaping the country. But what role does China play in Hindu naonalist narraves, and

how might those narraves aect China policy? This paper explores the various threads of

Hindu naonalism and chronicles the relavely limited role that China plays within them.

First, it explores the history of Hindu naonalism as a polical force in India, demonstrang

its tendency to view Islam – rather than the West or China – as the salient other. The

key naonalist policy priories for Hindu naonalists--including the introducon of a

Uniform Civil Code that reduces sharia’s role in civil law, the repeal of Arcle 370 of India’s

Constuon that protects Kashmir’s special status, and the construcon of a Ram temple

at Ayodhya on the grounds of what was once a mosque – are all issues that implicate Hindu

relaons with Islam. Second, aer making the argument that Hindu naonalism is primarily

focused on Islam, the paper then turns to analyzing China’s role in naonalist ideology.

It argues that China plays a relavely limited and oen contradictory role in naonalist

discourse despite the increasingly contenous Sino-Indian relaonship. Hindu naonalists

view China through a variety of lenses – sovereignty, trade, and values – each of which

produces a dierent perspecve and precludes a singular, unied Hindu naonalist view of

China.

And in some areas, Hindu naonalists even admire Chinese approaches.

Despite China’s limited presence in naonalist narraves, among members of the Indian

elite and bureaucracy concerns over China dang back to the annexaon of Tibet and the

1962 Sino-Indian War are sharpening as China’s power grows. Even so, China’s connued

support for Pakistan, its hardening posion on the border, its standos with India like the

one over Doklam, and its growing inuence in South Asia appear to be elite rather than

popular preoccupaons. The Modi government has pursued a modestly more compeve

policy with China than its predecessors, but for the most part it has balanced that approach

with engagement and sought largely to build on the policies of previous governments – and

this eort does not primarily ow from Hindu naonalist impulses. In contrast to countries

like Vietnam, where naonalism oen focuses externally on China, Hindu naonalism

remains focused on an internal other.

Should Hindu naonalism gain greater polical power – perhaps at the expense of the

historically secular state bureaucracies that are increasingly concerned about China – it

may create a modest opening for Beijing, which is less likely than the West to have concerns

over India’s majoritarian turn, and may even provide it cover in internaonal bodies on

human rights quesons. In this way, should the rise of Hindu naonalism and right-wing

populism wash over the Indian state, it could inhibit rather than propel the kind of great

power balancing that many in the West have long hoped for.

Doshi: China’s Role in India’s Hindu Naonalist Discourse | 119

The Rise of Hindu Nationalism –

Islam at the Center

Following independence, India remained riven by two broad naonalisms. One was the

secular Indian naonalism of the early Congress Party, which sought to incorporate the

country’s linguisc, ethnic, and religious diversity. The polical project of craing a unied

state out of such a diverse country, it was believed, required an inclusive approach. The

other was the religious Hindu naonalism of those who saw India as a home for a Hindu

majority that had suered under Muslim and Brish rule and now had an opportunity

to gain polical power. This form of Hindu naonalism has oen been intertwined with

quesons of Islam’s history and inuence in India as well as the trauma of paron, and

Muslims have constuted a more salient other in this discourse than the West or China.

Indeed, it was anger over the Congress Party’s policy on paron that led a naonalist

member of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) to assassinate Mahatma Gandhi. And

yet, the Congress Party’s power ensured the victory of secularists so totally that, at least for

a me, Hindu naonalism seemed anachronisc. As Milan Vaishnav notes:

Because India’s secularists achieved such a dominant victory in the early

years of the republic, it is easy to forget that there was a dueling naonalism

that may have been defeated, but which hardly disappeared from the scene

enrely. The alternave concepon of India’s identy, Hindu naonalism, has a

lineage that actually pre-dates its secular competor…

Temporarily defeated, Hindu naonalist ideology was for a me far from the levers of power.

Hindu Naonalism’s Organizaon

Although Hindu naonalism is not monolithic, some of its founding fathers like Vinayak

Damodar Sarvakar have argued that those who regard Indian sovereign territory as the

fatherland and holy land (Hindus, Buddhists, Jains, Sikhs) are part of the Hindu community

in contrast to Chrisans, Jews, and especially Muslims. Even among those who might

endorse this broad denion, there remain a variety of Hindu naonalist views on how

majoritarian and inclusive policy should be.

Organizaonally, Hindu naonalists are generally part of the Sangh Parivar, a family of

organizaons that emerged from the RSS, which began as a “cultural, rather than polical,

body with the sole purpose of strengthening Hindu society by building civic character,

unifying Hindus divided by caste, and enhancing their physical strength through training and

exercises.”

This boom-up organizaon grew rapidly, despite being banned at various points

in Indian history, and achieved signicant organizaonal prowess. Other key organizaons

within the Sangh Parivar include the Bharya Janata Party (BJP), the key polical vehicle

for Hindu naonalism, as well as the religious organizaon Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP).

Given the complexies of electoral polics, the BJP is somemes more moderate in its

membership and acvies than the VHP and the RSS, but it benets enormously from the

organizaonal capabilies of the laer two organizaons, with talented RSS organizers

oen joining the Party and entering electoral polics.

120 | Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies

Secularism’s Erosion and the Focus on Islam

Hindu naonalism’s polical return is a product of the organizaonal focus of these

organizaons and, crically, the erosion of secular naonalism, which was itself the result

of decisions made by the Congress Party. The rst of those decisions was Prime Minister

Indira Gandhi’s decision in 1975 to suspend elecons and due process and rule by decree

for twenty-one months. The Emergency, as the period was known, saw the RSS and several

other Hindu naonalist groups rise as key players in the opposion and also further

weakened Gandhi’s ruling Congress Party, creang a space for polical contestaon. Aer

Gandhi called elecons and her government promptly fell, these groups briey gained

power for the rst me since independence. Although these events did not constute a

direct blow to secularism, they undermined the Congress Party, which had championed

secular naonalism, and gave those who subscribed to Hindu naonalism invaluable

governing experience.

