1
2
National Food and Agriculture
Incident Annex to the Response
and Recovery Federal
Interagency Operations Plans
August 2019
This page left intentionally blank
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 i
Executive Summary
The National Food and Agricultural Incident Annex (FAIA) is an annex to the Response and Recovery
Federal Interagency Operational Plans (FIOPs). The FAIA utilizes the same concepts of operation for
delivering response and recovery core capabilities, as outlined in the FIOPs, and highlights the unique
attributes of a food, plant, or agricultural incident, including intentional acts of terrorism. For the purpose
of this annex, a food and agricultural incident refers to any incident, regardless of cause, that poses
significant human, animal, and environmental health impacts and/or jeopardizes the economic stability of
the U.S. agricultural or agribusiness industry to include animal disease outbreaks, plant and pest
pathogens, and intentional or accidental adulteration of the food supply chain.
FAIA is composed of a base annex and four branches dedicated to the specific incident types: food, animal
agriculture, plant agriculture and intentional incidents. The FAIA is scalable, flexible, and adaptable to a
wide range of food and agricultural incidents regardless of cause, size, location, or complexity. The four
branches detail the importance of establishing operational coordination with the Prevention Mission Area
regarding the response to food and agricultural incidents, specifically imminent intentional threats or acts
of terrorism.
Incident Types
Food - A food-related incident involves the unintentional
adulteration and/or contamination, threatened or actual,
of food, that impacts or may impact human health.
Animal - Animal health officials define an exotic or
foreign animal disease (FAD) incident as an important
transmissible livestock or poultry disease believed to be
absent from the United States and its territories that has a
potential significant health or economic impact.
Plant - An incident involves the detection of an invasive
plant pest or disease whose introduction into the country
can cause damage to the economy or natural resources.
Intentional – The threat of or the intentional use of
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN)
agents and other hazardous contaminants against the U.S.
food and agriculture sector.
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 ii
Lead Federal Departments and Agencies for Food and Agricultural Incidents
Incident type
Lead Federal Agency
Response to and Recovery from Food Incidents:
a) All human health impacts related to the incident
b) Adulterated meat, poultry, and processed egg products
c) Adulterated foods not under FSIS authority (beverages, dairy,
infant formula, juices, produce, seafood, shell eggs, animal/pet
food, etc.)
a) HHS
b) USDA Food Safety Inspection Service (FSIS)
c) HHS Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
Response and Recovery from Animal Agricultural incidents
USDA
Response and Recovery from Plant Agricultural incidents
USDA Animal and Plant Health Inspection
Service (APHIS), Plant Protection and Quarantine
(PPQ).
Law Enforcement for Intentional Incidents:
a) Criminal Investigations and Prosecutions
b) Counterterrorism/Counterintelligence Investigations and
Prosecutions
a) Lead: – Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI);
Supporting – FDA Office of Criminal
Investigation for Food and/or USDA Office of
Inspector General (OIG) for Animal and Plant
b) Attorney General (prosecutions)
Note: The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) may be called upon to
provide supplemental operational coordination support to the LFA during complex incidents.
Homeland Security
Operational Support Construct
Public, animal, and plant health agencies or officials at the state, local, tribal or territorial (SLTT) level of
government are the primary responders for food and agricultural incidents. As incidents change in size, scope,
complexity, and type of incident, a higher level of coordination among responsible agencies at the SLTT and federal
levels may be required for supplementary or complementary support. During a food or agricultural incident, the state
or tribal public health agency or agricultural health agency is normally the lead response agency for the geographic
area. When federal support is required for response and recovery efforts, the lead federal agency (LFA) is the agency
that has the regulatory authority for each type of incident. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) is
the LFA for food incidents as they pertain to human health and would coordinate with the lead regulatory agency,
depending on the implicated food product in the outbreak. The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) is
the LFA for both animal and plant agricultural incidents. As such, the LFA would be the originator for federal
agency-to-agency operational support tasks.
Critical Considerations
Incident Phases: Operational phases for the response to and recovery from a large-scale incident vary based on the
size, scope, and complexity of the incident. Each differing incident, whether intentional or incidental, may not
follow the standard operational phases and require a more dynamic approach.
Operational Coordination: Each LFA will make the determination to activate the UCG and establish federal
interagency support using key parameters that span all incidents. Potential triggers are located in Table 4 of the Base
Annex.
Private Sector: Nearly 100% of all food and agricultural production within the United States falls within the private
sector and as such there may be legal challenges in providing direct federal assistance outside SLTT channels.
Resource Shortfalls: The size, scope, and/or complexity of an incident may overwhelm existing SLTT capabilities
and resources, potentially causing significant strain on the whole community (specialized teams, personnel, waste,
equipment, logistics, etc.).
Economic Impact: The impacts to the food and agriculture sector extend far beyond immediate health and food
safety issues and include the potential for extensive local, state, national, and international economic impacts.
Waste Management: Agent and pathogen type may have an impact on waste processing and disposal. Management
of large quantities of waste, some deemed hazardous, will prove challenging and further drain resources. Adequate
disposal sites may not be available in the impacted areas.
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 iii
Homeland Security
Major Key Leader Decisions
Topic
Decision Point
Emergency
Declarations
-Public Health Emergency declared by the Secretary of HHS
-Declaration of Extraordinary Emergency by the Secretary of USDA
-Presidential declaration of a National Emergency
-Stafford Act Emergency or Major Disaster Declaration by the President
Supplemental Support
to the LFA
-LFA determination and request for supplemental support through:
(a) direct requests of other D/As per memorandum of agreement; or
(b) request for activation of an Emergency Support Function
Planning
-Provide early supplemental crisis planning support and coordination with the LFA to assist in
crisis action planning and coordination
Public Information and
Warning
-Formally establish a Joint Information Center (JIC) in support of the UCG to coordinate
interagency messaging with the SLTT and the public
Operational
Coordination
-Formally establish a UCG at the national level
-Designation of Senior Response Official (SRO) by the LFA head, per PPD-44
-Establish a national Federal Disaster Recovery Coordinator (at state, regional, or national level)
Funding
Considerations
-Public Health Service Act, Public Health Emergency Fund (Section 319)
-Animal Health Protection Act (7 U.S.C. §8301 et seq.)
-Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC)
-Supplemental Appropriations
-Interagency Agreements / Economy Act
-Disaster Relief Fund
Concept of Operations (con’t)
Incident
Triggers
Food
Programmatic support for response/recovery from the LFA is no longer able to meet the resource requirements
for managing the incident.
Multiple states declare public health emergencies.
Multiple states request federal assistance that cannot be met by the available LFA resources.
Incident is determined to be an intentional incident.
Animal
Agriculture
APHIS' Dr. Jere L. Dick Operations Center is activated due to the animal disease outbreak.
APHIS' Incident Coordination Group is activated at headquarters to oversee coordination of nationwide
APHIS response activities for the animal disease outbreak.
Secretary of USDA has activated its intradepartmental Multi-Agency Coordination Group in response to the
animal disease outbreak to maintain situational awareness, coordinate USDA component activities to assist
APHIS in its response activities, analyze food/agricultural economic impacts resulting from the outbreak, and
coordinate USDA strategic communications/outreach to affected communities.
APHIS VS Incident Management Teams are deployed to affected states with confirmed animal disease cases
to oversee, coordinate, and/or execute response activities at affected farms (both non-commercial and
commercial facilities).
Incident is determined to be an intentional act.
Plant
Agriculture
Incident is determined to be an intentional act.
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 iv
1
Tiered Approach to Operational Coordination (Non-Stafford)*
Incident
Coordination Structure
Level 3 – Normal Response Operations
The LFA operates under regulatory authorities and programmatic
responsibility to respond to and recover from the ongoing incident.
Level 2 – Normal Response Operations
with the possible establishment of a
Federal Disaster Recovery Coordinator
(FDRC)
As complexity increases and federal funding is provided to aid in sector
recovery, the LFA may designate and coordinate response and recovery
operations with an FDRC, and may coordinate with Recovery Support
Function (RSF) leads as appropriate.
Level 1 – Large-Scale, National
Incident
The LFA, in coordination with interagency partners and executive branch
leadership, may establish an integrated interagency coordination structure to
manage response and recovery operations through the establishment of a
UCG.
*A FCO is not mentioned as FAIA incidents will most likely be non-Stafford incidents
Adapted Base UCG Coordinating Structure
This coordination structure is generic to all incidents within this annex. Specific structures are located within each branch.
Homeland Security
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 v
H a n d l i n g Inst r u c t i o n s
Information contained in this National Food and Agriculture Incident Annex is subject to the
restrictions outlined in the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans. Public
availability is determined under 5 United States Code §552.
I n t e n d e d Au d i e n c e
The intended audience for this annex includes agencies and officials of the federal, state, local, tribal, and
territorial (SLTT) government as well as other whole community partners involved in planning for
the response to and/or recovery from food and agriculture incidents.
U s e o f t h i s D o c u m e n t
This annex provides guidance and serves as a reference for federal agency planning efforts
involving food and agriculture incidents. Other whole community partners (e.g., state, local,
tribal, territorial, and insular area governments; nongovernmental organizations; voluntary
agencies; and the private sector) engaged in their own planning will find this document useful in
enhancing their understanding of how the National Food and Agriculture Incident Annex will be
implemented and how their planning efforts can be complementary.
Those involved in incidents that either involve or may have been caused by criminal or terrorist
activities are addressed in Branch 4 to this annex to enhance their understanding of the additional
coordination required with the law enforcement community.
Distribution, transmission, and destruction of this annex will be in accordance with the
Department of Homeland Security Directive 11042.1, which is publicly available. Questions
pertaining to the distribution, transmission, or destruction of this annex should be submitted to
the Federal Emergency Management Agency, Office of Response and Recovery, Planning
Division, National Planning Branch at [email protected].
Rescission Notice
Publication of this National Food and Agriculture Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery
Federal Interagency Operational Plans hereby rescinds the following document: Food and
Agriculture Incident Annex to the National Response Framework, 2008.
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 vi
Document Change Control
Version
Date
Summary of Changes
Name
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 vii
Table of Contents
Operational Support Construct ....................................................................................................... ii
Critical Considerations.................................................................................................................... ii
Lead Federal Departments and Agencies for Food and Agricultural Incidents.............................. ii
Concept of Operations (con’t) ....................................................................................................... iii
Tiered Approach to Operational Coordination (Non-Stafford)* ................................................... iv
Handling Instructions .................................................................................................................. v
Intended Audience ....................................................................................................................... v
Use of this Document .................................................................................................................. v
Rescission Notice ........................................................................................................................ v
Document Change Control ............................................................................................................ vi
Table of Contents .......................................................................................................................... vii
Annex Overview ............................................................................................................................ xi
Base Plan ......................................................................................................................................... 1
Situation ...................................................................................................................................... 1
Interdependencies: ................................................................................................................... 1
Threat Environment: ................................................................................................................ 2
Public Response: ..................................................................................................................... 2
Incident Specific Branches: ..................................................................................................... 2
Purpose ........................................................................................................................................ 4
Scope ........................................................................................................................................... 5
Facts, Planning Assumptions, and Critical Considerations ..................................................... 6
Mission ...................................................................................................................................... 10
End State ................................................................................................................................ 10
Authorities: ............................................................................................................................ 11
Execution ................................................................................................................................... 12
Concept of Operations ........................................................................................................... 12
Steady State ........................................................................................................................... 13
Key Federal Response and Recovery Decisions ................................................................... 20
Potential Emergency Declarations ........................................................................................ 22
Administration, Resources, and Funding .................................................................................. 23
Administration ....................................................................................................................... 23
Resources ............................................................................................................................... 23
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 viii
Funding .................................................................................................................................. 23
Other Funding Options .......................................................................................................... 24
Oversight, Coordinating Instructions, and Communications .................................................... 25
Oversight: .............................................................................................................................. 25
Coordinating Instructions: ..................................................................................................... 25
Communications: ................................................................................................................... 26
Branch 1: Federal Response to and Recovery from Food Incidents ............................................. 27
Situation .................................................................................................................................... 27
Purpose .................................................................................................................................. 27
Scope ..................................................................................................................................... 27
Facts, Planning Assumptions, and Critical Considerations ................................................... 27
Execution ................................................................................................................................... 29
Branch 2: Federal Response to and Recovery from Animal Agriculture Incidents ..................... 35
Situation .................................................................................................................................... 35
Purpose .................................................................................................................................. 35
Scope ..................................................................................................................................... 35
Facts, Assumptions, and Critical Considerations .................................................................. 35
Planning Assumptions: .......................................................................................................... 36
Critical Considerations .......................................................................................................... 36
Execution ................................................................................................................................... 38
Operational Phases ................................................................................................................ 40
Branch 3: Federal Response to and Recovery from a Plant Agriculture incident ........................ 45
Situation .................................................................................................................................... 45
Purpose .................................................................................................................................. 45
Scope ..................................................................................................................................... 45
Facts, Assumptions, and Critical Considerations .................................................................. 45
Execution ................................................................................................................................... 47
Operational Phases ................................................................................................................ 48
Branch 4: Intentional Food and Agriculture Incident ................................................................... 52
Situation .................................................................................................................................... 52
Pre-Harvest Agriculture Phase: ............................................................................................. 54
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 ix
Post-Harvest Production: ....................................................................................................... 55
Law Enforcement Interaction with Responding Agencies .................................................... 56
Purpose .................................................................................................................................. 56
Scope ..................................................................................................................................... 56
Facts, Planning Assumptions, and Critical Considerations ................................................... 57
Critical Considerations for Crisis Action Planning:
............................................................... 60
Execution ................................................................................................................................... 65
Recognition of an Intentional Incident .................................................................................. 66
Transition from Counterterrorism Response to Consequence Management ......................... 74
Appendix 1: Policy and Capability Development Topics ............................................................. 75
Federal-to-Federal Support .................................................................................................... 75
Waste and Carcass Management ........................................................................................... 75
Coordination of Surge Veterinarians and Animal Health Technicians ................................. 76
State Licensure Agreements and Waivers ............................................................................. 77
Recovery from an Intentional Act ......................................................................................... 77
Appendix 2: Wildlife Animal Interface ........................................................................................ 79
Appendix 3: Authorities and References ...................................................................................... 81
Statutory and Regulatory Authorities .................................................................................... 81
Executive Orders and Presidential Directives ....................................................................... 92
Waivers .................................................................................................................................. 94
Source Documents and References ....................................................................................... 95
Appendix 4: Roles and Responsibilities for Response and Recovery to a Large-Scale Food or
agriculture Incident ....................................................................................................................... 96
Federal and Regional Government Offices ........................................................................... 96
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) .............................................................. 97
U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) ............................................................................ 100
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) .......................................................................... 102
Department of Justice (DOJ) ............................................................................................... 103
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 x
Department of Defense (DOD) ........................................................................................... 104
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) ........................................................................... 106
Department of the Interior (DOI) ........................................................................................ 107
Department of Transportation (DOT) ................................................................................. 108
U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) ....................................................................................... 108
State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial Governments (SLTT) ................................................. 109
Private Sector ...................................................................................................................... 109
Appendix 5: Federal Response Capability Inventory – Food and Agriculture Specific Assets,
Resources, and Teams ................................................................................................................. 110
Appendix 6: Acronym List ......................................................................................................... 121
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 x
This page left intentionally blank
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 xi
Annex Overview
The National Food and Agriculture Incident Annex (FAIA) is an annex to the Response and
Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans (FIOPs). The FIOPs provide details regarding
agency roles, responsibilities, critical tasks, and identify resources and sourcing requirements for
delivery of core capabilities. The FAIA utilizes the same concepts of operation for delivering
response and recovery core capabilities, as outlined in the FIOPs, and highlights the unique
attributes of a food or agriculture incident, including acts of terrorism. This annex is
supplemental to the FIOPs and other plans including the Lead Federal Agency (LFA)
departmental or agency plans but not limited to response to food and agriculture incidents that do
not rise to the level of federal-to-federal support. This annex does not alter or impede the ability
of any federal, state, local, tribal, territorial, or insular area agency to execute authorities or meet
responsibilities under applicable laws, executive orders, and directives.
The FAIA is composed of a base annex and four branches dedicated to the specific details of
each type of incident for food, animal agriculture, plant agriculture and intentional incidents. The
FAIA is scalable, flexible, and adaptable to a
wide range of food and agriculture incidents
regardless of cause, size, location, or complexity.
Figure 1 represents the basic FAIA support
construct contained in the plan. The four
branches detail the importance of establishing
operational coordination with the Prevention
mission area regarding the response to food and
agriculture incidents, specifically imminent
intentional threats or acts.
This annex describes the process and
organizational constructs used by the Federal
Government, when the LFA requests federal-to-
federal support from interagency partners, to
support response and recovery efforts during
large-scale food and agriculture incidents
1
.
Actions described in this annex may take place
without a Stafford Act declaration but could be
in conjunction with a public health emergency
declaration by the Secretary of the United States
Department of Health and Human Services or a declaration of extraordinary emergency by the
Secretary of the United States Department of Agriculture.
Although the FAIA provides guidance for the whole community, it focuses on large-scale
incidents in the nation’s food and agriculture sector that may threaten public health, animal
health, food and livestock production, wildlife, rangelands and wetlands, as well as cascading
effects and economic impacts. Coordination across all mission areas will help ensure risk-
1
For the purpose of this annex, a food and agriculture incident refers to any incident, regardless of cause, that poses
significant human, animal, and environmental health impacts and/or jeopardizes the economic stability of the
U.S. agricultural or agribusiness industry to include animal disease outbreaks, introduction of a plant pest or
pathogen, and intentional or accidental adulteration of the food supply chain.
Figure 1: FAIA Support Construct
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 xii
informed decision-making. The term “response” within this annex refers to those activities and
capabilities within the Response and Recovery Mission Areas that minimize the impacts of the
incident and secure the U.S. food supply and agricultural industries. Response actions are
exclusive of any law enforcement and criminal investigations activities and capabilities
otherwise described within the Prevention and Protection Mission Areas. Information on the U.S.
Government’s law enforcement response is available in Branch 4: Intentional Food and
Agriculture Incident to this annex. Mitigation actions are not listed or described in this plan.
Figure 2: FAIA Branches
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 1
Base Plan
S i t u a t i o n
The food and agriculture sector accounts for
roughly one-fifth of the nation’s economic
activity. An incident can range in scope and
severity and happen anywhere within the United
States. Its impact extends far beyond immediate
health and food safety issues to include the
potential for extensive economic impacts. An
incident that is identified as a food and agriculture
incident would have cascading impacts on service
industries and require a responsive messaging
campaign to try to minimize the effects. Food and
agriculture incidents can occur anywhere within
the United States and can range significantly in
scope and severity. A large-scale incident in the
food and agriculture sector may pose a threat to public health, plant health, animal health, and/or
food and livestock production, with potential impacts to the security, cost, and safety of the U.S.
food supply.
