A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free

BEARING ARMS

SECOND AMENDMENT

A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of

a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms shall

not be infringed.

IN GENERAL

For over 200 years, despite extensive debate and much legisla-

tive action with respect to regulation of the purchase, possession,

and transportation of ﬁrearms, as well as proposals to substan-

tially curtail ownership of ﬁrearms, there was no deﬁnitive resolu-

tion by the courts of just what right the Second Amendment pro-

tects. The Second Amendment is naturally divided into two parts:

its prefatory clause (“A well regulated Militia, being necessary to

the security of a free State”) and its operative clause (“the right of

the people to keep and bear Arms shall not be infringed”). To per-

haps oversimplify the opposing arguments, the “states’ rights” the-

sis emphasized the importance of the prefatory clause, arguing that

the purpose of the clause was to protect the states in their author-

ity to maintain formal, organized militia units. The “individual rights”

thesis emphasized the operative clause, so that individuals would

be protected in the ownership, possession, and transportation of ﬁre-

arms.

Whatever the Amendment meant, it was seen as a bar only

to federal action, not state

or private

restraints.

A sampling of the diverse literature in which the same historical, linguistic,

and case law background shows the basis for strikingly different conclusions in-

cludes: STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON THE CONSTITUTION, SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 97th

Congress, 2d Sess., THE RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS (Comm. Print 1982); DON B.

KATES, HANDGUN PROHIBITION AND THE ORIGINAL MEANING OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT (1984);

GUN CONTROL AND THE CONSTITUTION: SOURCES AND EXPLORATIONS ON THE SECOND AMENDMENT

(Robert J. Cottrol ed., 1993); STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED: THE

EVOLUTION OF A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT (1984); Symposium, Gun Control, 49 LAW & CONTEMP.

PROBS. 1 (1986); Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE

L.J. 637 (1989); JOYCE LEE MALCOLM, TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS: THE ORIGINS OF AN ANGLO-

AMERICAN RIGHT (1994); Glenn Harlan Reynolds, A Critical Guide to the Second Amend-

ment, 62 TENN. L. REV. 461 (1995); William Van Alystyne, The Second Amendment

and the Personal Right to Bear Arms, 43 DUKE L.J. 1236 (1994); Symposium, Sympo-

sium on the Second Amendment: Fresh Looks, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3 (2000).

Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 265 (1886). See also Miller v. Texas, 153 U.S.

535 (1894); Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 281–82 (1897). The non-application

of the Second Amendment to the states was reaffirmed in Quilici v. Village of Mor-

ton Grove, 695 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983).

United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876).

1371

One of the Second Amendment cases that the Court has heard,

and until recently the only case challenging a congressional enact-

ment, seemed to affirm individual protection but only in the con-

text of the maintenance of a militia or other such public force. In

United States v. Miller,

the Court sustained a statute requiring reg-

istration under the National Firearms Act of sawed-off shotguns.

After reciting the original provisions of the Constitution dealing with

the militia, the Court observed that “[w]ith obvious purpose to as-

sure the continuation and render possible the effectiveness of such

forces the declaration and guarantee of the Second Amendment were

made. It must be interpreted with that end in view.”

The signiﬁ-

cance of the militia, the Court continued, was that it was composed

of “civilians primarily, soldiers on occasion.” It was upon this force

that the states could rely for defense and securing of the laws, on a

force that “comprised all males physically capable of acting in con-

cert for the common defense,” who, “when called for service . . . were

expected to appear bearing arms supplied by themselves and of the

kind in common use at the time.”

Therefore, “[i]n the absence of

any evidence tending to show that possession or use of a ‘shotgun

having a barrel of less than 18 inches in length’ at this time has

some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a

well-regulated militia, we cannot say that the Second Amendment

guarantees the right to keep and bear such an instrument. Cer-

tainly it is not within judicial notice that this weapon is any part

of the ordinary military equipment or that its use could contribute

to the common defense.”

307 U.S. 174 (1939). The defendants had been released on the basis of the

trial court determination that prosecution would violate the Second Amendment and

no briefs or other appearances were ﬁled on their behalf; the Court acted on the

basis of the government’s representations.

307 U.S. at 178.

307 U.S. at 179.

307 U.S. at 178. In Cases v. United States, 131 F.2d 916, 922 (1st Cir. 1942),

cert. denied, 319 U.S. 770 (1943), the court, upholding a similar provision of the

Federal Firearms Act, said, “Apparently, then, under the Second Amendment, the

Federal Government can limit the keeping and bearing of arms by a single indi-

vidual as well as by a group of individuals, but it cannot prohibit the possession or

use of any weapon which has any reasonable relationship to the preservation or ef-

ﬁciency of a well-regulated militia.” See Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 65 n.8

(1980) (dictum: Miller holds that the “Second Amendment guarantees no right to

keep and bear a ﬁrearm that does not have ‘some reasonable relationship to the

preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia’ ”). See also Hickman v. Block,

