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Center for Stability and Development
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i
Abstract
The term meme was coined in 1976 by Richard Dawkins to explore the ways in which
ideas spread between people. With the introduction of the internet, the term has
evolved to refer to culturally resonant material—a funny picture, an amusing video, a
rallying hashtag—spread online, primarily via social media. This CNA self-initiated
exploratory study examines memes and the role that memetic engagement can play
in U.S. government (USG) influence campaigns. We define meme as “a culturally
resonant item easily shared or spread online,” and develop an epidemiological model
of inoculate / infect / treat to classify and analyze ways in which memes have been
effectively used in the online information environment. Further, drawing from our
discussions with subject matter experts, we make preliminary observations and
identify areas for future research on the ways that memes and memetic engagement
may be used as part of USG influence campaigns.
ii
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iii
Executive Summary
If you’ve spent any time online, you have probably encountered a meme. There are
thousands of memes in circulation (with new ones being created regularly) on a
variety of social media websites. The figure below represents one of the more
popular memes, a riff on a scene from Peter Jackson’s Lord of the Rings trilogy.
Figure.
“One Does Not Simply Walk Into Mordor” (on memes)
Source: imgflip Meme Generator, https://imgflip.com/memegenerator, accessed March
24, 2018.
While images like the one above are popularly known today as “memes,” a closer
look at the concept reveals a nuanced and complex set of ideas worthy of further
inquiry. The very concept of the term remains contested, and has evolved
considerably since first introduced in 1976, but for the purposes of this report we
define meme as a culturally resonant item easily shared or spread online.
While individual internet users have been using memes online for years, more
recently there have been suggestions that memes might also have utility for the U.S.
government (USG) as part of its information and influence campaigns to counter
state actors such as Russia and non-state actors such as the Islamic State. However,
the state of research on both memes and this type of activity—which we are referring
to as memetic engagement—remains nascent.
To help address this, CNA initiated an exploratory study of the applicability, utility,
and role of memes and memetic engagement within USG influence campaigns. The
purpose of this study is to further the conversation on memetic engagement within the
iv
USG influence community, as it considers novel approaches to countering state and
non-state actors in the online information environment.
To do this, CNA reviewed the literature on the history of memes, memetic
engagement, and so-called “memetic warfare,” along with psychology and marketing
literature that explores the role of virality and persuasion in changing people’s
attitudes and behaviors. Upon completion of the literature review, we conducted
semi-structured conversations with multiple subject matter experts (SMEs) to better
understand memes and memetic engagement. We used these insights, along with a
selection of specific past examples, to develop an epidemiological framework to
explore memetic engagement. Drawing on this literature, semi-structured
conversations, and analysis of the meme examples, we developed a set of preliminary
observations and concluding thoughts on the applicability of memes to influence
campaigns and areas for further research.
Construct for analyzing memes
Borrowing from epidemiological models, we have identified three ways in which
memes may be situated intentionally within information and influence campaigns: to
inoculate, to infect, and to treat. We took this approach for two reasons: (1) in an
effort to retain the original concept of memes by Richard Dawkins as a pseudo-
biological concept; and (2) in order to reflect the epidemiological models applied to
the study of radicalization and terrorism. The table below provides an overview of
this construct.
Table.
Overview of the “inoculate, infect, treat” construct
Inoculate
Infect
Treat
Purpose
Prevent or minimize the
effect of adversary messaging
Transmit messages in support
of USG interests
Contain the effect of
adversary messaging
Distribution
Preventative
Anticipatory
Offensive
Stand Alone Effort
Defensive
Reactive
Message
Disposition
Adversary USG Adversary
To illustrate the application of this framework, we include a set of 14 examples that
show how visual memes have been intentionally used to inoculate, infect, or treat
information in an influence campaign. While our data set is not exhaustive, this
approach: describes and summarizes effective memetic campaigns; identifies
approaches to memetic engagement that might be replicated or imitated; and
engages with a wide variety of campaigns and actors.
v
The figure below highlights one example of what we would describe as effective
memetic engagement. A pro-Russia media outlet falsely claimed that U.S.
ambassador John Tefft had attended an opposition rally in Moscow, and
supported this claim with a photograph of Tefft in attendance (see the figure
below, left image). The U.S. embassy in Russia responded via memetic
engagement—effectively treating the Russian attempt to infect—by turning Tefft’s
image into a meme. Specifically, the U.S. embassy identified the original source of
the image, explicitly labeled it as fake news, and used Photoshop to create
their own images of Tefft in a variety of locations (see the figure below, right
image).
Figure.
Example of U.S. Embassy memetic engagement in response to Russian
disinformation regarding U.S. Ambassador Tefft
Observations from examples of memetic
engagement
Looking across our data set of meme examples, we can draw a number of preliminary
observations:
• The effective use of visual memes is not limited to counter-radicalization
efforts. While memes certainly have utility in that area, they have also been
deployed productively in response to terrorism more generally, to
disinformation campaigns, and to government censorship.
• The range of visual memes being deployed in memetic campaigns is far-
reaching. In some instances, the format is the familiar one of combining a
well-known picture with words following an established grammar. Other
vi
examples include doctoring situationally relevant images, creating brand new
images with distinct messaging, and pairing images with common cultural
references.
• Visual memes often (though not always) use humor, irony, and sarcasm in
order to resonate emotionally.
• Visual memes often transcend individual cultures and languages, and can
reach broad communities of disparate actors in the online information
environment.
• Well-targeted visual memes are culturally specific and situationally narrow.
This may seem to be a direct contradiction of the previous observation, but it
is important to acknowledge that while memes may be understood across wide
swaths of humanity, they will likely be particularly meaningful within specific
cultures, languages, and situations.
• Visual memes are utilized by all manner of online actors—governments,
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), non-state actors, and individuals.
• Visual memes have been used effectively at the tactical level (e.g.,
combatting local government censorship) and the strategic level (e.g.,
against North Korean missile tests).
Observations from discussions with SMEs
In examining the roles of memes and memetic engagement, we conducted semi-
structured conversations with members of the USG influence community, as well as
academic and private sector experts and practitioners in marketing, advertising, and
psychology (to include a professional internet troll). Based on these conversations,
we make several observations regarding the potential applicability of memes to
influence campaigns. First, using memes effectively as part of such campaigns is
neither predictable nor formulaic—significant cultural, contextual, and experiential
knowledge is required, as is granular understanding of the intended audience.
Second, contrary to popular belief, virality of a meme is not necessarily correlated
with its persuasive power, and changes in people's attitudes do not
necessarily correlate to changes in their behavior. As a result, while memes can be
useful across the range of USG influence activities, they are likely to have the
most effect when used as a complementary part of a broader campaign that
includes other approaches to influence (e.g., diplomatic and face-to-face
engagement). The figure below illustrates how memetic engagement fits within
broader engagement activities.
vii
Figure.
How memes and memetic engagements fit into influence campaigns
In conclusion, we find that memes do have significant potential for enhancing USG
influence campaigns but that additional research on memetic engagement can
provide a better understanding of how to employ them most effectively. We suggest
the following topics for additional research:
• What constitutes an effective memetic engagement? What type of visual,
digital, and cultural information might one need to create an effective
memetic engagement? How would this differ from the information needed to
inform a traditional USG influence campaign?
• What can an effective memetic campaign accomplish? What makes a
campaign effective? How can we assess and evaluate the use of memes?
• Who are the appropriate USG entities to lead the creation, dissemination, and
evaluation of the use of memes?
• How much utility do memes have in shaping operations, in competition short
of armed conflict, in irregular warfare, and in major combat operations? How
and why might their utility and usage need to change across these activities?
We bel
ieve that visual memes and memetic engagement are tools with great potential
for the USG as it looks to counter the information activities of state and non-state
actors and more proactively engage audiences online. But we also believe that
considerable additional research should be undertaken in order to ensure that the
USG is maximally effective in the use of these tools.
viii
Figure. Morpheus on the report following this executive summary
S
ource: imgflip Meme Generator, https://imgflip.com/memegenerator, accessed March
24, 2018.
ix
Contents
Introduction .................................................................................................................................. 1
Research approach ................................................................................................................ 2
Organization ........................................................................................................................... 3
What are Memes? ......................................................................................................................... 4
Early definitions and theories ............................................................................................ 4
Modern interpretations ........................................................................................................ 6
Defining a meme ................................................................................................................. 11
Why Visual Memes are Useful Tools for Influence .......................................................... 12
Examples of Visual Memes and Observations on their Use for Influence ................ 15
Inoculate ................................................................................................................................ 17
Exemplar: Japanese citizens respond to the Islamic State .................................. 17
Supporting example: North Korean nuclear program .......................................... 21
Supporting example: Mexico responds to ISIS threat ........................................... 22
Supporting example: Spain responds to ISIS threat.............................................. 23
Infect ...................................................................................................................................... 24
Exemplar: Nahdlatul Ulama Responds to ISIS ........................................................ 24
Supporting example: Russian interference in Brexit ............................................ 27
Supporting example: Russian interference in U.S. presidential election .......... 29
Supporting example: ISIS spreads brand via @ISILCats ....................................... 30
Supporting example: 4Chan mocks ISIS with rubber ducks ............................... 32
Supporting example : #DAESHbags anti-ISIS campaign ....................................... 33
Treat ....................................................................................................................................... 34
Exemplar: U.S. Embassy Response to Russian Disinformation .......................... 34
Supporting example: Response to Italian government’s censorship ................ 39
Supporting example: Response to Catalan government’s disinformation ....... 41
Preliminary observations ................................................................................................... 42
Observations from Subject Matter Expert Discussions .................................................. 44
x
Conclusion .................................................................................................................................. 47
Suggestions for further research ..................................................................................... 48
Appendix: A History of “Memetic Warfare” ....................................................................... 50
Appendix B: Organizations and Individuals Contacted .................................................. 56
References ................................................................................................................................... 57
xi
List of Figures
Figure 1. Success Kid on Memes .................................................................................... 1
Figure 2. Dancing Baby meme ........................................................................................ 7
Figure 3. Some popular modern memes ...................................................................... 7
Figure 4. Memes combining images and text .............................................................. 8
Figure 5. Success Kid, original ....................................................................................... 9
Figure 6. Success Kid template ...................................................................................... 9
Figure 7. Success Kid memes ....................................................................................... 10
Figure 8. Summary of examples .................................................................................. 17
Figure 9. Examples of Japanese anti-ISIS memes ..................................................... 19
Figure 10. Examples of Japanese anti-ISIS memes: al-Baghdadi as “Chubby
Bubbles Girl” ................................................................................................... 20
Figure 11. Examples of responses to North Korean missile launch ....................... 21
Figure 12. Example of Mexico’s response to ISIS threats .......................................... 22
Figure 13. Example of Spanish reponse to ISIS threats ............................................. 24
Figure 14. Examples of NU responses to ISIS .............................................................. 26
Figure 15. Examples of responses to Russian interference in Brexit ..................... 28
Figure 16. Examples of Russian memes used to disrupt the U.S. Presidential
election ............................................................................................................. 30
Figure 17. Examples of “mewjahid” memes ................................................................ 31
Figure 18. Example of 4Chan anti-ISIS ducks .............................................................. 32
Figure 19. Examples of # Daeshbags campaign .......................................................... 34
Figure 20. Example Russian disinformation regarding U.S. Ambassador Tefft ... 36
Figure 21. U.S. embassy response to Russian disinformation ................................. 37
Figure 22. More examples of U.S. embassy response to Russian
disinformation ................................................................................................ 37
Figure 23. Russian Twitter users’ response to Russian disinformation ................ 38
Figure 24. Examples of Italian response to censorship ............................................ 40
Figure 25. More examples of Italian response to censorship .................................. 41
Figure 26. Example of response to Catalan disinformation ..................................... 42
Figure 27. How memes and memetic engagements fit into influence
campaigns ....................................................................................................... 48
Figure 28. Leonardo DiCaprio meme on the end of this report .............................. 49
xiii
Glossary
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
DOD Department of Defense
DOS Department of State
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigations
GIF Graphics Interchange Format
IC Intelligence Community
ISIS Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
NU Nahdlatul Ulama
SME Subject Matter Expert
USG United States Government
VORTEX Vienna Observatory for Applied Research on Radicalism
and Extremism
1
Introduction
If you have been online in the past year—if you have connected to the internet via a
desktop, laptop, tablet, or smartphone; if you have been on Facebook, Twitter,
Tumblr, Instagram, or any social media platform; or if you have an email account and
know someone inclined to pass along funny forwards—then you have almost
certainly seen a meme. There are thousands in circulation (the website Know Your
Meme lists over 4,000 “confirmed meme entries”), and new ones are being created
weekly.
1
Some have been around for nearly a decade, while others have been around
for a matter of days; some have broad appeal and can be found in relatively
mainstream online communities, while others are relatively niche and might circulate
only within closed online communities. One particularly popular example is that of
Success Kid, depicted in Figure 1 and discussed in detail later in this report.
