26 | The Federal Lawyer | September 2010
Disabilities and the Law:
The Evolution of Independence
By David Ferleger
Disabilities in Our Lives
Signing the Declaration of Independence on July 4,
1776, Stephen Hopkins referred to his cerebral palsy, say-
ing “My hand trembles but my heart does not.” During
the Constitutional Convention of 1787, Benjamin Franklin
was carried into sessions in a sedan chair because he
was almost immobilized by gouty arthritis. More than
two centuries later, thousands of people attended the
1990 White House signing ceremony for the Americans
With Disabilities Act (ADA), at which President George
H. W. Bush declared, “Today we’re here to rejoice in and
celebrate another ‘independence day,’ one that is long
overdue.”
People with disabilities influence and inspire our
lives. Thomas Edison and Ludwig van Beethoven were
deaf. Steven Hawking has a neurological condition. John
Milton became blind at the age of 43, and Claude Monet
became blind in later life. President Franklin Roosevelt,
musician Teddy Pendergrass, “Superman” Christopher
Reeve, and violinist Itzhak Perlman have used wheel-
chairs. The ballet dancer Vaslav Nijinsky had bipolar
disorder, as does Patty Duke, who played Helen Keller in
“The Miracle Worker.” The actress Sarah Bernhardt had to
have her leg amputated. Cher is dyslexic.
We are all extremely familiar with disabilities. We may
have been born with a disability. If we are not disabled
ourselves, we know people who are.
So-called temporarily able-bodied people may well
lose their sight or speech or mobility. Baby boomers who
are currently healthy will almost certainly become frail as
they age. People with one challenge or limitation today
often acquire another.
Currently, about 54 million people in the United States
are disabled at present. This number accounts for about
19 percent of the U.S. population. Among families in
America, 20,874,130 families—29 percent—have a family
member with a disability.
Of the people with disabilities who are 15 years and
older:
3.3 million use a wheelchair;•
10.2 million use a mobility aid such as a cane, crutch-•
es, or a walker;
1.8 million are unable to see printed words or are •
blind;
1 million are deaf or unable to hear conversations;•
2.5 million have difficulty having their speech under-•
stood by others; and
16.1 million have limitations in cognitive functioning •
or have a mental or emotional illness or developmen-
tal disability.
Snapshot numbers do not tell the whole story, of
course. Someone 25 years old has a 44 percent likelihood
of having at least one long-term disability that lasts three
months or longer before the person reaches the age of
65. One out of two women and one out of three men will
spend some time in a nursing home. The baby boomer
generation, which makes up an increasing proportion of
the U.S. population, has 76 million members. In addition,
in 2010, 13 percent of the United States population was
over 65; by 2040, this percentage will rise to 20.4 percent.
By 2050, there will be 88.5 million Americans over 65,
more than doubling the 2008 figure. Most adults plan to
keep working, even during so-called retirement.
People with disabilities live in relative social isola-
tion. Compared to people without disabilities, disabled
individuals are much less likely to work full- or part-time
(35 percent versus 78 percent); less likely to socialize
with close friends or relatives; less likely to go to church,
synagogue, or mosque; and less likely to go out to eat.
Physical isolation is also common in the lives of people
with disabilities. Tens of thousands of residential institu-
tions in the United States house people with disabilities.
For example, in 2002 there were 69,136 nursing facilities
and 28,448 facilities that serve people with developmen-
tal disabilities, mental health issues, or substance abuse.
As of June 30, 2008, 42 states operated 2,614 residential
settings that house people with intellectual or develop-
mental disabilities. Currently, 1.8 million people live in
nursing facilities. In 2008, at least 35,741 people lived
in large state-operated institutions that cared for people
with developmental disabilities.
Disabilities in History
The ancient Greeks called people with intellectual
deficiencies “idiots” and intended the term to refer to
their inferiority. Aristotle, who lived in the fourth century
B.C., recommended the establishment of laws “to prevent
the rearing of deformed children.” He claimed that “no
deformed child shall live.” In ancient Rome, children who
were blind, deaf, or mentally retarded were publicly per-
secuted and reported to have been thrown in the Tiber
River by their parents. Some children born with disabili-
ties were mutilated to increase their value as beggars.
