Journal
of
Air Transportation
VOI.
10,
NO.
1
-
2005
THE EFFECT
OF
LINE MAINTENANCE
ACTIVITY
ON
AIRLINE SAFETY QUALITY
Dawna
L.
Rhoades
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University
Rosemarie Reynolds
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University
Blaise Waguespack, Jr.
Em
bry-Riddle Aeronautical University
Michael Williams
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University
Daytona Beach, Florida
ABSTRACT
One of the arguments against deregulation of the airline industry has been the
possibility that financially troubled carriers would be tempted to lower line
maintenance spending, thus lowering maintenance quality and decreasing the overall
safety of the carrier. Given the financial crisis triggered by the events
of
9/11:
it
appears
to
be a good time to revisit this issue. This paper examines the quality of
airline line maintenance activity and examines the impact of maintenance spending
on maintenance quality and overall safety. Findings indicate that increased
maintenance spending is associated with increased line maintenance activity and
increased overall safety quality for the major U.S. carriers.
Dawna
L
Rhoades
is an Associate Professor at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University. She
received her Ph.D. from the University of Houston.
Rosemarie Reynolds
is an Assistant Professor at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University. She
received her Ph.D. in Industrial Psychology from the University
of
South Florida.
Blaise Waguespack,
Jr.
is an Associate Professor at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University.
He received his Ph. D in Marketing from the University of North Texas and completed the
requirements for the International Air Transportation Association diploma in marketing.
Miehael
J.
Williams
a Professor at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University. He received his
Ph.D. in Computer Technology from Nova Southeastern University. He has been an aircraft
technician
for
27
years and is an FAA certificated
AbP
Technician.
Rhondes,
Reynolds,
Ct’nguespack,
and
Ft’illiams
59
INTRODUCTION
One of the key concerns of opponents of airline deregulation
in
the U.S.
was that once carriers were fiee to compete based on the price of their goods
rather than on the quality of their service, the quality of their safety would
decline as the pressure to reduce costs increased (Lee, 1996; Rose, 1992).
The question of safety quality in the airline industry has provoked intense
debate over issues as basic as the definition of safety quality itself and as
complex as the relationship between safety and financial performance. In
the wake of 9/11, there is not only renewed interest in airline safety quality,
but concern that financially troubled carriers burdened with additional
security expenses might be forced to reduce safety spending and line
maintenance activity. The purpose of this research is to explore the role of
maintenance spending and line maintenance activity in the production of
airline safety quality.
Background
Prior to 1978, the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) regulated both airline
service quality and airline safety quality, establishing minimum standards for
both. With the passage of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978,
U.S.
airlines were free to determine market entry and exit, flight frequency,
aircraft type, capacity, aircraft configuration, and the level of amenities
provided (e.g., meals, entertainment, and seat pitch), based on market forces.
Establishing minimum standards and auditing for compliance is one of
several ways
to
define and measure service quality.
An
airline survey such
as those conducted by the publishers of Frequent Flyer and Conde Nast
Traveler is another way. These surveys typically ask
a
cross-section of
frequent
flyers
tu
rank
airtines
on
key issues
of
custoiiiei
sziisfaction.
Questions generally address the following ten factors of customer
satisfaction: on-time performance, airport check-in, schedule/flight
accommodations, seating comfort, gate location, aircraft interior, flight
attendants, post-flight services, food services, and frequent flyer programs
(Glab, 1998). While these surveys are an important source of information, it
is difficult to compare the results of different surveys or to examine trends
over time to gain a historical perspective of airline service quality. Aside
from the quality awards created by the airlines themselves (e.g., the Grand
Slam or Triple Crown), the most common method of defining and examining
airline service quality is to use the results of the
U.S.
Department of
Transportation’s (DOT) monthly publication,
Air Travel Consumer Report.
This publication contains information on flight delays, mishandled baggage,
over-sold flights, and consumer complaints filed with the DOT. In 1991, the
Aviation Institute at the University of Nebraska at Omaha began using this
data in its
Airline Qualify
Rating
(AQR)
report (Bowen
&
Headley, 1991).
60
Journal
of
Air Transportation
This report also includes key indicators of safety quality as well as financial
stability. Unlike the survey method, the
AQR
and other studies using the
data from the
Air Travel Consumer Report
have been criticized for focusing
on basic service quality issues rather than the amenities
(e.g.,
seating comfort
and food service) that form a larger component of the typical survey
(Perkins,
1998).