Figure
1. Success Kid on Memes
Source:
imgflip Meme Generator, https://imgflip.com/memegenerator
, accessed March
22, 2018
1
“Meme Database,” Know Your Meme, http://knowyourmeme.com/memes, accessed March 22,
2018.
2
While these images are popularly known as “memes,” a closer look at the concept
reveals a nuanced, contested, and complex set of ideas worthy of further inquiry. The
term has multiple active definitions; it has been invoked for decades by analysts
exploring its utility to the civilian and governmental influence communities; and it
has been mentioned recently in the context of online radicalization campaigns by the
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and Russia’s disinformation activities. In short,
the very concept of meme remains contested and yet there is an increasingly long list
of reasons compelling us to turn our attention to the role of memes in
shaping public discourse, to the capacity of memes to affect individual
attitudes and behaviors, and to the utility of memes as part of influence
campaigns—which we are referring to as memetic engagement.
In light of these trends, CNA initiated an exploratory study on the applicability,
utility, role, and value of memes and memetic engagement in USG influence
campaigns. Our hope is that this study will further the conversation on memetic
engagement within the U.S. government (USG) influence community, including policy-
makers and military leaders, as they explore novel and innovative approaches
to develop and employ strategies to counter state and non-state actors
in the online information environment.
Specifically, this study addresses the following questions:
• What are memes? What is the history of memes?
• How and why do memes affect individual and organizational attitudes and
behaviors? How and why do concepts such as virality and persuasion relate to
communication via memes (i.e., “memetic communication”)?
• Can memes and memetic engagement be useful in USG influence campaigns to
counter state and non-state actors? Does memetic engagement fit into USG
influence campaigns across the spectrum of conflict and range of activities?
• What type of framework can be used to design effective memetic engagement?
Research approach
This study was conducted in five steps:
1. We conducted a comprehensive literature review on the background and
history of memes, memetic engagement, and memetic warfare, starting from
the first articulation of the idea in 1976 and moving to the present. We used
3
this literature review to develop themes and insights that served as a
foundation for the study.
2. We reviewed psychology and marketing literature to gain insights on whether
memetic virality could be linked to changes in attitudes and behaviors, and
whether memetic communication was well suited to the work of persuasion.
3. We conducted semi-structured conversations with subject matter experts
(SMEs) across the influence community—to include the U.S. Departments of
Defense and State (DOD and DOS, respectively), the intelligence community
(IC), academia, marketing, and advertising—to further extrapolate, assess, and
validate our preliminary insights on memes and memetic engagement, virality
and persuasion, and the applicability and utility of memes and memetic
engagement in USG influence campaigns.
4. We used these insights along with a set of epidemiological models to develop a
framework to explore memetic engagement through a series of examples. Our
framework classifies these examples into three categories: inoculate, infect, and
treat. While additional models exist that explore memetic and online
engagement, including the concept of memetic warfare as discussed in the
appendix, our exploratory research suggests that epidemiological models
prove a sound way to explore the utility of memes in influence campaigns.
5. Drawing on the literature review, semi-structured conversations, and analysis
of these cases, we developed a set of preliminary observations from our
interviews with subject matter experts, along with concluding thoughts on the
applicability of memes to influence campaigns and ideas for further research.
Organization
This report is structured into six sections. First, we explore the concept of memes
—examining original, current, and popular usages; offering our own definition of
meme; and analyzing the relatively modest existing literature on the
operationalization of memes. Second, we explore why memes are a useful
tool for influence campaigns. Third, we present our concept for
operationalizing memes through the epidemiological framework of
inoculate, infect, and treat as depicted through select examples. Fifth, we
offer preliminary observations from subject matter experts on memetic
engagement. Sixth, we conclude with thoughts on the applicability of memes
to influence campaigns and ideas for future research.
4
What are Memes?
Early definitions and theories
In 1976, evolutionary biologist Richard Dawkins suggested that ideas could be
transmitted between people in much the same way that physical characteristics are
transmitted between people. In this model, memes—small bits of cultural
information, to include slogans, stories, fairytales, songs, jokes, beliefs, concepts,
and worldviews—are transferred between people via interpersonal and social
interactions. Importantly, Dawkins’ model of idea transmission (i.e., memetic
transmission) suggested that the persistence and spread of individual memes was
the product of an evolutionary process. He asserted that memes are self-replicating
in that the popularity or success of a meme ensures that it will be passed on in a
process that sometimes involves evolution and mutation: “If a scientist hears, or
reads about, a good idea, he passes it on to his colleagues and students. He mentions
it in his articles and lectures. If the idea catches on, it can be said to propagate itself,
spreading from brain to brain.”
2
Additionally, he argued that memes are subject to
copying error, variation, and mutation. In other words, memetic transmission
involves some of the core components of Darwin’s evolutionary process: variation,
replication, and natural selection.
Since Dawkins’ groundbreaking coining of the term, the concept of meme has
evolved considerably. Early work began with the idea that a meme was a bit of
cultural information that could be passed “from brain to brain,” and the concept was
used to explore how knowledge might be transmitted between individuals.
3
The
discipline of memetics, which took shape in the mid-1980s, built directly on
Dawkins’ work to explore the idea that evolutionary models explained cultural
information transfer between people and through generations. While some work on
this topic emphasized that memes were passed via human imitation (and Dawkins’
original definition emphasized this point), other scholarship posited that the
transmission of ideas could be best understood via an epidemiological model that
2
Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene (New York City, NY: Oxford University Press, 1989).
3
Ibid.
5
foregrounded contagion. In this line of thinking, ideas could essentially “infect”
individuals and societies in the same way that viruses infect a host. In short, two
models took shape: one in which memes were passed via the act of human imitation,
and one in which memes spread through a population as a contagion.
4
More interesting than the imitation/contagion debate was work that focused on what
made a specific meme successful. In other words, in an evolutionary environment
shaped by natural selection ensuring the survival of the fittest, it was important to
identify what made a meme fit. Different models were offered, but the same core
themes emerged in each. One researcher argued, for example, that a successful
meme went through four stages: assimilation, retention, expression, and
transmission. In other words, a successful meme is:
• Assimilated: a person needs to notice the meme, understand the meme, and
internalize the meme.
• Retained: a person needs to remember the meme (a process that is influenced
by “the uniqueness of the meme, frequency of presentation, authority of the
source, how easy it is to express, consistency with norms of a culture, and its
usefulness to an individual”).
• Expressed/Transmitted: a person needs to publicly express the meme so that it
can be transmitted to another person.
5
This e
arly approach to meme fitness focused on the factors related to transmission
of knowledge. Later research shifted the focus by exploring the work in cognitive
psychology and information processing theory to ask “how [memes] leave lasting
footprints.”
6
One article concluded that meme fitness could be explained in terms of
four criteria: “(1) In terms of a meme’s compatibility with the brain’s hardwiring (2)
4
Additional work explored the role that memes played in human evolution, suggesting that a
robust theory of memetic replication might account for human brain size or serve as an
explanation for the development of human language. In this more aggressive framework,
memes might be more important than genes: “Successful memes would begin dictating which
genes would be most successful. The memes take hold of the leash.” This theory is, however,
neither prominent nor widely accepted. For an outline of this argument, and a series of
counterarguments, see Susan Blackmore, “The Power of Memes,” Scientific American 283, no. 4
(October 2000): 64-73.
5
Francis Heylighen, “What makes a meme successful? Selection criteria for cultural evolution,”
paper presented at the 15th International Congress on Cybernetics, Namur, Belgium (1998,
August), quoted in Gideon Mazambani et al., “Impact of Status and Meme Content on the
Spread of Memes in Virtual Communities,” Human Technology 11 (2015).
6
Richard J. Pech, “Memes and cognitive hardwiring: Why are some memes more successful than
others?” European Journal of Innovation Management 6.3 (2003): 174.
6
By the ease with which the meme can be replicated… (3) By a meme’s ability to
provide for or meet the needs of the people it encounters… (4) By an accidental or
involuntary lodging of a meme or a part of a meme in the neural network.”
7
Modern interpretations
Little is published these days on the traditional understanding of memetics described
above, and the term has evolved to such a degree that the mention of meme no
longer brings to mind the work of Dawkins. Instead, the term has seen something of
a rebirth in the age of the internet and, as Merriam-Webster notes, a meme is now
popularly defined as “an amusing or interesting item or genre of items that is spread
widely online especially through social media.” As Dawkins himself noted in 2013:
The very idea of the meme, has itself mutated and evolved in a new
direction. An internet meme is a hijacking of the original idea. Instead
of mutating by random chance, before spreading by a form of
Darwinian selection, internet memes are altered deliberately by
human creativity. In the hijacked version, mutations are designed—
not random—with the full knowledge of the person doing the
mutating.
8
Today the concept of meme is broadly understood to mean one of two things. In
some instances, it might refer to a piece of cultural information that is shared or
spread online: an image, video, hashtag, a Graphics Interchange Format (GIF) image,
or textual statement. An early example would be Dancing Baby (1996), as shown in
Figure 2.
7
Richard J. Pech, “Memes and cognitive hardwiring: Why are some memes more successful than
others?” European Journal of Innovation Management 6.3 (2003): 179.
8
R. Dawkins (Performer) and Marshmallow Laser Feast (Director) (2013), Just for Hits. Available
at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GFn-ixX9edg, quoted in Bradley E. Wiggins and G. Bret
Bowers, “Memes as Genre: A Structurational Analysis of the Memescape,” New Media & Society
17.11 (2015): 1886-1906.
7
Figure
2. Dancing Baby meme
Source:
Dancing Baby, Know Your Meme
, accessed March 7, 2018,
http://knowyourmeme.com/
memes/dancing-baby.
More recent, but similarly popular examples, include those shown in Figure 3.
Figure
3. Some popular modern memes
Note:
Keyboard Cat (top left, 2007); Charlie Bit My Finger (top right, 2007), Kanye Interrupts
(
bottom left, 2009), Make A Wish’s #SFBatkid (bottom right, 2013).
Source:
Know Your Meme, http://knowyourmeme.com/memes, accessed March 7, 2018.
In other instances, and more commonly, the word meme doesn’t refer to a “simple
stand-alone artifact [but to] a full-fledged genre…with its own set of rules and
8
conventions.”
9
In these cases, the meme—typically an image accompanied by text of
some sort—develops its own grammar as it spreads: the image/meme conveys a
specific message, and informal rules dictate what words/quotes can be meaningfully
superimposed on the image. Such memes constitute a “shared cultural language”
that often transcends the internet, ensuring that broad parts of the general
population understand what is being communicated.
10
Examples of this type of
meme abound and include those shown in Figure 4.
Figure
4. Memes combining images and text
Note:
Grumpy Cat (left), Philosoraptor (center), The Most Interesting M
an in the World
(right).
Source:
Know Your Meme, http://knowyourmeme.com/memes, accessed March 7, 2018
;
imgflip
Meme Generator, https://imgflip.com/memegenerator, accessed March 22, 2018.
Critically, in each instance the core image is replicated by individuals who customize
it to communicate distinct messages. Thus, these memes are not merely viral images
shared online. They are, instead, a type of communication. These image-based
expressions are persistent, in part due to the participatory nature of their
construction.
11
A meme, in other words, has an organic lifestyle that approximately
follows the progression described below.
First, a single image is posted online. In the case of the Success Kid meme, the
original was a 2007 photo of 11-month-old Sammy Griner, as shown in Figure 5:
9
Bradley E. Wiggins and G. Bret Bowers, “Memes as Genre: A Structurational Analysis of the
Memescape,” New Media & Society 17.11 (2015): 1886-1906.
10
Marion Provencher Langlois, “Making Sense of Memes: Where They Came From and Why We
Keep Clicking Them,” Inquiries Journal 6.03 (2014).
11
Bradley E. Wiggins and G. Bret Bowers, “Memes as Genre: A Structurational Analysis of the
Memescape,” New Media & Society 17.11 (2015): 1886-1906.
9
Figure
5. Success Kid, original
Source:
Success Kid, Know Your Meme, http://knowyourmeme.com/memes/success-kid-i-
hate
-sandcastles, accessed March 7, 2018.
The image is then modified—in this instance, Sammy was photo-shopped onto a
purple background, as shown in Figure 6.
Figure
6. Success Kid template
Source:
Success Kid, Know Your Meme, http://knowyourmeme.com/memes/success-kid-i-
hate
-sandcastles, accessed March 7, 2018.
Finally, the meme was replicated extensively by a community that organically agreed
upon a basic syntax, as shown in Figure 7.
10
Figure
7. Success Kid memes
Source:
Success Kid, Know Your Meme, http://knowyourmeme.com/memes/success-kid-i-
hate
-sandcastles, accessed March 7, 2018.
In both contemporary cases—whether meme refers broadly to a piece of cultural
information shared online, or narrowly to a specific image with accompanying text—
the meme is culturally relevant, broadly resonant, organically developed, and
voluntarily spread. These memes are, returning to the language of Dawkins, bits of
cultural information that survive via replication, mutation, and natural selection.