The second set of decisions that Congress took were far more directly damaging to

secularism. In the 1980s, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi decided to policize religious

dierences in Punjab to shore up her electoral posion. That act facilitated religious

extremism, which culminated in Hindu-Sikh violence, with some Congress ocials even

commandeering state transportaon to bus Hindu militants into Sikh neighborhoods.

few years later, Indira Gandhi’s son – then Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi – further eroded

secularism when he sought to appease conservave Muslims by ensuring the passage of

the Muslim Women Bill, a piece of legislaon which incorporated bits of sharia law into

civil law, prevenng some Muslim women from receiving the protecon of the civil system

in cases of divorce.

The passage of the bill strengthened the argument of those in the BJP

that Indian secularism was a farce that advantaged only Muslim minories at the expense

of Hindu expression. The subsequent outrage helped propel the right.

Hindu Naonalism’s Policizaon

These acons by Congress fractured the secular naonalism of modern India and created

a space for others. While Congress did not fully enter the space it had created and was

driven by short-term polical opportunism, Hindu naonalists more focused on long-term

ideological advancement saw an opportunity in the erosion of secularism. Aer a series of

false starts in electoral polics – parcularly because the BJP was inially seen as a party of

the upper castes and the pey bourgeoisie – Hindu naonalist groups began to turn their

aenon and considerable organizaonal he to highly symbolic Hindu causes focused

on Islam’s inuence and history in the subconnent. The focus on Islam and on Hindu

vicmizaon successfully widened their polical base of support.

The Sangh Parivar and its aliates like the RSS and VHP were the inial leaders in this eort,

with the BJP a prime polical beneciary. For example, the VHP condemned conversions

to Islam and launched a “polico-cum-religious pilgrimage which sought to map out the

mythological unity of Hindudom” in which some 60 million Indians parcipated.

The most successful naonalist mobilizaon was the Ram Janmabhoomi campaign, which

held that the Babri Masjid mosque in Ayodhya was built over a Hindu temple that had

previously consecrated the birthplace of Lord Ram. The Babri Masjid was made into a

Doshi: China’s Role in India’s Hindu Naonalist Discourse | 121

physical symbol of Hindu vicmizaon at the hands of a Muslim minority, and the BJP

beneted from VHP and RSS agitaon over the issue and ed itself to the campaign to break

the Congress Party’s reliance on a coalion of lower-caste and Muslim voters and widen its

own support base. L.K. Advani, a BJP leader, launched the Rath Yatra, a “chariot” procession

which traveled across India and was designed to culminate at Ayodhya. These polical

stunts were extremely salient and encouraged a kind of movement polics that a focus on

the West or on China could not possibly have provided. For example, the VHP encouraged

individual Indians to send bricks in for the construcon for the Ayodhya temple, implying

that it was built by ordinary people from the ground up.

In another stunt, the VHP “lit

the Ram Agni, a specially consecrated torch, in Ayodhya. With this, they lit other torches, and

fanned out through the country, lighng torches along the way.”

This use of symbolism allowed

the BJP to succeed in gaining public support and appear above polics. And where the BJP dared

not go polically, the RSS and VHP could – which ulmately beneted the BJP itself.

The movement helped turn the BJP – and Hindu naonalist ideology -- into a polical

force in ts and starts. As Corbridge and Harriss note, “The 1996 general elecons saw

the BJP emerge for the rst me as the largest single party, though without signicantly

expanding the basis of its support numerically, socially or geographically.”

For the BJP

to fulll its naonal aspiraons, it would need to grow out of the Hindi heartland, nd

coalion partners, connue increasing support among the lower castes, and become more

than a single-issue party.

The Party began to focus more on liberalizing the economy,

ending corrupon, and taccally deploying Hindu naonalist symbols when helpful.

The

adaptaon proved successful, and the BJP nally achieved naonal power under Prime

Minister Atul Bihari Vajpayee in 1999.

Even as Hindu naonalism remained central to the

BJP, its eort to moderate with a focus on economics and corrupon was supplemented by

a kind of elite-focused “great power naonalism.” India’s nuclear tests, its fast growth, its

emergence as a global power, and its widening global engagement were key manifestaon

of this idea. In 2004, this campaign was enshrined in the “India Shining” slogan, which was

clearly based more on great power naonalism than on an otherizing, religious naonalism.

And ulmately, that slogan proved inadequate, resulng in the BJP’s defeat in that elecon.

The BJP’s inial success in stoking Hindu naonalism – largely by policizing Islam’s role in

India – changed Indian polics, resulng in what Niraja Gopal Jayal labels the “saronizaon

of polical discourse.”

For example, the potency of the Ram Janmabhoomi campaign led

even Rajiv Gandhi to hold a rally at Ayodhya and to argue in support of the VHP cause.

And

Jayal adds several other examples of the “BJP-izaon” of Congress in the decades following,

including the naonalist invocaons of Digvijay Singh, Congress chief minister of Madhya

Pradesh, who advocated a naonal ban on cow slaughter and cricized the RSS for seeking

to sell, rather than donate, a piece of supposedly sacred land that it possessed.

seriously, in the aermath of the February 2002 Gujarat riots, Congress President Sonia

Gandhi downplayed condemnaons of violence against Muslims and decided to “launch

the Congress campaign from the precincts of the Ambaji temple,” Jayal notes, in an aempt

to appeal to heightened Hindu identy.

Cing survey data that showed a majority of

youth uncomfortable with members from other communal groups, Jayal argues that it is

“an alarming sign of the ideological impact of the BJP over the last decade and a reminder

that urban and prosperous young Indians are not necessarily liberal or secular.”

122 | Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies

Modi’s Leadership

The BJP returned to power in the 2014 elecons under the leadership of then Gujarat Chief

Minister Narendra Modi, winning an outright majority in the lower house of parliament.

Modi’s own popularity among Hindu naonalists – notably the RSS and the VHP – ensured

their maximum organizaonal support for his eort. With naonalist support secured, Modi

had the ability to broaden his message to economics and an-corrupon issues, winning

the support of many disaected with the Congress Party’s perceived mismanagement of

the economy. When combined with Modi’s own unique charisma and signicant polical

talent, the result was a signicant victory for the BJP, with the party winning seats outside

its tradional areas of strength. And yet, although the elecon was primarily fought on

economic lines, Hindu naonalism too was an important part. As Milan Vaishnav argues.