The advantages of the
Air Travel Consumer Report
are its
consistent historical reporting of data and public availability.
While airlines were now free to determine their own level of service
quality, safety continues to be regulated by the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA). The FAA has authority to establish Federal Aviation
Regulations (FARs) relating to: a) the design, manufacturing, and
certification of aircraft, including their engines and other systems; b) the
certification
of
airlines; and c) the certification of personnel who directly
affect the safe operation
of
the aircraft, including pilots and mechanics. The
National Aviation Safety Inspection Program was created to conduct focused
inspections of airlines and maintenance facilities to insure compliance with
all
FARs. However, “there is also universal acknowledgement that full
compliance with applicable safety regulation cannot be ascertained with
existing or conventional methods of compliance surveillance” (Ozdener,
2000).
Researchers have variously defined safety quality
in
terms of fatal
accidents, accident rate and/or incident rate. Proxy measures of safety
quality include operating profit margin, maintenance expenditure, and
inspection results (Barnett
&
Higgins,
1989;
Kanafani
&
Keeler,
1989;
Rose,
1989; 1990; 1992).
According to the
U.S.
General Accounting Office (GAO), there are four
factors that affect the safe operation of airlines: a) financial stability, b)
maintenance quality, c) management attitude, and d) pilot competence
(GAO,
1988; 1996).
While pilot competence and managerial attitude have
been cited in antidotal reports of accident investigation, there is little
empirical data examining this link. One company, Flightsafe Consultants
Ltd., does attempt to assess management effort as it relates to safety, but the
assessment is subjective and not available to the public (Pasztor
&
Michaels,
2004).
Research on the relationship between safety and overall financial
performance has been mixed (Graham
&
Bowes,
1979;
Kanafani
&
Keeler,
1989;
Lee,
1996;
Moses
&
Savage,
1990;
Rose,
1990;1992).
The most
commonly used measure of safety quality has been the level of maintenance
expenditures, although this raw number can be misleading. Airline
maintenance spending levels can be affected by
a
number of factors
including the age
of
the aircraft in the fleet, the type and mix of aircraft, and
the level of outsourcing (GAO,
1988;
O’Toole,
1992).
In short, to
understand the issue of maintenance spending it is necessary to understand
the nature of airline maintenance programs.
1
Rhoades, Reynolds, Waguespack, and Williams
AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE PROGRAMS
61
In an effort to maintain a comfortable degree of safety, a scheduled
maintenance program is established for each transport category aircraft. For
large aircraft, such a program is a process that can take up to
five
years to
complete, and requires very close coordination between the aircraft
manufacturer and operator (Hessburg,
200
1).
The advent of modem scheduled maintenance programs began in the
late 1960s with the Boeing 747. The sophistication and operating capabilities
of the Boeing 747’s aircraft systems and engines reached
a
point where
maintenance programs currently in place were no longer considered
effective. The Air Transport Association (ATA) created a Maintenance
Steering Group (MSG) consisting of representatives of ATA-member
airlines. This group created a document that became known as MSG-1.
MSG-
1
was process-and-procedures oriented. MSG-
1
was soon followed by
MSG-2, which was used with both the McDonnell Douglas DC-10 and the
Lockheed L-
IO
1
1
aircraft.
With the development of more sophisticated aircraft utilizing higher
performance engines, glass cockpits, and advanced materials, the MSG-3
was introduced. The MSG-3 is a task-oriented rather than process-and-
procedure-oriented document. Originally intended for the Boeing 757 and
767, MSG-3 has undergone three revisions, the latest including the Boeing
777 (Friend, 1997; Hessburg, 200
1
;
Transportation Systems Consulting
Corporation, 1999).
The actual purpose of MSG-3 is to establish the methodology that will
be used to prepare the maintenance plan for a particular aircraft.
An
Industry
Steering Committee (ISC) and various working groups are then established
to create the plan. The purpose of the ISC is to oversee the activities of the
working groups, each of which are composed
of
specialists in the various
systems such as avionics, mechanical systems, structures, engines, and flight
controls (Hessburg,
2001).
The working groups in turn determine
Maintenance Specific Items (MSIs) and specific tasks for their inspection
and maintenance (Friend, 1997). Close cooperation between the regulatory
agencies, the manufacturer, and the airlines is essential throughout the
process.