Interdependencies:
A strong emergency response strategy is required to address natural or intentional incidents that
could result in significant adverse impacts to the food and agriculture sector. Traditional
approaches to response and recovery address significant incidents in the food and agriculture
sector. However, to address all components of these incidents, there must be a clear
understanding of the intricate
connections between humans, plants and
animals in the food and agriculture
sector with crosscutting approaches for
incident response and recovery. This
annex leverages a “one health”
approach, which recognizes that the
health of people is connected to the
health of animals, plants and the
environment.
Collaborations across the public health,
animal health (including wildlife), environmental health, and plant health communities are
critical if decision makers are to understand, prevent, respond to, and mitigate/recover from
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 2
large-scale, significant incidents in the food and agriculture sector with far reaching public, plant,
environmental, and animal health impacts as well as economic losses.
Threat Environment:
Response to and recovery from food and agriculture incidents are complex and challenging for
the whole community. Each type of pathogen or threat poses unique response and recovery
challenges that the United States may be forced to confront. Novel and re-emerging pathogens,
including those difficult to detect and/or treat can spread quickly throughout the globe, posing
threats to the food and agriculture sector. Environmental shifts, disasters, or other incidents can
change disease patterns, raising the risk of a food and agriculture incident. Genetic changes may
alter the characteristics (i.e., virulence and transmissibility) of common pathogens, potentially
resulting in increased morbidity and/or mortality. The widespread and improper use of antibiotic,
anti-viral, anti-fungal, and anti-parasitic treatments or other Medical countermeasures (MCMs) is
playing a role in the emergence of drug-resistant pathogens. Zoonotic diseases, where a virulent
pathogen may move between animal and human communities, also require a level of
collaboration and coordination between multiple agencies for response and recovery.
Adulteration of a food source with a toxin, radiological material, or chemical may also pose a
challenge in detection, quickly determining the adulterant and treatment.
Public Response:
Public response to food and agriculture incidents typically includes fear, therefore coordinated
public messaging regarding the risks is crucial. Behavioral health impacts may be significant
amongst the impacted population. In some situations, large numbers of impacted individuals may
seek medical assistance, which, if not mitigated by behavioral and medical triage, can quickly
overwhelm the ability of medical facilities and workers to assist the sick. Studies of populations
affected by disaster show that a disaster’s consequences upon people can include long-term
psychiatric disorders such as depression, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, phobias, and alcohol
and drug abuse. Early interventions are designed to mitigate the increased prevalence of long-
term psychiatric disorder in the affected population. Responders are also susceptible to stress and
should have a program available to assist in its control while deployed.
Incident Specific Branches:
Throughout the Food and Agriculture Incident Annex (FAIA) planning process, departments and
agencies recognized that a large-scale food and agriculture incident would cover a broad range of
scenarios and require such a range of resources and support from the interagency that one plan
could not cover all of the nuances among each type of incident. As such, the annex was crafted
into a base plan and four incident-specific branches.
Branch 1: Federal Response to and Recovery from Food
Incidents
The U.S. food supply is among the safest in the world. The food industry operates entirely by
private ownership in highly competitive global markets under the regulation of the Health and
Human Services (HHS)/Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the U.S. Department of
Agriculture (USDA)/Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS). Industry has worked closely
with these regulatory agencies to promote a food defense posture to minimize the threat to the
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 3
food supply and the risk of accidental and intentional adulteration of food. Foodborne outbreak
response and recovery requires a highly collaborative partnership between federal, SLTT,
academia, and industry entities. In addition, HHS/FDA, USDA, and the Department of Justice
(DOJ) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) have worked closely with federal partners and
industry to promote security at multiple levels throughout the production chain. These security
measures include physical security, security during manufacture, production, processing and
storage, security in shipping, and protocols for managing biological risks on farms for products
that lead directly into the food supply. While there have been foodborne animal and plant disease
outbreaks across the United States, to date, all incidents were managed within each regulatory
agency’s authorities without requests for large-scale response support.
Branch 2: Federal Response to and Recovery from Animal
Agricultural Incidents
Animal agriculture accounted for slightly less than half of farm cash receipts from the sale of
farm commodities in the United States in 2017, with cattle and calves accounting for nearly 40%
of annual sales.
Animal agriculture industries face increased challenges for managing infectious disease among
U.S. herds and flocks. As a result of the increased importation of animal products and expansion
of international businesses into the United States, animal agriculture industries create new
challenges to protect industry from the introduction of pathogens, including high priority foreign
animal diseases (FAD). A large-scale disease outbreak in animal agriculture may result in
devastating effects on the affected livestock industry as well as the agriculture sector and
economy. Such an outbreak will require the coordination of response and recovery efforts,
including animal health response, animal welfare management, and large-scale waste
management/carcass disposal.
The USDA Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) Veterinary Services (VS)
protects and improves the health, quality, and marketability of our nation’s animals, animal
products, and veterinary biologics. USDA APHIS VS prevents, controls, and eliminates animal
diseases and monitors and promotes animal health and productivity. In the event of a foreign
animal disease or other large-scale animal incident, USDA APHIS VS will activate the policies
and procedures within the disease specific incident response plans as outlined in the FAD
Preparedness and Response Manuals (FAD PReP). According to this manual, USDA follows the
standard incident coordination structure with multi-agency coordination providing resource,
coordination, and policy support to deployed incident management teams. The FAIA enhances
these response strategies and seeks to support interagency operational coordination for large-
scale incidents where federal-to-federal support is requested.
Branch 3: Federal Response to and Recovery from Plant
Agricultural Incidents
Plant agriculture spans a large variety of commodities in the United States including grains,
vegetables, fruits, nuts, and berries as well as timber used in the lumber and paper industries.
The introduction of a plant pest or pathogen can have significant impacts to these industries.
With the increase in international travel and efficient transportation of goods, new challenges
arise for minimizing the risk of the introduction of a foreign plant pest or pathogen.
The USDA APHIS Plant Protection and Quarantine (PPQ) is the lead federal agency for plant
health emergencies and for safeguarding U.S. plant agriculture against the entry, establishment,
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 4
and spread of pests, as well as the facilitation of the trade of agricultural products. USDA APHIS
PPQ focuses on preventing the introduction of invasive insect and mite species, mollusks,
nematodes, plant diseases, and weeds into U.S. plant agriculture. With the introduction of a plant
pest or pathogen, USDA APHIS PPQ works with state entities to coordinate response operations
and minimize the impact. USDA APHIS PPQ follows the response strategies outlined in the
National Plant Emergency Response Framework. While plant pests and pathogens can be
devastating to crop populations, commercial production can continue while response strategies
are implemented; however, the pest does affect trade and export markets and the quality of
product for consumers.
Branch 4: Intentional Food and Agriculture Incident
Branch 4 is active when there is evidence of a planned or actual use of a CBRN agent, a
suspicious disease, intoxication, or contamination incident of undetermined cause,
and/or intelligence threat reporting must be considered as a suspected or actual act of terrorism,
espionage, or other federal crime. This consideration is further supported if the response requires
integration of consequence management, critical infrastructure protection, and/or law
enforcement/counterterrorism operations. In these cases, joint criminal and epidemiological
investigations by law enforcement and public, animal, and/or plant health authorities should be
conducted to determine the cause. The wide variety of possible perpetrators, motivations, threat
materials, and methods available demonstrates the complexity of the threat and the need for
integrated response operations.
The intent of the Intentional Food and Agriculture Incident Branch is to support the integration
of Response and Recovery Missions (including consequence management and critical
infrastructure security and resilience operations) with the Prevention (imminent threats or
attacks) and the Investigation missions (criminal or counterterrorism). Effective integration
requires unity of effort across these mission areas as well as coordinated communication and
time-sensitive information sharing between operational and decision-making elements. An
effective joint effort increases the likelihood of successfully attributing/resolving threats,
protecting the food and agriculture sector, and ensures that rapid response and recovery
operations do not interfere or impede law enforcement operations or vice versa.
Existing CBRN Incident Annexes define general operational requirements for the interagency
response to incidents involving specific CBRN threat agents (Biological Incident Annex,
Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex, and Oil/Chemical Incident Annex) from the standpoint of
the management of incidents involving each separate material.
The FAIA and Intentional Incident Branch plan address consequence management and
threat/incident investigations from an all-hazards approach for the multiple food and agriculture
infrastructure elements that may be targeted with a spectrum of CBRN and hazardous
contamination threats.
P u r p o s e
The FAIA provides hazard-specific supplemental information to the Response and Recovery
FIOPs. Presently, the lead federal agencies (LFAs) for food and agriculture incidents have been
capable of managing response and recovery operations under their existing authorities and
capabilities. The FAIA will facilitate the federal interagency response to and recovery from a
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 5
large-scale food or agriculture incident to minimize the overall impact to public, animal, and
plant health while reducing the negative impact of the incident on the economy, industry, and the
environment in order to maintain public safety and confidence. The annex facilitates interagency
resource coordination once an incident response becomes too complex for the lead agency under
its own authorities. This annex does not replace the constructs and response strategies from these
individual agencies; normal interagency coordination, including with law enforcement, is
ongoing using internal agency processes.
S c o p e
The FAIA applies to federal response and recovery activities for food or agriculture incidents
that exceed the ability of the LFA to respond to and recover from the incident within its own
authorities, existing programmatic support, available resources, and laws. Such incidents may
involve the following (but not limited to):
• Any incident that results in an animal disease outbreak or large-scale injury or death of
animals, including high priority FADs, emerging and re-emerging diseases, and zoonotic
diseases in animal populations.
• Plant pests and pathogens
• Intentional or incidental adulteration of the food supply chain
2
,
3
.
• Upstream and downstream disruptions (e.g., equipment, feed, pesticides) to consumer
markets and the environment
While zoonotic diseases pose a threat to both human and animal populations, the severity of the
disease in each population will dictate whether response and recovery actions are managed
through the FAIA or the Biological Incident Annex (BIA). For the FAIA, zoonotic diseases that
primarily affect animal populations are addressed in the animal branch. However, a clear
delineation is drawn between zoonotic diseases that are in reservoir species and are not causing
significant disease in humans. The BIA is the appropriate operational annex for those diseases
that present stuttering or sustained infections
4
and severe or life-threatening disease in human
populations.
The FAIA will—
• Describe the process and organizational constructs the Federal Government will utilize to
support response and recovery efforts from a large-scale food or agriculture incident
when federal-to-federal support is requested.
• Outline the process for federal response and recovery operations for a non-Stafford Act
incident.
2
Where there is a suspected or actual terrorist threat or a suspected act of terrorism, consult the Terrorism Incident
Law Enforcement and Investigation Annex and national policy to identify coordination mechanisms.
3
It is understood that not all food and agriculture incidents may be intentional and all intentional food and
agricultural incidents may not be terrorism.
4
Stuttering and sustained infections pertain to the definition of zoonotic disease transmission between human and
animal populations outlined in Epidemic dynamics at the human-animal interface.
Lloyd-Smith, JO, George, D, Pepin, KM, Pitzer, VE, Pulliam, JR C, Dobson, AP, Hudson, PJ, and Grenfell, BT
(2009) Epidemic dynamics at the human-animal interface. Science 326: 1362-1367. doi:
10.1126/science.1177345.
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 6
• Provide information that is specific and unique to federal food and agriculture incident
response and recovery processes, assets, resources, and teams.
This annex does not address the following:
• National food shortage
• Aquaculture
• Companion and service animals except when the animal serves as a vector that could
further propagate the spread of disease in animal agriculture.
• Emergency Support Function (ESF) #8 Public Health and Medical Services or #11
Agriculture and Natural Resources, resources/procedures for natural disasters.
• Food and agriculture response and recovery from a nuclear or radiological incident as
described in the Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex.
• The loss of critical infrastructure including but not limited to electricity, transportation
and telecommunications.
Facts, Planning Assumptions, and Critical Considerations
The facts, planning assumptions, and critical considerations that contribute to the development of
an operational environment for the FAIA and are supplemental to the Response and Recovery
FIOPs were determined to be incident and commodity specific, and are described in the
respective incident-specific (food, animal agriculture, and plant agriculture) branch plan.
In absence of fact, planning assumptions represent information presumed to be true and are
necessary in order to facilitate planning. Assumptions are a baseline set for planning purposes,
and they do not take the place of specific activities or decision points that would occur during an
incident.
Facts:
Incident specific information is outlined within the branches of this plan.
• Situational Awareness: Full information about the incident (cause, origin, transmission,
impact and shortfalls) may not be immediately available and may take hours (e.g.,
pathogen identification), days (e.g., exposure areas and populations), or months (e.g.,
attack and secondary attack rates, lethality, susceptibility to countermeasures) to unfold.
Situational awareness will largely depend on the type of agent and its epidemiologic
characteristics. Response decisions will likely be made without complete information.
• Incident Cause: The cause of an incident (e.g., intentional, accidental, or naturally
occurring) may not be readily apparent.
• Disease Origin: The geographic origin of the incident may not be readily apparent; the
first detected cases may not be in the location of the initial release or exposure. Incidents
that originate abroad have the potential to spread quickly to the domestic U.S. population.
• Disease Transmission: A contagious disease or food incident may include waves of
secondary and tertiary infections/illnesses within the original outbreak region and
beyond. “Waves” of infections/illnesses and recurrences demonstrate how different levels
of impacts on the country could be possible and how strictly aligning response to
planning phases can be challenging.
• Disproportionate Impacts: People at lower socio-economic levels and persons with
access and functional needs experience disproportionate impacts from emergencies and
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 7
disasters. Responders and first responders may be disproportionately impacted either
medically or behaviorally, depending on the agent and the nature of the event.
• Economic/Conservation Impacts: Animal disease may affect a broad range of animal
species (including wildlife and animals in zoos or other animal collections). The resulting
incident may have significant impact, both from an economic and a species conservation
perspective.
• Public Information:
o The incident will garner media attention, and coordinated messaging will be
required to communicate the safety of the U.S. food supply.
o Communications will likely include incident information as well as animal health
and public health guidance that are more complex than most emergency
messages.
o Special permissions and/or non-disclosure agreements between the public and
private sectors will be required to protect proprietary information and may allow
for disclosure and dissemination on a need-to-know basis.
o To ensure that all persons have equal access to the information distributed to the
public, the information will be provided, as needed, in alternate formats for
persons with disabilities and with other access and functional needs, and in
languages other than English for persons with limited English proficiency.
• Significant Resource Shortfalls: The size, scope, and/or complexity of an incident may
overwhelm existing SLTT capabilities and resources, causing significant strain on the
whole community.
o Healthcare and Mental Health Response: Individual practitioners, healthcare
organizations, healthcare coalitions, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)
may become an integral part of response to a food or agriculture health incident.
o Medical countermeasures (MCMs) Development and Production: For
pathogens with no pre-established MCMs, development and production of
appropriate MCMs should occur as quickly as possible.
• Long-Term Recovery: Recovery of the impacted populations and environments may
take years.
Planning Assumptions:
During response and recovery operations, planning assumptions may be validated as facts. The
following are some overarching planning factors whether food, agriculture, plant, or intentional
incident related:
• Non-Stafford Act Response: A large-scale food and agriculture incident may not result
in a major disaster Stafford Act declaration but may require federal-to-federal support.
• Criminal / Counterterrorism Investigations: Any potentially intentional threat or
incident will require a joint criminal and epidemiological investigation. During an act of
terrorism, the FBI will coordinate criminal investigative activities with appropriate SLTT
and federal partner agencies such as HHS, USDA, Department of Homeland Security
(DHS), Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and other partners as appropriate; there
is more information in Branch 4: Intentional Food and Agriculture Incident.
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 8
Critical Considerations for Crisis Action Planning:
The following general critical considerations are supplemental to those outlined in the Response
and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans. Additional considerations apply
specifically to each Branch. Table 1 outlines some, but not all critical considerations.
Table 1: Critical Considerations
Coordinating Structures
Risk
• Public health, emergency management, environmental, and law enforcement
stakeholders will require close collaboration at the incident level, and in the
national multi-agency coordination centers.
Management
• Coordinating among SLTT governments, the private sector, federal partner
agencies, and international partners will facilitate prompt response and
recovery operations and actions.
• Close coordination with law enforcement, in the case of a suspected or actual
terrorist threat, between the animal and plant agriculture health community
and the counterterrorism community will be required throughout the incident.
Decision Coordination
Risk
• Interdependent decisions of mission areas should be coordinated to avoid
unintended consequences.
Management
Interdependent decisions include, but are not limited to––
• Pre-positioning of MCMs
• Security of points of entry or enhanced screening
• Public messaging
• Operations to resolve the threat, etc.
MCMs Prioritization and Dispensing
Risk
• Available but limited MCMs may fall short of the required demand due to a
variety of factors (e.g., geographical variance in the severity of the outbreak,
logistical issues, disruption to pharmaceutical production).
• SLTT entities may lack the capability to immediately provide MCMs and
personal protective equipment and may require assistance.
Management
• Ensure HHS prioritization of Strategic National Stockpile distributions are
consistent with national priorities.
• Coordinate and promulgate single federal guidance on the prioritized
procurement and dispensing of MCMs among federal, state, local, and
private sector users.
• Acquire and ensure federal operational support of existing SLTT City
Readiness Initiative (CRI) MCMs dispensing plans.
Waste Management
Risk
• Agent and pathogen type can have an impact on waste processing and
disposal. Management of large quantities of waste, some deemed hazardous,
will prove challenging and further drain resources.
Management
• Ascertain technical guidance on the collection, decontamination, and
transportation of waste.
• Coordinate with SLTT on the means, route, and destination of waste.
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 9
• Communicate protective measures to responders and the public for the
handling of waste.
Fatality Management
Risk
• Fatality management resources will likely be strained by both naturally
occurring and intentional incidents.
• Regular processing mechanisms may be overwhelmed due to large numbers
of human, animal, or plant remains, which are possibly hazardous due to the
presence of the causative agent(s).
• Evidence taken from remains might have to be recovered and preserved as
part of ongoing law enforcement investigations.
Management
• Coordinate with SLTT to align federal support to local decision making on
the identification, management, and handling of remains.
• Adherence to law enforcement direction and protocols to preserve evidence.
Non-Pharmaceutical Interventions (NPI)
Risk
• NPIs (e.g., social distancing, quarantine, import/export restrictions, stock
yard closures, manufacturing plant closure, etc.) may have unintended
consequences and require judicial implementation (to include but not limited
to civil rights and civil liberties, financial impacts, implementation
challenges, consistent applications, and efficacies).