Given Modi’s bona des within Hindu naonalist circles, there was no reason

to overly tout his Hindutva credenals. However, that certainly does not mean

that Hindu naonalist themes were absent from the campaign trail; on the

contrary, these messages were deployed in a targeted manner in contexts and

geographies where the BJP believed it could benet from using them. Modi

himself rounely aacked the Congress Party for pandering to Muslims by

promising them special treatment, and he oen embraced Hindu symbols

and personalies to extract maximum polical mileage.

The BJP used polarizing rhetoric in areas where Hindu-Muslim violence had erupted, and it

used the issue of Bangladeshi migraon to strengthen its performance in India's northeast.

Once in power, Modi did not make Hindu naonalism the center of his policy agenda, and

he was cauous on major naonalist objecves. In 1999, BJP leader Sushma Swaraj had

declared, “If the party ever comes to power on its own, it will not shy away from introducing

a Uniform Civil Code, repealing Arcle 370 of the Constuon” and rebuilding the temple

at Ayodhya – all issues, incidentally, implicang Hindu relaons with Islam.

And yet, when

the BJP did come to power on its own, it did not introduce the uniform civil code, which

would have eliminated carveouts for sharia law; it did not repeal Arcle 370, which gave

unique status to the Muslim-majority state of Kashmir; and it did not seek to rebuild the

temple at Ayodhya, which would have occurred on the grounds of the demolished Babri

Masjid. Despite these delays on major naonalist priories, as Vaishnav argues, the BJP

in power nonetheless “created a space for majoritarianism to ourish,” with a parcular

focus on Islam.

The BJP leadership has pushed for rewring textbooks to downplay

Islamic contribuons; strengthened laws banning cow slaughter or the sale and possession

of beef, which disproporonately aects Muslims; and assented to the selecon of Yogi

Adityanath as chief minister of Uar Pradesh, a gure who had supported Muslim and

Chrisan conversions to Hinduism and campaigned against Hindu-Muslim relaonships.

When the economy slowed ahead of the 2019 elecons, in part due to the BJP’s policies

of demonezaon and the messy rollout of the Goods and Services Tax, Modi returned

Hindu naonalist themes to the forefront, suggesng that the BJP would truly implement

the agenda of the wider naonalist movement in its next term of oce. Then, only three

months before the elecon, Modi responded to the suicide bombing of Indian forces in

Jammu and Kashmir - which killed roughly forty people - with an air strike on Jaish-e-

Mohammed terror camps in Pakistan. Despite controversy over whether the targets were

Doshi: China’s Role in India’s Hindu Naonalist Discourse | 123

hit and the loss of Indian ghter aircra in the aack, the strike on Pakistan likely helped

the BJP remain in power. Polls suggest that those aware of the aack were more likely to

overlook the economic situaon.

Since returning to oce, and with the economy connuing to slow, Modi has begun to

swily deliver on the Hindu naonalist movement’s core goals. He has made progress on

a uniform civil code by criminalizing the triple talaq (which allows Muslim husbands to

divorce their wives verbally), ended Arcle 370 and the special status of Kashmir, and will

see the construcon of a Ram temple at Ayodhya during his term aer a Supreme Court

verdict resolved outstanding legal issues prevenng construcon – thereby fullling the

Hindu naonalist core agenda.

Other internal issues connue to focus the aenon of the

government as well. Following the abrogaon of Arcle 370 in Kashmir, the government

shut down internet access in the region ahead of ancipated protests. Even aer restoring

internet access, it connued to block social media sites like Twier and Facebook.

As the BJP has entered the space vacated by the erosion of secularism, it has pursued

a movement-polics strategy and a naonalist agenda fundamentally movated by

communal issues involving the relaonship between Hinduism and Islam in India. Even at

the moment of its greatest electoral triumph, these issues remained the core of the BJP’s

focus, indicang the degree to which the connued hegemony of Hindu naonalism in

Indian polics might not necessarily lead to a greater focus on China.

China’s Contradictory and Limited Role

in Hindu Nationalist Thought

Hindu naonalists are a diverse group, and their perspecves on China – relave to

quesons related to Islam – are parcularly heterogenous. In general, China is not a major

part of Hindu naonalist thinking, and Hindu naonalist views of China can be divided into

three categories: 1) sovereignty/Tibet; 2) trade; and 3) values.

Sovereignty Disputes and Tibet

Hindu naonalists see China as a threat on issues related to sovereignty disputes and the

status of Tibet, though these issues remain far less salient than those involving Pakistan or

immigraon from Bangladesh. Concerns about China’s infringement on Indian sovereignty,

however, have a long historical lineage in Hindu naonalist discourse.

Even before independence, Hindu naonalists were very concerned about Chinese

incursions into Tibet, Nepal, and Bhutan, and along the Himalayan range. As BJP Chairman

Ram Madhav notes in his review of naonalist thinking on China, several leading gures

expressed their concerns about the Indo-Chinese border. Bipin Chandra Pal, the early

tweneth-century naonalist intellectual, warned that the long-term threat to India

“came not from pan-Europeanism but from pan-Islamism and Pan-Mongolianism.”

Aer independence, gures like the naonalist Aurobindo Ghose said that “the basic

signicance of Mao's Tibetan adventure is to advance China's froners right down to India

and stand poised to strike at the right moment and with the right strategy.”

Naonalist

icon and Congress Party member Sardar Patel in 1950 warned Nehru about China, wring,

"Chinese irredensm and communist imperialism are dierent from the expansionism or

124 | Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies

imperialism of the western powers. The former has a cloak of ideology which makes it

ten mes more dangerous. Under the guise of ideological expansion lie concealed racial,

naonal or historical claims. The danger from the north and northeast, therefore, becomes

both communist and imperialist.”

In short, at least among elite naonalists, China raised

serious concerns.

These concerns over sovereignty and Tibet are a product of two aspects of Hindu naonalism:

1) a cultural aspect that stems from the belief that Tibet is a part of the larger Hindu family

given Buddhism’s emergence in India and the presence of several Indian holy sites in Tibet;

and 2) a strategic aspect, with toughness on the border issue in parcular seen as part of a

muscular Indian defense posture.

With regard to the rst, naonalists in parcular feel an anity for Tibetan Buddhism

that shapes their views on China policy. In 1960, the RSS declared that India had a moral

responsibility to work for Tibetan independence.