The key to the process occurs early with a listing of the
MSIs,
that is,
items that require specific inspections as determined by the appropriate
specialists. After the list of MSIs has been determined, an analysis-known
as decision tree logic-is performed on each item, with the key function
being to differentiate between safety-related failure and economic failure.
Servicing and maintenance requirements are determined at this time and
include checks, inspections, lubrication, and when to discard. These
requirements-known as tasks-are studied to the point where maintenance
intervals can be defined in units of time called intervals. Intervals may
62 Journal
of
Air
Transportation
include hours, cycles, and calendars. The final product of the
ISC
and
working groups are specific maintenance recommendations that include
a
list
of items, tasks, and intervals. These recommendations are then presented to
an FAA Maintenance Review Board that has approval authority, after which
the necessary documents are developed (Hessburg,
200
I).
The primary focus in aircraft maintenance, according to the FAA, is to
provide continued airworthiness. Part
25
of the Code of Federal Regulations
(CFR)
prescribes airworthiness standards for the issuance of type certificates
for Transport Category aircraft. The essence of the FAA regulation is that
the instructions for continued airworthiness for each aircraft must contain
inspection and maintenance information for not only the airframe, but also
for every part of the aircraft, for example, appliances, engines, and propellers
Continued airworthiness data are typically in the form of manuals in paper,
microfilm, microfiche, and/or
CD-ROM
format and organized in a specific
manner. There will be general descriptions of the aircraft and its systems,
basic operation of components and systems, servicing information regarding
lubrication and capacities, troubleshooting information, methods of
removing and replacing components, testing procedures, and specific details
relating to inspections, maintenance, and servicing (FAA,
2003).
Once the
complete inspection package is developed, it
is
submitted to the FAA for
approval. An FAA approved inspection program is then implemented as
specified and takes the form of
a
number of different processes.
AlRCRAFT
INSPECTIONS
For large aircraft, inspections fall into two broad categories: scheduled
and special. Scheduled inspections include service checks, letter checks,
phased checks, and calendar checks. The composition, scheduling, and even
the titles of each inspection will vary with each operator. Regardless of the
method used, the objectives behind such inspection programs are both safety
and to increase aircraft availability.
Special inspection programs are the other major category of inspections
performed on transport category aircraft, and, essentially, supplement
existing scheduled programs. Special inspection programs-often the result
of new technology or accidentslincidents-are approved by the FAA and
coordinated with the aircraft and/or engine manufacturer. Aging aircraft
inspections, corrosion control programs, Extended Twin-Engine Operations,
low aircraft utilization, and Global Position Systems for navigation, are all
cases where special inspection programs are utilized (Hessburg,
200
1).
Scheduled Inspections
The most basic of the scheduled inspections is the service check. A
service check includes checking and replenishing fluids, and inspecting for
apparent deterioration, damage and security. These cursory inspections are
Rhoades, Reynolds, Waguespack, and Williams
63
made at certain times during an aircraft’s operating day. These inspections
are made by line personnel, rather than by certificated technicians and are
called, depending on their purpose, such names as preflight, throughflight,
postflight, and overnight. Service checks are accomplished according to
calendar time or flight hours depending
on
the requirements of the inspection
program.
The most widely known type of inspections are the A-D letter checks,
with an A Check being the most basic and frequent, and a
D
Check being the
most comprehensive. All of these checks are accomplished at specified
maintenance stations with the lower checks being accomplished along the
route structure and the higher checks at a major maintenance base. The
detailed and idiosyncratic nature of an inspection program is such that some
items, for example on a B Check, may be accomplished every second or
third check rather then each time a B Check is performed. Letter checks, as
well as all other approved inspection programs, are customized to both the
aircraft as well as the operator.
The A Check involves more detailed inspection than a service check,
and focuses on servicing and periodic inspections of certain components on a
daily basis. Some special tools and test equipment are required and the
technicians performing them will have appropriate certifications. Fluid
checks, system operations, and Built-in Test Equipment are all common with
A
Checks. A Checks typically occur twice per month, take
36
labor hours,
and keep the aircraft out of service for approximately 12 hours (Hessburg,
2001) The
B
Check, which is no longer employed in many inspection
programs, involves more in-depth servicing and testing. When performed, a
B
Check will take up to a
40
hour labor week to complete, are accomplished
every four months or
so,
and keep the aircraft out of service for up to 12
consecutive scheduled flight hours (Hessburg,
200
1).