Management
• Coordinate with SLTT on the risks/benefits of local decision making to
impose NPIs.
• Issuance of protective action guidance and facility instructions for federal
responders.
• Inclusion of guidance with public affairs materials and messaging.
Competing Priorities
Risk
• Private sector priorities may not be in-line with the federal priorities for the
response.
Management
• Close coordination is required in order to bring the priorities into agreement
to facilitate agreed upon results.
Additional critical considerations, in addition to those found in the Response and Recovery
FIOPs are as follows:
• Complex Medical and Health Information: Communications must synthesize complex
medical and health information to promote public compliance with guidance.
o Information from SLTT, federal, and private sector partners will be necessary to develop
a full understanding of risks, identify appropriate response actions, and provide accurate
risk communications.
• Resistant Pathogens: There is the potential for pathogens to be resistant to MCMs, limiting
the availability of prophylaxis and treatment options.
• Immunity of Populations: There will be limited, if any, immunity in the population to some
novel emerging infections.
• Responder Exposure
o Responders may be placed at risk if not adequately protected.
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 10
o Responders could also become contaminated with a pathogen or agent before recognition
of its presence has occurred.
o Tracking of responder health post deployment.
• New Therapies or Diagnostics: Unique therapeutic and unapproved or novel therapies and
diagnostic tests may need to be used after appropriate regulatory authorization.
• Contact Tracing: State and federal authorities should have documented processes to
accomplish contact tracing which involves the identification of other people, animals, or plants
that may have been exposed to the pathogen in question. The process should:
o Look forward and backward from initial detected incident site,
o Identify exposed people, animals, plants or mechanical vectors,
o Identify measures to mitigate further exposure, and
o Be prepared to manage recalcitrant individuals.
• Decontamination
o A few pathogens or agents could require long-term or permanent closure of buildings
or public spaces in the instance of a wide-area dissemination.
o Decontamination may take an extended period of time, closing affected areas to
individuals and businesses.
• Behavioral Health Impacts: Public concern for exposure without demonstration of illness
and the desire for preventive prophylaxis will all amplify the demand for medical and health
resources.
o Due to the characteristics of incidents, behavioral health impacts should be
anticipated.
• Transportation Protocols: Appropriate protocols may be necessary when transporting
persons, animals, and plants from areas affected by a pathogen or agent to include restriction
of movement. Protocols will delineate the screening and follow-up requirements of those
infected within the United States, as well as those from overseas.
• National/Global Markets: Response activities associated with an animal disease outbreak or
a plant pest/pathogen (e.g., quarantines, use of vaccinations) may impact national and global
markets.
M i s s i o n
The mission of the LFAs in incident response and recovery efforts is to save lives, reduce human
and unnecessary animal suffering, protect private property and the environment, and re-establish
business operations to stabilize the food and agriculture sector to restore and maintain public
confidence in the U.S. food supply and all levels of government.
End State
The desired end state of federal response and recovery operations to a food and agriculture
incident occurs when food and agriculture operations are restored to the nation while maintaining
public safety and consumer confidence in the U.S. food supply and all levels of government.
This end state is achieved when:
• Measures are in place for the restoration of food and agriculture sector operations.
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 11
• Federal and SLTT governments are returned to pre-incident operations.
• All lifesaving and life-sustaining operations have been completed.
• Public safety and health protection assurances have been made and healthcare and
veterinary infrastructure capacities are operating at pre-incident levels.
• The public has been provided the necessary information to protect against and recover
from the food or agriculture threat.
• Long-term public health monitoring and behavioral health programs are in place for
affected victims, responders, and other populations.
• Long-term animal and plant monitoring programs are in place for affected agriculture
populations.
• For intentional incidents, determination of attribution has been made and prevention and
protection measures have been completed against further attacks.
• Contaminated debris and waste is managed, transported, contained and/or disposed of.
• Pathogen transmission has been stopped, slowed to a target rate, or has ceased within the
U.S. borders.
• Environmental impacts are mitigated and assurances can be made that contaminated areas
have been assessed for safety, continued decontamination, and reoccupancy.
• SLTT governments can provide food and agriculture businesses with the means to
rebound from their losses in a manner that sustains their economic well-being.
• Economic impacts both locally and nationally have been minimized and vital markets are
functioning.
Authorities:
See Appendix 3: Authorities and References which lists and details the primary federal
authorities applicable to food and agriculture incidents.
• This annex does not alter or impede the ability of any federal department or agency to
exercise their authorities or perform their responsibilities under law.
• This annex does establish parameters and methods for interagency coordination without a
Stafford Act declaration.
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 12
E x e c u t i o n
Concept of Operations
Public, animal, and plant health agencies or officials at the SLTT level of government are the
primary responders for food and agriculture incidents. As incidents change in size, scope,
complexity, and type of incident, a higher level of coordination among responsible agencies at
the SLTT and federal levels may be required for supplementary or complementary support.
During a food or agriculture incident, the state or tribal public health agency or agriculture health
agency is normally the lead response agency for the geographic area. When federal support is
required for response and recovery efforts, the LFA is the agency that has the regulatory
authority for each type of incident. HHS is the LFA for food incidents as they pertain to human
and animal health, and would coordinate with the lead regulatory agency depending on the
implicated food product in the outbreak. USDA is the LFA for both animal and plant agriculture
incidents. As such, the LFA would be the originator for federal agency-to-agency operational
support tasks. Under these incidents, a Stafford Act declaration is not likely, but FEMA and
other interagency partners may facilitate additional resources and coordination support to the
LFAs, upon an approved request.
Table 2: Lead Federal Departments and Agencies for Food and Agriculture Incidents
Incident complexities require the LFA to establish interagency coordination mechanisms to
support all components of federal response and recovery.
Incident type
Lead Federal Agency
Response to and Recovery from Food Incidents:
a) All human health impacts related to the incident.
b) Adulterated meat, poultry, and processed egg products.
c) Adulterated foods not under FSIS authority (beverages,
dairy, infant formula, juices, produce, seafood, shell
eggs, animal/pet food, etc.).
a) HHS
b) USDA FSIS
c) HHS FDA
Response and Recovery from Animal Agriculture incidents
USDA
Response and Recovery from Plant Agriculture incidents
USDA APHIS PPQ
Law Enforcement for Intentional or Terrorist Acts:
a) Criminal Investigations and Prosecutions
b) Counterterrorism / Counterintelligence Investigations
and Prosecutions
a) Lead: – FBI
(investigations);
Supporting – FDA
Office of Criminal
Investigation for Food
and/or USDA Office of
Inspector General (OIG)
for Animal and Plant
b) Attorney General
(prosecutions)
Note: The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) may be called upon to provide supplemental operational
coordination support to the LFA during complex incidents.
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 13
For intentional incidents, coordination between crisis and consequence management entities is
required to ensure that rapid response and recovery operations do not interfere or impede law
enforcement operations or vice versa.
Steady State
Multiple federal agencies, SLTT governments, and private sector entities manage the steady state
for each type of incident in the food and agriculture sector. Syndromic surveillance disease
reporting; public, animal, and plant health investigations occur as part of ongoing activities under
the regulatory authorities of each agency. Multiple federal agencies are tasked to seek and report
any abnormalities or unusual cases of concern as part of their daily work, in order to prevent and
detect food and agriculture threats.
Each food or agriculture incident will vary greatly as it unfolds. Before activating this annex,
activities will occur at the local, state appropriate departments and agencies as well as within the
Lead Federal Agency. As the incident moves from a normal response to a large-scale response,
additional Federal departments and agencies may provide resources to the LFA. Given the
numerous roles and responsibilities of various departments and agencies, the agencies that are
“activated” will vary from incident to incident. Operational phases for food and agriculture
incidents are different from the traditional operational phases typically seen in emergency
response and recovery operations.
HHS Incident Recognition/Initial Decision-Making Process
Within HHS, the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR) is the lead for
coordinating federal public health and medical preparedness and response to disasters and other
emergencies. ASPR also has responsibilities for providing departmental resources to assist
federal and SLTT government requests for public health and medical assistance. ASPR
collaborates with senior leadership, their designated subject matter experts (SMEs) across HHS
operating divisions, and staff divisions to convene and collaborate with senior leadership and
their designated subject matter experts (SMEs) across HHS, to discuss policy issues and develop
solutions to support preparedness, response, and recovery related to a national incident or event.
The ASPR ensures a coordinated HHS-wide strategic approach among the executive leadership
of HHS operating divisions and staff divisions. In some instances, leaders from additional federal
departments and agencies could be included in these strategic discussions.
If HHS is the lead, ASPR is responsible for determining when interagency coordination is
required. ASPR is able to convene representatives and subject matter experts from across the
Federal Government to coordinate operational response. The initial decision for interagency
coordination may be apparent if certain parameters exist, such as—
• Departments and agencies agree, through the interagency policy process described in
National Security Presidential Memorandum 4 or its successor that enhanced interagency
coordination is recommended.
• The lead agency has exhausted or has insufficient domestic incident management
capacity to meet incident demand, necessitating augmentation.
• The incident has the potential to increase in magnitude and complexity such that it
requires other elements outside of the abilities in HHS.
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 14
• Existing obligations require the U.S. Government to report certain developments
through international mechanisms (International Health Regulations (IHR), International
Food Safety Authorities Network, World Organization for Animal Health).
When the need for interagency coordination is not immediately apparent, ASPR will consider all
known information including input from other federal agencies as appropriate. Information to be
evaluated may include the following:
• Availability and deployability of effective “medical countermeasures” or “medical
interventions,” effectiveness of medical countermeasures and NPIs.
• Immediate and short-term needs of local public health authorities and medical facilities;
• Need for health risk communication and public affairs coordination.
• Data regarding the effectiveness of public health interventions.
• Impacts on long-term community resiliency and recovery.
• Need for, and availability of, international assistance.
• Impacts on international relationships, foreign travel, and global trade.
• Need to support law enforcement, criminal investigation, and interdiction activities while
simultaneously mitigating public and worker health impacts.
• Gaps in current knowledge and needs for immediate and long-term research.
Many additional factors will also be considered when making a decision on enhanced
coordination, some of which may include:
• Potential or actual Public Health Emergency (PHE) declaration.
• Exceeding public health capabilities and resources or expanding geographic impact
necessitating the local, tribal, county, parish, territory, or state to request public health
assistance from its neighbors or elevated supporting agency.
• Simultaneous occurrence of similar illness in non-contiguous areas, unusual geographic
or seasonal distribution.
USDA Incident Recognition/Initial Response Actions
The following represents a high-level overview of the communication and decision flow of
information from the initial detection/onset of a food/agriculture incident to the response
implementation. Although these incidents may have the greatest impact on USDA, they do not
represent all possible scenarios in which the USDA would respond.
Foreign Animal Disease (FAD)
• For more information about specific details concerning the FAD PReP, contact APHIS
VS. Resources available for a foreign animal disease outbreak include FAD PReP
materials (i.e., general concept of operations, specific disease response plans, and
livestock industry manuals), the National Animal Health Emergency Management
System Guidelines, and the National Veterinary Stockpile.
• Local veterinarian determines if sick animal(s) could potentially be infected with a FAD.
• The local veterinarian reports the case to state agriculture department/APHIS VS Area
Office.
• State agriculture department/APHIS VS Area Office assigns a FAD-trained veterinarian
to the case.
• FAD-trained veterinarian travels to the site of the sick animal(s) for critical examination.
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 15
• FAD-trained veterinarian identifies animal(s) potentially infected with a FAD.
• Veterinarian collects samples and calls state agriculture department/APHIS VS Area
Office to open FAD ticket and establish priority level.
• In high priority situations, APHIS senior leadership is notified directly.
• APHIS senior leaders notify USDA Office of the Secretary (OSEC), Office of Homeland
Security (OHS) and other need-to-know USDA agencies and/or offices.
• Samples from animal(s) are delivered to USDA lab.
• Presumptive positive results received.
• Lab director notifies APHIS senior leadership
• As determined by the Office of the Secretary, stand up a Multi-Agency Coordination
(MAC) Group
• MAC Group is made up of USDA agencies/offices that coordinate response and recovery
efforts for the Department.
Food Contamination (FC)
For the complete terminology, responsibilities and public notification procedures regarding the
voluntary recall of FSIS meat and poultry products, refer to FSIS-Directive 8080.1. As depicted
below, FSIS would utilize the recall procedures with or without the Emergency Management
Committee (EMC) activation. FSIS senior managers determine if EMC activation is warranted
for a particular incident. If FSIS determined an intentional contamination, law enforcement may
be notified and the incident would be restricted to individuals on a need to know basis.
• Significant number of consumer illnesses related to the consumption of food is noted
• Local Health Departments may report illness to the State Health department, who will in
turn report to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).
• CDC notifies FSIS.
• FSIS notifies relevant FSIS districts and offices.
• The incident is reviewed to see if it has characteristics, such as being large scale, multi-
jurisdictional and/or expanding rapidly that would require the EMC to be activated to
address and manage the Agency's response.
• EMC is activated.
• EMC notifies OSEC and OHS.
• As determined by the Office of the Secretary, stand up a MAC Group, if determined
necessary.
• MAC Group leads/coordinates response efforts with support from other USDA
agencies/offices.
Plant Pest/Disease
• Potential quarantined plant pest/disease detected.
• APHIS PPQ National Identification Services confirms identification
• Pest status evaluated/options stated
• Solicit stakeholder input
• Recommendations made/assessment of options against resources made
• APHIS PPQ leadership chooses an option and course of action
• Response plans are developed as applicable to pest or disease and environmental factors
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 16
• Action taken and APHIS PPQ partners with states and tribes to implement response
• As determined by the Office of the Secretary, stand up a MAC Group
• MAC Group leads/coordinates response efforts with support from other USDA
agencies/offices.
Initial response and recovery operations follow the standard response and recovery strategies
managed by the federal agency with the appropriate authorities for incident management. For
elevated incidents, the LFA may designate an FDRC who will coordinate with the appropriate
RSFs to facilitate the coordination of recovery efforts for those affected by the incident.
Activating Unified Coordination
Notification of unified coordination will likely take place in the 2b or 2c phase of response
operations. Appendix 4 outlines the roles and responsibilities of federal interagency partners in
response to and recovery from food and agriculture incidents.
The LFA, in coordination with Executive Branch (National Security Council, Domestic
Resilience Group [DRG]) leadership and interagency partners, will make the determination to
establish a federal Unified Coordination Group (UCG). The LFA is responsible for identifying
the relevant departments and agencies and the level of coordination support required for
participation in the UCG. The establishment of a UCG may occur without any formal emergency
declaration, though a PHE or Declaration of Extraordinary Emergency could result in the
establishment of a UCG to manage the large-scale incidents. The LFA will use a flexible and
scalable approach to coordination that adapts depending upon the severity of the incident.
Senior Response Official: In the event of a large-scale incident that requires unified coordination,
the LFA will designate a senior response official (SRO) and establish the UCG with those
interagency partners that have responsibilities and programmatic authority to support response
and recovery. The senior response official,
5
in coordination with the federal interagency partners
and Executive Branch leadership, will determine the level of operational support required for the
incident. Table 3 outlines the tiered approach to operational coordination that allows for
flexibility and scalability depending on the severity of the incident through the establishment of a
UCG.
Table 3: Tiered Approach to Operational Coordination
5
Per PPD-44, When the President designates or agencies agree to recognize a lead Federal agency for a domestic
incident pursuant to this policy, the agency head will identify a senior response official who will be fully
dedicated to the response.
Incident
Coordination Structure
Level 3 – Normal Response Operations
The LFA operates under regulatory authorities and programmatic responsibility to
respond to and recover from the ongoing incident
Level 2 – Normal Response Operations
with the establishment of a Federal
Disaster Recovery Coordinator (FDRC)
The LFA designates and coordinates response operations with an FDRC, and
will coordinate with RSF leads as appropriate
Level 1 – Large-Scale, National Incident
The LFA, in coordination with interagency partners and Executive Branch
leadership, may establish an integrated interagency coordination structure to
manage response and recovery operations through the establishment of a UCG
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 17
Timing: Each LFA will make the determination to activate the UCG and establish federal
interagency support using key parameters that span all incidents. Table 4 outlines the general
triggers based on the commodity affected, which may indicate a UCG will be established. The
list of triggers below is not inclusive of all items that may generate a federal-to federal support
request. It is important to note that if one or more of the triggers occurs, the LFA is not required
to automatically request establishment of a UCG. It is still within the discretion of the LFA to
determine whether or not to initiate a request for a UCG.
Table 4: Potential triggers to establish a UCG to manage large-scale
food and/or agriculture incidents
(The Secretary of Agriculture and/or the Secretary of Health and Human Services
decide whether to establish the UCG)
UCG Organization: The UCG structure below demonstrates a “plug and play” model where the
actual interagency partners will be incident dependent based on the roles and responsibilities
outlined in Appendix 4.
The centralized coordination structure establishes a high-level coordinating group with the
capability to make deliberate federal resource adjudication recommendations across multiple
regions and states. This entity will be comprised of senior federal interagency leaders who
possess subject matter expertise and decision-making authority and the ability to interact
effectively with SLTT regulatory offices, Governors’ offices, and tribal leadership (Figure 3).
The UCG will have direct ties to any pertinent law enforcement investigations to ensure that
crisis and consequence management activities can run concurrently without impeding one
another. To leverage private sector assets and information to facilitate response and recovery
during the incident, this coordinating body provides key private sector partners and stakeholders
with direct access to federal decision-makers.
*The Secretary of Agriculture and/or Secretary of Health and Human Services decide whether to establish a UCG
Incident
Triggers
Food
• Programmatic support for response/recovery from the LFA is no longer able to meet the resource
requirements for managing the incident
• Multiple states declare public health emergencies
• Multiple states request federal assistance that cannot be met by the available LFA resources
• Incident is determined to be an intentional act
Animal
Agriculture
• APHIS' Dr. Jere L. Dick Operations Center is activated due to the animal disease outbreak
• APHIS' Incident Coordination Group is activated at headquarters to oversee coordination of nationwide
APHIS response activities for the animal disease outbreak
• Secretary of USDA has activated its intradepartmental Multi-Agency Coordination Group in response to
the animal disease outbreak to maintain situational awareness, coordinate USDA component activities to
assist APHIS in its response activities, analyze food/agriculture economic impacts resulting from the
outbreak, and coordinate USDA strategic communications/outreach to affected communities
• APHIS VS Incident Management Teams are deployed to affected states with confirmed animal disease
cases to oversee, coordinate, and/or execute response activities at affected farms (both non-commercial
and commercial facilities)
• Incident is determined to be an intentional act
Plant
Agriculture
• Incident is determined to be an intentional act
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 19
Figure 3: Operational coordination structure for the establishment of a federal UCG
External Affairs Coordination – Activation of a Joint Information
Center
The LFA will use its existing and pre-approved external affairs structure that coordinates with
federal and SLTT agencies, and the private sector and other entities to provide credible
messaging and accurate information to affected populations using all available technologies and
tools through their public information officers (PIO) and external affairs offices.