Thus, despite the significant shift away from early models and the language of
Dawkins (i.e., models suggesting that memes mutated randomly), many of the core
ideas developed by early thinkers remain relevant (i.e., questions about meme fitness
and selection are still important). What makes these contemporary memes unique is
simply that this process is intentional and purposeful, and that the memes
themselves exist primarily in a virtual world.
Importantly, work on memes has consistently been somewhat controversial and
contested. It has evolved considerably, from being articulated in models that
foreground imitation, and in models that focus on contagion; to being applied to
human biological evolution, and to the spread of information; to referencing all types
of cultural information, and a narrow subset that appears online. And at times it has
been taken up by thinkers that exist at the fringes of reputable science. One relatively
recent article acknowledged this messy history quite clearly:
Memetics, the study of meme theory and application, is a kind of grab
bag of concepts and disciplines. It's part biology and neuroscience,
part evolutionary psychology, part old fashioned propaganda, and
11
part marketing campaign driven by the same thinking that goes into
figuring out what makes a banner ad clickable. Though memetics
currently exists somewhere between science, science fiction, and
social science, some enthusiasts present it as a kind of hidden code
that can be used to reprogram not only individual behaviors but
entire societies.
12
As this article notes, the question of how a meme functions—or what conceptual or
practical value might come from the study of these processes—is not yet settled.
Memes are, however, unquestionably ubiquitous and it thus seems clear that a robust
engagement with the concept is critical. Understanding the history of the term
informs this process, but the messy nature of the literature on memes makes it
particularly important to accurately define and situate the concept.
Defining a meme
For the purpose of this exploratory study, we have adopted the following functional
definition:
A meme is a culturally resonant item easily shared or spread online.
Of note, this definition is not exclusively visual, as memes can (and do) consist of
non-visual items (e.g., a hashtag campaign). However, in the remainder of this paper
we will focus on visual memes.
13
The decision to do this was motivated primarily by
available resources. Defined most inclusively a meme is an idea, but an analysis
of how ideas are important for influence campaigns was clearly too broad in
scope. Additionally, we recognize that currently the term meme brings to mind
funny images spread online (e.g., Grumpy Cat, Success Kid). This, combined with
the shift (discussed in more detail below) to increasingly visual communication
online, led us to focus our attention on the use of visual memes.
The reality that memes are ubiquitous does not, however, necessarily mean that they
are an effective vehicle via which to engage in influence campaigns. As a result, it is
necessary to consider both whether and how memes might be an important addition
to activities and programs already underway. We do this in the sections that follow.
12
Jacob Siegel, “Is American Prepared for Meme Warfare?” Motherboard VICE (Jan 2017),
https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/xyvwdk/meme-warfare.
13
We are not, in other words, focused on memes that are textual (hashtags, slogans, etc.),
musical (jingles, theme songs, pop hits, etc.), narrative (fairy tales, urban legends, etc.), and the
like.
12
Why Visual Memes are Useful Tools
for Influence
Across the fields of psychology, behavioral sciences, philosophy, and marketing, the
literature agrees that images offer some advantages over text. These advantages—
particularly those with respect to brevity and stickiness—make visual memes
especially well-suited for influence campaigns. One advantage that memes have in
influence campaigns is that they consist of perceptual information. In other words,
they communicate information beyond the composition of the image itself. This
intuited, or connotatively conveyed, information means that images take less time to
consume than text and allow us to communicate complex concepts quickly.
14
Further, advertising, marketing, and psychological research suggest that visual cues
take advantage of heuristics, which enable our brains to retrieve information related
to images more quickly than information related to text. Indeed, neurocognitive
research confirms that the human brain is predominately an image processor whose
sensory cortex is far larger than its word processing centers.
15
This reliance on
heuristics is particularly acute for information presented online: technology
increases reliance on heuristics, which reduces the likelihood that consumers will
think deeply.
16
As a result, a rational discussion of an issue (e.g., an article exploring
corruption in the upper tiers of the Islamic State) will be less effective than a visual
campaign (e.g., a memetic engagement discrediting the group).
Finally, images tend to be emotionally evocative. In the visual domain, research has
shown that emotional cues (both offensive and appetitive) are preferentially
14
Peter J. Lang, A Bio-Informational Theory of Emotional Imagery (Madison, WI: Society for
Psychophysiology, University of Wisconsin, September 1978),
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1469-8986.1979.tb01511.x/full; and David Kieras,
“Beyond Pictures and Words: Alternative Information Processing Models for Imagery Effects in
Verbal Memory,” Psychological Bulletin 85, no. 3 (1978): 532-554.
15
Haig Kouyoumhjian, “Learning through Visuals: Visual Imagery in the Classroom,” Psychology
Today, July 2012, https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/get-psyched/201207/learning-
through-visuals.
16
Semi-Structured Discussion with Fellow, Social Innovation Lab, Stanford University, January
10, 2018.
13
processed in the brain.
17
Interestingly, research suggests that emotion can be elicited
subliminally, suggesting that we do not need to be aware of why we feel a certain way
for our attitudes and behaviors to be affected. The stickiness of emotionally
evocative information and the effectiveness that images produce in eliciting these
emotional responses creates a message efficacy that textual means of
communication lack.
18
In combination, research exploring these ideas suggests that
visual memes are particularly strong vehicles for communication.
While this behavioral science work is compelling, so is marketing research, which
suggests that a failure to engage memetically effectively cedes a massive
communications forum to those who are doing this work (e.g., state actors, non-state
actors, citizens, etc.). To begin, the visual online arena is growing rapidly. A recent
article in a marketing magazine suggests that over 80 percent of communications
will soon be visual, and that visual content has overtaken textual content in terms of
consumer engagement.
19
Additionally, a marketing website notes that readers engage
with relevant infographics more than with the surrounding text (i.e., choosing the
easily processed over the cognitively demanding).
20
The same site also notes that images are liked and shared three times more
frequently than other types of online content; that images radically increase the
likelihood that someone will accurately follow instructions (people perform over 300
percent better with accompanying images); and that images significantly improve
information retention (information paired with an image was retained for longer than
information presented alone).
21
Data analysis also suggests that in some instances
visual content has meaningfully influenced behavior as people were more likely to
17
Antje BM Gerdes, Matthias J Wieser, and Georg W Aplers, “Emotional Pictures and Sounds: A
Review of Multi Modal Interactions of Emotion Cues in Multiple Domains,” Frontiers in
Psychology, December 2014, https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/
fpsyg.2014.01351/full.
18
Kirsten I. Ruys and Diederik A. Stapel, “The Secret Life of Emotions,” Psychological Science 19
(4) (2008): 385; Association for Psychological Science, Cause and Affect: Emotions Can Be
Unconsciously and Subliminally Evoked, Science Daily Review (April 2008),
https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2008/04/080428155208.htm.
19
Larry Kim, 16 Eye-Popping Statistics You Need to Know About Visual Content Marketing, INC
Online, November 2015, https://www.inc.com/larry-kim/visual-content-marketing-16-eye-
popping-statistics-you-need-to-know.html.
20
Jesse Mawhinney, 42 Visual Content Marketing Statistics You Should Know in 2017, Hubspot
Online, February 2018, https://blog.hubspot.com/marketing/visual-content-marketing-strategy
21
Ibid.
14
purchase a product if the advertisement was a video.
22
In other words, online visual
engagement is growing, and increasingly sophisticated tools and metrics for
engaging in this forum now exist. Thus, it appears that there are considerable
reasons for further exploration of the use of memes as part of influence campaigns.
In the next section, we will present a number of specific examples of the use of visual
memes for various influence purposes.
22
Larry Kim, 16 Eye-Popping Statistics You Need to Know About Visual Content Marketing, INC
Online, November 2015, https://www.inc.com/larry-kim/visual-content-marketing-16-eye-
popping-statistics-you-need-to-know.html.
15
Examples of Visual Memes and
Observations on their Use for
Influence
Borrowing from epidemiological models, we have identified three ways in which
memes may be situated intentionally within information and influence campaigns: to
inoculate, to infect, and to treat. We have adopted this model for two reasons: first
and foremost, we felt that applying an epidemiological model was in keeping with
the original understanding of memes, as defined by Richard Dawkins, as a pseudo-
biological concept; and second, this model is adapted from the existing body of
literature related to radicalization and terrorism wherein epidemiological models
have been applied in a number of studies to the transmission of radical and
extremist narratives. In light of this study’s limited scope, we synthesized and
distilled the existing literature’s concepts into inoculate, infect, and treat categories.
Table 1 below provides a brief overview of this construct.
Table 1. Overview of the “inoculate, infect, treat” construct
Inoculate
Infect
Treat
Purpose
Prevent or minimize the
effect of adversary messaging
Transmit messages in support
of USG interests
Contain the effect of
adversary messaging
Distribution
Preventative
Anticipatory
Offensive
Stand Alone Effort
Defensive
Reactive
Message
Disposition
Adversary USG Adversary
Primary sources used to develop this concept below; additional sources in references section
23
23
Kenrad E Nelson. Epidemiology of Infectious Disease: Theory and Practice, 3
rd
Edition
(Burlington, MA: Jones and Bartlett Publishing, 2014); Mauricio Barreto, Maria Gloria Teixeira,
and Eduardo Hage Carmo, “Infectious Diseases Epidemiology,” Journal of Epidemiology and
Community Health 60, No. 3 (March 2006): 192-195,
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2465549
16
To highlight and illustrate the application of this framework, we include a set of
examples below that show how visual memes have been used to inoculate, infect, or
treat information in an influence campaign. These examples were identified
as effective in part via an application of the concept of meme fitness (discussed
above): they were assimilated (i.e., they were noticed and understood); they were
retained (i.e., they were remembered enough to engender engagement); and
they were expressed or transmitted (i.e., relevant images were shared and posted
publicly).
24
In short, we take the examples below to be examples of effective
memetic engagement for three reasons: (1) they were targeted to a specific issue, (2)
they resonated with a relevant population, and (3) they were fit enough to gain
traction (both in the form of memes posted, and in the form of mainstream media
coverage). These examples are not exhaustive, but represent a sample of cases
from which we can gain greater insights into the applicability and
operationalization of memes in influence campaigns.
Our research suggests that the epidemiological approach has unique value because it
is descriptive, prescriptive, and inclusive: this approach offers a clear summary of
effective memetic campaigns; it identifies approaches to memetic engagement that
might be replicated or imitated; and it capaciously engages with a wide variety of
campaigns and actors. Figure 8 on the next page summarizes the examples we
discuss—showing the range of issues and environments in which memetic
engagement has been used.
Randy Borum, “Radicalization into Violent Extremism II: A Review of Conceptual Models and
Empirical Research,” Journal of Strategic Security 4, No. 4 (Winter 2011): 37-62,
http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1140&context=jss.
24
Francis Heylighen, “What makes a meme successful? Selection criteria for cultural evolution,”
paper presented at the 15th International Congress on Cybernetics, Namur, Belgium (1998,
August), quoted in Gideon Mazambani et al., “Impact of Status and Meme Content on the
Spread of Memes in Virtual Communities,” Human Technology 11 (2015).
17
Figure
8. Summary of examples
Source:
CNA
Inoculate
To use a meme in an effort to protect against a threat or anticipated
attack. Using memes to preemptively address—with an emphasis on
delegitimizing or undermining—a message or attack expected from
another actor.
Exem
plar: Japanese citizens respond to the Islamic
State
Actor: Japanese citizens
Message: Anti-ISIS
Target Population: ISIS, Japanese people
On January 20, 2015, ISIS released a video featuring Japanese prisoners Kenji
Goto and Haruna Yukawa. The video functioned as a ransom request: the
militants demanded that the Japanese government pay $200 million in order
to secure the hostages’ release.
25
The video also included a message to the
Japanese public:
18
To the Japanese public, [..] you now have 72 hours to pressure your
government into making a wise decision by paying $200 million to save
the lives of your citizens.... Otherwise, this knife will become your
nightmare.
26
The Japanese public, however, did not cooperate with ISIS’s request. Instead, they
embraced a hashtag that translated to “ISIS Crappy Photoshop Grand Prix,” and
embarked upon an aggressive campaign mocking ISIS and the armed militant
featured in the video.
27
Importantly, this hashtag campaign—which included a
significant memetic engagement—aspired in part to inoculate the Japanese
public against the expected horror of the hostages being executed.
The hashtag campaign was varied and far reaching, and included a significant
number of memes. Many of these were iterations of a specific image (in this case, a
screenshot of the hostages and militant taken from ISIS’s video). Some of
the responses were culturally specific, and referenced Japanese gaming, kawaii,
and anime culture; and some were more universally accessible and referenced Star
Wars, cats, and global politics.
28
Some sample memes are shown in Figure 9.
25
Martin Fackler and Alan Cowell, “Hostage Crisis Challenges Pacific Japanese Public,” New
York Times, January 20, 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/21/world/middleeast/video-
isis-japanese-hostages.html?_r=0.
26
Ibid.
27
Alicia Lu, “Japan Trolls ISIS On Twitter With Memes In A Defiant, Passionate Show Of
Resistance,” Bustle, January 23, 2015, https://www.bustle.com/articles/60218-japan-trolls-isis-
on-twitter-with-memes-in-a-defiant-passionate-show-of-resistance.