In the Middle Ages, as leprosy began to disappear,
leprosariums were converted to houses to be used by all
sorts of people considered deviant: orphans, vagabonds,
prostitutes, widows, and people with mental illness and
intellectual disabilities. During this time, “idiot cages”
became common in town centers and were used to keep
people with disabilities “out of trouble.” These facilities
may also have served as entertainment for townspeople.
Some people with disabilities were shipped off to other
countries. Sailors were paid to take these individuals
away in what were called “ships of Fools,” which sailed
from port to port. The sailors charged admission to view
their cargo and eventually abandoned their passengers.
With the Age of Enlightenment, a more humane edu-
cational motive in services developed, with profession-
als observing that people with disabilities were able to
grow and develop. The “moral treatment” movement was
influenced by the Quakers in England and post-French
Revolution reformers in France in the late 1700s and into
the 1800s. Reformers in the United States included activ-
ists like Dorothea Dix and Clifford Beers, whose personal
crusades were rewarded with attention from legislators.
The first schools for students who were deaf opened
September 2010 | The Federal Lawyer | 27
in Europe in the mid-1700s and in the United States in
1817. A school for students who were blind opened
in Boston in 1832. In the mid-1800s, so-called training
schools for people with developmental disabilities were
established. Sadly, rapidly increasing enrollment and,
eventually, the eugenics movement and a perception that
residents of these schools were dangerous, resulted in a
shift from “training” to custodial care in overcrowded and
understaffed institutions.
The turn-of-the-century institution was aptly described
by Louis Brandeis. Years before his appointment to the
U.S. Supreme Court, Brandeis once represented Alice
N. Lincoln, a Boston philanthropist and noted crusader
for the poor. In 1894, Brandeis appeared at public hear-
ings, which were held to investigate conditions in the
public poorhouses. Brandeis’ summation at one of these
hearings emphasized the nature of segregation for those
whom he described as “the outcasts of society”:
They call this a Home for Paupers. That place
may be as clean today, or any day, as any place
in Christendom; the food may be as good, the air
may be perfect; you may have beds in woven-wire
mattresses as good as any that can be found; the
attendants and the discipline and work may all be
there. But that place as it presented itself to us is as
far from a home as one pole is from another. It is
the very opposite of a home in every particular.
Documents of the City of Boston for the Year 1894, Vol.
6, p. 3632-3633 (Boston: Rockwell & Churchhill. City
Printers, 1895). The “out of sight, out of mind” approach
adopted by institutions was echoed in society at large in
the late 1800s: laws were passed to keep people with
cerebral palsy and other visible disabilities from even
appearing in public. These laws were sometimes called
the “ugly laws” or “unsightly beggar ordinances,” and the
most famous was the City of Chicago Municipal Code,
§ 36034 (1911), which provided the following: “No per-
son who is diseased, maimed, mutilated or in any way
deformed so as to be an unsightly or disgusting object
or improper person to be allowed in or on the public
ways or other public places in this city, or shall therein or
thereon expose himself to public view, under a penalty
of not less than one dollar nor more than fifty dollars for
each offense.”
The Chicago law was not repealed until 1974, and it
took other communities decades to eliminate similar ordi-
nances as well. The grim history also includes medical
experimentation focused on people with disabilities and
forced sterilization. Even today, people with disabilities—
whether they are living in institutions or in the communi-
ty—are sometimes abused or subjected to degrading use
of physical restraints and seclusion.
Disability Rights in the United States
The disability rights movement has transformed the
“social good” of services into a “rights model.” When we
trace existing legal rights back to their origins in social
values, we find that it takes 15 to 20 years for this change
to occur. Change has not occurred simply as a result of
successful advocacy by people with disabilities. “Rights”
today have often evolved from what had been found to
be the most effective and humane professional practices
and by those who were defendants in litigation. Often,
consent orders in disability cases resulted in reforms to
services for people with disabilities. Sometimes the need
for those changes was first advanced by the state and
local officials who were (or later became) defendants in
the actions.