• The SRO and LFA public information officer may elect to establish a Joint Information
Center (JIC) for large-scale food and agriculture incidents
• The JIC ensures all potential stakeholders for food and agriculture incident response and
recovery efforts are provided the necessary information for release
• The JIC can deconflict all information prior to release and provides a unified public
message regarding the status of the incident response and recovery as well as any food
safety and public, animal, plant, or environmental health impacts that may arise from the
incident
• If applicable, the JIC will have direct contact with the UCG as outlined in Figure 3 to
ensure that all messaging coincides with the ongoing response and recovery operations
• All efforts should be taken to minimize delays to release cleared messaging ensuring:
o Equal access to the information distributed to the public
o Information, as needed, in alternate formats for persons with access and
functional needs, children, and elderly persons
o Languages other than English for persons with limited English proficiency, as
appropriate
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 20
Recovery
Food or agriculture incidents create economic challenges that may be exacerbated by natural
resource contamination and health and social services issues. These incidents are unlikely to
directly impact infrastructure and housing. The Recovery FIOP applies for integrating and
synchronizing federal resources to support SLTT recovery in both Stafford and non-Stafford Act
declarations. The Recovery FIOP should be initiated early to minimize impacts to the affected
populations and businesses, and assist in returning the food and agriculture sector back to normal
business operations to maintain consumer confidence in the U.S. food supply.
Eliminating any ongoing threat is the critical basis for any recovery. Economic recovery, which
could encompass wide swaths of industries associated with food and agriculture nationally, will
depend upon messaging to assure the public that the threat, which in worst cases may have led to
multiple deaths, has been controlled and the food supply is safe. Efforts to restore the
environment will be limited to the areas with direct impact from the contamination. Economic
recovery and the efforts of health and social service experts may be far more wide ranging than
the affected area.
Key Federal Response and Recovery Decisions
Table 5 below provides key federal response and recovery decision points for a food or
agriculture incident. This list is not all encompassing of the potential federal decisions during a
food or agriculture incident. These decisions, along with key tasks and critical considerations
will be maintained in an execution checklist spreadsheet within FEMA’s WebEOC.
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 21
Table 5: Key Federal Response and Recovery Decisions.
Topic
Decision Point
Emergency
Declarations
(summarized below)
• Public Health Emergency declared by the Secretary of HHS
• Declaration of Extraordinary Emergency by the Secretary of USDA
• Presidential declaration of a National Emergency
• Stafford Act Emergency or Major Disaster Declaration by the President
Supplemental Support
to the LFA
• LFA determination and request for supplemental support through:
• (a) direct requests of other D/As per memorandum of agreement; or
• (b) request for activation of an Emergency Support Function
Potential or Confirmed
Intentional Act
• See Triggers within Branch 4: Intentional Food and Agriculture Incident for coordinated
execution of law enforcement investigations with sector lead federal agency response
operations
Planning
• Provide early supplemental crisis planning support and coordination with the LFA to assist in
crisis action planning and coordination
Public Information
and Warning
• Prepare public messaging with fundamental information that provides messaging regarding
the safety of the food supply, pertinent information on any potential transmissibility of disease
to human populations, status of response to the incident
• Formally establish a JIC in support of the UCG to coordinate interagency messaging with the
SLTT and the public
• To ensure that all persons have equal access to the information distributed to the public,
provide information, as needed, in alternate formats for persons with access and functional
needs, children, and elderly persons, and in languages other than English for persons with
limited English proficiency, as appropriate
Operational
Coordination
• Formally establish a UCG at the national level
• Designation of Senior Response Official (SRO) by the LFA head, per PPD-44
• Formally establish a national Federal Disaster Recovery Coordinator (at state, regional, or
national level)
Critical Transportation
• Coordinate interstate transportation waivers, if required, for the licensing and transport of
contaminated biomass across jurisdictional lines
• Ensure compliance with the proper packaging and transport of hazardous materials, including
regulated medical waste, and biomass
Environmental
Response/Health and
Safety
• Provide advice and support on appropriate measures to ensure the protection of the health
and safety of the public and workers, as well as the environment, from all-hazards in support
of responder operations and the affected communities
• Provide advice and support on appropriate locations and certification of biomass disposal
sites
Infrastructure
Systems
• Determine the scope and scale of support to the private sector to minimize health and safety
impacts
• Determine the level of support required to efficiently restore the commodity system
On-scene Security,
Protection, and Law
Enforcement
• Determine the requirements to provide security and protection for responders and people in
the affected areas
Operational
Communications
• Determine the level of communications support required to security, operations, and
situational awareness between the affected communities, producers, and responders within
the affected area
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 22
Potential Emergency Declarations
In a large-scale food or agriculture incident, the following declarations may be issued and may
influence incident response and recovery actions. In any of the declarations listed below, the
National Response Framework (NRF) and National Disaster Recovery Framework (NDRF) may
serve as guidance documents to assist the LFA in responding to an incident.
HHS Declaration of Public Health Emergency
Section 319 of the Public Health Services Act (PHSA) authorizes the Secretary of HHS to
declare a public health emergency (PHE) if the Secretary (1) determines a disease or incident
presents a PHE, or (2) a PHE, including significant outbreaks of infectious diseases or
bioterrorist attacks, otherwise exists. A declaration authorizes the Secretary to take appropriate
actions consistent with other authorities to respond to the emergency, temporarily suspend or
modify certain legal requirements, and expend available funds in the PHE Fund to respond to the
PHE. The Secretary has broad authorities to respond to a public health emergency, regardless of
whether a formal PHE is declared.
USDA Extraordinary Emergency Declaration
In the event of a plant health or animal health emergency, the Secretary of USDA may declare an
extraordinary emergency and may elect to provide compensation for economic losses incurred
because of actions taken under the declaration of extraordinary emergency. When a plant pest or
animal disease threatens any segment of agricultural production in the United States, the
Secretary, with concurrence from the Office of Management and Budget, may transfer funds
from other appropriations or funds available to the agencies or corporations that are necessary to
control, eradicate, or prevent the spread of the pest or disease. Under a declaration of
extraordinary emergency, the Secretary of USDA may use federal authorities to take action
within a state if the affected state is unable to take appropriate action to control and eradicate the
disease or pest. Actions taken during an animal or plant emergency are guided by and
coordinated with SLTT entities and local preparedness and response officials, homeland security
officials, and existing USDA internal policies and procedures.
Public Health,
Healthcare, and
Emergency Medical
Services
• Determine the requirements to avoid additional disease and injury to provide targeted public
health, medical, and behavioral health support, and products to all affected populations and
responders
Situational
Assessment
• Determine the level of information and process for providing senior leadership with decision-
relevant information regarding the nature and extent of the incident, any cascading effects,
and the status of the response
Economic Recovery
• Determine the best and most appropriate way forward to return the affected sector activities
to the pre-incident levels
Health and Social
Services
• Determine the strategy to promote a resilient, independent pre-incident community
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 23
Presidential Declaration of a National Emergency
Section 201 of the National Emergency Act (NEA) authorizes the President of the United States
to declare a national emergency. Under NEA Section 301, statutory emergency authority enabled
by the national emergency declaration cannot be exercised until the President specifies the
provisions of law under which the President or other officials will act. Such specification may be
made either in the declaration or in subsequent Executive Orders published in the Federal
Register and transmitted to Congress.
Stafford Act Declaration
The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act) is not often
discussed for response to a food or agriculture incident; however, there is a small possibility it
could be used for incident response. When the President of the United States issues a declaration
under the Stafford Act for a food or agriculture incident, coordination of interagency partners
and tasking through mission assignments will occur through the National Response Coordination
Center (NRCC) or the Regional Response Coordination Center (RRCC) of the affected
jurisdictions. The National Response Framework (NRF) and the NDRF, as well as the associated
FIOPs, will serve as guidance to provide the appropriate federal assistance.
Ad m i n i s t r a t i o n , R e s o u r c e s , a n d F u n d i n g
Administration
Federal agencies are responsible for managing their own financial activities during all
operational phases and across all mission areas within their established processes and resources.
The Financial Management Support Annex to the NRF provides financial management guidance
for federal agencies that provide support for incidents that require a coordinated federal response.
Resources
Federal departments and agencies are responsible for personnel augmentation to support
operations under this annex. Each federal agency possesses individual policies for personnel
augmentation that are predicated on its authorities, various policies, memoranda of
understanding, and mutual aid agreements. Federal agencies will provide their full and prompt
cooperation, resources, and support, as appropriate and consistent with their own responsibilities.
Funding
Funding to support federal response operations will be consistent with applicable laws and
authorities as detailed within the Financial Management Support Annex to the NRF. Under the
NRF, the LFA or a UCG may request federal-to-federal support by executing inter/intra-agency
reimbursement agreements in accordance with applicable authorities under the Economy Act of
1932. Table 6 describes available funding sources for federal response.
• Federal agencies providing mutual aid support may request reimbursement from the
requesting agency for eligible expenditures
• Funding for resource requests may come directly from the requesting entity’s budget or
through another source, such as an incident-specific congressional appropriation
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 24
Table 6. Funding Sources for Federal Response
Source of Funds
Managed by:
Each
Department/
Agency
Coverage:
Steady-state statutory mission
requirements
Contingency / Cap Amounts:
As established by Congress (most federal agencies do not
have disaster response appropriations and specific
guidance from agency financial management offices
should be obtained)
Public Health
Service Act,
Public Health
Emergency Fund
(Section 319)
HHS
Disease or disorder presenting
a public health emergency; or
Public Health Emergency (ie,
significant outbreaks of
infectious disease or
bioterrorism)
• “No-year” funds
• Supplements (does not supplant) other FSLTT funds
provided for public health grants, awards, contracts,
and investigations
• Secretary must report to Congress 90 days after the
fiscal year any funds spent from the PHEF and the
activities undertaken with respect to the emergency
Animal Health
Protection Act
(7 U.S.C. §8301
et seq.)
USDA
Declaration of an agriculture
emergency or an extraordinary
agriculture emergency.
Covers protective actions
against the spread of livestock
disease, including seizing,
treating, or destroying animals
if USDA has reason to believe
stated action will prevent the
spread of disease or pests
affecting livestock.
• Compensation to producers for animals that must be
euthanized, for their disposition, and for infected
materials that must also be destroyed. Provided by
annual appropriations or USDA unobligated funds
• Additional funding may be available with the approval
of the Office of Management and Budget
• Secretary determination that an extraordinary
emergency exists because of the presence of a pest or
disease of livestock and that the pest or disease of
livestock threatens livestock in the U.S.
• The Secretary may take action in a state upon finding
that the measures being taken by the state are
inadequate to control or eradicate the pest or disease
Supplemental
Appropriations
Congress
Emergency funding
requirements beyond annual
appropriations.
• Congress may designate certain spending for disaster
relief, which is not subject to the discretionary caps
specified in the statute
Interagency
Agreements /
Economy Act
Supporting
D/As
Any costs not already covered
by the above
• Federal departments and agencies may execute
inter/intra-agency reimbursable agreements
• D/As may request reimbursement from the requesting
agency for eligible expenditures
Disaster Relief
Fund
FEMA
Tasks initiated pursuant to ESF
#8, 10 or 11 or Mission
Assignments
• Funds from the DRF are used to pay for ongoing
recovery projects from disasters occurring in previous
fiscal years, meet current emergency requirements,
and as a reserve to pay for upcoming incidents
• The DRF is funded annually and is a “no-year” account
Other Funding Options
U.S. Small Business Administration Disaster Loan Program
The Small Business Administration’s (SBA’s) federal disaster loan program is activated by an
SBA disaster declaration when the governor of a disaster affected state requests a declaration and
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 25
SBA documents that the physical damage or economic injury meets the declaration threshold.
SBA also makes a disaster declaration for a Presidential disaster declaration that includes
Individual Assistance or Public Assistance and when the U.S. Secretary of Agriculture
designates an agriculture disaster.
There are two types of SBA disaster loans:
• Physical Disaster Loans: For businesses of all sizes and private nonprofit organizations,
SBA offers Physical Disaster Loans to repair or replace damaged or destroyed real estate,
machinery, equipment, inventory and other business assets. The SBA can also lend additional
funds for mitigation to help business with the cost of making improvements that protect,
prevent or minimize the same type of disaster damage from occurring in the future.
• Economic Injury Disaster Loans: For small businesses, small agriculture cooperatives, and
most private nonprofit organizations, SBA offers Economic Injury Disaster Loans to help
meet working capital needs caused by the disaster. Economic injury assistance is available
regardless of whether the business suffered any property damage.
There is a $2,000,000 statutory limit for business loans for any combination of physical,
economic injury, mitigation, and refinancing for each business and its affiliates. If a business is a
major source of employment, SBA has the authority to waive the $2,000,000 statutory limit.
Under a Presidential disaster declaration for Individual Assistance or an SBA Administrative
disaster declaration, SBA disaster loans are available to homeowners to repair or replace their
damaged or destroyed primary residence and to homeowners and renters to repair or replace
damaged or destroyed personal property.
O ve r s i g h t , C o o r d i n a t i n g I n s t r u c t i o n s , a n d
C o m m u n i c a t i o n s
Oversight:
In response to food incidents with large-scale human health implications, HHS is responsible for
coordinating the federal government’s public health and medical response in support of the
affected SLTT. During animal and plant agriculture incidents, USDA is responsible for
coordinating veterinary or agriculture support to those affected states and premises.
FEMA, in close coordination with HHS and USDA, is the executive agent for this annex.
Coordinating Instructions:
For food incidents that potentially have large human health impacts, ASPR will coordinate
resources at the Federal level. The HHS Emergency Management Group (EMG) provides public
health and medical coordination and incident support functions to the regions and/or joint field
offices, conducts operational planning, deploys national-level resources, and collects and
disseminates incident information. The LFA with the regulatory authority for each commodity
manages all response activities.
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 26
• USDA FSIS is the public health agency responsible for ensuring that the nation’s
commercial supply of meat, poultry, and processed egg products is safe, wholesome, and
correctly labeled and packaged.
• HHS/FDA is responsible for protecting the public health by ensuring the safety and
security of our nation’s food supply. HHS/FDA has regulatory authority for all foods,
which are not under the regulatory authority of FSIS including beverages, dairy, infant
formula, juices, produce, seafood, shell eggs, animal feed, and pet food, etc.
• For large-scale agriculture incidents, the USDA Operations Center is the primary
coordinating body for resources from the USDA National/headquarters level. The USDA
Operations Center assists in the development and coordination of policies, capabilities,
and procedures for reporting and response to emergencies affecting the USDA mission or
personnel. The Operations Center receives, assesses, and analyzes emergency’s or incidents,
making internal and external notifications as required.
Consistent with the NRF, the NDRF, and in accordance with Homeland Security Presidential
Directive (HSPD)-5, the Secretary of DHS, through the FEMA Administrator or other
appropriate officials, will coordinate the federal government's resources utilized in response to or
recovery from a food or agriculture incident when required by HSPD-5. In cases of intentional
threats or acts giving rise to a food or agriculture incident, the Secretary will coordinate, as
necessary, with the Attorney General. In the absence of a Stafford Act declaration, FEMA may
designate a Federal Resource Coordinator and/or rely on the pre-existing MOU/Memorandum of
Agreement (MOA) with each LFA operating through reimbursable Interagency Agreements for
the requested level of support.
Communications:
Each agency will identify the appropriate communications systems to relay the necessary
information throughout the course of incident response and recovery operations. All situational
awareness and communications channels will be coordinated through a central coordinating
body, such as the UCG. In the instance of a intentional/terrorist act or threat, the FBI shall be
consulted before issuing sensitive media/press releases.
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 27
Branch 1: Federal Response to and
Recovery from Food Incidents
S i t u a t i o n
This branch plan addresses the specific components to response and recovery for large-scale
food incidents.
Purpose
This branch plan provides scenario-specific supplemental information to the Food and
Agriculture Incident Annex (FAIA) base plan. Federal interagency partners will respond in a
lead role or in support to SLTT governments to save lives, protect private property and the
environment, and meet basic human needs when there is an accidental or intentional adulteration
of the U.S. food supply.
Scope
This branch plan applies to all federal responses to large-scale food incidents, regardless of
complexity, unless otherwise noted. The primary focus is on a large-scale incident where the
need for immediate federal and state assistance is obvious, resource pre-positioning is not
possible, and the exact nature of resource and asset requirements is unknown.
Facts, Planning Assumptions, and Critical Considerations
Facts
The following facts pertain to food incidents:
Lead Roles
LFAs for food
incidents
(e.g.,
USDA//FSIS,
HHS/FDA)
• The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) and the U.S. Department of Agriculture
(USDA) Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) have ongoing
regulatory requirements for inspection of facilities according to their own
programmatic responsibilities under their own authorities
• The lead federal agency (LFA) does not participate in the cleaning and
disinfection of a private firm’s facility during food adulteration incidents;
the LFA does monitor the process and procedures and indicates when
industry may resume normal operations
• Response operations will primarily use capabilities of the SLTT health
organizations, private healthcare facilities, and the food industry
USDA/FSIS
• Ensures the safety of meat, poultry, and processed egg products
HHS/FDA
• HHS/FDA has regulatory authority for all foods, which are not under the
regulatory authority of USDA/FSIS, including beverages, dairy, infant formula,
juices, produce, seafood, shell eggs, animal/pet food, etc.