28
@deepquest, “#ISISクソコラグランプリ. #Caturday #ISIS,” January 24, 2015,
https://twitter.com/deepquest/status/559015796127444994; @dedeyudistira, “
Tongsis rek RT
@Mosesofmason: ‘@MFugicle: ‘@temmo5: #ISISクソコラグランプリ ‘even Isis likes to keep it
trendy,’’” January 24, 2015, https://twitter.com/dedeyudistira/status/559054832661569536;
@raktvru, “Reimu owned! #ISISクソコラグランプリ
,“ January 21, 2015,
https://twitter.com/raktvru/status/558025030710599680; @tokyoscum, “ISIS threatens to
execute two Japanese hostages, becomes Photoshop meme: #ISISクソコラグランプリ,”
January 20, 2015, https://twitter.com/tokyoscum/status/557708538282512384;
@Mitch_Hunter, “#ISISクソコラグランプリ #ISIS This has to be my favorite so far. Might be
time to make a few myself ;),” January 22, 2015,
https://twitter.com/Mitch__Hunter/status/558480504874598400; @Top_kek_3,
“@PelayoKnoxville #ISISクソコラグランプリ,” January 21, 2015,
https://twitter.com/Top_kek_3/status/558038543222984704.
19
Figure
9. Examples of Japanese anti-ISIS memes
Source: See footnote 2
8.
Importantly, not all of the memes that circulated as part of this hashtag campaign
were iterations of the original screenshot from the video. Some were simply tapping
into the ethos of the campaign, but relying on other imagery. One such example of
this was a meme that circulated under this hashtag, but which used alternative
imagery, and was an iteration of a widely circulated American meme that dated to
2009. In the new meme, ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was featured as “Chubby
Bubbles Girl” and shown fleeing a tiger.
29
See Figure 10.
29
Know Your Meme, “Chubby Bubbles Girl,” http://knowyourmeme.com/memes/chubby-
bubbles-girl; @sutesute60, “Baghdadi getaway バグダディ逃走中。 #ISIS #IS #ISISクソコラグラ
ンプリ #iraq #Syria #jihād,” Febuary 18, 2015, https://twitter.com/sutesute60/
status/568071190524227584.
20
Figure
10. Examples of Japanese anti-ISIS memes: al-Baghdadi as “Chubby Bubbles
Girl”
Source: See footnote 2
9.
Ultimately, the fate of the hostages was not influenced by this memetic response.
The Japanese government did not pay the ransom, and by the end of the month, ISIS
had released videos showing the men being beheaded. Without minimizing this
tragedy, it is possible to recognize that the memetic campaign surrounding it was
incredibly effective. The hashtag was used more than 200,000 times in the days after
the ISIS video was posted (and is, in fact, still in use in early 2018).
30
And while the
campaign provoked controversy, it was effective in undermining the ultimate goal of
the terrorist movement by casting them as preposterous rather than powerful and
threatening. The campaign permitted the Japanese people to take control of the
narrative and “[deflate] ISIS's formidable image.”
31
As one Twitter user posted (with
reference to the ransom deadline): “Tomorrow will be sad but it will pass and #ISIS
will still be a big joke. You can't break our spirit.”
32
In short, the memetic response—
inspired by screenshots from ISIS’s own video—effectively inoculated the Japanese
people. While it did not change the outcome of the beheadings, it may have helped
undermine the impact by delegitimizing ISIS and its actions.
30
“Japan Is Fighting ISIS With Super-Kawaii Tweets,” Vice, January 23, 2015,
https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/8gdpvb/japan-is-fighting-isis-with-super-kawaii-tweets.
31
Alicia Lu, “Japan Trolls ISIS On Twitter With Memes In A Defiant, Passionate Show Of
Resistance,” Bustle, January 23, 2015, https://www.bustle.com/articles/60218-japan-trolls-isis-
on-twitter-with-memes-in-a-defiant-passionate-show-of-resistance.
32
Ibid.; @djvjgrrl, “Tomorrow will be sad but it will pass and #ISIS will still be a big joke. You
can't break our spirit #ISISクソコラグランプリ,” January 22, 2015,
https://twitter.com/djvjgrrl/status/558451972102045696.
21
Supporting example: North Korean nuclear program
Actor: Miscellaneous
Message: Mocking Kim Jung Un and North Korea
Target Population: Miscellaneous
In September 2016, the online community responded to North Korea’s fifth
successful nuclear test with a variety of memes mocking both the country and its
leader. The effort was not organized, and primarily relied on the somewhat generic
hashtag #NorthKorea. That said, this organic online movement appears to have been
an effort to inoculate against North Korea’s belligerent posturing and increasing
threat by delegitimizing the fear that the North Korean regime attempted to sow.
33
Images circulated online in response to North Korea’s nuclear test included screen
shots of leader Kim Jong Un, cartoons, and preexisting memes adapted to the
moment (see examples in Figure 11).
Figure
11. Examples of responses to North Korean missile launch
Source:
See Footnote 33.
The effect of this memetic effort was observed through news coverage of the hashtag
campaign that poked fun at Kim Jong Un, and it drew attention to North Korea’s
limited missile capabilities. This effort, coordinated by a disparate community of
social media users, served to effectively undermine the threat that the North Korean
regime wished to convey.
33
Rory Tingle, “Kim Jong Fun! Internet Reacts to Tubby North Korean Dictator's Latest Nuke
Test by Mocking Him with Hilarious Memes,” Daily Mail, September 9, 2015,
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3782305/Internet-reacts-tubby-North-Korean-
dictator-s-latest-nuke-test-mocking-hilarious-memes.html.
22
Supporting example: Mexico responds to ISIS threat
Actor: Mexican citizens
Message: Anti-ISIS
Target Population: ISIS, Mexican people
In 2015, ISIS released a video erroneously naming Mexico as a member of the
coalition fighting the terrorist movement and issuing a threat against the country
and its citizens. The Mexican people responded via a meme campaign—using the
hashtag #IsisEnMexico—and inoculated themselves against the group by posting a
variety of memes mocking the movement and making light of the threat. The theme
of the messages shared in response to ISIS’s threat was humorous and self-
deprecating, with many of the memes invoking Mexican cultural ideas to comment
on the nation’s preparedness, as the examples in Figure 12 illustrate.
34
Figure
12. Example of Mexico’s response to ISIS threats
Translation (right): We are ready.
Translation (left): I’m buying nuclear weapons because ISIS is in Mexico and we must
defend the motherland.”
Source:
See Footnote 34.
34
Latin Times, “ISIS in Mexico Memes: Twitter Reacts to Threat from Terrorist Group,” Latin
Times, November 25, 2015, http://www.latintimes.com/isis-mexico-memes-twitter-reacts-
threat-terrorist-group-355911; Rafa Fernandez de Castro, “Mexican Mock ISIS Terrorist Threat
With Memes and Humor,” Splinter, November 27, 2015, https://splinternews.com/mexicans-
mock-isis-terrorist-threat-with-memes-and-humo-1793853226.
23
In short, by deriding ISIS’s mistake and by making light of the threat that the group
poses to Mexico, Mexican citizens effectively inoculated themselves against the
group’s fearmongering.
35
Supporting example: Spain responds to ISIS threat
Actor: Spanish citizens
Meme Message: anti-ISIS
Target Population: ISIS, Spanish people
In August 2017, shortly after its attacks in Barcelona, ISIS released a video featuring a
Spanish-speaking extremist threatening violence against the country and promising
to avenge the deaths of Muslims killed during the 15
th
-century Spanish Inquisition.
The Spanish people responded promptly—demonstrating considerable resilience
given the recent attacks—by using memes to both undermine the threat levied
against them and to inoculate themselves against future violence. The campaign
featured a series of images mocking the movement and turning the extremist into
something of a laughingstock, as illustrated in Figure 13.
36
35
Latin Times, “ISIS in Mexico Memes: Twitter Reacts to Threat from Terrorist Group,” Latin
Times, November 25, 2015, http://www.latintimes.com/isis-mexico-memes-twitter-reacts-
threat-terrorist-group-355911; Rafa Fernandez de Castro, “Mexican Mock ISIS Terrorist Threat
With Memes and Humor,” Splinter, November 27, 2015, https://splinternews.com/mexicans-
mock-isis-terrorist-threat-with-memes-and-humo-1793853226 and Rafa Fernandez de Castro,
“Mexican Mock ISIS Terrorist Threat With Memes and Humor,” Splinter, November 27, 2015,
https://splinternews.com/mexicans-mock-isis-terrorist-threat-with-memes-and-humo-
1793853226.
36
Lucy Pasha Robinson, “ISIS Fighter Relentlessly Mocked On Spanish Twitter After Threatening
Further Violence,” Independent, August 26, 2017, http://www.independent.co.uk/
news/world/europe/islamic-state-fighter-el-cordobes-mocked-spanish-twitter-violence-
barcelona-attacks-muhammad-yasin-a7914366.html; Tom O’Connor, “ISIS Calls On Muslims to
Attack Spain, Becomes Top Twitter Meme,” Newsweek, August 25, 2017,
http://www.newsweek.com/twitter-blows-isis-militant-promising-more-attacks-spain-655242;
Emily Lupton, “ISIS Fighters Hilariously Mocked by Spanish Social-Media Users,” Business
Insider, August 25, 2017, http://www.businessinsider.com/r-islamic-state-fighter-mocked-on-
spanish-twitter-2017-8.
24
Figure
13. Example of Spanish reponse to ISIS threats
Source: See Footnote 36.
Infect
To use a meme to spread a specific message. To use memes in order to
articulate a message—either positive (e.g., defending a value) or
negative (i.e., disparaging an institution)—that aligns with broader
mission objectives.
Exemplar: Nahdlatul Ulama Responds to ISIS
Actor: Indonesian non-profit Nahdlatul Ulama
Message: Anti-ISIS, Anti-violent Islam, Pro-moderate Islam
Target Population: Indonesian people
In 2015, the New York Times reported that Nahdlatul Ulama (NU)—an Indonesian
Muslim organization with 40-50 million members—was poised to embark upon a
campaign to counter ISIS’s extremism.
37
NU was working with the University of
Vienna in Austria (via a program called VORTEX, the Vienna Observatory for Applied
Research on Radicalism and Extremism) to prepare effective responses to ISIS’s
online propaganda. It was poised to open a “prevention center” where NU would train
“male and female Arabic-speaking students to engage with jihadist ideology and
37
Joe Cochrane, “From Indonesia, a Muslim Challenge to the Ideology of the Islamic State,” New
York Times, November 25, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/27/world/asia/indonesia-
islam-nahdlatul-ulama.html.
25
messaging under the guidance of NU theologians who are consulting Western
academia.”
38
The movement’s approach, importantly, was not simply ideological whack-a-mole
(e.g., an ISIS message is posted, and an NU representative responds). NU has a
distinct and clear religious message. As one of the group’s leaders claimed:
“According to the Sunni view of Islam every aspect and expression of religion should
be imbued with love and compassion, and foster the perfection of human nature.”
39
More pointedly, according to the article, NU “promotes a spiritual interpretation of
Islam that stresses nonviolence, inclusiveness and acceptance of other religions.”
40
These values were to be at the center of NU’s campaign. In short, the group would
aspire to infect the population with a positive, pro-social, and moderate
conceptualization of Islam that would be inimical to ISIS’s violent extremism.
Less than a year later, in 2016, reporting indicated that NU’s social media work was
und
erway.
41
Nearly 500 NU “cyber warriors” were actively attempting to counter
ISIS’s online propaganda.
42
As one cyber warrior commented, “We try to make the
image of Islam as fun as possible. That’s why memes and tweets are the best way to
spread our ideas.”
43
He went on to note that he typically posted “silly memes that
poke fun at extremists as well as earnest text posts that extol moderate Islam.”
44
38
Krithika Varagur, “World’s Largest Islamic Organization Tells ISIS To Get Lost,” The
Huffington Post, December 3, 2015, https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/indonesian-
muslims-counter-isis_us_565c737ae4b072e9d1c26bda; Joe Cochrane, “From Indonesia, a
Muslim Challenge to the Ideology of the Islamic State,” New York Times, November 25, 2016,
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/27/world/asia/indonesia-islam-nahdlatul-ulama.html.
39
Joe Cochrane, “From Indonesia, a Muslim Challenge to the Ideology of the Islamic State,” New
York Times, November 25, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/27/world/asia/indonesia-
islam-nahdlatul-ulama.html.
40
Ibid.
41
In fact, NU’s social media efforts were just one facet of a broader campaign that included a
documentary film, several websites, an Android app, TV broadcasts, and conferences.
42
“Indonesia’s Muslim Cyber Warriors Take On ISIS,” The Strait Times, May 8, 2016,
http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/indonesias-muslim-cyber-warriors-take-on-isis.