The intensity of these views increased

aer the Sino-Indian border war of 1962, parcularly among the RSS, as Walter Andersen

and Shridhar Damle detail in their authoritave history of the RSS. Aer India’s defeat, RSS

head Golwalkar said that India needed universal military service and nuclear weapons to

counter China. “Seventy years ago, Swami Vivekananda had specically warned that China

would invade Bharat soon aer the Brishers quit,” Golwalkar declared, “For the past eight

years we of the Sangh, too, had been unambiguously warning that China had aggressed into

our territory at various strategic points.” He further argued India needed a free Tibet as a

buer, and that India should recognize the government of Tibet.

“Let the Dalai Lama […]

declare the independence of Tibet,” Golwalkar proclaimed, “Let us give him all necessary

support in carrying on the struggle for his country’s freedom.”

The highest-level decision-

making body of the RSS, the ABKM, issued a resoluon declaring, “it is unbecoming and

illogical to talk or negoate with her [China] so long as we do not completely liberate

our lost territory,” and it further argued that “Tibet's freedom is also a must if China's

expansionism is to be contained and the right of all naons to a free existence is to be

upheld and permanent security of India's borders is to be assured.”

The ABPS – a high-

level RSS meeng – also argued for severing diplomac es with China and recognizing the

government of the Dalai Lama. In 1999, the RSS established the Bharat-Tibet Sahyog Manch

- a small and obscure body intended to boost cooperaon between India and Tibet.

In 2010, the RSS journal Organiser said that India "has failed to li even a lile diplomac

nger on their [Tibetans'] behalf." More recently, in 2017, the RSS advocated that the Dalai

Lama receive the highest civilian award India can confer, the Bharat Ratna.

Reciprocally, the Dalai Lama's organizaon is close with the RSS, and these links are oen public.

He visited RSS headquarters in 2014 and declared that "the RSS has always been with us in

our struggle for Tibet."

The Tibetan community has been astute in stressing the cultural links

between India and Tibet that so appeal to Hindu naonalists. At the 2014 World Hindu Congress,

the Dalai Lama said that "Ancient India was our guru" but "not modern India, [because] it is

too westernized,” an argument that analyst Kryzstof Iwanek says was “verbal honey” to the

ideological RSS.

Although a few BJP policians advocate the independence of Tibet (e.g.,

B.S. Koshiyari), most in the Sangh Parivar have generally refrained from pushing the Modi

government hard on this issue. For example, although the Dalai Lama was invited to Modi's rst

inauguraon, he was not invited to the second inauguraon, and cricism of that decision was

scarce. In short, although the Tibet issue is a powerful one for naonalists who view the region’s

Buddhists as part of a larger Hindu family, it does not substanally shape Indian China policy.

Doshi: China’s Role in India’s Hindu Naonalist Discourse | 125

Second, with respect to sovereignty quesons, border disputes with China are less salient

for the Hindu naonalists than those with Pakistan. The war with China in 1962 was an

extraordinary circumstance, and the fact that naonalist senments were inamed then

does not tell us precisely how salient China is in Hindu naonalist discourse today, though it

does hint at certain common themes. In more recent disputes with China over the border,

parcularly the 2017 crisis at the China-India-Bhutan trijuncon border area of Doklam –

the closest India and China have come to armed conict in many years – the RSS has made

public statements. For example, the RSS was strongly supporve of Modi’s decision to send

Indian troops to confront China during the Doklam crisis, and members of the Sangh Parivar

called for boycos of Chinese goods in response to China’s incursions and its decision to

cancel pilgrimages for Indian cizens to holy sites in Tibet, notably the Kailash-Mansarovar

pilgrimage.

These bold calls were rarely met with serious organizaonal eorts, however,

and the governing BJP – unlike the RSS and VHP – took a more careful line with these

issues.

Unlike other policy maers, notably communal issues at home or confrontaons

with Pakistan, the RSS and VHP exercised far less pressure on the BJP to take a more hosle

or confrontaonal line. Even during the crisis, the BJP connued normal interacons with

China, seeking to decouple regular interacon from the border or other sensive issues, and

was able to do so relavely free from naonalist pressure. Shortly aer the resoluon of the

crisis, Modi aended the BRICS summit in Xiamen, as did a number of cabinet ministers – all

without provoking cricism.

The following year, the RSS was silent on the May 2018 Modi-

Xi Wuhan summit aimed at reseng India-China es.

As Andersen and Damle observe,

“on such maers [involving China], the RSS leadership is under less pressure at home as few

signicant interests are directly aected by foreign policy issues.”

In sum, while high-level gures in the Sangh Parivar may raise issues related to Tibet and the

Sino-Indian border, the rank-and-le remain far more concerned about those involving Muslims

and Pakistan. As Andersen and Damle conclude, “the RSS leadership…seems prepared to go

along with the Modi government's policy of disnguishing India's geostrategic imperaves,

as at Doklam, from the valued economic dimensions of the India-China relaonship.”

Economic Naonalism

In the economic domain, Hindu naonalists have conicng views of China. The economic

naonalists generally see Beijing as a threat to India’s domesc industry and also observe

in China’s own domesc proteconism a model for Indian development. But others in the

Sangh Parivar are not parcularly animated by economic relaons with China and connue

to focus on other issues.

The main economic naonalist organizaon within the Sangh Parivar is the Swadeshi

Jagaran Manch (SJM), a spino of the RSS founded in 1991. The organizaon was founded

and long led by the ideologue Swaminathan Gurumurthy, who seeks protecon for India’s

economy, preaches a gospel of economic self-reliance, and condemns globalizaon. It is

currently led by Ashwani Mahajan, an economist. The organizaon’s name draws from

the Swadeshi Movement, which harkens back to the boyco of Brish goods in India

during the independence movement, with the name “Swadeshi” meaning “of one’s own

country.” Although the organizaon is part of the Hindu naonalist family, it somemes

es its posions to a wide-ranging set of thinkers – some within and others outside of the

right wing. These include B.R. Ambedkar, Mahatma Gandhi, Vinayak Damodar Savarkar,

126 | Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies

Ram Manohar Lohia, and Deendayal Upadhyay.

Although the organizaon oen es its

thinking to these ideological roots, it is important to note that small and medium enterprises

are a major part of the Sangh Parivar’s coalion, and consequently, that the SJM’s advocacy

may be movated as much by polical consideraons as by ideological rigidity.