81 F.3d 98 (9th Cir.) (plaintiff lacked standing to challenge denial of permit to carry

concealed weapon, because Second Amendment is a right held by states, not by pri-

vate citizens), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 912 (1996); United States v. Gomez, 92 F.3d

770, 775 n.7 (9th Cir. 1996) (interpreting federal prohibition on possession of ﬁre-

arm by a felon as having a justiﬁcation defense “ensures that [the provision] does

not collide with the Second Amendment”). United States v. Wright, 117 F.3d 1265

(11th Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1007 (1997) (member of Georgia unorganized mili-

1372 AMENDMENT 2—BEARING ARMS

After that decision, Congress placed greater limitations on the

receipt, possession, and transportation of ﬁrearms,

and proposals

for national registration or prohibition of ﬁrearms altogether have

been made.

Miller, however, shed little light on the validity of such

proposals. Pointing out that interest in the “character of the Sec-

ond Amendment right has recently burgeoned,” Justice Thomas, con-

curring in the Court’s invalidation (on other grounds) of the Brady

Handgun Violence Prevention Act, questioned whether the Second

Amendment bars federal regulation of gun sales, and suggested that

the Court might determine “at some future date . . . whether Jus-

tice Story was correct . . . that the right to bear arms has justly

been considered, as the palladium of the liberties of a republic.’ ”

It was not until 2008 that the Supreme Court deﬁnitively came

down on the side of an “individual rights” theory. Relying on new

scholarship regarding the origins of the Amendment,

the Court in

District of Columbia v. Heller

conﬁrmed what had been a grow-

ing consensus of legal scholars—that the rights of the Second Amend-

ment adhered to individuals. The Court reached this conclusion af-

ter a textual analysis of the Amendment,

an examination of the

historical use of prefatory phrases in statutes, and a detailed explo-

ration of the 18th century meaning of phrases found in the Amend-

ment. Although accepting that the historical and contemporaneous

use of the phrase “keep and bear Arms” often arose in connection

with military activities, the Court noted that its use was not lim-

tia unable to establish that his possession of machine guns and pipe bombs bore

any connection to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia).

Enacted measures include the Gun Control Act of 1968. 82 Stat. 226, 18 U.S.C.

§§ 921–928. The Supreme Court’s dealings with these laws have all arisen in the

context of prosecutions of persons purchasing or obtaining ﬁrearms in violation of

prohibitions against such conduct by convicted felons. Lewis v. United States, 445

U.S. 55 (1980); Barrett v. United States, 423 U.S. 212 (1976); Scarborough v. United

States, 431 U.S. 563 (1977); United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (1971).

E.g., NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, WORKING PAPERS

1031–1058 (1970), and FINAL REPORT 246–247 (1971).

Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 937–39 (1997) (quoting 3 Commentar-

ies § 1890, p. 746 (1833)). Justice Scalia, in extra-judicial writing, has sided with

the individual rights interpretation of the Amendment. See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER

OF INTERPRETATION, FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW, 136–37 n.13 (A. Gutmann, ed., 1997)

(responding to Professor Tribe’s critique of “my interpretation of the Second Amend-

ment as a guarantee that the Federal Government will not interfere with the indi-

vidual’s right to bear arms for self-defense”).

E. Volokh, The Commonplace Second Amendment, 73 N. Y.U. L. Rev. 793 (1998);

R. Barnett, Was the Right to Keep and Bear Arms Conditioned on Service in an Or-

ganized Militia?, 83 Tex. L. Rev. 237 (2004); E. Volokh, “Necessary to the Security of

a Free State,” 83 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1 (2007); What Did “Bear Arms” Mean in the

Second Amendment?, 6 Georgetown J. L. & Pub. Policy (2008).

554 U.S. 570 (2008).

The “right of the people,” for instance, was found in other places in the Con-

stitution to speak to individual rights, not to collective rights (those that can only

be exercised by participation in a corporate body). Id. at 578–80.

1373AMENDMENT 2—BEARING ARMS

ited to those contexts.

Further, the Court found that the phrase

“well regulated Militia” referred not to formally organized state or

federal militias, but to the pool of “able-bodied men” who were avail-

able for conscription.

Finally, the Court reviewed contemporane-

ous state constitutions, post-enactment commentary, and subse-

quent case law to conclude that the purpose of the right to keep

and bear arms extended beyond the context of militia service to in-

clude self-defense.

Using this “individual rights theory,” the Court struck down a

District of Columbia law that banned virtually all handguns, and

required that any other type of ﬁrearm in a home be dissembled or

bound by a trigger lock at all times. The Court rejected the argu-

ment that handguns could be banned as long as other guns (such

as long-guns) were available, noting that, for a variety of reasons,

handguns are the “most popular weapon chosen by Americans for

self-defense in the home.”

Similarly, the requirement that all ﬁre-

arms be rendered inoperable at all times was found to limit the

“core lawful purpose of self-defense.”