43
Krithika Varagur, “Indonesia’s Cyber Warriors Battle ISIS With Memes, Tweets and
WhatsApp,” The Huffington Post, June 9, 2016,
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/indonesia-isis-cyber-
warriors_us_5750779ae4b0eb20fa0d2684?ir=Technology§ion=us_technology&utm_hp_ref=
technology.
44
Ibid.
26
Examples of NU postings are difficult to identify as the group is still modestly sized
and operating almost entirely in the Indonesian language. Some example posts have,
however, been reported in the Western media, as illustrated in Figure 14.
Figure
14. Examples of NU responses to ISIS
Translation (center): “Keep your worship secret the same way you conceal your
abominations.”
Translation (left):
“It’s not important what your religion is…if you do something good for all
mankind, people will never ask you.” And “Yes, religion keeps us away from sin, but how
many sins do we commit in the name of religion?”
Source:
Krithika Varagur, “Indonesia’s Cybe
r Warriors Battle ISIS With Memes, Tweets and
WhatsApp,”
The Huffington Post
, June 9, 2016,
h
ttps://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/indonesia-isis-cyber-
warriors_us_5750779ae4b0eb20fa0d2684?ir=Technology§ion=us_technology&utm_hp_
ref=technology.
The NU movement remains small compared to the sophisticated social media
campaign being coordinated by ISIS itself.
45
That said, as a terrorism expert from the
Indonesian Muslim Crisis Center noted, “It's a good strategy to make Google searches
fill up with moderate Islamic content…The battleground for Islamic ideology has
moved to the Internet, and by producing as many moderate websites as they can,
they can keep more minds healthy.”
46
In short, NU aims to “set a ‘perimeter’ around
aggressive Islam so that it doesn’t spread beyond those who are already
radicalized.”
47
Its goal is to articulate a moderate Islamic message, or, in other words,
45
“Indonesia’s Muslim Cyber Warriors Take On ISIS,” The Strait Times, May 8, 2016,
http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/indonesias-muslim-cyber-warriors-take-on-isis.
46
Ibid.
47
Krithika Varagur, “Indonesia’s Cyber Warriors Battle ISIS With Memes, Tweets and
WhatsApp,” The Huffington Post, June 9, 2016,
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/indonesia-isis-cyber-
warriors_us_5750779ae4b0eb20fa0d2684?ir=Technology§ion=us_technology&utm_hp_ref=
technology.
27
to infect the wider population with an understanding of Islam that is tolerant and
non-violent—in part because the organization believes that its understanding of
Islam can serve as an exemplar for the Muslim world, and in part to prevent the
spread of extremism.
Supporting example: Russian interference in Brexit
Actor: Russian troll farms
Message: Pro-Brexit, Pro-leave
Target Population: British people
On June 23, 2016—the day of the Brexit vote—over “150,000 Russian-language
Twitter accounts posted tens of thousands of messages in English” advocating for a
leave vote in the referendum.
48
The campaign was relatively short-lived but still
robust. The implicated accounts had been mostly silent on the issue of Brexit in the
month leading up to the referendum, but became active as the vote approached. One
set of researchers found, for example, that the pace increased from “about 1,000 a
day two weeks before the vote to 45,000 in the last 48 hours.”
49
Another study found
that 38 accounts that Twitter had identified as Kremlin-linked had tweeted 400 times
on the day of the vote. A third analysis found that 29 of the Russian accounts
identified to Congress had “also tweeted 139 times about Britain or Europe.”
50
And a
fourth found that “a network of more than 13,000 suspected bots” tweeted pro-
Brexit messages.
51
Importantly, though, much of this early analysis focused on
Twitter accounts linked to the Internet Research Agency and so doesn’t necessarily
offer a comprehensive overview of Russian activity as the vote approached.
This campaign relied on a number of tactics. First, the Twitter accounts were linked
to a variety of profiles and “people purporting to be a U.S. Navy veteran, a Tennessee
Republican and a Texan patriot—all [tweeted] in favour of Brexit.”
52
The tweets
48
David D. Kirkpatrick, “Signs of Russian Meddling in Brexit Referendum,” New York Times,
November 15, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/15/world/europe/russia-brexit-
twitter-facebook.html.
49
Ibid.
50
Ibid.
51
James Ball, “A Suspected Network Of 13,000 Twitter Bots Pumped Out Pro-Brexit Messages In
The Run-Up To The EU Vote,” Buzzfeed, October 20, 2017, https://www.buzzfeed.com/
jamesball/a-suspected-network-of-13000-twitter-bots-pumped-out-
pro?utm_term=.wwnGyBKKP#.iiBXNkMMY.
52
Robert Booth et al., “Russia Used Hundreds of Fake Accounts to Tweet About Brexit, Data
Shows,” Guardian, November 14, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/
nov/14/how-400-russia-run-fake-accounts-posted-bogus-brexit-tweets.
28
invoked hashtags such as #EUref, #BrexitInOut, #BritainInOut and #BrexitOrNot in
order to connect to a broader discourse.
53
In some instances, they deployed anti-
Muslim language and stoked fears about immigrants. As one analyst noted: “Many of
these accounts strongly pushed the narrative that all Muslims should be equated
with terrorists and made the case that Muslims should be banned from Europe.”
54
As
one example, a Twitter user tweeted: “I hope UK after #BrexitVote will start to clean
their land from muslim invasion!”
55
The account went on to post a widely shared
photo—captioned to deliver an anti-Islamic message—taken during the attack on the
Westminster Bridge.
56
This image can be seen in Figure 15.
Figure 15. Examples of responses to Russian interference in Brexit
Source:
See Footnote 55.
Importantly, the campaign wasn’t nearly as extensive as the similarly structured and
themed campaign to interfere in the 2016 U.S. presidential election (discussed
below). Nor is it entirely clear what this campaign was attempting to accomplish. As
one analyst noted, “We cannot say whether [these accounts] were primarily trying to
influence Brexit or whether it was a side effect of them trying to wreak discord
53
Caroline Mortimer, “If You Saw These Tweets, You Were Targeted By Russian Brexit
Propaganda,” Independent, November 12, 2017, https://www.independent.co.uk/life-
style/gadgets-and-tech/news/brexit-russia-troll-factory-propaganda-fake-news-twitter-
facebook-a8050866.html.
54
David D. Kirkpatrick, “Signs of Russian Meddling in Brexit Referendum,” New York Times,
November 15, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/15/world/europe/russia-brexit-
twitter-facebook.html.
55
Robert Booth et al., “Russia Used Hundreds of Fake Accounts to Tweet About Brexit, Data
Shows,” Guardian, November 14, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/
nov/14/how-400-russia-run-fake-accounts-posted-bogus-brexit-tweets.
56
Ibid.
29
generally.”
57
The content was “quite chaotic” and perhaps “aimed at wider
disruption.”
58
And yet despite this ambiguity, it seems clear that these Kremlin-linked
accounts were aspiring to infect a portion of the population with a clearly pro-Brexit
message.
Supporting example: Russian interference in U.S.
presidential election
Actor: Russian troll farms
Message: Pro-Trump, Anti-Clinton, Pro-civil discord
Target Population: American people
In 2016, a series of Russian-linked social media accounts—primarily on Twitter and
Facebook, but also on YouTube, Tumblr, and Pokémon Go—shared a number of
memes designed to influence the outcome of the American election. The ultimate
goal of these Russian actors remains unclear. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
asserted that they aspired to aid then-candidate Trump, and the Federal Bureau of
Investigations (FBI) asserted that there was no firm evidence to support this
conclusion. Minimally, though, the activity seems to have been designed to disrupt
the American political process by infecting the public discourse. As Facebook itself
noted, the ads purchased on its website “appeared to focus on amplifying divisive
social and political messages across the ideological spectrum.”
59
An investigation into
the activity continues, and indictments accusing 13 individual Russian citizens of
interfering in the election came down in early 2018.
60
An example of some memes
that were used as part of this campaign are shown in Figure 16.
57
David D. Kirkpatrick, “Signs of Russian Meddling in Brexit Referendum,” New York Times,
November 15, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/15/world/europe/russia-brexit-
twitter-facebook.html.
58
Robert Booth et al., “Russia Used Hundreds of Fake Accounts to Tweet About Brexit, Data
Shows,” Guardian, November 14, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/
nov/14/how-400-russia-run-fake-accounts-posted-bogus-brexit-tweets.
59
Alex Stamos, “An Update On Information Operations On Facebook,” Facebook Newsroom,
September 6, 2017, https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2017/09/information-operations-update/.
60
Donie O’Sullivan and Dylan Byers, “Exclusive: Even Pokeman Go Used By Extensive Russian-
Linked Meddling Effort,” CNN, October 13, 2017, http://money.cnn.com/2017/10/12/
media/dont-shoot-us-russia-pokemon-go/index.html; Alex Stamos, “An Update On Information
Operations On Facebook,” Facebook Newsroom, September 6, 2017,
https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2017/09/information-operations-update/; CNN Library, “2016
Presidential Campaign Hacking Fun Facts,” CNN, February 21, 2018,
https://www.cnn.com/2016/12/26/us/2016-presidential-campaign-hacking-fast-
facts/index.html; Jon Swaine and Marc Bennetts, “Mueller Charges 13 Russians With Interfering
30
Figure
16. Examples of Russian memes used to disrupt the U.S. Presidential election
S
ource: See Footnote 60.
Supporting example: ISIS spreads brand via @ISILCats
Actor: ISIS
Message: Pro-ISIS
Target population: Potential recruits and sympathizers
In 2014, ISIS sympathizers launched a new Twitter account—Islamic State of Cats,
@ISILcats—that attempted to take advantage of the internet’s preexisting obsession
with cat images. Beginning on July 25, the account posted images of ISIS fighters
playing with kittens and cats, of kittens and cats playing with the paraphernalia of
in US Election to Help Trump,” Guardian, February 17, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2018/feb/16/robert-mueller-russians-charged-election; Scott Shane, “These Are the Ads
Russia Bought on Facebook in 2016,” New York Times, November 1, 2017,
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/01/us/politics/russia-2016-election-facebook.html.
31
jihadi life (e.g., guns, ammunition), and of domestic life within the Islamic State. (See
examples in Figure 17.)
The account referred to the kittens and cats as mewjahid (a pun on mujhideen), and
functioned primarily to infect the public discourse with a softer image of the Islamic
State. Analysts noted that the audience for such a campaign was relatively limited,
and there was considerable debate in the U.S. media about the idea that ISIS might
actually be recruiting via this account. CNN aired a segment sensationally claiming
that ISIS was recruiting with kittens and Nutella, and other outlets pushed back to
note that such a framework infantilized women and that the reasons women joined
ISIS were varied and complex. Whether the campaign resulted in successfully
attracting new recruits may miss the point, though, as its core objective might have
been simply to normalize the group and its members.
61
Figure
17. Examples of “mewjahid” memes
Source:
See Footnote 61.
61
James Vincent, “’I Can Haz Islamic State Plz’: ISIS Propaganda on Twitter Turns to Kittens and
LOLSpeak,” Independent, August 21, 2014, https://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-
and-tech/isis-propaganda-on-twitter-turns-to-kittens-and-lolspeak-i-can-haz-islamic-state-plz-
9683736.html; Emily Lodish, “ISIL Loves Terrorism and Kittens,” PRI, June 25, 2014,
https://www.pri.org/stories/2014-06-25/isil-loves-terrorism-and-kitties; Katie Sanders, “The
Truth About ISIS Using Nutella, Kittens, and Emoji to ‘Lure’ Western Women,” Politifact,
February 19, 2015, http://www.politifact.com/punditfact/statements/2015/feb/19/cnn/truth-
about-isis-using-nutella-kittens-and-emoji-l/; Amanda Taub, “No, CNN, Women Are Not Joining
ISIS Because of “Kittens and Nutella,” Vox, February 18, 2015,
https://www.vox.com/2014/10/20/6987673/isis-women; Tom Whitehead, “Islamic State Using
Kittens to Lure Jihadists to Fight,” Telegraph, May 25, 2016,
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/05/25/isil-using-kittens-to-lure-jihadists-to-fight/.
32
Supporting example: 4Chan mocks ISIS with rubber
ducks
Actor: 4Chan, miscellaneous
Message: Anti-ISIS
Target population: Miscellaneous
In November 2015, a community on the website 4Chan spontaneously started an
anti-ISIS online memetic campaign relying on rubber ducks. The idea, as one 4Chan
community member argued, was to “[castrate] the image of ISIS by replacing the
faces on ALL the propaganda photos with bath ducks.” In short, this online
community aspired to infect the public discourse with a decidedly anti-ISIS image
that undermined the movement’s own propaganda efforts. Images were posted using
the hashtag #AllahuQuackbar, and an album collecting just a few of the photos was
posted to website Imgur and had been viewed nearly 450,000 times by early 2018.
(See examples in
Figure 18.)
62
Figure
18. Example of 4Chan anti-ISIS ducks
Source:
See Footnote 62.