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 28
• Situational Awareness: Full information about threats or causative agents may not be
immediately available due to the time for investigation and laboratory testing require to
identify the adulterant and for any delayed symptoms to present in exposed populations
• Economic: A food incident may result in intermittent shortages of the affected product
on the store shelves, but will not cause a long-term food shortage
• Public Information:
o The incident will garner media attention, and coordinated public messaging will be
required to communicate the safety of the U.S. food supply
o Public concern for exposure, similarity of initial symptoms to more common
illnesses, and the lack of definitive knowledge about exposure areas and times may
amplify the demand for medical and health resources
• Response: Medical needs for a large-scale food incident will overwhelm existing
healthcare capacity including staff, facilities, equipment, and medical countermeasures
• Recovery: A food incident may have cascading effects beyond the direct impacts to
industry, including economic losses to related industries, economic losses to surrounding
communities, trade restrictions/closures, and related public and behavioral health impacts
Planning Assumptions
The following are planning assumptions that are supplemental to those outlined in the Response
and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans (FIOPs) and base plan:
• Declarations: A food incident may not result in a major disaster Stafford Act declaration
but may require federal-to-federal support
Critical Considerations
Protecting Proprietary Information
Risk
• Disclosure and dissemination of private sector proprietary information
Management
• Special permissions and/or non-disclosure agreements between the public
and private sectors may be required to protect proprietary information and
allow for disclosure and dissemination on a need-to-know basis
Healthcare Services
Risk
• Healthcare services typically operate with a just-in-time inventory that may
impact patient care and availability of resources
Management
• Identifying the early onset of healthcare system becoming overtaxed in order
to deploy medical assistance to the impacted locations
Incomplete Information
Risk
• Decisions may be required with incomplete information on the exact agent
and the source of the adulterant
Management
• Determine courses of actions appropriate for the most relevant information
available
State Resources
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 29
Risk
• States may withhold resources in order to ensure that sufficient capability
exists to respond in their own jurisdictions.
Management
• Determine available resources within the impacted state and adjoining states
• Provide close coordination and communication with both the impacted and
adjoining state on possible mutual aid requirements
E x e c u t i o n
In response to a food incident of any size, scope, or complexity, response operations will place
immediate priority on mitigating the human and animal health impacts and identifying the
causative adulterant and the affected food product. Under normal response operations, each
agency will manage the response activities that pertain to each’s programmatic and regulatory
authority as outlined in Figure 4 of the FAIA base plan.
Throughout the response, operational coordination will follow the well-established response
plans for each agency with regulatory and programmatic authority for the incident. Interagency
support and coordination will occur through the pre-established coordination channels as
outlined in Figure 4. Each agency has national; regional or district; and state, local, tribal, and
territorial (SLTT) constructs that support the ongoing response efforts for a food incident.
Included in this coordination structure are coordination mechanisms for law enforcement
investigations, support from interagency partners, and all levels of SLTT government. These
coordination structures are well practiced and follow the routine response structures of each
agency. These follow the ongoing coordination mechanisms and response strategies that the LFA
previously established under each agency’s programmatic and regulatory authority for
emergency response.
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 30
Figure 4: Coordination structures for routine response to foodborne incidents and
outbreaks
Operational Phases
Operational phases for the response to and recovery from a large-scale food incident vary based
on the size, scope, and complexity of the incident. A food incident, whether intentional or
accidental adulteration, may not follow the standard operational phases and require a more
dynamic approach to understanding each phase of response and recovery efforts as seen in
Figure 5. For food incidents, Response, Recovery, and Prevention Mission activities are
interdependent and often concurrent. Decisions made and priorities set early in response will
have a cascading effect on the nature and speed of recovery and resolution of the incident.
Traditional operational phases for response and recovery follow more finite timelines, with
distinct activities that relate to each phase. Operational phases for food incidents overlap and
each phase is typically longer than standard response and recovery timelines given the nature of
disease etiology for foodborne outbreaks.
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 31
Figure 5: Normal operational phases for response and recovery (top). Operational phases
for food incidents (bottom)
Phase 1a (Normal Operations)
Phase 1a activities include the normal programmatic operations of the lead federal agencies
based on their ongoing authorities, statutory requirements, and mission. The USDA FSIS
performs routine inspections of facilities under their regulatory authority to ensure all practices
within processing plants and facilities meet regulatory requirements for providing safe and
wholesome foods to the U.S. food supply. FDA performs routine processing plant inspections
and works with industry on food safety requirements through multiple coordination structures,
including the Food and Agriculture Sector Coordinating Council. FDA and USDA serve as the
Co-Chairs of the Food and Agriculture Sector Government Coordinating Council. The sector is a
public-private partnership that combines expertise from several federal agencies as well as SLTT
officials (representing agriculture, public health, and veterinary services) and the private sector
(more than 100 trade associations and individual firms).
As outlined in the FDA Emergency Operations Plan, FDA may employ a number of activities
prior to the confirmation of an incident that are designed to minimize the threat of acts,
regardless of intent, against FDA-regulated products and protect consumers from public health
hazards. FDA leverages heightened and targeted preventive measures at various points in the
processing and distribution chains to protect the safety and security of regulated products and
protect consumers from harm. These activities are conducted in coordination and collaboration
with FDA organizational components, federal and SLTT partners, industry, academia, foreign
governments, and international organizations including, but not limited to:
• Implementing risk communications with government and industry partners
• Prioritizing examination of food commodities based on potential for contamination
• Identifying entities handling specific FDA-regulated consumer products
• Conducting targeted inspections and investigations and collecting samples
• Readying laboratory response and other scientific capabilities to analyze/test for chemical
and microbiological agents
• Requesting or requiring appropriate recall of food products that might cause a temporary
health problem or pose a slight threat of a serious nature
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 32
• Educating establishments on security measures to minimize the risk of intentional
adulteration or protect against the effects of disease
• Provide establishments information on suggested mitigation strategies to minimize the
risk of intentional adulteration
• Working as appropriate with federal and SLTT governments and international partners
• Issuing warnings, alerts, advisories, and other advice to consumers regarding food
product safety
o To ensure that all persons have equal access to the information distributed to
consumers, the information will be provided, as needed, in alternate formats for
persons with disabilities and with other access and functional needs, and in
languages other than English for persons with limited English proficiency
FDA uses targeted preventive measures in coordination with other intergovernmental partners to
provide a significant increase in coverage, awareness, and preparedness to respond to incidents
relating to FDA-regulated products. The overarching goal is to provide for more protected supply
and distribution chains and a national network that is better prepared to respond to an identified
threat or hazard.
FSIS is the public health agency in USDA responsible for ensuring that the nation’s commercial
supply of meat, poultry, and processed egg products is safe, wholesome, and correctly labeled
and packaged. Through its mission, FSIS collaborates with partners and stakeholders across
government, industry, and academia to implement an aggressive program to build a resilient U.S.
food infrastructure with the ability to prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to, and recover
from intentional adulteration of the food supply. Throughout normal operations, FSIS routinely
performs inspections and ensures that all products meet regulatory compliance. FSIS also works
collaboratively with a group of stakeholders to identify and share information about potential
vulnerabilities in the food supply chain. Programs within FSIS support preparedness for an
incident involving intentional adulteration of the food supply such that the agency can support
industry with protecting its business, products, and employees to further create resiliency within
the U.S. food supply.
Phase 1b and 1c (Elevated Threat and Credible Threat)
As adulterated food products reach stores and food preparation facilities, small pockets of illness
will begin to arise from those exposed to the adulterant through consumption of the product.
Medical and veterinary facilities and/or poison control centers will see an increase in illness,
while SLTT level public health officials begin to report clusters or similar illnesses across
multiple geographic locations. SLTT public health officials may reach out to the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) for support in performing epidemiological investigations
to identify the food product causing illness as well as the causative agent. States may also request
assistance from the LFA for public health response and any potential messaging related to the
spreading foodborne outbreak.
Upon determination of an incident, the LFA, for response, will perform preventive and protective
measures in order to mitigate the incident. For example, these may include:
• Increasing surveillance of adverse incidents and emerging public health concerns
regarding the incident
• Increasing surveillance of food products to ensure no further adulteration is occurring
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 33
• Providing initial public messaging regarding the potential for a foodborne incident
• Beginning to deploy/position personnel to perform investigations of facilities initially
implicated in the incident
Phase 2a (Immediate Response)
Upon identification and verification of a large-scale foodborne outbreak, the LFA will
implement initial response activities. Included in this phase are activities that seek to provide
accurate and credible information to affected individuals, healthcare providers, as well as any
applicable interagency partners. In addition, any indication of an intentional adulteration of the
food supply will result in immediate coordination with law enforcement to investigate the
potential criminal or terrorist origins of the adulterant, as outlined in Branch 4.
Throughout the ongoing outbreak, FDA or FSIS is actively engaged in investigations to
determine the potential adulterated food product. Laboratories will see an increase in clinical and
food samples for agent identification, clinical confirmation of disease, and investigation of the
causative food agent. CDC will continue ongoing epidemiological investigations to support the
identification of the causative agent. In the event that the associated clinical symptomology
exceeds the routine treatment at hospitals, medical, or veterinary facilities, SLTTs may request
the release of medical countermeasures from the Strategic National Stockpile to support patient
management.
Phase 2b (Deployment)
As the food incident progresses through the population, HHS will implement and deploy federal
response-related resources to include personnel, personal protective equipment, and medical
countermeasures to supplement and support SLTT health authorities and activities and protect
public health and safety. Throughout this phase, interagency coordination will continue to
maintain federal situational awareness and understanding of any additional federal assets that
may be required. In addition, FDA and/or FSIS will be working with industry to understand the
full scope of the incident and begin public messaging campaigns about the safety of the U.S.
food supply for the consumer. The focus of these efforts is to minimize both the public health
impacts as well as any economic impacts to the U.S. food supply.
Phase 2c (Sustained Response)
The incident will transition into sustained response activities. Upon identification of the
adulterated food item, the LFA with the appropriate regulatory authority for that product will
work with industry to establish a voluntary recall of the adulterated food product. The LFA and
industry will coordinate to release appropriate public messaging regarding the affected food and
the appropriate courses of action for disposal.
Phase 3 (Recovery)
Recovery from a food incident includes short- and long-term actions to ensure and restore the
safety and availability of food products within the U.S. food supply and to ensure that the
consumer is protected from the food incident and public confidence in the safety of the food
supply remains high after food incident. Included among these recovery activities, the LFA may
be responsible for the following:
• Continue inspections or investigations of regulated facilities to collect and analyze
samples from implicated products.
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 34
• Oversee product destruction or product reconditioning as appropriate to the incident.
• Oversee the sanitization of the food production facility that may have processed or was
implicated in the adulterated food product.
• Determine impacts to and provide appropriate information for recovery support to any
facilities that manufacture/process, pack, or hold food for human or animal consumption
during the incident.
• Provide clear and consistent information to assist industry in understanding and
complying with regulations in the post-incident environment.
Depending on the size, scope, and complexity of the incident and the amount of recovery support
required for the incident, the LFA may designate a Federal Disaster Recovery Coordinator for
the coordination of recovery operations with the national and SLTT entities. The standard
operational coordination structure would remain the same adding in operational coordination of
recovery activities as outlined in Figure 6.
Figure 6: Normal operational coordination for food incident response remains the same,
but incorporates the coordination of recovery efforts through the addition of the FDA
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 35
Branch 2: Federal Response to and Recovery
from Animal Agriculture Incidents
S i t u a t i o n
This branch plan addresses the unique nature of large-scale animal agriculture incidents.
Purpose
This branch plan provides supplemental information to the Food and Agriculture Incident Annex
(FAIA) base plan. Federal interagency partners can respond in a lead role or in support to SLTT
governments to save lives, protect property and the environment, and meet basic human needs
when there is a natural, unintentional, or intentional introduction of an animal agriculture
disease-causing agent among the U.S. livestock and poultry populations.
Scope
This branch plan applies to all federal responses to large-scale animal agriculture incidents. The
focus is on an incident where the need for immediate federal and state assistance is obvious,
resource pre-positioning is not possible, and the exact nature of resource and asset requirements
is unknown.
Facts, Assumptions, and Critical Considerations
Facts
The following facts pertain to large-scale animal agriculture incidents:
• The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service
(APHIS), Veterinary Services (VS) has robust Foreign Animal Disease (FAD) Preparedness
and Response plans (PRePs) including the disease-specific response plans for Foot and
Mouth Disease, Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza, Classical Swine Fever, and Newcastle
Disease, in addition to well-developed internal plans, policies, and procedures for response
operations under its authorities and capabilities.
• In a novel or emerging disease outbreak, information about the agent and associated risk will
require additional research to identify the pathogen and understand pathogenicity.
• In a known FAD outbreak, vaccine matching and other strain characterization can take days
to complete.
• FAD is not limited to livestock and poultry animals and can affect other susceptible animals
on farms, pets, wildlife, and zoo animals, which would create challenges with response.
• Economic:
o In consultation with the U.S. Department of State and our U.S. Missions abroad,
export markets may close for affected animal and animal products.
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 36
Planning Assumptions:
The following planning assumptions are supplemental to those outlined in the Response and
Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans (FIOPs) and base plan:
• Declarations:
o An animal incident may likely result in an Extraordinary Emergency Declaration.
o An animal incident may not result in a major disaster Stafford Act declaration but
may require federal-to-federal support.
• Economic: Job losses may endure for months as farms recover and repopulate the
affected herds.
• Containment:
o Individuals may hide animals or move them outside of a quarantine zone to avoid
depopulation.
o Vehicles and persons might also serve as fomites for distributing pathogen(s).
• International: Due to an outbreak, other countries may implement bans and trade
restrictions on U.S. animals and animal products affected, until the disease is eradicated.
• Responder Capability:
o Increased biological safety training may be needed to ensure that all workers,
including those on farms, are trained to utilize appropriate personal protective
equipment and clean and disinfect responder equipment prior to entry onto or exiting
from quarantined premises to prevent disease spread as a result of response efforts.
o There is a significant need for large-scale transport and disposal of large quantities of
infected biomass.
o The need for veterinarians, animal health technicians, and animal handlers may far
exceed existing numbers of qualified individuals, and varying state licensure
requirements will create additional challenges for outbreak response.
o Composting subject matter experts and other disposal personnel may be in very short
supply.
o Behavioral health support may be required for the affected farmers, general
population, and responders supporting depopulation and disposal efforts.
• Recovery:
o Repopulation of all affected livestock may take months,and some farms might be
unable to return to normal operation after the outbreak.
o Cascading effects will arise, and specific outbreak management plans may be needed
if other animal industry groups such as zoos or other exhibitors are impacted by the
outbreak.
Critical Considerations
The following are critical considerations that are supplemental to those outlined in the Response
and Recovery FIOPs:
SLTT Resources
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 37
Risk
• SLTTs may withhold resources in order to ensure that sufficient capability
exists to respond in their own jurisdictions.
Management
• Determine available resources available within the impacted SLTT and
adjoining SLTTs.
• Provide close coordination and communication with both the impacted and
adjoining state on possible mutual aid requirements.
Waste Management and HAZMAT Transport
Risk
• Limited national capacity for large-scale contaminated and/or hazardous
materials transport, storage, and disposal exist.
• Waste management for larger scale incidents may require regional and
national approaches and facilities to supplement SLTT expertise and
capacity.
• Depending on the threat to public health, movement of infected biomass
disposal may require additional permitting and be subject to regulation.
• SLTTs refuse the transportation of contaminated biomass across
jurisdictional lines creating coordination challenges for final disposal.
Management
• Determine public/private sector coordination requirements within the
impacted zones.
Quarantines
Risk
• Quarantines may require road closures and detours, which may impact
federal interagency and private sector response and recovery operations.
Management
• Determine effective measures, movement controls, and public messaging
guidance for SLTT jurisdictions that retain the lead role for designating
population protection measures.
Physical Site Security
Risk
• Increased physical security may be required to protect the premises and
responders from individuals and groups who wish to disrupt response
operations.
Management
• Determine the applicability for the use of ESF #13
Animal Movement and Wildlife Interface
Risk
• Animal movement during an outbreak may increase disease spread due to the
potential for animals to be asymptomatic but infected.
• If animal agriculture disease spreads into state, federal, and tribal wildlife,
resource management agencies should be consulted immediately to
determine acceptable disease response and control options.
Management
• Determine proper movement protocols to limit or eliminate the risk
associated with animal movement.
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 38
E x e c u t i o n
In response to an animal agriculture incident of any size, scope, or severity, response operations
will place immediate priority on mitigating the animal health impacts while minimizing the
spread of disease or identifying the cause of the incident. USDA APHIS Veterinary Services
(VS) is the Lead Federal Agency (LFA) for responding to all significant incidents that affect the
U.S. livestock and poultry populations, including the introduction of a FAD. Under normal
response operations to an incident affecting the livestock and poultry populations, USDA
APHIS, SLTT, and private sector partners should initiate standard response strategies outlined in
the FAD PRePs that were previously established under the agency’s regulatory and
programmatic authority. USDA APHIS will follow the goals outlined in the FAD PReP manuals
to contain, control, and eradicate the disease in U.S. livestock and poultry populations, including
but not limited to the following:
• public communication and messaging,
• rapid appraisal and indemnity processing for producers, as applicable,
• imposition of effective quarantine measures and movement controls,
• rapid diagnosis and disease reporting,
• epidemiological investigation and tracing,
• increased surveillance,
• continuity of business measures for non-infected premises based on the secure food or
supply plans,
• biosecurity measures,
• mass depopulation, emergency vaccines and euthanasia as the response strategy indicates,
• effective and appropriate disposal measures
Interagency support and coordination will occur through the pre-established coordination
channels as outlined in Figure 7.
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 39
Figure 7: Coordination structures for response to animal agriculture incidents and outbreaks
USDA APHIS VS has national; regional or district; and state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT)
constructs that support the ongoing response efforts for an animal agriculture incident. Included
in this coordination structure are coordination mechanisms for law enforcement investigations,
industry partners, support from interagency partners, and all levels of SLTT government. This
coordination structure outlines the ongoing coordination mechanisms and response strategies that
USDA previously established under the programmatic and regulatory authority for emergency
response.
In the event an LFA is designated by the President in concert with an Emergency Declaration
6
under the Stafford Act, the Joint Field Office (JFO) and its associated functions should remain
separate from any non-Stafford Act support provided by the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) to the LFA. If a Unified Coordination Group (UCG) is established by the LFA,
early separation of Stafford Act emergency management disaster roles and non-Stafford Act
UCG activities is essential to maintain compliance with statutory and financial requirements.
What is critical to these parallel operations is the coordination of situational awareness
information as well as public information and messaging efforts between their respective Joint
Information Center functions to ensure the unity of effort and provide a singular messaging
strategy for the incident.
6
Emergency Declaration: Can be declared for any occasion or instance when the President determines federal
assistance is needed. Emergency Declarations supplement SLTT efforts in providing emergency services such
as the protection of lives, property, public health and safety, or to lessen or avert the threat of a catastrophe in
any part of the United States. The total amount of assistance provided for a single emergency may not exceed
$5 million. If this amount is exceeded, the President shall report to Congress.
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 40
Operational Phases
The response to and recovery from a large-scale animal agriculture incident, whether an
intentional or accidental introduction of a FAD, does not follow the standard Response FIOP
operational phases and requires a more dynamic approach to understanding each phase.