In the last 25 years, we have witnessed an explosion
of federal legislative action designed to protect people
with disabilities from facing discrimination in their every-
day lives. In addition to the most visible statute, the
Americans With Disabilities Act—legislation that covers
employment, public accommodations, and state and local
government—Congress has passed the Air Carrier Access
Act, the Architectural Barriers Act, the Fair Housing
Amendments, the Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act, the Telecommunications Act, the Urban Mass Trans-
portation Act of 1964, the Help America Vote Act, and the
Rehabilitation Act. More than 100 regulations have been
attached to federally assisted or conducted programs that
promote accessibility for people with disabilities.
Although these laws have a modern feel, they have
grown out of a long-standing recognition that there is
positive social, political, and perhaps spiritual value in
serving the needs of people with disabilities. The nondis-
crimination rights we recognize today were first seen as
merely good federal or state policy. For example, social
welfare policy favoring community services for people
confined in institutions developed into a right to com-
munity services in succeeding decades.
In addition, partly in response to criticism of the
nation’s poor response to the disability-based problems
of Civil War veterans, the United States began to address
the issue of disability when soldiers returned from ser-
vice during World War I. In 1916, the National Defense
Act provided for soldiers to receive funds for instruction
as a way to facilitate their return to civilian life; this was
the first time the country recognized and responded leg-
islatively to its obligation to persons injured in military
service. In 1917, the Smith-Hughes Act established the
federal-state program in vocational education and a year
later, the Smith-Sears Veterans Rehabilitation Act expand-
ed the role of the Federal Board of Vocational Education
to provide services for vocational rehabilitation of veter-
ans disabled during World War I; this was also called the
Soldiers’ Rehabilitation Act.
These veteran-based laws were succeeded by civilian-
based laws. In 1920, the Smith-Fess Act (also called the
Civilian Rehabilitation Act) established rehabilitation pro-
grams for all Americans with disabilities. During the Great
Depression, the 1935 Social Security Act was established
as an income maintenance system for those unable to
work and included medical and therapeutic services for
children with physical disabilities as well as assistance to
people who are blind.
28 | The Federal Lawyer | September 2010
After 1945, emerging disability rights movements were
typically led by parents’ groups and reform-minded
professionals who promoted deinstitutionalization and
community services for people with developmental dis-
abilities; access to American sign language and cultural
self-determination for people who are deaf; and self-
directed, community-based living for people with physi-
cal disabilities. The organized movement for the visually
handicapped lobbied for the right to use white canes and
guide dogs in public places and for policies to advance
the economic well-being of the blind.
The Challenge of Disability Rights Legislation
Enforcement of these laws ensuring rights to the dis-
abled has been challenging for the courts and the parties
before them. For every claim, there is a defense. For
every rule, there is an exception. The “right to education”
and the “right to community services” are informative
exemplars.
First, in the United States, individuals with a wide
range of disabilities are legally entitled to education and
other support services under federal law. In 1975, the
Education for All Handicapped Children Act (known
since 1990 as the Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act, or IDEA) became the legal basis for public education
for all children, including those with severe and multiple
disabilities. The IDEA requires an “individualized educa-
tion program” for each child and establishes a right to
“free appropriate public education” in the “least restric-
tive environment.”
Defining the meaning of “appropriate” education and
the meaning of the “least restrictive environment” has
been fodder for a great deal of commentary and litigation.
A major issue has been the extent to which children can
be educated in an age-appropriate school setting along-
side nondisabled peers. In school districts in rural areas,
organizing sufficient resources without compelling exces-
sive travel time is problematic. Other issues have been the
parameters of other aspects, such as the following:
summer educational programs to reduce or prevent •
skill regression;
interventions that enable students to stay in school •
(providing catheterization for those unable to urinate
voluntarily, for example);
services and technology to assist with movement, •
positioning, speech, and augmentative forms of com-
munication;
education that is not limited by an assessment of edu-•
cational potential; and
provision of regular opportunities for interaction with •
nondisabled peers and inclusion in general education
classrooms.
Another example of challenges in interpretation and
enforcement is the Americans With Disabilities Act. The
intricacies of enforcing the ADA’s ban on employment
discrimination are familiar to most readers: thousands
of cases involve determination of whether a person is
disabled and, if so, what employment accommodation is
required. Less familiar is the ADA’s application to insti-
tutionalization.