62
Joel Gunter, “ISIS Mocked With Rubber Ducks as Internet Fights Terror with Humour,”
Guardian, November 28, 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/28/isis-
fighters-rubber-ducks-reddit-4chan; Mark Molloy, “Why the Internet is Putting Rubber Ducks on
Heads of ISIL Fighters,” Telegraph, November 28, 2015, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/
news/worldnews/islamic-state/12022424/Islamic-State-4Chan-puts-rubbers-ducks-on-Isil-
heads.html; James Bullen, “4Chan Are Replacing Islamic State Figures with Ducks to Fight ISIS,”
Huffington Post, November 29, 2015, https://www.huffingtonpost.com.au/2015/11/29/4chan-
isis-ducks_n_8674076.html; UhUhUhU, “creates the duck state,” Imgur gallery, November 24,
2015, https://imgur.com/gallery/RvqlI.
33
Supporting example : #DAESHbags anti-ISIS campaign
Actor: Anonymous
Message: Anti-ISIS
Target population: ISIS Social Media Accounts
In 2015, following the Charlie Hebdo attacks, the hacktivist movement Anonymous
began targeting ISIS’s online operations. The movement’s efforts were relatively
diffuse as those within Anonymous disagreed about which direction the campaign
should take and/or whether or not it should continue. That said, while much of the
work was focused on identifying ISIS-linked accounts on Twitter, Anonymous
declared December 11, 2015, to be “ISIS Trolling Day” and encouraged those online
to post mocking images using the hashtag #DAESHbags. The group even posted
detailed instructions online offering suggestions for how to mock ISIS on Twitter,
Instagram, Facebook and Youtube (as well as in “Real Life”). In short, Anonymous
attempted to spread the message that ISIS was absurd by infecting the public
discourse with a decidedly counter-ISIS message (see examples in Figure 19).
63
63
Abby Ohlheiser, “What You Need to Know About Anonymous’s ‘War’ on the Islamic State,”
Washington Post, November 17, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
intersect/wp/2015/11/17/what-you-need-to-know-about-anonymouss-war-on-the-islamic-
state/?utm_term=.16fb280bc9e6; Barbara Speed, “#Daeshbags: Anonymous Is Attacking ISIS’s
Brand of Toxic Masculinity Using Memes,” New Statesman, December 11, 2015,
https://www.newstatesman.com/world/middle-east/2015/12/daeshbags-anonymous-
attacking-isis-s-brand-toxic-masculinity-using-memes; Andrew Griffin, “Anonymous ‘Trolling
Day’ Against ISIS Begins, with Group’s ‘Day of Rage’ Mostly Consisting of Posting Mocking
Memes,” Independent, December 11, 2015, https://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-
and-tech/news/anonymous-trolling-day-against-isis-begins-with-group-s-day-of-rage-mostly-
consisting-of-posting-a6769261.html; Andrew Griffin, “Anonymous ‘ISIS Trolling Day’: Online
Activist Group Asks Public to Help Mock ISIS on 11 December,” Independent, December 7, 2015,
https://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/news/anonymous-isis-trolling-day-
online-activist-group-asks-public-to-help-mock-isis-on-11-december-a6763076.html;
@AnonyOpNews, “Reports of #Daeshbags targeting Anons due to ISIS memes. Make them more
mad by joining us on Dec 11 #TrollingDay,” December 8, 2015, https://twitter.com/
AnonyOpNews/status/674202475109351425.
34
Figure
19. Examples of # Daeshbags campaign
Source:
See Footnote 65.
Treat
To use a meme to treat an already circulating message. To respond
memetically—by mocking, disproving, or otherwise countering—to a
message that has been spread by another actor.
Exemplar: U.S. Embassy Response to Russian
Disinformation
Actor: U.S. Embassy in Russia
Meme message: News report circulating disinformation; anti-fake news
Target population: Russian people, REN TV, @rentvchannel and @USEmbRU
followers
On September 20, 2015, pro-Russia media outlet REN TV falsely claimed that U.S.
ambassador John Tefft had attended an opposition rally in Moscow earlier in the
day.
64
The charge was significant both because it affiliated Tefft with the opposition
64
Посла США в России Джона Ф. Теффта отправили на митинг оппозиции в Марьине, REN TV,
September 20, 2015, http://ren.tv/novosti/2015-09-20/posla-ssha-v-rossii-dzhona-f-teffta-
otpravili-na-miting-oppozicii-v-marine.
35
movement, and because it aligned with Russian pro-government media claims that
opposition actors are puppets of the U.S. government.
65
The report claimed: “The meeting of the opposition in [the district of] Marino was
memorable not only for the small number of people who came to support the
opposition, but also for the appearance of the U.S. Ambassador in Russia, John F.
Tefft.”
66
It then went on to say that Tefft, when asked about his presence at the rally,
indicated that he had attended in order to assess the “caliber” of Russian
democracy.
67
In order to substantiate this claim, the report included a photograph of Tefft
standing in front of a bank of reporters, with the opposition rally clearly visible in
the background. REN TV even tweeted the photo with a link to the (now edited)
report, saying “US Ambassador to Russia John Tefft strolled at an opposition rally in
Marino” (see Figure 21).
68
65
Max Seddon, “This Is The Best Photoshop The U.S. Government Has Ever Produced,” Buzzfeed
News, September 21, 2015, https://www.buzzfeed.com/maxseddon/the-state-department-has-
finally-learned-how-to-use-twitter?utm_term=.dcmdJ21xXv#.npDeW1Olyx.
66
“Pro-Kremlin Media Share Fake Image of U.S. Ambassador at Opposition Rally,” The Moscow
Times, September 21, 2015, https://themoscowtimes.com/news/pro-kremlin-media-share-fake-
image-of-us-ambassador-at-opposition-rally-49694.
67
Ibid. Similar reporting came from other sites, with Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty
reporting that the original report said: “No matter how hard the American diplomat tried to get
lost in the crowd, the media asked him why he showed up to this event. The short answer: He
came to look at the development of democracy in Russia and judge its scale.”
67
Some of this language remains in the REN TV article. Carl Schreck, “Photoshop Wars: U.S.
Ambassador ‘Attends’ Russian Opposition Rally…And The Moon Landing,” Radio Free Europe /
Radio Liberty, September 21, 2015, https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-photoshop-us-ambassador-
tefft-opposition-rally-ren-tv/27260885.html.
68
This report was later edited to note that while photos of Tefft attending the rally were
available on social media networks, it wasn’t clear whether they were accurate. Reporting at the
time, however, relied on cached versions of the website (no longer available) to demonstrate
that these additions were made after the fact. Carl Schreck, “Photoshop Wars: U.S. Ambassador
‘Attends’ Russian Opposition Rally…And The Moon Landing,” Radio Free Europe / Radio
Liberty, September 21, 2015, https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-photoshop-us-ambassador-tefft-
opposition-rally-ren-tv/27260885.html; Посла США в России Джона Ф. Теффта отправили на
митинг оппозиции в Марьине, REN TV, September 20, 2015, http://ren.tv/novosti/2015-09-
20/posla-ssha-v-rossii-dzhona-f-teffta-otpravili-na-miting-oppozicii-v-marine@rentvchannel;
“Посол США в России Джон Ф. Тефт прогулялся на митинге оппозиции в Марьино,” September
20, 2015, https://twitter.com/rentvchannel/status/645658877426593792.
36
Figure 20. Example of Russian disinformation regarding U.S. Ambassador Tefft
Source:
See Footnote 68.
The U.S. embassy chose to respond memetically—effectively treating the Russian
attempt to infect—by turning Tefft’s image into a meme. They identified the original
source of the image (a February 28 interview at a site near the Kremlin), explicitly
labeled it as fake news and an act of photoshopping, and created their own
photoshopped images to mock the fake story.
69
Just a few hours after the REN TV
tweet, the U.S. embassy in Russia responded with the tweet shown in Figure 21.
70
69
Carl Schreck, “Photoshop Wars: U.S. Ambassador ‘Attends’ Russian Opposition Rally…And
The Moon Landing,” Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, September 21, 2015,
https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-photoshop-us-ambassador-tefft-opposition-rally-ren-
tv/27260885.html.
70
@USEmbRu, “Посол Теффт провёл вчерашний выходной дома. Но благодаря фотошопу
можно оказаться где угодно. #fake #фейк,” September 21, 2015,
https://twitter.com/USEmbRu/status/645921015613276160.
37
Figure
21. U.S. embassy response to Russian disinformation
Translation: Ambassador Tefft spent yesterday's weekend at home. But thanks to
P
hotoshop you can be anywhere. #fake #fake
Images: The original image (upper left); the photoshopped image that REN TV tweeted
(upper right); Tefft at the moon landing (lo
wer left); Tefft at a hockey game (lower right).
Source:
See Footnote 70.
The U.S. embassy continued with a series of three additional tweets placing Tefft at
the moon landing (a repeat), with Douglas MacArthur in the Philippines in 1945, and
at a hockey game (also a repeat), as shown in Figure 22.
71
Figure
22. More examples of U.S. embassy response to Russian disinformation
Source:
See Footnote 71.
71
@USEmbRu, “@rentvchannel,” September 21, 2015, https://twitter.com/USEmbRu/status/
645922652096475136; @USEmbRu, “@rentvchannel,” September 21, 2015,
https://twitter.com/USEmbRu/status/645922554318856192; @USEmbRu, “@rentvchannel,”
September 21, 2015, https://twitter.com/USEmbRu/status/645922378527166464.
38
Reporting also indicated that in the hours after the U.S. embassy tweets, other
Russian Twitter users tweeted similarly doctored images showing Ambassador Tefft
attending Russian weddings and (in one particularly amusing instance) surrounded
by cats, as shown in Figure 23.
72
Figure
23. Russian Twitter users’ response to Russian disinformation
Source
: See Footnote 72.
REN TV initially responded by editing its original article to reflect the possibility that
the image it had posted had been doctored, and ultimately followed up with an
acknowledgment that the image was fake.
73
The real victory, though, was that the U.S.
embassy tweets had been retweeted nearly 1,000 times while the initial REN TV tweet
was retweeted less than 100 times. Additionally, the memetic exchange generated
widespread media coverage with news articles—clearly identifying the Russian story
as fake—appearing in Russia, the United States, and Europe.
72
Max Seddon, “This Is The Best Photoshop The U.S. Government Has Ever Produced,” Buzzfeed
News, September 21, 2015, https://www.buzzfeed.com/maxseddon/the-state-department-has-
finally-learned-how-to-use-twitter?utm_term=.dcmdJ21xXv#.npDeW1Olyx; @valery7matveev,
“@rentvchannel Да ладно пиздеz, он у Пескова на свадьбе был,” September 21, 2015,
https://twitter.com/valery7matveev/status/645924593144852480; “Fake: REN-TV Shows U.S.
Ambassador at Opposition Rally,” Stop Fake, September 24, 2015,
https://www.stopfake.org/en/fake-ren-tv-shows-u-s-ambassador-at-opposition-rally/.
73
Carl Schreck, “Photoshop Wars: U.S. Ambassador ‘Attends’ Russian Opposition Rally…And
The Moon Landing,” Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, September 21, 2015,
https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-photoshop-us-ambassador-tefft-opposition-rally-ren-
tv/27260885.html.
39
Supporting example: Response to Italian
government’s censorship
Actor: Italian citizens
Message: anti-censorship
Target population: Italian government, Italian people
In January 2016, in preparation for the visit of Iranian President Hassan Rouhani,
Italian authorities chose to cover up a series of nude statues in the Capitoline
Museum (the planned site of the meeting). The decision attracted considerable
attention, and reporting on the topic indicated that Rouhani had not requested the
accommodation. Moreover, the Italian Culture Minister called the act
“incomprehensible” and noted that neither he nor the Italian Premier had been
consulted about the decision.
74
The online response was, however, less concerned with who made the decision than
with the fact that it had been made. As a result, in the wake of the news breaking a
somewhat spontaneous memetic response from both Italians and Iranians took
shape. Despite its organic and unorganized nature, the effort was a clear rejection
and condemnation of the Italian government’s decision to censor. It was, in other
words, an effort to treat an existing social ill (or, what one Twitter user described as
“cultural suicide”).
75
The response was, importantly, incredibly varied.
In one image, a photograph of the statues was modified to suggest that they had
been covered with the same banner that Iranians see when a website has been
banned by the government (see left image in Figure 24).
76
In other instances, the
images attempted to offer alternative means of covering the allegedly offensive
nudity (see center image in Figure 25).
77
And in some instances, the images gestured
74
Golnaz Esfandiari, “Memes Circulate After Italy Hides Nude Statues for Rohani Visit,” Radio
Free Europe, January 27, 2016, https://www.rferl.org/a/italy-hides-nudes-for-iranian-
visit/27515457.html; “Critics Assail Italy for Hiding Nude Statues During Rouhani Visit,” Voice
of America, January 28, 2016, https://www.voanews.com/a/criticism-memes-circulate-after-
italy-hides-nude-statues-for-rouhani-visit/3166200.html.
75
BBC Trending, “Covering Up Nude Statues: Iranians Say Thanks But No Thanks to Italy,” BBC,
January 27, 2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-trending-35423028.