Although the SJM has a wide-ranging economic agenda, China is increasingly a major

priority and central to its work. In 2017, it launched a one-year campaign to raise awareness

about excessive imports of Chinese goods, advocang both boycos and an-dumping

measures.

It also took credit for Modi’s taris on some Chinese goods levied that same

year.

The SJM has generally advocated for boycos of Chinese goods to promote domesc

manufacturing. While their allies in the VHP or RSS also somemes call for a naon-wide

boyco of Chinese goods, such as in response to Beijing’s border incursions during the

Doklam crisis, the SJM and its fellow economic naonalists are dierent: they support

boycos of Chinese goods not only in response to Beijing’s provocaons, but also as a

maer of policy. The SJM has ed advocacy of these preferences opportuniscally to Sino-

Indian tensions. For example, the SJM advocated a boyco in 2017 following territorial

disputes with China, in 2019 following China's decision to block the blacklisng of Masson

Azhar, again that same year aer China refused to blacklist the founder of militant terror

group Jaish-e-Mohammed at the UN, and following Chinese cricism of Indian policy in

Kashmir.

The SJM also opposes free trade agreements, parcularly those involving China.

In October 2019, the SJM led a ten-day protest of India’s possible parcipaon in RCEP,

declaring it would “eecvely funcon as an FTA with China.”

In a statement, the SJM said:

The trade decit with China is at an alarming level of $54 billion. It is a well-

known fact that the non-tari barriers are the main cause of denial of market

access to China. There is nothing in the RCEP to eecvely discipline the non-

tari barriers (such as Mutual Recognion Agreements) and its exclusive focus

on tari reducon would be bringing an end to Indian manufacturing…

The SJM was hardly alone on this issue. The Sangh Parivar family, as well as most of the

BJP, was also opposed to RCEP – as was the opposion Congress Party. Aer India decided

not to join RCEP, the SJM, in a demonstraon of its proteconist preferences, encouraged

the BJP to consider rethinking or withdrawing from other trade agreements, such as those

with Japan and Korea.

Aer withdrawing from RCEP, the BJP's spokesman for economic

aairs, Gopal Krishna, issued a statement that revealed the limits of the SJM’s thinking

among some in the BJP. “Our polics is right centre,” he declared, “we believe in the market

economy and the open economy,” implicitly rejecng the SJM’s economic view.

Even so, the SJM appears to be gaining policy inuence, and the leaders of the movement are

themselves increasingly serving in Indian polics. Perhaps seeking to further instuonalize

its preferences on China policy, the SJM has pushed the government to create a “China

cell” within the Ministry of Commerce to aend to the trade balance with China.

specically, SJM founder Gurumurthy, long inuenal in Sangh Parivar circles – in 2015, BJP

President Amit Shah and Finance Minister Arun Jaitley ew to aend his daughter’s wedding

–is now making and not simply inuencing policy. He has waged a campaign to remove

“foreign” inuence from the Reserve Bank of India, and in 2018, found himself appointed

to the board of the bank, an enormous departure from its previously technocrac focus.

He connues to be crical of China on economic maers.

Doshi: China’s Role in India’s Hindu Naonalist Discourse | 127

Similarly, the current head of the SJM Ashwani Mahajan shares Gurumurthy’s hoslity

to imports and investment from China, having wrien crically about China’s Belt and

Road Iniave, accusing it of serving as debt-trap diplomacy.

The SJM under Mahajan

has also sought to revoke China’s Most-Favored Naon trade status and to ban Chinese

social media apps (e.g., TikTok) as well as e-commerce plaorms.

It has also pursued a

robust campaign against Chinese telecommunicaons manufacturers, notably Huawei,

with Mahajan declaring that they constute “an unacceptable security risk.”

He further

argued that “India must recognize the full extent of the naonal and economic security

threat posed by foreign and especially Chinese equipment in India’s ICT (informaon and

communicaon technology) networks” and argued that “China today controls a signicant

secon of India’s telecom networks, even though informaon dominance is at the core of

China’s military strategy.” The SJM has kept up the pressure, cricizing Indian ministers from

aending Huawei-sponsored conferences or allowing Huawei to parcipate in domesc

trials.

To be clear, the SJM does not necessarily advocate for the usage of other foreign

companies like Ericsson and Nokia; their preference is for India to develop its own telecom

manufacturers, perhaps taking a lesson from China’s own approach.

The SJM’s concern over economic es with China should not be confused with reexively

an-China views. Indeed, though SJM naonalists wish to reduce China’s economic

inuence in India, they also admire China’s economic success as well as its proteconist and

mercanlist approaches. For example, Gurumurthy is an open admirer of Deng Xiaoping,

and once said that Modi has the potenal to li India like Deng did China.” He noted that

“Deng did what works in [and] for China. Now Modi plans the same.” Gurumurthy has some

unusual views on China’s economic success, arguing that “Deng never spoke English, but he

understood what would develop China. He knew it was not FDI. He silently built the economy

from the boom."

The SJM sees China as an example of a major economy that used small and

medium enterprises to propel the country forward and advocates the same for India.

Despite their exerons, the economic naonalists have been unsuccessful in reshaping

India’s economic policy away from China and away from globalizaon. During the 1990s,

the SJM was harshly crical of the Vajapyee government for connuing the liberalizing

reforms of its predecessor, as well as for appoinng a non-RSS member as the head of the

Reserve Bank of India. And yet, despite the cricism, the BJP proceeded to push for modest

liberalizaon. Under Modi’s government, the SJM has had more inuence – parcularly

with respect to demonezaon, foreign retail, monetary policy, and increasingly policies on

data and digital economy. And yet, on issues related to China, the BJP has largely pursued its

own course and has been unwilling to jeopardize economic es with China, which is India’s

largest trading partner by goods, to sasfy the SJM. In general, the rest of the Sangh Parivar

has deferred to the BJP on these issues. As Andersen and Damle note:

The RSS has not backed the SJM's demand that the Modi government stop

Chinese investments and put regulatory hurdles on the operaons of Indian

companies with signicant Chinese investment....In short, the rest of the

Parviar does not buy into the SJM's policy prescripon that incidents like the

Doklam incursions jusfy a prohibion of all Chinese investments in India…

[and] such incidents do not necessarily mean that China is an imminent threat

as long as India makes clear that it has the will and means to defend

its strategic interests."