Eleven years ago, the Supreme Court in Olmstead v.
L.C.
1
held that unjustified institutionalization is discrimina-
tion that is forbidden by the Americans With Disabilities
Act. In this case, the Court held that the ADA proscribes
“[u]njustified isolation of the disabled.”
2
A five-justice
majority held that a failure to provide care for individu-
als with mental disabilities in the most integrated setting
appropriate to their needs may be viewed as discrimina-
tion in violation of the ADA, unless the state or another
public entity can demonstrate an inability to provide
less restrictive care without “fundamentally altering” the
nature of its programs.
The Olmstead decision was heralded as a potentially
“revolutionary” advance for people with disabilities.
Although other courts had previously found the same
protections in the ADA, Olmstead’s conclusion that Title
II of the ADA forbids unjustified isolation of people with
disabilities was a defining moment for the law.
Legal advocates and scholars are perhaps prone to
overstate the impact of particular cases on the world gen-
erally, as well as on the law. That has been Olmstead’s
fortune. Although one might have expected the Olmstead
decision to accelerate community placement for people
with disabilities, this did not happen. In addition, the
decision is fraught with ambiguities that have frustrated
achievement of the right articulated by the Court: an end
to unjustified isolation.
Since the Olmstead decision, the movement of resi-
dents from both public and private institutions has actu-
ally slowed down, according to an analysis marking
the 10th anniversary of the ruling. Olmstead alone has
proven insufficient to provide significant motivation for
the increased attention to community integration that the
decision mandates.
Apart from its lack of constitutional teeth, Olmstead
suffers from several internal deficiencies that weaken the
force of its integration mandate. These flaws include an
unclear fundamental alteration defense, an ambiguous
nonaccountable “working plan” option to demonstrate
compliance, lack of guidance on standard of care, and
lack of direction on the respective roles of the courts and
legislatures.
The Fundamental Alteration Defense
The obligation of public entities to make reasonable
modifications of their policies, practices, and procedures
to avoid the discrimination of unjustified segregation is
limited by the “fundamental alteration” defense found in
federal regulations.
3
Courts must consider whether “in the
allocation of available resources, immediate relief for the
plaintiffs would be inequitable, given the responsibility
the State has undertaken for the care and treatment of a
large and diverse population of persons with … disabili-
ties.”
4
Additional cost alone does not constitute a funda-
mental alteration, however. The difficulty is that there is
no clear guidance in Olmstead on meaningful parameters
September 2010 | The Federal Lawyer | 29
for the defense of fundamental altera-
tion.
Clear and Nonaccountable Working
Plan
Justice Ginsburg’s plurality opinion
in Olmstead gives states “leeway” to
adopt “a comprehensive, effectively
working plan for placing qualified
persons with mental disabilities in less
restrictive settings, and a waiting list
that moved at a reasonable pace not
controlled by the State’s endeavors to
keep its institutions fully populated.”
5
Each element of this operational test—
a “comprehensive, effectively work-
ing plan,” a waiting list moving “at a
reasonable pace,” and a plan that is
“not controlled” by a state’s effort to
keep institutions filled—raises difficult
interpretive questions. It is a challenge
to define these terms clearly.
One thing is certain. Any change to
a complex system necessitates careful planning, which
will typically include analysis; development of a mission,
goals, and objectives; expected outcomes, tasks, and time-
lines; deadlines; identification of persons responsible for
tasks; quality assurance and accountability mechanisms;
and evaluation. When done well, a self-adjusting system
will be in place, with sufficient feedback and flexibility
to adapt to changing conditions. Absent unusual circum-
stances or prolonged violations of rights, a state should
generally be given the first opportunity to come forward
with a plan. An unimplemented or vague plan, however,
is insufficient to satisfy parties’ or courts’ concerns that
the court’s involvement will someday come to an end.
Courts are certainly limited in their ability and
resources needed to shepherd all the details of compli-
ance,
6
but courts are capable of ensuring compliance
with the law—even in the most complex situations.