Items formerly
performed
in
this type of check have been incorporated into either
A
Checks
or
C
Checks.
The
two
remaining letter checks (C and D) are known
as
heavy checks
and involve extensive inspection, testing, tools, and training. The
C
Check is
the most common heavy check and is typically performed every
12
months
or
so.
C Checks require approximately
450
labor hours and keep the aircraft
out of service for as much as four days (Hessburg, 2001). Typical tasks
performed during a C Check include detail visual inspections, specified
systems hnctional testing, and major component lubrication. The most in-
depth scheduled inspection is the
D
Check, which is predominately a major
structural inspection designed to detect corrosion and fatigue failure through
the use of sophisticated techniques such as Non-Destructive Testing. D
Checks require as much as
1,500
labor hours and take a week
or
more to
complete (Hessburg, 2001). Most operators have discontinued the
D
Check
and have incorporated the various tasks into C Check intervals. An example
Rhoades, Reynolh, Waguespack, and
Williams
65
to address the problems in question citing the categories above for reference
(Rohrbach,
2004).
From a glance at the above categories and those listed
below for reportable procedures, the safety implications behind such actions
as engine shutdown or a failure in the landing gear should be reasonably
clear.
The reported data are entered and compiled into a database for weekly
distribution to aircraft manufacturers, air carriers, repair stations, and the
general aviation community. The raw data
in
the SDRs are available to the
public through the
FAA
Web site (www.faa.gov) or other related Web sites
such as www.landings.com. The
FAA
Aeronautical Center uses these
reports to identify trends and significant safety issues. Based
on
this review
of the database, the
FAA
may propose changes to existing procedures after
due comment and may then issue an airworthiness directive or service
bulletin.
In this study, we examined SDR history for the major
U.S.
carriers in
order to understand the relationship between this measure
of
line
maintenance activity (quality), maintenance spending, and safety outcomes,
namely the number of procedures reflected on the SDRs. The historical
nature of the data on the SDRs, their public availability,
and
close link to
safety-related problems in maintenance appear to make them an excellent
proxy for safety-related maintenance activity. Specifically, we wished to
determine whether maintenance spending does improve the quality of line
maintenance activity as reflected in the SDRs.
METHODS AND RESULTS
Data on safety outcomes were gathered from the
FAA
safety databases
on accidents, incidents, and near mid-air collision. These data and the
annual number of departures per carrier are contained in work previously
conducted by Rhoades and Waguespack
(1999;
2000;
2001).
Data on line
maintenance activity were collected from the Web site www.landings.com,
which obtains the publicly available information directly from the
FAA.
Information collected included the total number of yearly SDRs filed and the
total number of procedures by category. The categories are:
a)
unscheduled
landing, b) aborted takeoff, c) aborted landing, d) engine shutdown, e)
emergency descent,
f,
return to blocks, and g) deployment of emergency
oxygen and/or fire activation systems. lnformation on maintenance spending
was gathered from the
Air Carrier Financial Statistics Quarterly, compiled
by
the Bureau of Transportation Statistics and published
by
the
US.
Department of Transportation.
Information on the operational statistics
(departures, miles, hours) was collected from the
Air Currier Traffic
Statistics Monthly
and the Bureau of Transportation Statistics. These data
were used to normalize the safety and maintenance spending data for each
carrier.
66
Journal
of
Air Transportation
Table
1
shows the calculated figures for maintenance spending per mile
flown for the carriers in this study. The last row on the table shows the mean
maintenance spending per year. Spending rates below the industry mean are
indicated.
It
should be noted that maintenance spending per year has
increased for the industry overall between 1994 and
2000.
Table
1.
Maintenance spending per mile flown, for
U.S.
airlines,
1994-2000
Airline
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Alaska .0009*
.0008*
.0008*
.OOlO*
.OOlO*
.0012*
.0015*
AmericaWest
.0008*
.0009*
.0009* .0012* ,0014' .0016*
,0018'
American .0014*
.0015
.0015
.0020 .0020 ,0019 .0021
Continental
.0017
.0014* .0014*
.0015*
.0016* .0016*
.0016*
Delta
,0015
.0014*
.0013*
.0014*
.0015*
.0016*
.0018*
Northwest
.0017
.0018
,0021 .0021
,0025
,0024 ,0029
Southwest
.OOlO*
.OOlO*
,001
I*
.0010*
,001
I*
.0013* .0012*
TWA ,0019 .0019 ,0021 ,0020 .0020
,0020
.0020*
United
,002
1
,0022 .0022 .0022 ,0024 ,0024 ,0024
USAir
.OO
18
.0018 ,0019
.0021
.0023 .0022 ,0022
Mean
,0015
.0015
.0015
,0017
,0018
.a018
.0020
*
Spending rate is below the industry annual mean
Note: The raw data are from
Air
Currier
Finunciul
SIufrsrrcs
Quur/er/y.