Response and recovery is a more time-consuming effort and operational phases may overlap or
take longer to accomplish tasks and to transition from one phase to the next, as seen in Figure 8.
For animal agriculture incidents: Response, Recovery, and Prevention Mission activities are
interdependent and often concurrent. Decisions made and priorities set early in response will
have a cascading effect on the nature and speed of recovery and resolution of the incident.
Figure 8: Traditional operational phases for response and recovery (top). Operational
phases for animal agriculture incidents (bottom)
Phase 1a (Normal Operations)
Phase 1a activities include the normal programmatic operations of USDA APHIS VS that focus
on carrying out its ongoing mission to support the health of the U.S. livestock and poultry
populations. USDA APHIS VS works with external stakeholders and industry partners to
promote public preparedness messaging, educational opportunities, general response awareness,
and training to recognize the signs and dangers associated with threats to the U.S. livestock and
poultry populations, especially those of FADs. Throughout U.S. livestock and poultry
populations, state or federal veterinarians visit farms to investigate reportable disease issues,
impose quarantines, or for other purposes. In addition, livestock animals are issued Certificates
of Veterinary Inspection from accredited private veterinarians to validate the health of the animal
prior to movement for sale, slaughter, etc.
Phase 1b and 1c (Elevated and Credible Threat)
Upon identification of a sick animal on a farm, farm management isolates the animal and
requests evaluation from the private veterinarian to diagnose the illness. In the presence of
clinical signs resembling a FAD, a FAD diagnostician in consultation with a state or federal
veterinarian will examine the animal and take samples for appropriate diagnostic testing to a
National Animal Health Laboratory Network (NAHLN) laboratory capable of performing the
initial to a National Animal Health Laboratory Network (NAHLN) laboratory capable of
performing the initial and concurrent testing on the sample (Figure 8) in addition to sending to
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 41
National Veterinary Services Laboratories (NVSL) for validating initial NAHLN results and to
initiate confirmatory diagnostics and pathogen typing.
Figure 9: National Animal Health Laboratory Network
Phase 2a (Immediate Response)
After confirmation of an FAD in the U.S.,
USDA APHIS VS will immediately activate
the FAD PReP response protocols for that
particular disease outlined in the disease
specific FAD PReP manual. In general, initial
actions will include:
• Establish quarantine, hold orders, movement restrictions, and standstill notices for
relevant zones and regions.
• Initiate appraisal process for animals affected by the disease.
• Begin depopulation activities.
• Notify SLTT, Extension, industry, and trading partners and the media of confirmed
positive disease.
• Implement increased biosecurity measures to minimize the spread of disease
• Initiate epidemiological investigations and tracing activities.
• Initiate management organizational structures and processes.
• Begin data collection and information management in the APHIS Emergency
Management Response System (EMRS).
The National Animal Health Laboratory
Network (NAHLN) forms part of a
nationwide strategy to coordinate the
work of organizations providing animal
disease surveillance and testing.
services.
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 42
Phase 2b (Deployment)
Upon initial detection and implementation of quarantine and movement controls, USDA APHIS
VS will move forward with deployment and will focus on containment of the disease. Ongoing
activities include:
• Evaluate quarantine and movement controls to ensure that they are appropriate.
• Continue depopulation and disposal activities for all animals that are presumed positive
for FAD.
• Ensure that the appraisal and compensation process moves forward for indemnity for
eligible livestock and poultry affected by the disease.
• Proceed with surveillance and tracing activities to rapidly identify any potential spread of
the disease or new outbreaks.
• Execute timely and accurate data entry in EMRS.
• Initiate a public awareness messaging and communication campaign on the status of the
outbreak.
• Implement and enforce increased biosecurity measures.
• Initiate continuity of business plans for the affected industry.
• Continue confirmatory diagnostics at NAHLN laboratories and NVSL.
• Determine if a vaccine match is available to use and decide when to order.
• Deploy Incident Management Teams to the field and prepare SLTT entities for the arrival
of the teams.
• Establish incident command and incident coordination groups, as appropriate.
• Deploy appropriate assets from the National Veterinary Stockpile (NVS) as requested by
SLTT to support incident response.
• Alert and mobilize other federal agencies about the potential request(s) for assistance.
Phase 2c (Sustained Response)
As the disease continues through the impacted species, USDA APHIS VS will continue to
manage the incident, focusing on minimizing disease spread and eradicating the disease to
quickly return to normal business operations. USDA APHIS VS will continue to support the
incident with ongoing activities including:
• Augment incident command and incident coordination groups, as needed.
• Ensure compensation process proceeds efficiently.
• Continue all ongoing depopulation and disposal activities.
• Continue timeline and accurate data entry into EMRS.
• Continue ongoing surveillance and tracing actions.
• Continue implementation and enforcement of biosecurity measures.
• Continue public awareness campaign.
• Initiate permitting and other continuity of business actions to minimize the impacts of the
disease to industry.
• Deploy identified personnel from other federal agencies to a reception, staging, onward
movement, and integration (RSOI) point for just in time training and deployment to the
incident location(s).
Throughout the sustained response, USDA APHIS VS will continue to deploy NVS assets and
make any policy determinations to support incident response. Among these decisions, USDA
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 43
may alter the approach to the usage of veterinary countermeasures and depopulation/euthanasia
7
as a means to manage the impacts of the ongoing incident. The Secretary of Agriculture will
make the determination based on the ongoing situational assessment of the incident under his or
her authority. This decision will be incident-specific and based on multiple factors including, but
not limited to the extent of the outbreak, the affected animal populations, location of the
outbreak, and ability to contain or eradicate the disease quickly and effectively.
Phase 3 (Recovery)
Recovery operations for an animal agriculture
incident will occur simultaneously with response
operations. Recovery is achieved when the disease
has been eradicated using strategies that seek to
stabilize animal agriculture, the food supply, and the
economy, and protect public health, animal health, and the environment. Throughout response
operations, USDA APHIS VS works with SLTT and industry to minimize the impacts from the
disease through business continuity plans highlighted by the secure food supply plans, a series of
industry specific plans that outlines the continuity of business plans for the management of non-
infected premises and non-contaminated animal products in the event of a FAD outbreak. These
plans provide science- and risk-based approaches and systems as a critical activity in FAD
response to support agriculture and food industries, to maintain business operations during
incident response, and to support the quick return to normal business operations. The
overarching goals of the plan seek to avoid interruptions in animal and animal product movement
to commercial processing from premises with no evidence of an FAD, and to provide a
continuous supply of wholesome foods to consumers and maintain business continuity for
producers, transporters, and food processors through response planning.
Depending on the size, scope, and complexity of the incident and the amount of recovery support
required for the incident, USDA might designate a Federal Disaster Recovery Coordinator for
the coordination of recovery operations with the national and SLTT entities. The standard
operational coordination structure would remain the same adding in operational coordination of
recovery activities as outlined in Figure 10.
7
It is important to understand that USDA APHIS recognizes a difference between euthanasia and depopulation.
Euthanasia involves transitioning an animal to death as painlessly and stress-free as possible. Mass Depopulation is
a method by which large numbers of animals must be destroyed quickly and efficiently with as much consideration
given to the welfare of the animals as practicable.
Current secure food supply plans
written or in development for
turkey, dairy, egg, pork, and
beef.
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 44
Figure 10: Normal operational coordination for animal agriculture incident response
remains the same, but incorporates the coordination of recovery efforts through the
addition of a FDRC
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 45
Branch 3: Federal Response to and
Recovery from a Plant Agriculture incident
S i t u a t i o n
This branch plan addresses the unique nature of a large-scale plant agriculture incident.
Purpose
This branch plan provides supplemental information to the Food and Agriculture Incident Annex
base annex. Federal interagency partners can respond in a lead role or in support to SLTT
governments to save lives, protect property and the environment, and meet basic human needs
when there is a natural or intentional introduction (non-terrorism) of a plant pest or pathogen
within the U.S. crop and plant industries.
Scope
This branch plan applies to all federal responses to large-scale plant agriculture incidents,
regardless of scope and complexity, unless otherwise noted. The focus is on an incident where
the need for immediate federal and state assistance is obvious, resource pre-positioning is not
possible, and the exact nature of resource and asset requirements is unknown.
Facts, Assumptions, and Critical Considerations
Facts
The following are facts that pertain to large-scale plant agriculture incidents:
• The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service
(APHIS), Plant Protection and Quarantine (PPQ) maintains the National Plant Health
Emergency Management Framework as well as well-developed internal plans, policies, and
procedures for response operations under its own authorities and capabilities.
• Full information about scope of infestation will not be immediately available and will take
days for identification or weeks for delimitation surveys to be completed depending on the
identified pest.
• Neighboring areas that have not been designated as infected must also be surveyed for the
presence of the pest, requiring even more resources.
Planning Assumptions
The following are planning assumptions that are supplemental to those outlined in the Response
and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans (FIOPs), and base plan:
• Declarations: A plant incident will not result in a major disaster Stafford Act Declaration
but may require federal-to-federal support.
• Response Capabilities:
o Quarantines require agricultural inspections at state and/or tribal boundaries
o Movement of host materials may be refused
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 46
o USDA’s resources may become overwhelmed within 60-90 days, especially in an
agro-terrorism incident or a concurrent agriculture incident.
o Plant incidents may not cause long-term national commodity shortages.
o Export markets for affected commodities may close based on U.S. foreign policy
considerations with the importing country, conditions set within pre-established trade
negotiation agreements, and the import country’s plant, pest, and pathogen profiles.
o The size, scope, and complexity of a plant incident, may overwhelm existing
capabilities and resources, causing significant strain on the whole community.
Critical Considerations
The following critical considerations are supplemental to those outlined in the Response and
Recovery FIOPs:
Pest Surveillance
Risk
• Due to the nature of plant pest infestations, limitations exist in the ability to
conduct surveillance.
• Plant pests may move quickly to other states beyond the initial site of the
incident requiring additional resources for response on a national scale.
Management
• State, local, and private sector resources will be leveraged to assist USDA
APHIS PPQ with pest surveillance given the 3-6 month minimum that is
required for verification of pest-free status.
Criminal Incidents
Risk
• Identification may be delayed, or become more complex in the event of law
enforcement investigations and intelligence operations.
• If a large-scale plant incident is treated as intentional, such as a suspected or
actual act of terrorism, espionage, or other federal crime, or if the cause of a
biological incident is undetermined, the response requires integration of
consequence management, critical infrastructure protection, and law
enforcement/counterterrorism operations.
• A suspected or actual intentional large-scale plant incident could take many
forms.
Management
• Mission area planning should account for a full range of possible incident
scenarios.
• Terrorist threat-related information collected domestically, including
suspicious activity reporting involving suspected federal crimes of terrorism,
may be shared comprehensively and immediately with the FBI Joint
Terrorism Task Forces so that threats can be investigated and resolved as
soon as possible.
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 47
Physical Site Security
Risk
• There will be an immediate need to inform the public of the situation and
what protective actions to take.
Management
• Determine the requirement for establishment of a JIC to ensure one message
from the USG.
E x e c u t i o n
In response to a plant agriculture incident of any size, scope, or complexity, response operations
will place immediate priority on mitigating the spread of the plant pest or pathogen while trying
to determine the cause or source of the pest or pathogen. USDA APHIS PPQ is the Lead Federal
Agency (LFA) for responding to all significant incidents that affect plants in the United States,
including exotic plant pests and pathogens. Under normal response operations to a plant pest or
pathogen, USDA APHIS PPQ will follow the protocols and guidance outlined in the National
Plant Health Emergency Management Framework previously established under the agency’s
regulatory authorities. Interagency support and coordination will occur through the pre-
established coordination channels as outlined in Figure 11. USDA APHIS PPQ has national,
regional or district, and state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) constructs that support the
ongoing response efforts for a plant agriculture incident. Included in this coordination structure
are coordination mechanisms for law enforcement investigations, industry partners, support from
interagency partners, and all levels of SLTT government. This coordination structure outlines the
ongoing coordination mechanisms and response strategies that USDA previously established
under the programmatic and regulatory authority for emergency response.
In the event an LFA is designated by the President in concert with an Emergency Declaration
8
under the Stafford Act,
the Joint Field Office (JFO) and its associated functions should remain separate from any non-Stafford Act support
provided by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to the LFA. If a Unified Coordination Group (UCG) is
established by the LFA, early separation of Stafford Act emergency management disaster roles and non-Stafford Act
UCG activities is essential to maintain compliance with statutory and financial requirements. Critical to these parallel
operations is the coordination of situational awareness information, as well as public information and messaging
efforts between their respective Joint Information Center (JIC) functions to ensure the unity of effort and provide a
singular messaging strategy for the incident.
8
Emergency Declaration: Can be declared for any occasion or instance when the President determines federal
assistance is needed. Emergency Declarations supplement SLTT efforts in providing emergency services, such
as the protection of lives, property, public health and safety, or to lessen or avert the threat of a catastrophe in
any part of the United States. The total amount of assistance provided for a single emergency may not exceed
$5 million. If this amount is exceeded, the President shall report to Congress.
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 48
Figure 11: Coordination structures for response to plant agriculture incidents
Operational Phases
The timing of the operational phases identified in the Response and Recovery FIOPs are seen in
Figure 12. For plant agriculture incidents: Response, Recovery, and, if applicable, Prevention
Mission activities are interdependent and concurrent. Decisions made and priorities set early in
response will have a cascading effect on the resolution of the incident and the nature and speed
of recovery. Operational phases for plant agriculture incidents overlap and each phase is
typically longer than standard response and recovery timelines given the nature of the incident.
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 49
Figure 12: Normal operational phases for response and recovery (top). Operational phases
during plant agriculture incidents (bottom)
Phase 1a (Normal Operations)
USDA APHIS PPQ works to safeguard agriculture resources and natural resources to ensure an
abundant, high quality, and varied food supply, and for safeguard plant health in the U.S. prior to
an incident, USDA APHIS PPQ, in coordination with federal and SLTT departments and
agencies and industry, works to prepare, build, and sustain operational capacity and capabilities
to support a strategy for mitigating threats to plant health threats and pest introductions
including:
• Early detection capabilities
• Timely, accurate, and confirmed diagnostics
• Effective containment, mitigation, and control strategies
USDA APHIS PPQ performs routine surveillance operations to investigate for pests and
pathogens that pose a threat to the United States both within and at the borders. USDA APHIS
PPQ uses multiple early warning systems to evaluate and prepare for plant pest and pathogen
threats. These warning systems provide data that support the development of response strategies
including:
• Identification and diagnostic services
• PPQ-New Pest Advisory Group assessments and recommendations
• New Pest Response Guidelines
• Formation of Incident Management Teams
• Incident Command System training, including emergency response exercises
Phase 1b and 1c (Elevated and Credible Threat)
Pests and pathogens are detected in the United States through various means from PPQ-targeted
surveys, SLTT Cooperative Agriculture Pest Surveys, or by growers and private individuals.
Preliminary diagnosis may occur through PPQ identifiers, taxonomists, SLTT diagnosticians,
and the National Plant Diagnostic Network, unless it is an unknown plant pest and then PPQ’s
National Identification Service must provide the final diagnosis. As a pattern is identified that
does not follow the normal spread or location of the plant pest or pathogen, USDA APHIS PPQ
will initiate outreach and communication protocols with SLTT, potentially impacted industries,
and trading partners. The communication includes the biological and ecological parameters of
the pest and its regulatory significance, economic importance, potential impact on industries,
trade implications, affected states, and other pertinent information.
Phase 2a (Immediate Response)
At the onset of response operations, USDA APHIS PPQ initiates rapid detection and delimiting
surveys to facilitate the rapid containment, control, and eradication of the pest or pathogen.
USDA APHIS PPQ staff, under the oversight of the state plant health director, conducts survey
activities to assist in delimiting the distribution of the pest or pathogen. In the event of the
introduction of an exotic pest or pathogen, PPQ’s National Identification Service will provide the
necessary information to provide the foundations for quarantine action decisions. After
understanding the full scope of the pest or pathogen, USDA APHIS PPQ will implement
regulatory measures, quarantines, and other response strategies to minimize the spread and
support efforts to eradicate or eliminate the pest or pathogen.
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 50
Phase 2b (Deployment)
Upon the identification of a large-scale plant incident or plant health emergency, USDA APHIS
PPQ and collaborators will activate, assemble, and transport the resources, both equipment and
personnel, necessary for successful emergency response.
Phase 2c (Sustained Response)
USDA APHIS PPQ will continue response operations in coordination with federal and SLTT
departments and agencies, academia, industry, and related stakeholders to minimize the spread of
the plant pest or pathogen and establish regulatory and other control measures to contain or
eradicate the pest or pathogen.
Phase 3 (Recovery)
Recovery operations are ongoing through response operations. USDA APHIS PPQ works with
federal and SLTT departments and agencies, universities, and the private sector to develop and
implement systems designed to provide long-term stability and protection from the pest or
pathogen that caused the incident. The recovery activities include:
• Long-term Protection Planning: Long-term plans designed to prevent further domestic
plant health emergencies from occurring through the use of eradication, pest mitigation,
and regulatory strategies.
• Demobilization: The process and procedures to ensure orderly, safe, and efficient return
of an incident resource to its original location and status, including the debriefing of
personnel and return and inventorying of equipment and materials.
• National Plant Disease Recovery Systems: System to ensure tools, infrastructure,
communication networks, and capacity required for mitigating the impact of plant pests
or pathogens are available to allow for a reasonable level of crop production.
• Science-based methods and technology: Scientific assessments of methods and
technologies that support recovery strategies to ensure that tools and methods are
developed to achieve pest and pathogen mitigation goals.
• Outreach: Providing key stakeholders and interested parties as well as federal and SLTT
partners with vital information on the proposals, overall progress, and available public
and industry meetings to support recovery strategies.
Depending on the size, scope, and complexity of the incident and the amount of recovery support
required for the incident, USDA might designate a Federal Disaster Recovery Coordinator for
the coordination of recovery operations with the national and SLTT entities. The standard
operational coordination structure would remain the same adding in operational coordination of
recovery activities as outlined in Figure 13.
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 51
Figure 13: Normal operational coordination for plant agriculture incident response
remains the same, but incorporates the coordination of recovery efforts through the
addition of a Federal Disaster Response Coordinator
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 52
Branch 4: Intentional Food and Agriculture
Incident
This branch plan addresses the unique nature of the threat of or the intentional use of chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) agents and other hazardous contaminants against
the U.S. food and agriculture sector. For the purposes of this document, these various materials
are hereinafter referred to as “threat agents.”