128 | Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies

Meanwhile, joint ventures in renewable energy, electric vehicles, e-commerce, digital

payments, and a range of other industries are crical to India’s modernizaon goals and

have connued. India remains the second-largest shareholder in AIIB, even though it has

not parcipated in BRI. And Chinese manufacturers like Huawei, Xiaomi, Gionee, LeEco,

Oppo, and Vivo have opened manufacturing operaons in India. Modi connues to pursue

Chinese investment across a range of industries.

And despite the frequency of SJM calls

for a dierent approach, the rest of the Sangh Parivar has been more exible. For example,

the RSS did not object to Modi courng Chinese investment and exports to China during his

tenure as Gujarat chief minister, nor has it or the VHP seriously done so during his tenure as

prime minister.

The limited success of the SJM on these issues is likely related to China’s

importance to India, as well as to the limited salience of economic issues involving China

among the broader public.

Asian Values

The Sangh Parivar is generally skepcal of Western values and liberalism, and somemes

sees China as a kindred civilizaonal spirit standing against an intervenonist and culturally

expansionary West. As a demonstraon of the mulfaceted way Hindu naonalists see China,

some of these individuals may in one breath cricize China for dumping products in India,

its policies in Tibet, or its encroachments on the border, but nonetheless simultaneously

aack Western civilizaon while making common cause with Beijing on broader

quesons of values.

For most foundaonal Hindu naonalist authors, Hinduism’s value was dened in contrast

to the West. Many, like Swami Vivekananda saw the West as material and Hinduism as

spiritually superior: "On metaphysical lines, no naon on earth can hold a candle to the

Hindus,” he argued in 1897, “it seems however advanced the Western naons are in

scienc culture, they are mere babies in metaphysical and spiritual educaon.”

Other

naonalist thinkers reiterated some of these views, including Savarkar. Aer independence,

these themes persisted among key naonalist thinkers. For example, Modi’s favorite

Hindu naonalist thinker, Deen Dayal Upadhyay, put forward a concept he called “integral

humanism” that outlined a vision of Hinduism’s contribuons relave to Western thinking.

As Rahul Sagar explains, Upadhyay’s thinking suggests that “India has more to teach than

to learn from the world because, unlike the West, which priorizes the material over the

social and the spiritual, Hinduism understands that the good life is the ‘integrated life’—a

life that fulls the plurality of human needs and aspiraons.”

Upadhyaya discouraged the

“thoughtless imitaon of the West,” parcularly its consumerist and materialist impulses.

Similarly, RSS head Golwalkar argued,“The Western theory of creang mulplicity of wants,

more machinery to meet them will only result in making man the slave of machine.”

The distaste for Western approaches has oen led to a feeling of anity with Asian civilizaons,

parcularly because naonalists regard with pride the historical spread of Buddhism to the

rest of Asia. During the independence struggle, early naonalist organizaons such as the

Arya Samaj, Brahmo Samaj, and the Hindu Mahsabha were generally pro-Asian, had concerns

over the West, and celebrated Asian victories against imperialists – such as Japan's 1905 victory

against Russia. Decades later, Indian leaders – including former Congress Party members Netaji

Subhas Chandra Bose, who was inuenced by the naonalist Brahmo Samaj – even cooperated

with Japan during WWII against the Brish.

Doshi: China’s Role in India’s Hindu Naonalist Discourse | 129

In the present day, these pan-Asian impulses remain. Indeed, modern China is somemes

seen in these terms. As Andersen and Damle argue in their review of the RSS, “China is also

part of the East that the RSS nds culturally and strategically appealing against a domineering

and threatening West. Xi Jinping has, more than any recent Chinese leader, stressed the

importance of tradion and some of that tradion has common roots in India.”

These themes are important elements of contemporary Hindu naonalism. Concerns about

Westernizaon animate many of the mass militant acons naonalists take against movies,

books, and other cultural items they believe belie Hindu culture. Many members of the

Sangh Parivar are aghast at what they perceive as Western decadence, commercializaon,

and excessive deference to minority groups. With regard to the laer, although many

Western states banned Modi aer the 2002 Gujarat riots, China did not.

A subset of these same individuals are drawn to pan-Asian thinking, and these themes

have even appeared in speeches by Modi and have been incorporated into Indian foreign

policy. For example, Indian civil society has organized the annual Samvad conference which

seeks to bring together key gures and scholars from around Asia to discuss Hinduism and

Buddhism. The conference has featured Modi and Prime Minister Abe, high-level ocials

from other countries, academics, and religious leaders – including Tibetans. The conference

is self-consciously pan-Asian. For example, in Modi’s 2015 address to the conference,

he declared, “Ethical values of personal restraint in consumpon and environmental

consciousness are deeply rooted in Asian philosophical tradions, especially in Hinduism

and Buddhism.” He also singled out “Confucianism, Taoism, and Shintoism” as taking a

similar approach, implicitly criquing the West for its shortcomings in this regard relave

to Asian approaches.

Top Sangh Parivar ocials somemes go even further, grounding their criques of the West

and their preference for majoritarian naonalism in pan-Asian terms. Gurumurthy – the

inuenal economic naonalist – has a history of expressing these kinds of senments,

occasionally drawing China into criques of the West. “The West will target all non-western

global leaders, be it Pun, Xi, Abe, or Modi, all of whom [are] naonalist. The West will never

allow naonalist leaders to rise in non-western geographies.”

Similarly, “Japan's answer to

Western modernity is Nihonjinron. China's is Neo-Confucianism,” he noted before asking

what India’s would be.

Wring on the Samvad conference, he noted, its purpose was to

“shi the West-centric narrave into a world-centric and Asia-inclusive one.” Many in the

Sangh Parivar would welcome this approach. They may also be recepve to similar language

from China. When Beijing hosted the Conference on Dialogue of Asian Civilizaons, it invited

hundreds from across Asia and wrapped the proceedings in the language of Asian values

pied against Western ones. For example, a typical Xinhua piece argued, “Many Westerners

are obsessed with Western style centralism” and “have seen the rapid development of

non-Western countries, and Asian countries in parcular, which has made them sensive

and narrow-minded.” It further warned that Western “hoslity toward foreign civilizaons

only agitate their dierences and contradicons, and can ignite bloody conicts.”

In a few small but highly important cases, Hindu naonalists have – perhaps movated

partly by these senments or for other reasons – encouraged conciliatory China policies.