76
“Critics Assail Italy for Hiding Nude Statues During Rouhani Visit,” Voice of America, January
28, 2016, https://www.voanews.com/a/criticism-memes-circulate-after-italy-hides-nude-
statues-for-rouhani-visit/3166200.html.
77
BBC Trending, “Covering Up Nude Statues: Iranians Say Thanks But No Thanks to Italy,” BBC,
January 27, 2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-trending-35423028.
40
at the fact that Rouhani was scheduled to visit France after departing Italy (see right
image in Figure 24).
78
Figure
24. Examples of Italian response to censorship
Source:
See Footnotes 76 and 77.
Others images mocked Rouhani by photo-shopping an image to suggest that he had
met with the Pope beneath a prominently displayed painting of nudes (see left image
in Figure 25).
79
And some were effectively targeted efforts to send nude images to
Rouhani himself via the use of hashtags #Rouhani and #Statuenude (see center and
right images in Figure 25).
80
78
“Critics Assail Italy for Hiding Nude Statues During Rouhani Visit,” Voice of America, January
28, 2016, https://www.voanews.com/a/criticism-memes-circulate-after-italy-hides-nude-
statues-for-rouhani-visit/3166200.html.
79
Ibid.
Golnaz Esfandiari, “Memes Circulate After Italy Hides Nude Statues for Rohani Visit,” Radio
Free Europe, January 27, 2016, https://www.rferl.org/a/italy-hides-nudes-for-iranian-
visit/27515457.html.
80
BBC Trending, “Covering Up Nude Statues: Iranians Say Thanks But No Thanks to Italy,” BBC,
January 27, 2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-trending-35423028.
41
Figure
25. More examples of Italian response to censorship
Source:
See Footnotes 79 and 80.
The campaign was relatively short lived and somewhat scattered, but it was
nonetheless a clear refutation of what had happened. It was also, importantly, an
attempt to treat the harm done by this event: it worked to shape the public discourse
so as to prevent the widespread acceptance and normalization of such censorship,
and/or reduce the potential that it might occur again.
Supporting example: Response to Catalan
government’s disinformation
Actor: Spanish citizens
Meme message: Anti-Catalan leaders
Target population: Spanish people
In October 2017, a controversial referendum was held on the question of Catalan
independence.
81
While the results suggested strong support for the move,
accusations of police pressure, voter suppression, and voter corruption were also
rampant. Following a series of political steps—by the local Catalan government and
the larger Spanish government—the local government was dismissed. Additionally,
the Spanish government indicated that it intended to charge the Catalan president
and his cabinet with rebellion and embezzlement. In response, the Catalan president
and a few advisors fled the country.
81
Catalonia is an autonomous community—a political and administrative region with its own
elected government—consisting of four provinces located in the northeastern corner of the
country.
42
A few weeks later, these now deposed government leaders launched a new website
for the “legitimate government” of Catalan. On the main page, they included a
photograph of the government’s leaders. The image they used, however, was a
picture edited to remove one individual. The photoshopping effort was botched,
though, and the removed individual’s pants were still visible. This resulted in a series
of memes (some invoking the TV show The Simpsons and the film Back to the Future)
responding to the event. (See examples in Figure 26.) These memes were essentially
treating the issue by calling attention to incompetence (i.e., in this particular case the
issue was not disinformation, but the incompetent and untrustworthy nature of the
Catalan leadership).
82
Figure
26. Example of response to Catalan disinformation
Source:
See Footnote 82.
Preliminary
observations
This wide
-reading and compelling dataset of examples is not—
due to the exploratory
and preliminary nature of this study
—empirically robust enough, in terms
of
collection technique or analytic assessment
,
to justify strong conclusive statements
82
“Deposed Catalan Government’s Botched Photoshop Job Sparks Memes,” The Local,
November 20, 2017, https://www.thelocal.es/20171120/deposed-catalan-governments-
botched-photoshop-job-sparks-memes.
“Airbrush Fail: Deposed Catalonian Govt Post Bizarre Photoshop Image,” RT, November 20,
2017, https://www.rt.com/news/410432-catalan-government-photo-fail/.
43
regarding the nature or utility of memetic engagement. It is possible, though, to
articulate a number of preliminary observations that stem from an examination of
the
examples explored above:
• The effective use of visual memes is not limited to counter-
radicalization
efforts.
While memes certainly have utility in that area, they have also been
deployed productively in
response to terrorism more generally, disinformation
campaigns, and government censorship.
• The range of visual memes
being deployed in memetic campaigns is far
reaching. In some instances the format is the familiar one of combining a well
-
known picture with words following an established grammar. Other examp
les
include doctoring
situationally relevant images (e.g., a screenshot taken from
an ISIS video), creating brand new images with distinct messaging, and
pairing
images with common cultural references.
• Visual memes often (though not always) make use of humor, irony,
and
sarcasm in order to resonate emotionally.
• Visual memes often transcend individual cultures and languages,
and can
reach broad communities of disparate actors in the online information
environment. For example, the images edited to mock ISIS
’s threat to execute
Japanese hostages are widely recognizable as anti-ISIS images
and do not
depend on an understanding of Japanese culture or language.
• Well-targeted v
isual memes are culturally specific and situationally narrow.
This may seem to be a dir
ect contradiction of the previous observation, but it
is important to acknowledge that the images edited to mock ISIS’s threat to
execute the Japanese hostages are particularly
effective in context (i.e., as part
of the relevant hashtag campaign and in dir
ect response to ISIS’s threat) and
particularly
meaningful with an understanding of Japanese culture and
language.
• Visual memes are utilized by all manner of online actors—
governments,
NGOs, non-state actors, and individuals. Most frequently, though, they
take
shape organically and are created by a civilian population.
• Visual memes have been used effectively at tactical level
(e.g., combatting
local government censorship) and strategic level (e.g., against
North Korean
missile tests).
44
Observations from Subject Matter
Expert Discussions
In addition to our review of relevant literature and examples of visual memes, we
conducted semi-structured discussions with a number of subject matter experts
from the USG, as well as academic and private sector experts and practitioners in
marketing, advertising, and psychology (to include a professional internet troll). We
did this to help draw preliminary observations on the applicability of memes to USG
influence campaigns. Given the exploratory nature of this study, this list of
observations is not conclusive, but is designed to elicit follow-on dialogue:
• Using memes well is neither predictable nor formulaic. Across the board, the
SMEs we spoke with suggested that the art of using digital content to influence
people is largely uncharted territory. Experts emphasized that messages
should be crafted with care—rejecting conventional wisdom that it might be
best to simply attempt a variety of options—in order to increase the likelihood
of effective engagement, increase the likelihood of message integrity being
maintained, and protect against unforeseen consequences. That said, some of
the most popular online campaigns develop through organic, community
driven engagement in which this type of control is impossible. There will, as a
result, continue to be a steep learning curve as government and the private
sector begin to understand how to use memes as part of a coherent narrative
arc.
• Viral content is not analogous to persuasive content. Experts challenged the
tyranny of quantitative metrics repeatedly by noting that clicks and likes do
not translate into activity by content viewers. Indeed, motivating offline
behavior was earmarked as one of the toughest problems to tackle. This
reflection is bolstered by a body of existing academic research which suggests
that spreading content is not reliably correlated to active behavioral
outcomes.
83
While viral content may be useful when used as a way to increase
83
Evgeny Morozov. The Net Delusion: the Dark Side of Internet Freedom; pp.180. Public Affairs
Books, New York, NY – 2012; Malcolm Gladwell. Small Change: Why the Revolution Will not be
Retweeted; New Yorker Magazine, October 2010, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/
45
message repetition, quantitative metrics do not generate enough data from
which to draw meaningful conclusions with respect to message impact or
effect. As a result, understanding the impact of information or influence
campaigns remains a challenge.
• Changes in attitude do not necessarily correlate to changes in behavior. This
observation, driven by our literature review, was echoed in conversations with
SMEs in both psychology and advocacy. Indeed, the behavioral psychology
literature is clear that changes in attitudes may not produce changes in
behavior. With this in mind, experts suggested that consideration should be
given to achieving behavioral outcomes by examining influence vectors in the
offline environment in addition to those used online.
84
• Audience granularity is essential to generating desired effects in memetic
engagement. Through conversations with government practitioners,
particularly those who work as information and psychological operations
tacticians, we learned that gaps exist between teams responsible for
identifying audiences and those producing content. This disconnect
contributes to an environment in which audiences are treated monolithically.
These SMEs, as well as those who practice grassroots advocacy, suggested that
greater specificity relative to audience demography will enhance message
penetration and audience consumption as part of influence campaigns.
• Memes can play a role across the spectrum of USG activities and conflict. A
number of SMEs from the USG influence community noted that memes can
play a role in messaging, shaping counter-narratives, and broader online
engagement at strategic, operational, and tactical levels as part of whole-
of-government influence campaigns for countering both state and non-
state adversaries. Further, integrating memetic engagement with other
USG tools, including diplomacy, development, and defense, may be fruitful
in achieving the desired effects in countering adversaries.
2010/10/04/small-change-malcolm-gladwell; Clay Shirky, “The Political Power of Social Media:
Technology, the Public Sphere, and Political Change,” Foreign Affairs (as published by the
Council on Foreign Relations, January/February 2011),
https://www.cc.gatech.edu/~beki/cs4001/Shirky.pdf; and semi-structured discussion with
advocacy expert at George Washington University, February 2018.
84
Min-Sun Kim and John E Hunter, “Attitude-Behavior Relations: A Meta-Analysis of Attitudinal
Relevance and Topic,” Journal of Communication 43, No. 1 (1993): 101-142; and Duane F.
Alwin, “Making Inferences from Attitude-Behavior Correlations,” Sociometry (American
Sociological Association) 36, no. 2(1973): 253-278.
46
• It is helpful for memetic engagement to be reinforced with face-to-face
engagement. Numerous SMEs from the USG influence community noted that
face-to-face and on the ground engagement serve as critical components to
influence campaigns, and are used as tools to promote Western values, build
personal connections, and affect stability in countries of interest. Many noted
that it is useful to think about combining memetic engagement online with
face-to-face engagement to counter the influence of state and non-state actors
in the information environment. Such a combined approach can serve as a
force multiplier in persistent military and diplomatic engagement, which serve
as critical components of influence campaigns.
47
Conclusion
This exploratory study was structured to serve as a foundation for analyzing the
applicability, utility, and role of memes in USG influence campaigns. We approached
the concept of memes from a historically informed perspective, and we reviewed
literature on the topic ranging from Richard Dawkins’ 1976 definition to recent
internet-era innovations. In light of this analysis, we concluded that a meme was
most productively and accurately defined as a culturally resonant piece of
information that is easily shared or spread online. We then shifted our focus to visual
memes, and developed an epidemiologically inspired rubric to classify cases of
memetic engagement, and identify the ways in which memes might be effective tools
in influence operations.
Our preliminary observations—based on our comprehensive review of the
literature on the operationalization of memes, exploration of these example
cases, and discussions with a wide range of subject matter experts—
suggest that memetic engagement is a potentially effective, but currently
underexplored, vector via which to counter state and non-state actors, and
further USG policy goals via the online information environment.
Our discussions with subject matter experts across the USG and other
expert communities indicated that memetic engagement can be integrated
into USG influence campaigns as part of a broader influence strategy. The largely
unchecked (or imperfectly checked) spread of information online allows memes, a
complement and supplement to existing narrative and visual campaigns, to
move across cultures and countries and to serve as a “force multiplier” for
diplomatic and military face-to-face engagement.
In short, our discussions with subject matter experts emphasized that memetic
engagement should be undertaken as part of broader USG influence campaigns
with clearly defined objectives. The porous borders of the online information
environment mean that a meme posted to an account on one continent can go viral
on another continent 20 minutes later and with a potentially very different outcome.
Thus as depicted in Figure 27, memetic campaigns should be positioned within
existing influence campaigns. They may fit within more narrow category of narrative
engagements or may fall broadly within influence campaigns writ large; and they
may be visual initiatives or they may be non-visual efforts (though our focus has
been on visual memes). In each instance, though, overarching consistency—and
the recognition that memetic engagement is one part of a larger influence initiative
—is critical to success.
48
Figure
27. How memes and memetic engagements fit into influence campaigns
Source:
CNA
Suggestions for further research
Given our conclusion that memes and memetic engagement hold promise as a
component of USG influence campaigns, we strongly believe that additional research
on the use of memes and memetic engagement should be undertaken. Suggested
topics for additional research include:
• What constitutes an effective memetic engagement? What type of visual,
digital, and cultural information might one need to create an effective
memetic engagement? How would this differ from the information needed to
inform a traditional USG influence campaign?
• When are memes and memetic engagement effective? What can an effective
memetic campaign accomplish? What makes a campaign effective? How can
we assess and evaluate their use in a way comparable to that in which we
assess and evaluate the use of other forms of communication and
messaging?
• Who should hold authorities for memetic engagement? Who are the
appropriate USG entities to lead the creation, dissemination, and evaluation
of the use of memes?