S i t u a t i o n
Due to current world conditions, is critical to recognize the food and agriculture infrastructure as
a national security resource no less important than other defense and security capabilities. The
complex structure and dispersed nature of all phases of production make it a potential target for
intentional disruption by adversaries with various motivations and methods of disruption,
deliberate contamination, introduction of pathogens, or espionage.
The developing technical capability and motivations of domestic and international threat actors,
the threat of economic espionage and technology theft, advances in synthetic biology, and the
accessibility to a multitude of existing or emerging CBRN threat agents, increases the risks for
their misuse for nefarious purposes. Potential targets include: agricultural commodity production
infrastructure, food processing and the credibility of food safety and security, as well as
agricultural biotechnology/genomic research and development capability.
To prevent and detect intentional incidents, it is essential to continuously develop the tools to
recognize threats, threat actors, and potential targets and to perform effective joint responses.
When evaluating the credibility of whether suspicious, unusual, or unexplained food and
agriculture incidents are intentional acts we must consider:
• what adversary would benefit from deliberate attacks
• what is the motivation, goal or desired effect, and the value gained
• what methods are available and feasible
Potential perpetrators include multiple categories of groups or individuals with varying
capabilities, available technical means, and motivations:
• Non-state sponsored terrorists (radicalized political / religious / nationalist groups)
• Criminal Elements / Cartels
• State Sponsored CBRN warfare or espionage programs by foreign adversary
governments
• State sponsored terrorist operations
• International corporate competitors
• Domestic
o Terrorists (militant animal-environmental rights groups / anarchist and anti-
government extremist groups)
o Commercial or corporate competitors
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 53
o Home Grown Violent Extremists (HVE) (self-radicalized U.S. residents recruited or
directed by foreign entities)
o Lone offenders with individual motivations
• “Insider Threats” or employees that exploit their position, credentials, trust, or
employment to gain access to carry out acts of terrorism or espionage. Their employment
allows special access which can bypass security protocols.
The requirements for acts of terrorism or espionage may generate recognizable triggers of
suspicious behaviors and actions: 1- Perpetrator (with sufficient expertise, capability,
motivation), 2- Access and ability to acquire CBRN threat agents, 3- Agricultural Target
(livestock, crops, biotech, laboratories, markets, food processing, transportation, etc.), 4-
Operational Capability (planning activities, training, logistics, rehearsals, personnel), 5- Access
to the Target, 6- and Effective Means of Dissemination.
The first indication of an intentional incident may be the initial reports of suspicious or unusual
syndromic surveillance detections and investigations of high consequence human, animal, or
plant disease incidents. The ability of responders to identify and accurately report initial
suspicious activity or an incident (e.g., clinical signs, necropsy findings, epidemiological
investigations, and interviews) will be key to timely prevention or investigation operations (e.g.,
official state/USDA Foreign Animal Disease/Exotic Plant Disease Investigations or FBI/law
enforcement investigations/intelligence operations).
Evidence of terrorism in an agricultural environment, is inherently fragile and may be difficult to
recognize and detect. The window of opportunity to identify and report threats, suspicious
activities, or unusual disease events; initiate investigations, and prevent or disrupt ongoing
terrorist and/or criminal operations is limited.
The food and agriculture sector provides multiple, disparate vulnerabilities and points of access
for the intentional introduction of threat agents. To facilitate threat risk analysis and incident
detection, investigation, and joint response operations, agriculture production is classified into
“Pre-Harvest” and “Post-Harvest” phases of production.
This differentiation is pertinent for concurrent, multi-agency criminal and epidemiological
investigations between the FBI, other federal law enforcement agencies (e.g., FDA Office of
Criminal Investigation [OCI] and USDA Office of Inspector General [OIG]), and the lead federal
agencies (LFAs) responsible for biosurveillance, epidemiological investigations, and response
operations for food and agriculture incidents (e.g., HHS, FDA, USDA FSIS, USDA APHIS).
These federal interagency partners can respond as the lead or in support to other government
agencies with the common mission to prevent, detect, and respond to the threat of or an
intentional incident.
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 54
Pre-Harvest Agriculture Phase:
The intentional use of high consequence CBRN agents or other hazardous contaminants against
pre-harvest agriculture targets (field level production of livestock, and crops) up to the point of
delivery for processing into food. The intended effect is to disrupt U.S. agriculture production,
the national economy, and to undermine the trust and credibility of the availability and safety of
U.S. food and agriculture products.
Biological Threat
The most credible CBRN threat to pre-harvest agriculture is the use of high consequence
biological agents that specifically target production animals and crops with diseases, pests,
or toxins that may have minimal or no direct effect on human health.
Consequences: Highly contagious
biological agents (unlike chemical or R/N
agents) may spread exponentially beyond
the initial point-source of dissemination as
a result of variable disease characteristics,
environmental factors, and
production/marketing activities.
Accidental, Naturally Occurring or
Intentional: The introduction of foreign,
emerging, or zoonotic animal diseases; exotic
plant diseases or pests; and contaminants can
occur by natural incursion, accidental
introduction, or as an intentional criminal or
terrorist act. Due to current world threats,
LFAs must not rule out intentional
introductions when developing
epidemiological investigation courses of
action for unusual or suspicious disease
events.
Chemical and Radiological/Nuclear Threat
The threat or use of agricultural, industrial, or weapons grade chemicals and
radiological/nuclear agents is feasible and includes exposure and contamination of
livestock and crops as well as secondary environmental contamination of soil, water,
pasture, equipment, and feed materials.
Consequences: Multiple incidents or a
single widespread event could have short-
or long- term effects and deny the use of
contaminated crop and pasture land.
Although potentially catastrophic, the
threat and effects of an intentional
radiological dispersal device or deliberate
release from a nuclear facility may be
limited by the accessibility of R/N
components, required technical capability,
and patterns of release and dispersion.
Vulnerability / Exposure: The direct
effects of chemical or R/N agents to
exposed animals and plants may vary from
acute mortality to minimal or undetectable
clinical signs and be limited to the exposure
of an individual herd, crop production unit,
or premises within a defined geographical
area. Contamination in asymptomatic
animals or crops without apparent physical
damage may only be detected by diagnostic
laboratory screening techniques.
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 55
The FBI, other federal law enforcement agencies, and the Intelligence Community consider the
use of all CBRN agents and hazardous contaminants as a spectrum of potential tools and
methods available to state or non-state adversaries when performing threat modeling and incident
credibility evaluations.
Post-Harvest Production:
The intentional contamination of post-harvest food products with various threat agents is a
recognized threat that specifically targets public health and the human or animal population
consuming the affected products.
Post-Harvest Threat
Vulnerability: Contamination can occur
throughout the phases of processing,
storage, transportation, wholesale or
retail distribution, and preparation with a
multitude of points of access prior to
consumption.
• The introduction of CBRN agents
into the phases of food processing can
have potentially catastrophic effects
on the human or animal population
consuming contaminated food
products, with both acute and chronic
health effects.
• As with threats to pre-harvest
production, the potential use of R/N
agents may be more limited due to
technical requirements and
availability of materials.
• Biological contamination of food
products is a constant risk to the
production and delivery of safe and
wholesome food regardless of means
of introduction or sources. The
deliberate introduction of pathogenic
bacteria, viruses, or toxins obtained
from natural, laboratory, or
clandestine sources would have
severe public health consequences
and would be difficult to detect or
prevent; especially if the perpetrator
is an “insider threat” with legitimate
access to processing systems.
Consequences: The desired effects are to
generate high human casualty rates (e.g.,
illness, debilitation, and death) primarily
through the consumption of food products
intentionally contaminated with human or
zoonotic biological agents, other CBRN
agents (e.g., agricultural-industrial-military
chemicals, toxins, and R/N materials),
various available hazardous contaminants
(e.g., unregulated toxic
materials/compounds; physical debris such as
metal, glass, or wire; or other
organic/inorganic particles), and other
materials that create a possible health risk or
otherwise make products unfit for human
consumption.
• Threatened or actual acts of terrorism
potentially have severe consequences to
agriculture production, domestic
agricultural markets, international export
markets, the economic security of the
greater agriculture community, the
perception of food safety and food
security, and the economic stability and
national security of the United States.
• Consequences of a terrorist event
would include unanticipated security
requirements, multiagency joint
investigations, and simultaneous disease
response and control operations from
multiple lead agencies.
• The degradation of the perceived
security of the food supply and the
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 56
response efforts would further tax the
credibility and capabilities of the LFAs.
Law Enforcement Interaction with Responding Agencies
While the LFAs for public, animal, and plant health (HHS, FDA, USDA) are performing time-
sensitive epidemiological investigations and response operations, the LFAs for law enforcement
investigations (DOJ/FBI, FDA OCI, and USDA OIG) will be tasked to perform concurrent, joint
criminal/terrorism investigations and response operations.
These concurrent operations will likely be performed at the same locations potentially
contaminated with hazardous threat agents, involve interviewing the same witnesses, victims, or
other personnel, as well as collecting diagnostic biological and environmental epidemiological
samples and physical evidence for diagnostic laboratory or forensic examination.
Establishing and initiating joint public, animal, plant health, and law enforcement investigation
protocols is critical for the early recognition and reporting of initial indicators/triggers of
suspected or confirmed acts of terrorism and the subsequent coordinated prevention, response,
and investigative operations.
Suspicious or unexplained food and agriculture incidents that are suspected of or confirmed to be
a terrorist act would likely trigger psychological effects in the general public. Unsubstantiated
claims, hoaxes, and inaccurate information from perpetrators: clandestine or unofficial social
media sources could disrupt effective disease control operations as well as response
messaging/information operations by the responsible LFAs.
Purpose
This branch plan provides supplemental information to the Food and Agriculture Incident Annex
(FAIA) to define the roles and responsibilities for law enforcement and public, animal, and plant
health agencies during suspected or confirmed criminal/terrorist incidents. It further describes the
prevention, detection, disruption, joint criminal-epidemiological investigation, and attribution of
these incidents as a critical component of the U.S. National Security posture.
The strategic end state is an enhanced awareness of threats before they manifest into incidents.
This enables earlier recognition of threats and ensures that responsible investigation and response
decision making is informed by intelligence, threat forecasting, and risk assessment by the
responsible agencies. Early and sustained intelligence collection and analysis improves
understanding of the capabilities, intention, and motivations of threat actors.
Scope
This branch plan applies to the federal response to intentional incidents against food and
agriculture sector targets, regardless of size or complexity. The primary focus is a covert incident
where there is an apparent need for federal and state response assistance, resource pre-
positioning is limited or delayed, and the exact nature of the resource and asset requirements is
undetermined. The scope of activities specifically refers to the joint criminal and epidemiological
investigation and response to the threatened, suspected, or known intentional introduction and
use of a CBRN agent or other hazardous contaminant. Unlike existing federal incident annexes
that address the interagency response to the effects of individual CBRN agents, the FAIA
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 57
addresses the response to incidents affecting the specific food and agriculture infrastructure and
the several classes of commodities. This branch plan specifically addresses the intentional use of
a wide spectrum of possible CBRN agents and other contaminants from an all-hazards approach.
Facts, Planning Assumptions, and Critical Considerations
Lead Roles
LFAs for food
and agriculture
(e.g., USDA,
HHS, and
FDA)
• Executing the spectrum of production, processing, biosecurity, safety, and
quality assurance activities with either primary, supporting, or shared roles and
responsibilities in the event of an intentional attack.
• Agencies with the technical expertise and regulatory responsibility for these
classes of agriculture and food commodities are critical to the initial detection,
epidemiological investigation, and rapid reporting of unusual or suspicious
incidents and the jointly recognized triggers of the possible use of threat agents.
• Support requests made by the FBI Director to provide technical and logistical
support for search and neutralization, WMD crime scene operations, WMD
forensic evidence preservation, collection, and examination, and render safe
operations within their areas of expertise and authority or in accordance with
interagency agreements.
• Federal and state, local, territorial, and tribal authorities (SLTT) who suspect or
discover potential CBRN threats or terrorist activity should be advised, trained,
and encouraged to contact their nearest FBI Field Office or the WMD
Coordinator to report and resolve the threat. LFAs with responsibilities identified
in the FAIA should coordinate with their state and local counterparts to
participate in FBI sponsored interagency CBRNE threat and response outreach
and training initiatives.
DOJ - Attorney
General
• The Attorney General, generally acting through the Director of the FBI, leads
and coordinates the operational law enforcement response and related
investigative and intelligence activities related to imminent threats and incidents
against food and agriculture infrastructure assets.
FBI - Director
• The FBI Director has the lead responsibility for: operational law enforcement
response and criminal investigation of terrorist threats, or incidents in the United
States and its territories.
• The FBI Director has the lead responsibility for searching for: finding, and
neutralizing chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives
(CBRNE) threats within the United States and its territories in response to
information received through law enforcement, intelligence, or other channels.
This includes search planning, operational activity and identifying, detecting,
deterring, and disrupting terrorist operations before they occur.
• Lead and coordinate the law enforcement, criminal investigational response, and
related intelligence activities to resolve the threat through the FBI Joint
Operations Center (JOC) for all suspected intentional incidents involving the
suspected or known use of CBRN and other hazardous materials
• Execution of threat awareness and prevention/outreach operations, intelligence
operations, and the investigation of possible intentional incidents in accordance
with FBI authorized CBRN risk-based assessment and crime scene investigation
protocols to protect the health and safety of responders and investigators as well
as to preserve critical forensic evidence.
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 58
• The FBI has primary jurisdiction to investigate, apprehend, and prosecute those
responsible for threatened or actual acts of terrorism and the intentional
acquisition, manipulation, and dissemination of CBRN agents and other
hazardous contaminants.
FBI - Joint
Terrorism Task
Forces (JTTFs)
• Acting through the JTTFs the "FBI is the lead for investigative activities
involving federal crimes, terrorism, espionage and domestic intelligence
operations including coordination of Federal resources to respond to and assist in
terrorist incidents.
• Suspected federal crimes, espionage, or terrorism threat information from
domestic or international sources, including suspicious activity reports (SAR) of
suspected federal crimes of terrorism, will be shared with the FBI Joint
Terrorism Task Forces to expedite threat investigation and resolution. This
includes performing threat credibility evaluations (TCEs) and determining the
appropriate interagency prevention or response actions.
FBI On-Scene
Commander
(OSC)
• Leads and coordinates the overall federal operational law enforcement and
investigative activities necessary to prevent and resolve imminent threats and
retains the authority to take appropriate operational measures (including hostage
rescue, tactical response, render safe, and bomb management operations) at any
time during the response.
• Oversees crime scenes and evidence management operations.
FBI Weapons
of Mass
Destruction
(WMD)
Coordinators
• Serve as the primary FBI points of contact and interagency liaisons for outreach
with all of the local/state/regional critical infrastructure partners (e.g., law
enforcement, HAZMAT/emergency management, public, animal, or plant health
agencies and private food and agriculture entities).
• Establish joint CBRN/WMD threat or incident reporting protocols and to
develop and coordinate interagency information sharing and joint investigations
capabilities regardless of the suspected or known source, means of introduction,
target, or type of threat agent.
• Under the oversight of the FBI OSC, may be assigned as the official case agent
responsible for the tactical, operational management of a law enforcement
investigation of a specific incident or continue to provide investigational
expertise as the FBI liaison to the interagency Unified Command structure.
• Located in all 56 FBI Field Offices and multiple resident agencies.
Facts
There are striking differences in the various phases of the production, processing, and ultimate
use of pre-harvest and post-harvest agriculture and food commodities.
The primary differences are between the public health consequences of an intentional incident
targeting post-harvest food products intended for human or animal consumption and the mostly
economic and trade consequences of an intentional incident against pre-harvest livestock and
crop production systems.
Coordination:
Attacks against animal or plant health targets will require joint responses and resource
allocations from both state and federal agriculture agencies with the responsibility and authorities
for disease surveillance, detection, epidemiological investigation, and response operations.
o Operational coordination with the FBI OSC is critical for risk-based operational decisions
for specific incidents across the Response, Recovery, and Prevention Missions.
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 59
The incident will require a national effort to identify the potential targets or affected human
populations, food products, livestock, or crops and initiate medical countermeasures,
epidemiological investigations, and disease control operations as appropriate.
Consequences:
Intentional public health or food incidents may result in a large number of human and animal
casualties; the resulting need for medical or veterinary services can quickly overwhelm city or
state resources.
Depending on the agent, contamination may spread to uncontaminated areas from transit through
the contaminated zones.
Mobilization:
Full information about a threat agent incident may not be immediately available and can take
hours, days, or months to become known. Early and periodic interagency evaluations are
essential for timely information sharing and the coordination of joint field investigations.
Availability and deployment will vary depending on asset status, political decisions,
infrastructure availability, and other operational considerations.
Adequate federal and state resources (personnel, equipment, commodities, and materiel) capable
of safe and efficient operations will require several hours of activation, staging, and deployment
prior to the commencement of tactical operations.
Assumptions:
The following are planning assumptions that are supplemental to those outlined in the Response
and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans (FIOPs):
Nexus to Terrorism/Criminal/Espionage Incidents
o A terrorist threat or incident may occur at any time of day with little or no warning,
may involve single or multiple geographic areas, and may involve the use of multiple
threat agents against a variety of food and agriculture targets.
o Unusual or suspicious threats, investigations, and incidents that meet the criteria for
joint interagency triggers and tripwires will be treated as an intentional act until
determined otherwise.
o The types of detection may identify the initial triggers of intentional CBRN and other
hazardous contamination incidents.
Triggers and Tripwires
For the purposes of this document, the following definitions are critical to the recognition and
reporting of unusual or suspicious incidents:
• Triggers are the first signs or traces of characteristic behaviors, activities, or disease incidents
that are recognizable as being unusual, atypical, or suspicious and suggestive of an
intentional (criminal/terrorist) act.
• Tripwires are the specific, agreed-upon threshold levels of these triggers used to activate
interagency notification and information sharing protocols.
• The development of interagency tripwire initiatives establishes a mechanism for the timely
reporting of these triggers and is critical to rule in or rule out potential links to
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 60
criminal/terrorist actions at the earliest possible opportunity and to notify partner food,
agriculture, and law enforcement/intelligence agencies.