7
A
case in point is United States v. State of Connecticut, in
which Senior U.S. District Judge Ellen Bree Burns found
the state in contempt of a consent decree intended to
reform Southbury Training School (STS), an institution for
people with developmental disabilities.
8
The court found
deficiencies in such areas as medical care, psychiatric
services, psychological programs, physical therapy, treat-
ment of injuries, and protection from harm, concluding
that “STS’s systemic flaws have caused many residents to
suffer grave harm, and, in several instances, death.” The
court appointed the author of this article as special master
to review the care provided by the STS, to determine the
changes needed, to “formulate specific methods to imple-
ment the required changes,” and to help “effectuate those
changes.”
9
In this position, I actively oversaw a detailed
remedial plan and held hearings where necessary; after
nine years, the state achieved compliance with the law at
the institution and was purged of contempt.
10
Such spe-
cial mastership, especially under the 2008 Amendment to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53, works well in secur-
ing compliance.
Standard of Care
The Olmstead Court stated the following in footnote 14
to the opinion: “We do not in this opinion hold that the
ADA imposes on the States a ‘standard of care’ for whatever
medical services they render, or that the ADA requires States
to ‘provide a certain level of benefits to individuals with
disabilities.’” Justice Kennedy’s concurrence is stated more
strongly. He concluded that, given states’ need to weigh
their priorities, “[i]t follows that a State may not be forced to
create a community-treatment program where none exists.”
Justice Kennedy did not explain how one distinguishes
between “creation” and “expansion” of community pro-
grams, however. The multiplicity of opinions and the weak
language cited above is another weakness in the decision.
The language does not appear to support even the mini-
mally adequate level of habilitation that the Supreme Court’s
1982 Youngberg v. Romeo decision held is required.
11
Respective Roles of the Courts and Legislatures
Constrained perhaps by internal divisions, the Supreme
Court was muted in its endorsement of vigorous efforts
to move to a fully community-oriented system. Olmstead
holds that institutional settings may be “terminated” but
not for people “unable to handle or benefit” thereby.
According to the ruling, institutions may be “phased out”
so long as this does not place “patients in need of close
care at risk.”
This limited closure mandate appears calculated to
appeal both to those who do not favor institutions and
to those concerned that some residents may not be well
served in the community. Obviously, no one would
intentionally adopt a “phase out” effort or place even
a single person into the community if the move would
30 | The Federal Lawyer | September 2010
predictably cause harm, but analysis of risk and benefit
is a complex calculus in human services. Missing from
the Court’s discussion is the nature of the balance in this
sensitive area between the legislative policy-setting role
and the judicial role in the definition and enforcement
of rights. Also missing is the question of what weight to
give the constitutional liberty interests of the individual
and his or her desires or those of parents or guardians.
One wishes for clearer guidance from the Court on these
issues.
The Future of Disability Rights
The two legislatively created rights discussed above
(education and community integration) have been vitally
important to administrators, government policy-makers,
and the courts in defining and providing services to
people with disabilities. The prohibition on employment
discrimination enables employers to have the benefit of
able workers who, in the past, would have been exclud-
ed from the workplace. One could cite examples of dis-
ability rights in other domains as well.
As in any such effort to address societal needs, leg-
islation falls short of resolving all the complex elements
of the issue. In the disabilities arena, where fundamen-
tal needs are at the forefront, there are two additional
approaches that may assist in resolving the nuanced chal-
lenges posed by the legislation’s language.
First, the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution
may provide assistance on this issue. Prior to the enact-
ment of the “right to education” IDEA and prior to the
“community integration” concept in the ADA, the federal
courts had enunciated two related constitutional rights on
two occasions: (1) a constitutional right to education in
1972 and (2) a constitutional right to community services
in the 1970s.
With the statutes in the forefront, constitutional analy-
sis took a backseat to the law. It may be, however, that
a comprehensive legal theory embodying both constitu-
tional and statutory rights is more likely to serve private
and public needs than a theory including just one or the
other. This may be a time to circle back to those con-
stitutional principles on which the rights of people with
disabilities were recognized decades ago. Restoring the
constitutional dimension to the conversation encourages
reasoned discussion of both the opportunities and the
deficits in the statutory solutions.