1994-2000,
Washington
DC:
U.S.
Department
of
Transportation Center for Transportation Information.
Table
2
provides the ratio of procedures to total number of SDRs for
these same carriers. If SDRs in general reflect the performance
of
routine
maintenance, then-all other things being equal-a carrier performing more
maintenance should demonstrate a higher level
of
maintenance quality, and
thus
a
smaller number of procedures.
A
higher number of procedures, on the
other hand, would not be a desirable outcome. We would expect the ratio
of
SDRs
to procedures to be one indication of overall maintenance quality. In
this case, Southwest stands out as being above the industry mean for 1994-
1998, despite an excellent reputation for quality and an excellent record of
safety.
Analysis
of
the relationship between maintenance spending, SDRs, and
safety quality reveals a number
of
interesting findings. There does not
appear to be a significant correlation between maintenance spending per
departure, mile or hour and the total number
of
SDRs filed each year by the
major carriers. There was a small correlation
(.362)
between maintenance
spending per average haul and total SDRs. This
is
to be expected for
two
reasons. First,
A
Checks and
B
Checks are performed whenever a flight
lands or terminates; airlines with short average hauls (total miles divided by
Rhoades, Reynolds, Wagiiespack, and Williams
67
departures) would be expected to perform more of these checks. Second,
much of the wear and tear on an aircraft is the result of the pressure changes
experienced during ascending and descending. Aircraft flying short hauls
can be expected to experience more
of
this type of stress.
Table
2.
Ratio of reportable procedures
to
total service difficulty reports, for
U.S.
airlines,
1994-2000
Airline
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
2000
Alaska
9.24 11.35 21.63 12.17 59.78 101.44 53.10
America West
6.87 4.19 7.54 8.31 7.38 5.23 10.90
American
4.96 4.96 10.71 5.14
13.01
7.93 7.81
Continental
1.91
2.80 8.05 7.40 19.98 25.41 38.06
Delta
14.55 12.39 6.31 4.76 8.08 4.53 3.40
Northwest
3.41 3.08 5.82 3.90 3.64 5.44 3.85
Southwest
14.73 8.80 12.82 9.61 20.96 10.95 13.05
TWA
4.23 2.02 3.97 6.15 8.26 16.76 20.00
United
2.71 1.82 3.12 2.75 1.97 1.96 2.07
USAir
3.60 3.98 3.38 3.07 3.96 7.86 8.41
Mean 6.62
5.54
8.34 6.33 14.70 18.75 16.06
Note: The raw data
on
SDRs
are collected
from
http://www.landings.com.
These same maintenance rates do show a significant, moderate
correlation
(.273-.522)
with the number of reported yearly procedures
indicating that maintenance spending increases with the level
of
procedures
experienced in a given year. It is unknown whether increasing levels of
procedures generate more maintenance costs to carriers or whether carriers
increase maintenance spending as
a
result
of
increasing levels of procedures.
Examining the relationship between the ratio
of
procedures to
SDRs
and
maintenance spending, we found a significant negative relationship
(-.328),
that is, as the level
of
maintenance spending increases then the ratio
of
procedures to
SDRs
declines. Maintenance spending was also negatively
associated with the total safety rate, that is, as maintenance spending
increases the number of safety problems per year decreases.
DISCUSSION
Our analysis demonstrates that there is a relationship between
maintenance spending rates and the level of both
SDRs
in line maintenance
and the safety outcomes
of
the major carriers in the
U.S.
airline industry. As
maintenance spending increased, carriers decrease the ratio
of
procedures to
total
SDRs.
This
is
good news in several respects.
Good
routine
maintenance appears to help lower the level of emergency and precautionary
procedures. This in turn lowers the overall level of maintenance spending.
Journal
of
Air
Transportation
Increased maintenance spending also appears to decrease the number of
safety problems experienced by airlines. This is the good news.
As
one
articles recently stated, “[alircraft maintenance matters-a lot” (McCartney,
2004).