• Where are memes most useful in USG operations (e.g., at the strategic,
operational, and tactical military levels, as part of diplomatic engagements,
49
etc.)? How much utility do they have in shaping operations, competition short
of armed conflict, irregular warfare, and in major combat operations? How
and why might their utility and usage need to change across these activities?
In closing, we believe that visual memes and memetic engagement are tools with
great potential for the USG as it looks to counter the information activities of state
and non-state actors and more proactively engage audiences online. But we also
believe that considerable additional research should be undertaken in order to
ensure that the USG is maximally effective in the use of these tools.
Figure
28. Leonardo DiCaprio meme on the end of this report
S
ource: imgflip Meme Generator, https://imgflip.com/memegenerator, accessed March
26, 2018.
50
Appendix: A History of “Memetic
Warfare”
One of the concepts that initially led to our interest in the topic of memes was that
of “memetic warfare.” Ultimately, for reasons we discuss below, we decided not to
pursue this concept as the framework for thinking about the use of memes
(preferring instead the epidemiological model presented above). But it is worth
including a brief discussion of this concept here both for the sake of completeness
and to make the reader aware of its shortcomings.
In an unsurprising way, the discussion on “memetic warfare” closely followed the
discussion on memes, in that early work focused on the transmission of ideas, and
later work focused on the transmission of ideas on the internet.
The first school of thought on memetic warfare referred primarily to an effort to win
a broadly construed battle of ideas. One articulation of this position came in Edmund
Glabus’s 1998 “Metaphors and Modern Threats: Biological, Computer, and Cognitive
Viruses.” Clearly inspired by the work of Dawkins, and by epidemiological
approaches to meme transmission (i.e., those in which memes are understood to be
passed from brain to brain via a process that mimics contagion), Glabus argued that
“cognitive viruses by our definition infect people with a meme, a unit of information
in a mind whose existence influences events such that more copies of itself get
created in other minds.”
85
He went on to argue that these memes—which might
include rumors of U.S. involvement in germ warfare, conspiracy theories about U.S.
complicity in spreading the AIDS virus, etc.—were particularly problematic for the
U.S. government because they “spread so well and are so durable.”
86
Memetic warfare,
as Glabus framed it, was conceptually closest to perception management, which he
defined, in part, as “actions taken to convey and/or deny selected information and
indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives and objective
85
Edmund Glabus, “Metaphors and Modern Threats: Biological, Computer, and Cognitive
Viruses,” in Challenging the United States Symmetrically and Asymmetrically: Can America Be
Saved?” edited by Lloyd J. Matthews (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic
Studies Institute, 1998): 206.
86
Ibid.
51
reasoning.”
87
Citing a short paper that was published on information warfare, Glabus
suggested that the objective of memetic warfare would be to “insert new memes into
the mind of the adversary,” taking advantage of the fact that they were likely to self-
replicate, spread, and infect a growing population.
88
Memetic warfare was, in other
words, an advancement of work on information warfare, and an effort to infect a
population with a viral idea that was beneficial to the U.S. government.
A more thorough exploration of the idea came a few years later with Richard Pech’s
“Inhibiting Imitative Terrorism Through Memetic Engineering.” Pech acknowledged
that a meme might convey a core message, but emphasized that there would be
considerable variation in how these messages were received by different listeners. He
then argued that this mechanism—the spread of memes via the media, the
embedding of a core message, and the interpretability of the message—had
significance for those hoping to combat violence:
Certain violent behaviours labeled under such terms as terrorist,
sniper, and gunman, become immortalised in history and…a small
minority of individuals justify their violent behaviours by
projecting themselves into the role and circumstances of their
hero predecessor. They choose to do this because certain violent
acts have become memes with which they find identification and
through which they find justification. Some of these violent
memes project an image depicting a macho, freedom fighting,
minority rights, and/or wronged individual redressing balance of
power theme.
89
These terrorism and violence memes are, in other words, appealing to a vulnerable
subset of the population. Thus, one easy response to the challenge of reducing
terrorism might be “in the elimination” of such memes.
90
Unfortunately, terrorism
and violence memes are also appealing to the media because they make good
headlines and increase sales. As a result, it is difficult to imagine that the media will
87
Ibid., 205.
88
George Stein and Richard Szafranski, “The Memetic Warfare Model,” U.S. Information
Warfare, Jane’s Special Report (Alexandria, VA: Jane’s Information Group, 1996): 145-147, in
Edmund Glabus, “Metaphors and Modern Threats: Biological, Computer, and Cognitive
Viruses,” quoted in Challenging the United States Symmetrically and Asymmetrically: Can
America Be Saved?” edited by Lloyd J. Matthews (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College
Strategic Studies Institute, 1998): 206.
89
Richard J. Pech, “Inhibiting Imitative Terrorism Through Memetic Engineering,” Journal of
Contingencies and Crisis Management 11, no. 2 (June 2003): 62.
90
Ibid., 64.
52
voluntarily stop reducing the spread of these memes. Pech went on to argue that one
viable response to this conundrum—a response he refers to as memetic
engineering—might be to edit the meme’s encoded information. He argued, “Changes
to the terrorism meme will alter the information that is received by an individual in a
state of disidentification, possibly removing the stimulus that could have led to an
act of terrorism, and in the event of an act of terrorism, changes in its reporting may
inhibit copying behaviours by re-engineering the contents of the terrorist meme.”
91
In
other words, purposefully editing the meme—perhaps by always describing terrorists
as “cowardly, insecure, weak, malicious, gutless, pointless, mentally unstable,
spineless, puny, pathetic, despicable, and loathsome”—might diminish its appeal,
slow its replication, and (most optimistically) decrease the number of terrorist acts.
92
As Pech noted, it is even possible that “a deliberate mutation [of the meme] will be
lethal to the meme’s level of fitness, contributing to a failure to replicate and
ultimately, being a causal factor in its death.”
93
The second school of thought on memetic warfare built on this early work (i.e.,
framing memetic warfare as an effort to shape the information environment) but
recognized that the battle of memes would largely be waged online. Some of this
work was focused, for example, on the challenge of maintaining message integrity in
the Wild West of the global internet. Thus one article, on memetic warfare within
domestic American politics, acknowledged the struggle to find a balance between
facilitating and constraining mutation: “We, the virus designers, wanted participants
to take the core idea and make it their own—to ‘run with it’—but we also wanted to
control the degree and kinds of mutation.”
94
Done successfully, the meme would
evolve such that “the mutations that developed in the field generally tended to be
extensions of, rather than departures from the basic framework.”
95
Done
unsuccessfully, the meme might evolve in ways that conflicted with the original
message and agenda.
91
Ibid.
92
Ibid., 65.
93
Ibid., 64. One frequently cited article on the topic is “Memetics: A Growth Industry in US
Military Operations,” which was published in 2005 by Major Michael Prosser during his tenure
as a student at the United States Marine Corps School of Advanced Warfighting. Prosser, now a
lieutenant colonel in the Marine Corps, briefly summarized the literature on memetic warfare,
argued for the creation of a “Meme Warfare Center” to take up this work, and outlined the
hypothetical organizational structure/location of such a center.
94
Andrew Boyd, “Truth is a Virus: Meme Warfare and the Billionaire for Bush (and Gore)”
(2002), http://andrewboyd.com/truth-is-a-virus-meme-warfare-and-the-billionaires-for-bush-or-
gore/.
95
Ibid.
53
Other articles took the additional step of attempting to offer concrete ideas for
countering ISIS’s presence online. One author suggested, for example, that we might
undermine ISIS’s efforts to dominate the information space by recruiting “a few good
internet trolls” to engage in campaigns such as “[flooding] the online environment
with an overwhelming volume of counter-narratives,” or spreading fake material so
as to “drown legitimate videos in a sea of fake ones.”
96
Another article argued for an
even more aggressive engagement including controversial actions such as catfishing
(i.e., luring and deceiving someone online via a fraudulent account), doxing and
harassing the family member of ISIS affiliates (i.e., publishing the personal contact
information of family members and encouraging online harassment), spreading
misinformation, and/or launching delegitimizing social media campaigns that link
ISIS with ideas it finds abhorrent.
97
Perhaps not surprisingly, much of this internet-era work has been driven by a
concern about ISIS’s online social media success and the USG’s struggle to
successfully counter the movement’s messaging. As a result, memetic warfare is
being proposed as a non-kinetic means of undermining ISIS’s online presence (and
thus an approach that risks fewer civilian casualties than, for example, bombing
ISIS’s media infrastructure). One particularly comprehensive treatment of the topic
comes in Jeff Giesea’s 2015 “It’s Time to Embrace Memetic Warfare.” The article
begins with the idea that “it seems obvious that more aggressive communication
tactics and broader warfare through trolling and memes is a necessary, inexpensive,
and easy way to help destroy the appeal and morale of our common enemies.”
98
Importantly, the article goes on to offer a relatively robust definition of memetic
warfare:
Memetic warfare, as I define it, is competition over narrative, ideas,
and social control in a social-media battlefield. One might think of it
as a subset of ‘information operations’ tailored to social
media…Memetic warfare could also be viewed as a ‘digital native’
version of psychological warfare, more commonly known as
propaganda. If propaganda and public diplomacy are conventional
96
Kalev Leetaru, “A Few Good Internet Trolls,” Foreign Policy (July 14, 2015),
http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/07/14/ islamic-state-twitter-recruiting/. This article also argues
that this effort should be located in the Department of Defense as tasking State Department
representatives with the work of responding to ISIS might inadvertently validate ISIS.
97
Jeff Giesea, “It’s Time to Embrace Memetic Warfare,” Defense Strategic Communications: The
Official Journal of the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence 1, no. 1 (Winter
2015): 71.
98
Ibid., 69.
54
forms of memetic warfare, then trolling and PSYOPs are guerrilla
versions.
99
In addition to locating memetic warfare very firmly in the “communications
battlespace,” Giesea also frames the tactic as an aggressive form of the more “tepid,
timid, and stale” PSYOPS and military information operations.
100
It is “weaponized
trolling,” which is “the social media equivalent of guerrilla warfare.”
101
In theory, of course, memetic warfare needn’t be as aggressive as it is in the model
that Giesea outlines. That said, most contemporary work frames memetic warfare in
decidedly aggressive terms. It is understood to be an inherently disruptive process,
and the tools of such an approach—ranging from the creation of a new meme, to the
doxing of an enemy, to wide-ranging social media guerilla operations—are theorized
to be best suited to only certain types of engagement. In other words, despite early
work suggesting that memetic warfare might be understood as a form of “perception
management,” contemporary approaches consistently frame it as something more
like guerilla social media use.
This work is, in all likelihood, a direct response to the reality of the online
environment in which internet memes exist. As one article noted, successful memes
are necessarily simplistic and they “thrive on a lack of information—the faster you
can grasp the point, the higher the chance it will spread.”
102
Memes effectively
provide information that is over-distilled, over-simplified, and under-evidenced (and
in some cases, patently false). The same article noted that successful memes tend to
articulate extreme positions, and cited research demonstrating that socially isolated
individuals who might be described as “on the fringe” were more likely to create
successful memes.
103
Another article argued that memes “function like the IEDs of
information warfare…great for blowing things up, but likely to sabotage the desired
effects when handled by the larger actor in an asymmetric conflict.”
104
In other
words, memes are typically understood to be an effective tool for insurgencies
striving to disrupt the status quo, but they are not typically framed as effective tools
99
Ibid., 70.
100
Ibid.
101
Ibid.
102
Douglas Haddow, “Meme warfare: how the power of mass replication has poisoned the US
election,” The Guardian (Nov 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2016/nov/04/political-memes-2016-election-hillary-clinton-donald-trump.
103
Ibid.
104
Jacob Siegel, “Is American Prepared for Meme Warfare?” Motherboard VICE (Jan 2017),
https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/xyvwdk/meme-warfare.
55
for established powers looking to foster stability.
105
Memes are, in short, typically
understood to be inherently destabilizing and not well suited to the articulation of a
cultivated, managed message or program.
Our analysis recognizes the rich history of the concept of “memetic warfare,” and we
do not deny that this type of disruptive engagement (i.e., guerilla social media use)
has value. The very crisis that provoked this recent spate of writing on memetic
warfare—ISIS’s online social media success and effective messaging—is one that
could be productively mitigated with a careful and thoughtfully disruptive effort.
That said, our analysis suggests that memes have utility far beyond the types of
engagements that fall under the narrow rubric of “memetic warfare.” As a result, we
recommend that practitioners in the influence community instead seek to explore
the role of memes within the broader and more inclusive category of influence
campaigns.
105
Ibid.
56
Appendix B: Organizations and
Individuals Contacted
Comedian, Professional internet troll
George Washington University
Intelligence Community Consultant
National Counterterrorism Center
Social Media Consultant
Stanford University, Peace Innovation Lab
University at Buffalo, The State University of New York
U.S. Army Special Operations Command
U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Information Operations Warfare Center
U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Staff
U.S. Department of State, Global Engagement Center
U.S. Navy Office of Naval Research
U.S. Special Operations Command
57
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