For example, BJP upper-house parliamentarian and former Indian minister Subramaniam

Swamy has defended his pro-China views by saying “they are our neighbours and we

130 | Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies

share cultural similaries. As the Chinese President said, if India and China come together,

the whole world watches.”

Swamy opposes Indian involvement in the South China Sea,

encourages greater distance between the U.S. and India, blames the U.S. and India for the

1962 Sino-Indian War, and has said the Dalai Lama’s followers must shut down their polical

apparatus in India.

Although he is a prominent BJP gure, Swamy’s views are nonetheless

outside the mainstream, and the current BJP government under Modi has not moved in the

direcon he advocates. Even the Sangh Parivar generally does not share these views. For

example, the RSS has supported Modi's decision to include Japan as a regular parcipant

in the Malabar naval exercises, to avoid parcipang in BRI, and to raise issues related to

Pakistan-based terrorism with China.

Conclusion

Hindu naonalism is a project animated by Hinduism’s relaonship with Islam, whether at

the domesc level or the internaonal level, and views of China are less salient and less

consistent. Naonalist leaders oppose China’s asserveness on the border and its repression

of Buddhists in Tibet, but not so much that they would push a BJP government to pursue

dramacally tougher posions on those issues. They may be concerned about the volume

of Chinese exports to India, but those proteconist impulses are relavely widespread, and

many economic naonalists also see China as worthy of emulaon. They may be skepcal

of Westernizaon and drawn to “Asian values” approaches, seeing China as a kindred spirit,

but that anity has, at least so far, not substanally reshaped polics. Taken together, the

contradictory impulses on sovereignty, trade, and values quesons related to China and the

limited mass appeal of these issues strongly suggest that if Hindu naonalism strengthens,

China policy is unlikely to harden as a direct result of that trend. Contrary to the fears of

Chinese polemicists and Western great power strategists, naonalist polics are unlikely to

induce greater Indian balancing against China on its own.

To the contrary, it is possible that Hindu naonalism’s intensicaon could actually produce

greater strains in India’s relaonship with the United States, creang modest openings for

China. The majoritarian impulses of the Sangh Parivar, parcularly on quesons related

to India’s Muslim populaon, have drawn cricism from the American media, acvists,

scholars, and members of Congress. If India’s treatment of Muslims becomes a polical

issue within the United States and other liberal democracies, and if those concerns become

translated into policy, Hindu naonalists will say that their suspicions about the West have

been conrmed. At the same me, despite Beijing’s cricism of India’s revocaon of Jammu

and Kashmir’s special status under Arcle 370, China is unlikely to be nearly as crical of

India’s domesc governance. Paradoxically then, stronger Hindu naonalism and the

resultant Western backlash could intensify those veins of naonalist discourse that stress

commonality with China and come at the expense of closer Indian es to the United States.

Endnotes

Yu Ning, “Hindu Naonalism Risks Pushing India into War with China,”

Global Times, July 19, 2017, hp://www.globalmes.cn/content/1057147.shtml.

I am grateful to Tanvi Madan for her suggesons on this framework.

Doshi: China’s Role in India’s Hindu Naonalist Discourse | 131

Milan Vaishnav, “Religious Naonalism and India’s Future” (Washington, DC: Carnegie

Endowment, April 4, 2019), hps://carnegieendowment.org/2019/04/04/religious-

naonalism-and-india-s-future-pub-78703.

Ibid.

Stuart Corbridge and John Harriss, Reinvenng India: Liberalizaon, Hindu Naonalism

and Popular Democracy (New York: Polity, 2000), 114.

Paul R. Brass, The Polics of India since Independence

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 223.

Corbridge and Harriss, Reinvenng India: Liberalizaon, Hindu Naonalism and

Popular Democracy, 125.

Ibid., 112.

Amrita Basu, “The Dialeccs of Hindu Naonalism,” in Atul Kohli, ed., The Success of

India’s Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 172.

Ibid.

Stuart Corbridge and John Harriss, Reinvenng India: Liberalizaon,

Hindu Naonalism and Popular Democracy (Cambridge: Polity, 2000), 133.

Amrita Basu, “The Dialeccs of Hindu Naonalism,” 177, 181.

Ibid., 176.

Ibid.

Ibid., 28.

Corbridge and Harriss, Reinvenng India: Liberalizaon,

Hindu Naonalism and Popular Democracy, 114.

Ibid.

Ibid., 32.

Vaishnav, “Religious Naonalism and India’s Future.”

Ibid., 183.

Vaishnav, “Religious Naonalism and India’s Future.”

Milan Vaishnav, “If It’s ‘The Economy, Stupid,’ Why Did Modi Win?” Washington Post,

May 25, 2019, hps://carnegieendowment.org/2019/05/25/if-it-s-economy-stupid-

why-did-modi-win-pub-79211.

Neerja Chowdhury, “Ayodhya Verdict Gives BJP More Leeway to Pursue Its Agenda,”

Economic Times,November 11, 2019, hps://m.economicmes.com/news/polics-

and-naon/view-ayodhya-verdict-gives-bjp-more-leeway-to-pursue-its-agenda/

arcleshow/72013320.cms.

Aijaz Hussain and Sheikh Saaliq, “India Keeps Lid on Kashmir’s Internet 6 Months into

Lockdown,” Reuters, February 14, 2020, hps://apnews.com/6c9f105f899cadee6c22e5

67057a4fd4.

132 | Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies

Walter Andersen and Shridhar D. Damle, Messengers of Hindu Naonalism:

How the RSS Reshaped India (London: Hurst & Company, 2019), 156-157.

Ibid., 156-157.

Ibid.

Kryzstof Iwanek, “Will India’s Hindu Naonalists Play the ‘Tibet Card’ Against China?”

The Diplomat, October 1, 2019, hps://thediplomat.com/2019/10/will-indias-hindu-

naonalists-play-the-bet-card-against-china/.

Andersen and Damle, 157.

Iwanek, “Will India’s Hindu Naonalists Play the ‘Tibet Card’ Against China?”

Andersen and Damle, 145.

Iwanek, “Will India’s Hindu Naonalists Play the ‘Tibet Card’ Against China?”

Ibid.

Andersen and Damle, 147.

Ibid., 148.

Ibid., 150.

Ibid., 161-162.