12
Another avenue is one that neither Congress nor the
courts have explored thus far. Universal design—also
called “inclusive design”—refers to the design of services,
products, and environments that all people can use, to the
greatest extent possible, without the need for adaptation
or specialized design. Early writers in the field cite the
Brown v. Board of Education conclusion that “separate is
not equal” as the “milestone that marks the beginning of
an approach to design that respects all users.”
The effort to address societal needs involves making
things in the world more usable by as many people as
possible at little or no extra cost, regardless of the per-
son’s level of ability or disability. We all know the famil-
iar examples in the barrier-free and accessibility context.
However, the inclusive design concept refers to a broader
issue than physical access. The concept encompasses
every field in which disability rights has been asserted,
including education, community integration, telecommu-
nications, health care, and others. The benefits of univer-
sal design include elimination of discrimination, empow-
erment of individuals, increased fairness, and justice. It is
essential, however, that the concept not be undermined
by implementation without standards and by mandates
without enforcement.
One example is mobility. The two-wheeled, self-
balancing transportation device known as the Segway
®
is visible in many cities during commercial tours of his-
toric sites; the devices are used by police in downtown
Orlando, by shopping mall security guards, and for
recreation by people who can afford these devices. For
many people with disabilities, the Segway has become an
essential everyday mode of mobility, which allows peo-
ple with a wide variety of disabilities a means to “walk”
alongside family and colleagues and to meet the world at
eye level. Using the Segway has mitigated or eliminated
painful movement for these users. Hundreds of veterans
have benefited from the universal design inherent in the
Segway thanks to donations and training by Segs4Vets,
a national charity that donates the mobility device to
American veterans who have been permanently disabled
in Iraq and Afghanistan.
In addition to mobility, modern technology provides
new domains in which the rights of people with dis-
abilities must be protected. For example, work is under
way to ensure that computer hardware, software, and
the Internet are accessible to all. Federal law (§ 508 of
the Rehabilitation Act) requires federal agencies to make
their electronic and information technology accessible to
people with disabilities.
Conclusion
The presence of disability in our communities is ines-
capable. As the population ages in the coming decades,
the presence of people with disabilities and their par-
ticipation in the nation’s life will increase. The American
legal community’s response to disabilities has evolved
from Louis Brandeis’ compassionate concern expressed
in his plea in 1864 to the statutory rights established
by Congress in the last quarter century. State and local
governments have played important roles both in defin-
ing rights locally and in implementing federal laws. The
federal courts have both interpreted and enforced the
rights of people with disabilities and have often been
called upon to balance competing needs and interests in
this field.
But the law’s expanse consists of more than the stat-
utes and the Constitution. It embodies our government
and the nation’s ideals. In 1977, Hubert Humphrey mem-
orably reminded us of our duties to people with disabili-
ties: “The moral test of government is how it treats those
September 2010 | The Federal Lawyer | 31
INDEPENDENCE continued on page 50
The California court has the following goals:
• Cooperative, therapeutic treatment strategy for vet-
erans in the criminal justice system who suffer from
posttraumaticstressdisorder(PTSD),psychologicalor
substanceabuseproblems,asaresultofhavingserved
inacombattheater.
• ThegoalandpurposeofcreatingtheVeteransCourtis
nottoincarceratedefendants,buttogivethemaccess
to the kind of treatment they need, which is often
intense,dependingonthecircumstancestheyendured
whileatwar.
• Veterans who will benefit from VeteransCourtoften
suffer from addictions, mental illness and traumatic
braininjuries.Thisnewly-designedcourtdoesnotfol-
low the same procedures thatOrange County courts
follow,
a
s these men and women who experience
symptomsofPTSDneedtobetrieddifferently,accord-
ingtotheirmentalandphysicalcondition.
MatthewB.Wallin,Orange County, Creates a Veterans Court,
www.schools.com/news/law-criminal-justice/orange-
county-veterans-court_201001193008.html(lastvisitedJune
9,2010).
The foregoing is just a small sampling of approaches
todealingwithveteranswhosufferfromPTSD.AGoogle
search on this topic will reveal that the idea of veterans
courts is being discussed in many areas of the country.