The bad news is that this relationship is not as simple as
it
would seem,
nor does it appear to hold for all major carriers, leading to questions about
the maintenance process itself. Southwest consistently posts a level of
maintenance spending well below that of comparable major carriers and yet
has an exceptional safety record. In part, this is due to the nature
of
their
fleet which consists solely of
B-737s.
Maintaining
a
single aircraft fleet
allows them to benefit from economies of scale in parts and equipment
purchasing as well as lower training costs. United Air Lines, on the other
hand, has posted a relatively high level of maintenance spending without any
apparent improvement
in
safety outcomes. Of course, spending is not enough
to guarantee safe outcomes nor can the total spending alone be used to judge
maintenance quality since
it
is a function of fleet mix and age as well as the
efficiency
of
the overall process and the stage at which potential safety
problems are detected and corrected. Several recent articles have pointed to
a key weakness in the maintenance field, namely
FAA
inspection. SDRs,
while required
of
all repair stations, are covered under a fairly broad set of
regulation. However,
an
effort by the
FAA
to tighten reporting to include a
wider range of routine repairs and failures provoked an outcry from repair
station operators (Rohrbach, 2004). Since reporting is and continues be
subject to interpretation and individual carrier discretion, then active
oversight of repair station operations is critical to ensure standards are met.
Unfortunately, the FAA has been heavily criticized in recent years for its
failure to provide adequate oversight, particularly of outsourced and foreign
repair stations (McCartney, 2004; Pasztor, 2004; Alexander, Reed
&
Mellnik,
2003).
No
study is without its limitations. In relying on
SDRs,
it is clearly
possible that we have not fully captured the quality of line maintenance
activity. The concept of quality in any area is a complex, multifaceted one.
Maintenance quality
is
presumably a function of well-trained mechanics
equipped with the proper tools and/or systems, utilizing parts that meet
industry standards, and installing and maintaining them in ways proscribed
by their manufacturer. However, these aspects of quality are not available to
researchers. Data on the level
of
qualifications
of
the personnel hired by
individual carriers are not available. Likewise, there is
no
source other than
the airlines themselves (through voluntary reporting to researchers) of the
level of corporate spending on training. Finally, as noted above, we must
consider the accuracy
of
the SDRs themselves and the variation that exists
between in-house and outsourced maintenance activities.
1
Rhoades, Reynolds, Waguespack, and Williams
69
Future research should address the impact of fleet mix and age on
maintenance spending as well as the actual reporting process itself. Based
on our review, there appears to be a good deal of variation both within and
between carriers in the number and type of events reported. The relationship
between maintenance quality, as reflected by SDRs and procedures should
be examined to understand their relationship to direct safety outcomes such
as accidents and incidents. Other issues that should be addressed include the
effect of aircraft utilization and maintenance training on overall maintenance
spending and safety quality. This study should also be extended to examine
these relationships for national and regional carriers.
Safety quality has been seen as an economic good that is both desired by
consumers and costly to provide. Viewed in this context, “it no longer
follows that the socially desirable level of safety is the highest that
is
both
technologically and humanly possible,” (Ozdener,
2000,
p.
18)
since such a
level would be prohibitively expensive. Even when a consensus can be
reached on an acceptable level of safety, it is difficult to observe safety
directly. Regulators, firms, and researchers have tended to observe safety
outcomes such as accidents, incidents, and near mid-air collisions and relate
these to safety inputs such as financial condition, maintenance spending, and
training spending. This study
is
only one step in understanding the complex
process of airline line maintenance activity. This process has come under
increasing scrutiny in the last several years due to
a
series of high profile
accidents (e.g., Alaska Airlines Flt 26
1
[2000], Flash Airlines Flt 504[2004]).
While
U.S.
airlines continue to be some of the safest
in
the world, there is
always room for improvement. Before this improvement can begin, it is
necessary to develop a better understanding of the factors that affect
maintenance quality and the processes that could be used to improve it.
failures to adequately oversee airline safety, particularly maintenance
practices. Unfortunately, “outside groups and academics have made limited
efforts to
fill
the gap” (Pasztor
&
Michaels, 2004, p. A14). This paper is one
attempt to
fill
this very large gap. A gap we believe must be filled in order
to provide consumers with the safety they expect and deserve.
IT,.+:,...
,
xarlvllal
and international
organizations
have been criticized
for
their
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