Ibid.

Ibid., 155.

Kiran Tare, “Swadeshi Jagran Manch Launches Campaign for Protecon of Small

Enterprises,” India Today, February 7, 2018, hps://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/

swadeshi-jagran-manch-campaign-protecon-small-enterprises-1162903-2018-02-07.

Ibid.

Pawan Bali, “Dues on Chinese Items Result of Campaign: SJM,” Deccan Chronicle, July

24, 2017, hps://www.deccanchronicle.com/business/in-other-news/240717/dues-

on-chinese-items-result-of-campaign-sjm.html.

“Modi Ally Calls for Boyco of China Companies on Kashmir, Trade,” Straits Times,

August 23, 2019, hps://www.straitsmes.com/asia/south-asia/modi-ally-calls-

for-boyco-of-china-companies-on-kashmir-trade; Ashwani Mahajan (ashwani_

mahajan), August 15, 2019, Tweet, hps://twier.com/ashwani_mahajan/

status/1161887278039367682; Archana Chaudhary, “Modi Ally Calls for

Boyco of China Companies on Kashmir, Trade,” Bloomberg, August 22, 2019,

hps://www.bloomberg.com/news/arcles/2019-08-22/modi-ally-calls-for-

boyco-of-china-companies-on-kashmir-trade.

“‘Eecvely An FTA With China’: Swadeshi Jagran Manch Launches 10-Day Naonwide

Sr Against RCEP,” Swarajya Magazine, October 10, 2019, hps://swarajyamag.com/

insta/eecvely-an-a-with-china-swadeshi-jagran-manch-launches-10-day-naonwide-

sr-against-rcep.

Ibid.

Doshi: China’s Role in India’s Hindu Naonalist Discourse | 133

Elizabeth Roche Anuja, “The Polics Behind India’s No to RCEP Deal,” Livemint,

November 5, 2019, hps://www.livemint.com/polics/policy/the-polics-behind-india-

s-no-to-rcep-deal-11572936377571.html.

Bhavan Jaipragas, “China, Gandhi or RSS? The Real Reason India Snubbed RCEP Trade

Pact,” South China Morning Post, November 9, 2019, hps://www.scmp.com/

week-asia/polics/arcle/3036985/china-gandhi-or-rss-real-reason-india-snubbed-

rcep-trade-pact.

Amrita Nayak Dua, “RSS-Aliate Seeks Economic Clarity with a ‘Chinese Cell,’”

DNA India, October 21, 2017, hps://www.dnaindia.com/india/report-rss-aliate-

seeks-economic-clarity-with-a-chinese-cell-2554214.

Alasdair Pal, “Maverick Accountant Gurumurthy Shaking Up India’s Central Bank,”

Reuters, November 30, 2018, hps://www.reuters.com/arcle/us-india-cenbank-

gurumurthy-newsmaker/maverick-accountant-gurumurthy-shaking-up-indias-central-

bank-idUSKCN1NZ0IE.

Ashwani Mahajan, “China’s Debt-Trap Diplomacy,” New Indian Express,, December 19,

2017, hps://www.newindianexpress.com/opinions/2019/dec/19/chinas-debt-trap-

diplomacy-2078207.html.

Dua, “RSS-Aliate Seeks Economic Clarity with a ‘Chinese Cell.’”

Neha Dasgupta and Nidhi Verma, “Hindu Group Sees Chinese Telecom Firms as Security

Risk for India,” Reuters, August 18, 2019, hps://www.reuters.com/arcle/uk-india-

china-telecom/hindu-group-sees-chinese-telecom-rms-as-security-risk-for-india-

idUKKCN1V80DP.

Anand Kumar Patel, “Swadeshi Jagran Manch Objects to DoT Team to Aend 5G

Conference, Writes to PMO,” India Today, July 31, 2019, hps://www.indiatoday.

in/technology/news/story/swadeshi-jagran-manch-objects-to-dot-team-visit-to-5g-

conference-in-china-writes-to-pmo-1575555-2019-07-31.

Yappy Tops, “Aer One Year of Demonezaon, It’s Time India Knew the Man Behind

It,” Medium, November 15, 2017, hps://medium.com/@trynaveen4/aer-one-year-of-

demonezaon-its-me-india-knows-the-brain-behind-it-s-gurumurthy-9ab07901161f.

Andersen and Damle, 155.

Ibid., 153.

Ibid., 154.

Complete Works of Swami Vivekananda (HP788) CXXIII, April 28, 1897

Rahul Sagar, “A Malnourished Bismarck Astride the Indo-Pacic,” Livemint, April 5, 2018,

hps://www.livemint.com/Opinion/1f5LedQUsZ4NM8Vs8xyBVO/A-malnourished-

Bismarck-astride-the-IndoPacic.html.

Rahul Sagar, "Hindu Naonalism and the Cold War," in Manu Bhagavan, ed.,

India and the Cold War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 237.

Ibid., 236.

Andersen and Damle, 159-160.

Ibid., 162.

Ibid., 154.

134 | Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies

Text of PM’s address at "Samvad"- Global Hindu-Buddhist Iniave on Conict

Avoidance and Environment Consciousness, Government of India Press Informaon

Bureau, September 3, 2015, hps://pib.gov.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=126588.

Swaminathan Gurumurthy (sgurumurthy), March 22, 2018, Tweet, hps://twier.com/

sgurumurthy/status/976817889268285440.

Ibid.

“CDAC Harmony Is an Idea Western Crics Can’t Understand,” Xinhua, May 15, 2019,

hp://www.chinatoday.com.cn/ctenglish/2018/hotspots/yzwm/1/201905/

t20190515_800168078.html.

Ibid.

“We Will Not Allow an Intrusive Foreign Probe - Dr. Subramanian Swamy,” Daily Mirror,

July 23, 2014, hps://www.mfa.gov.lk/ta/5008-we-will-not-allow-an-intrusive-foreign-

probe-dr-subramanian-swamy/.

Debasish Roy Chowdhury, “India’s China Policy O Target, Says Modi’s Mandarin-

Speaking ‘Guided Missile,’” South China Morning Post, February 16, 2020,

hps://www.scmp.com/week-asia/geopolics/arcle/2047376/indias-china-policy-

target-says-modis-mandarin-speaking-guided.

Andersen and Damle, 153-154.