Thisisa promisingsignthatthecountryisbeginningto
understandtheseverityoftheproblemsfacingmanyofthe
veteransreturningfromwarzones,includingtheproblems
associated
with
PTSD. We need to honor our veterans
and give them the help they need without looking to
incarcerationfirstwhendrugaddictionorotherbehavioral
problemsthatlead toanarrestcan clearlybeassociated
withthe effectsof post-traumaticstress disorderor other
traumatic physical and psychological injuries sustained
whentheyrenderedservicetothiscountry.TFL
Marcia G. Shein is a nationally rec-
ognized attorney in matters of federal
trial, pleas, sentencing mitigation,
and appellate and post-conviction
litigation. Shein is a life member of
National Association of Criminal De-
fense Lawyers and member of the ex-
ecutive board of the Georgia Associa-
tion of Criminal Defense Lawyers. Her
articles have appeared in publications
such as TheChampion,TheFederal
Lawyer, and TheGeorgia Defender and have dealt with
topics such as the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the
crack-cocaine sentencing disparity, an issue she and oth-
ers have been fighting for 20 years. In addition to her law
degree, Shein has a masters degree in psychology from Nova
University. Shein has also served as an adjunct instructor of
legal and psychology courses for the Criminal Justice Pro-
grams for Broward Community College and Nova Universi-
ty in Florida, Troy State University in Alabama, and Kaplan
University in Chicago. The author may be reached at 404-
633-3797, www.federalcriminallawcenter.com, and www.
federalappealslawyer.com. Research and development of
this article was possible because of the extraordinary assis-
tance of Leigh Schrope and Elizabeth Brandenburg, associ-
ates with the Law Office of Marcia G. Shein.
50 | The Federal Lawyer | September 2010
whoareinthedawnoflife,thechildren;thosewhoareinthe
twilightoflife,theelderly;andthosewhoareintheshadows
oflife,thesick,theneedy,andthehandicapped.”TFL
David Ferleger received his J.D. degree
from the University of Pennsylvania
School of Law in 1972. He has a nation-
al litigation and consulting practice in
disability law. He was special master for
a federal court for nine years in a case
involving a state institution for people
with developmental disabilities and
a court-appointed monitor in similar
litigation. His Web site is www.ferleger.
com and he can be reached at david@
ferleger.com. Benjamin Johnson, William Mitchell College of
Law (J.D. candidate, 2011), provided research assistance for
this article. For full citations, readers can send an e-mail to
the author. © 2010 David Ferleger. All rights reserved.
Endnotes
1
527U.S.581(1999).
2
Id.at597.
3
28C.F.R.§35.130(b)(7).
4
527U.S.at603–604,615(Kennedy,J.concurring).
5
Id. at605–606.
6
SeeSamuelR.Bagenstos,Justice Ginsburg and the Judi-
cial Role in Expanding “We the People”: The Disability Rights
Cases,104C
o l u m . l. Re v .49,58(2004).
7
SeeDavidFerleger, Special Master Rules: Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 53, The Role of Special Masters in the Judi-
cial System,2004 Special Masters Conference: Transcript of
Proceedings,31W
i l l i a m mi t C h e l l l. Re v .1193(2005);David
Ferleger, Special Masters Under Rule 53: A Welcome Evolu-
tion,inALI-ABA,t
h e aR t a n d SC i e n C e o f Se R v i n g a S a Sp e C i a l
m
a S t e R (2007).
8
931F. Supp. 974(D.Conn. 1996), appeal dism’d, 116
F.3d 466 (table), 1997 WL 321594 (1997), cert. den. sub
nom., Connecticut v. United States,522U.S.1045(1998).
9
931F.Supp.at985.
10
Messier v. Southbury Training School,562F.Supp.2d294,
299–300(D.Conn.2008)(describingthesuccessofthisjudicial
oversightinaparallelcaseinvolvingthesameinstitution).
11
Youngberg v. Romeo,457U.S.307(1982).
12
DavidFerleger,The Constitutional Right to Community
Services,26g
e o R g i a St a t e u. la. Re v .763(2010).
INDEPENDENCE continued from page 31