However, the Court speciﬁ-

cally stated (albeit in dicta) that the Second Amendment did not

limit prohibitions on the possession of ﬁrearms by felons and the

mentally ill, penalties for carrying ﬁrearms in schools and govern-

ment buildings, or laws regulating the sales of guns.

The Court

also noted that there was a historical tradition of prohibiting the

carrying of “dangerous and unusual weapons” that would not be af-

fected by its decision.

The Court, however, declined to establish

Id. at 580–91. In so doing, the Heller Court rejected the argument that “only

those weapons useful in warfare are protected” by the Second Amendment, as the

“traditional militia was formed from a pool of men bringing arms ‘in common use at

the time’ for lawful purposes like self-defense.” Id. at 624–25 (quoting United States

v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939)) (“We therefore read Miller to say only that the

Second Amendment does not protect those weapons not typically possessed by law-

abiding citizens for lawful purposes, such as short-barreled shotguns.”); see also Caetano

v. Massachusetts, 577 U.S. ___, No. 14–10078, slip op. at 2 (2016) (vacating a ruling

by a state court that a ban on stun guns did not violate the Second Amendment

because such weapons were not “readily adaptable to use in the military.”).

Heller, 554 U.S. at 594–96. Similarly, the phrase “security of a free state” was

found to refer not to the defense of a particular state, but to the protection of the

national polity. Id. at 596–98.

Id. at 628–29. Subsequently, in Caetano v. Massachusetts, the Court empha-

sized that, under Heller, the protections of the Second Amendment extend to ﬁre-

arms that were not in existence at the time of the Framers. See Caetano, slip op. at

2 (per curiam) (vacating and remanding a Massachusetts state court ruling uphold-

ing a state law that prohibited the possession of stun guns, in part, on the grounds

that stun guns were not in common use when the Second Amendment was ad-

opted).

Heller, 554 U.S. at 630.

Id. at 626.

Id. at 627 (2008). But see Caetano, slip op. at 2 (rejecting, as inconsistent

with Heller, the view that a weapon may be deemed “unusual” if it was not in com-

1374 AMENDMENT 2—BEARING ARMS

the standard by which future gun regulations would be evalu-

ated.

And, more importantly, because the District of Columbia is

a federal enclave, the Court did not have occasion to address whether

it would reconsider its prior decisions that the Second Amendment

does not apply to the states.

The latter issue was addressed in McDonald v. Chicago,

where

a plurality of the Court, overturning prior precedent, found that the

Second Amendment is incorporated through the Fourteenth Amend-

ment and is thus enforceable against the states.

Relevant to this

question, the Court examined whether the right to keep and bear

arms is “fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty”

or “deeply

rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition”.

The Court, relying

on historical analysis set forth previously in Heller, noted the Eng-

lish common law roots of the right to keep arms for self-defense

and the importance of the right to the American colonies, the draft-

ers of the Constitution, and the states as a bulwark against over-

reaching federal authority.

Noting that by the 1850s the per-

ceived threat that the National Government would disarm the citizens

had largely faded, the Court suggested that the right to keep and

bear arms became valued principally for purposes of self-defense,

so that the passage of Fourteenth Amendment, in part, was in-

tended to protect the right of ex-slaves to keep and bear arms. While

it was argued by the dissent that this protection would most logi-

cally be provided by the Equal Protection Clause, not by the Due

Process Clause,

the plurality also found enough evidence of then-

existent concerns regarding the treatment of blacks by the state mi-

mon use at the time when the Second Amendment was adopted, as well as the view

that the Second Amendment only protects weapons that are “useful in warfare”).

Heller, 554 U.S. at 629 n.27 (discussing the non-application of rational basis

review).

561 U.S. ___, No. 08–1521, slip op. (2010).

The portion of the opinion ﬁnding incorporation was authored by Justice Alito,

and joined by Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Scalia and Justice Kennedy. Justice Thomas

declined to join the plurality’s opinion as regards incorporation under the Due Pro-

cess Clause. Instead, Justice Thomas, alone among the Justices, would have found

that the Second Amendment is applicable to the states under the Privileges or Im-

munities Clause. For a more detailed discussion of incorporation and the Privileges

or Immunities Clause, see supra Bill of Rights, Fourteenth Amendment and Four-

teenth Amendment, Privileges or Immunities.

Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).

Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (internal quotation marks

omitted).

McDonald, 561 U.S. ___, No. 08–1521, slip op. at 20 (noting that Blackstone

had asserted that the right to keep and bear arms was “one of the fundamental

rights of Englishmen”).

561 U.S. ___, No. 08–1521, slip op. at 20–22.

561 U.S. ___, No. 08–1521, slip op. at 23–24 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

1375AMENDMENT 2—BEARING ARMS

litia to conclude that the right to bear arms was also intended to

protect against generally-applicable state regulation.

1376 AMENDMENT 2—BEARING ARMS