• Joint Operations for Investigations until a Determination is Made on Intentional Act:
o Initial determination of whether a suspected intentional incident is a criminal or terrorist
act may not be readily apparent, therefore, law enforcement investigations and responses
will be joint operations by the FBI, the USDA Office of Inspector General, and/or the
FDA Office of Criminal Investigation until it is determined that a link to terrorism does
or does not exist.
o If a nexus to terrorism is suspected or identified, the FBI will be the lead law
enforcement/investigatory agency. If no terrorist link can be determined, the FBI will
defer further criminal investigations to USDA OIG or FDA OCI depending on the
affected phases of food or agriculture production and will continue in a supporting role
• Incident Detection: Detection will occur through one of the following methods:
o Field intelligence and threat information reports
o Criminal and epidemiological investigations of unusual or suspicious activities or disease
incidents.
o Syndromic surveillance by state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT); federal, public,
animal, and plant health authorities
o Biosurveillance from human/animal/plant disease field investigations by private
practitioners and official epidemiological investigators
o Mandatory state and federal agency lists of reportable diseases
• Mutual Aid: Neighboring and host states may withhold emergency services resources to
ensure that sufficient capability exists to secure their own jurisdictions.
Critical Considerations for Crisis Action Planning:
Intentional Incidents: Unlike the interagency planning and operational response protocols to
incidents involving specific CBRN materials (e.g., Biological Incident Annex,
Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex, and Oil/Chemical Incident Annex) the variety of possible
intentional food and agriculture scenarios may involve one or more, but are not limited to, the
following characteristics:
o Non-contagious biological agent: Not all biological agents are transmissible
between individual humans, animals, or plants. In these circumstances, disease may
be limited to those immediately exposed during an intentional dissemination;
however, exposures could occur from exposure to residual biological agents in the
environment or through cross-contamination.
o Contagious biological agent: Some biological agents are highly contagious and may
be readily transmitted, resulting in the spread of disease beyond the initial premises,
herd, or geographic area of the attack. Subsequently, livestock, crops, or humans
infected during the initial attack as well as cross-contaminated equipment, vehicles,
and other fomites may spread infection beyond the original point-source of
dissemination; thus, the area at risk may expand across state and international
borders. It is critical that public, animal, and plant health as well as criminal
investigators share information in order to contain and stop ongoing or planned
attacks.
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 61
o Chemical agents: The intentional use of chemical agents can range from
contamination of human food or livestock feed in storage and during production;
direct or indirect dissemination targeting livestock, crops, and humans; and small or
large scale deliberate spills or releases from commercial or clandestine production or
storage facilities.
The chemical products for intentional use can vary from readily available over-the-counter
commercial products, toxic agriculture or industrial chemicals, illicit street drugs, illicit and gray
market pharmaceuticals, military grade chemical warfare agents, or various improvised chemical
agents manufactured in clandestine facilities. Criminal and epidemiological investigations in
these incidents require the use of appropriate WMD/CBRN operations protocols to protect
investigators and response personnel.
Secondary exposures could also occur from contact with residual chemical agents in the
environment or through cross-contamination of personnel, equipment, or vehicles.
Radiological/nuclear agents (R/N): The intentional use of R/N materials could potentially have
long term catastrophic effects depending on the type and grade of material used, isotope half-
lives, and methods of dissemination. Most exposure scenarios would be secondary to an
accidental incident or the intentional release from (1) radiological dispersion devices, (2) a
security breach and release from a nuclear facility, (3) the detonation of a nuclear device, and (4)
the theft and release of weapons or industrial grade R/N materials.
Intentional releases and dissemination of R/N agents could directly contaminate soil, water
sources, livestock feed, pastures and forage, livestock, crops, and human food products and also
deny the use of large livestock and crop production areas either for years, decades, or
permanently depending on the characteristics of the materials.
Criminal and epidemiological investigations in these incidents requires the use of appropriate
WMD/CBRN operations protocols to protect investigators and response personnel from direct or
secondary exposures to residual R/N agents in the environment or through cross-contamination.
Delayed initiation of public, animal, and plant disease control/eradication operations
Risk
• Delayed reporting can allow terrorist, criminal, or espionage operations to
continue undetected resulting in more rapid and widespread disease
transmission well beyond the original point of introduction. The delay of
hours to days can have exponentially greater negative consequences to the
U.S. economy and national security.
Management
• Ensure incident annex triggers are formally tracked as critical information
requirements.
• Enforce joint operations and information sharing among the LFA and law
enforcement agencies.
Delayed Attribution and Communication of Intentional Act
Risk
• The intentional introduction of a threat agent may be initially difficult to
discern from an accidental or naturally occurring incident resulting in
separate law enforcement, public, animal, and plant health investigations.
• Uncoordinated investigations and response operations can impede mutual
situational awareness and effective communication between the disciplines,
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 62
delay attribution, and miss the opportunity to prevent/disrupt criminal or
terrorist actions.
Management
• Perform concurrent and coordinated joint criminal-epidemiological
investigations to facilitate more rapid attribution of intentional CBRN
incidents (e.g., identify threat agents, sources, perpetrators, motivations, and
means of dissemination) and prevent or reduce further harm to the food and
agriculture sector
• Execute FBI, CDC, and USDA concepts and protocols to perform Public,
Animal, and Plant Health Joint Criminal-Epidemiological Investigations of
unusual or suspicious CBRN incidents include:
o Interagency Relationships Joint Prevention/Threat Awareness
o Joint Trigger/Tripwire Reporting Initiatives and time sensitive Alert
Notification Protocols
o Joint Threat Assessments (Threat Credibility Evaluation(TCE))
o Joint Information Sharing
o Joint Investigations
o Joint Memorandum of Understanding/Interagency Agreements
o Joint Training (example: FBI-USDA Animal-Plant Health Joint Criminal-
Epidemiological Investigations Course, FBI WMD Coordinator sponsored
interagency agroterrorism working groups, state and local law enforcement
CBRNE courses, table top and field exercises)
Mitigate Mobilization Delays through Information Sharing
Risk
• Immediate alert notification and information sharing of the detection of
jointly recognized trigger and tripwire incidents is critical to mitigate
expected delays in the deployment of responding assistance
Management
• Identify threshold levels to notify interagency partners of disease and law
enforcement triggers and the follow-on information sharing protocols should
be low.
• Early consideration of a possible intentional incident and the initiation of a
joint threat credibility evaluation (TCE) is essential to prevent, detect, and
disrupt planned or ongoing criminal or terrorist operation, despite the fact
that initial incident reports and investigational information may be limited or
incomplete.
Simultaneous Operational Mission Requirements
Risk
• Multiple interagency missions will, by necessity, occur simultaneously
Management
• Establishment of a UCG in an active and fluid situation requires both initial
and sustained interagency coordination (e.g., criminal/terrorism and
epidemiological investigations; CBRNE incident response operations;
intelligence/ counterterrorism operations; crime scene investigations; disease
control/eradication operations; and continuity, response, and recovery
operations).
Locations as Crime Scenes
Risk
• The location of a suspected or actual intentional incident will be treated as a
federal crime scene. Due to the environment, ongoing farming or processing
operations, and the method of attack, the crime scene and forensic evidence
may be minimal, fragile, and not appear out of the ordinary.
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 63
• Materials and equipment used to transport and disseminate threat agents
may go unnoticed and be commonly found in livestock/crop production
operations or food processing facilities.
Management
• Ensure that public, animal, and plant health investigators as well as response
and recovery personnel recognize and preserve possible crime scenes and
evidence during epidemiological investigations of suspicious or unusual
disease incidents.
• Criminal and epidemiological investigations training for the public,
animal, and plant health investigators
Need to Preserve Crime Scenes and Evidence
Risk
• The early recognition, preservation, and collection of evidence is critical to
determine the identity of culpable parties or information of additional
planned attacks.
Management
• Coordinate and ensure CBRN/WMD crime scene investigations follow
approved FBI WMD operations guidelines and protocols to:
(1) Perform risk assessments to protect criminal and epidemiological
investigators from unknown CBRNE threats and secondary explosives
devices.
(2) Preserve and collect contaminated physical/forensic evidence for
examination, characterization, and later prosecution.
(3) Field screen evidence for chemical/radiological/nuclear agent
contamination before submission to animal, plant, and public health
diagnostic network laboratories and forensic/analytical laboratories
(FBI or partner agencies).
(4) Prevent secondary cross contamination of equipment, evidence,
personnel, and spread outside of the crime scene.
(5) Transport evidence to a laboratory capable of forensic examination of
contaminated evidence.
(6) Follow approved forensic evidence chain-of-custody protocols.
Responder Safety
Risk
• Federal agencies with defined investigation and response missions and
responsibilities for CBRN incidents must ensure the safety, physical, and
behavioral health of their assigned response and recovery personnel
(including contract workers).
Management
• Determine and distribute MCMs as required/directed
• Determine/provide guidance on use of MCMs (e.g., antimicrobials,
vaccines, and immunotherapeutics)
• Determine appropriate behavioral health service to provide responders
Immediate Public Information Is Warranted
Risk
• Timely and situationally appropriate information sharing and messaging
operations are critical to address the concerns of the public and provide
guidance and recommended response measures for the LFAs for public,
animal, and plant health and law enforcement.
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 64
Management
• Guidelines for media releases related to joint investigative activities requires
mutually agreed upon and coordinated through a Unified Command Joint
Information Center (JIC).
• Information concerning a suspected or actual intentional incident will not be
released without coordination with and approval from each agency
conducting investigations and ongoing response operations.
Indeterminate location(s)
Risk
• The location of an intentional incident provides critical intelligence value to
determine the identity of the perpetrators as well as their methods of
operations. This information may help law enforcement stop ongoing or
future CBRN attacks; however, the location may not be immediately known
Management
• Public, animal, and plant health agencies should coordinate and share
information with the FBI and federal law enforcement agencies responsible
for leading law enforcement investigations, counterterrorism, and
intelligence activities to identify possible locations associated with the attack.
• Evaluate all suspicious, unusual, or suspected intentional incidents as defined
by the FAIA, Presidential and Congressional Policy directives, interagency
agreements, and joint protocols to determine if there is a credible
criminal/terrorist threat.
• Treat all highly suspicious or suspected intentional incidents as terrorist
threats until determined otherwise as the effects of the intentional
acquisition, manipulation, and dissemination of threat agents may be
indistinguishable from a naturally occurring or an accidental public, animal,
or plant health incident.
Multiple attacks
Risk
• Criminal and epidemiological personnel may be required to respond
concurrently to multiple incidents in multiple locations possibly involving
more than one threat agent or other hazardous contaminant.
Management
• Utilize pre-existing joint interagency capabilities, protocols, and resources
for effective prevention and response to threats.
• Assist and coordinate with the prevention mission area to plan and prepare
for multiple threat locations.
Multiple areas
Risk
• The effect of a threat agent may be temporally and geographically dispersed
with no readily identifiable or defined “incident site.”
Management
• Close coordination between criminal and epidemiological investigators may
provide critical information needed to detect pending or ongoing attacks and
to identify a possible crime scene location
• Intelligence analysis and linking unrelated but similar reports and
investigations is critical for the recognition of a complex attack.
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 65
E x e c u t i o n
In response to an intentional incident, immediate response actions must focus on protection and
stabilization of public, animal, and plant health, continuity of operations for food and agriculture
infrastructure, and activation of interagency protocols for alert notification, information sharing,
TCEs, and joint criminal-epidemiological investigations.
Operational phases for the response to and recovery from an incident vary based upon the size,
scope, and complexity of the incident. The FAIA base annex provides an overview of the default
posture. For an intentional incident, Response, Recovery, and Prevention Mission activities are
interdependent and often concurrent. The phases detailed below are where certain actions during
an intentional incident may diverge from actions detailed in the base FAIA.
Phase 1a (Normal Operations)
• Phase 1a activities include industry, interagency, and public preparedness messaging,
educational outreach operations, general threat awareness and trigger recognition, and
training of emergency responders to develop and recognize the joint triggers and report
tripwire detections associated with the detection of and response to an incident.
Examples are:
o the FBI-USDA Animal-Plant Health Joint Criminal-Epidemiological
Investigations Course;
o the FBI-CDC (Public Health) Joint Criminal-Epidemiological Investigations
Course;
o WMD Coordinator-Sponsored One Health and Agroterrorism Working
Groups;
o FBI, state-local CBRNE awareness training courses (State and Local Law
Enforcement, HAZMAT, public health, and agriculture sector agencies);
o monthly Ag-Intelligence Meetings;
o Joint FBI Field Office – Public Health MOUs;
o Joint FBI, USDA APHIS, USDA OIG, USDA FSIS, HHS/CDC, FDA, and
EPA MOUs and agreements and outreach programs to public, animal, and
plant health agencies, food and agriculture industry groups, and university
programs;
o the FBI and law enforcement are constantly vigilant for threats of terrorism,
including CBRNE incidents;
o the public, animal, and plant health community and emergency management
officials should work closely with law enforcement regarding positioning
resources and appropriate capabilities in the case of an intentional CBRN
threat or incident
Key Investigative Information
• Determination of a suspected or confirmed threat through the FBI’s TCE process.
• Alert notification of suspicious or unusual incidents utilizing joint criminal-
epidemiological investigation protocols between partnered public, animal, and plant
health and law enforcement agencies (e.g., existing interagency agreements between FBI
WMD Directorate, FBI Laboratory Division, FBI Field Offices, USDA APHIS, USDA
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 66
FSIS, USDA OIG, FDA, and HHS/CDC Joint Criminal-Epidemiological
Investigations/Select Agent programs, state departments of agriculture, and state public
health departments).
• Clinical recognition of key syndromic signs and symptoms by public, animal, and plant
health investigators and private medical/veterinary healthcare providers.
• Presumptive or confirmed laboratory diagnosis of high consequence human, animal, or
plant pathogens or other hazardous materials indicative of an intentional act.
• Disease surveillance activities suggest a suspicious pattern that may indicate an
intentional act.
• Threat information from field intelligence operations, Guardian, criminal investigations,
and other FBI and law enforcement CBRN threat reporting and outreach programs.
• Sensitive information shared between the LFAs (e.g. FBI, USDA, FDA) will be
classified, declassified, and safeguarded according to Executive Order 13526,
Information Security Oversight Office Directive No. 1, and handled appropriately as
prescribed by the originating agency and with the concurrence of the other agencies.
• Joint interagency notifications of the detection of public, animal, or plant health triggers,
law enforcement/intelligence triggers, and interagency tripwire reports of suspicious
incidents are highly sensitive and critical to the recognition of possible intentional
criminal or terrorist operations.
o This information, as well as that of associated epidemiological and
criminal/counterterrorism investigations, as stated in existing interagency
agreements, will be handled as “For Official Use Only (FOUO) // Market and
Law Enforcement Sensitive.”
o The additional classification caveats limit the distribution to those personnel and
elements with an operational need-to-know requirement for joint investigations.
Recognition of an Intentional Incident
The FBI and law enforcement agencies are constantly vigilant for threats or intentional incidents
using CBRN, explosive devices, and other hazardous contaminants. The public, animal, and
plant health community and emergency management officials should work closely with law
enforcement to position resources and develop appropriate capabilities for the investigation of
and response to the detection of an intentional incident. Threat information is provided through a
variety of sources, including open source, private sector, SLTT partners, federal departments and
agencies, the intelligence community, or from foreign governments. Important informational or
decisional points for each of the various phases of response, which may point to a suspected or
actual intentional incident, are addressed below.
Triggers and Tripwires
During the course of daily operations, public, animal, and plant health and law enforcement
agencies may receive reports of suspicious disease incidents and activities that could indicate
early or ongoing criminal/terrorist/espionage operations operations. These reports may be the
first recognizable trigger and should be communicated between the partner agencies in an
appropriate, timely manner to facilitate a joint investigation and response.
Triggers can be indicators of overt or covert actions by individuals, groups, and state or non-state
sponsored programs, or non-specific intelligence and information of suspicious or unexplainable
disease incidents. These may include detection of suspicious or unusual clinical signs and
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 67
necropsy findings from syndromic surveillance programs, during official State/USDA Foreign
Animal Disease/Exotic Plant Disease Investigations, or from law enforcement
investigations/intelligence operations).
Through the use of interagency tripwire initiatives, the following list of incident triggers can be
used to prompt interagency operational elements to share information and initiate joint
investigative protocols. These key indicators can either originate from epidemiological
investigations of suspected or confirmed disease incidents or from law enforcement and
intelligence operations and evidence potentially linked to a developing threat or attack.
Public, Animal, and Plant Health Triggers
• Presumptive or confirmed diagnosis of high consequence human, zoonotic, foreign or
emerging animal diseases, or exotic plant pests and diseases
• Unusual or suspicious syndromic surveillance detections:
o Highly suspicious Foreign Animal Disease/Emerging Disease Investigations (e.g.,
Priority 1 and Priority A submissions)
o Highly suspicious Public Health Epidemiological Investigations
o Unusual Exotic Plant Pathogen Investigations
• Simultaneous or progressive outbreaks of unusual or suspicious human, zoonotic,
emerging or foreign animal diseases, or exotic plant pests or pathogens in multiple
locations with no epidemiological link.
• Unusual increase in the number of sick or dying animals or plants, including disease
outbreaks or reports of dead animals at a strategic, iconic, or other target of interest.
• Large numbers of animals and humans with similar, unexplained clinical signs or
symptoms or outbreaks of disease that are associated with high morbidity or mortality.
• Multiple unusual or unexplained diseases in the same animal or herd and human
populations.
• Disease with an unusual geographic or seasonal distribution or atypical signs and clinical
presentations.
• Similar genetic type among biological agents from geographically distinct sources.
• Identification of an unusual, atypical, genetically engineered, or antiquated strain of a
biological agent.
• Unexplained increase in incidence of endemic diseases or changes in virulence of clinical
signs and susceptible species.
• Simultaneous suspected or confirmed outbreaks of the same disease in animals and
people.
Law Enforcement Triggers
Overt:
• A public declaration of a threat, a crime, or the intention to commit a crime against U.S.
food and agriculture.
• An overt increased activity or protest against a specific agriculture target.
• Claims of responsibility for visible acts, or detection of developing or on-going
criminal/terrorist/espionage acts.
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 68
Covert:
• Suspects apprehended with agriculturally significant threat agent dissemination devices,
processing equipment, or equipment for preserving and transporting various threat agents
or other hazardous materials.
• Efforts to avoid/violate prohibited dual-use material import/export restrictions.
• Notifications received regarding reports of threats or unusual activity at livestock/crop
production facilities and farms, food processing and production facilities, markets and
transportation systems, animal-plant disease diagnostic laboratories, biotechnology
research/development laboratories (corporate, university, or state/federal), commercial
agricultural equipment, vaccine, and other biotechnology production facilities.
• Reports or intelligence of potential “Insider Threat” operations at food and agriculture
sector laboratories, research, production, or processing facilities.
• Suspicious or unexplained Centers for Disease Control and Prevention/Animal and Plant
Health Inspection Services Select Agent and Toxin Program (Division of Select Agents
and Toxins/Agriculture Select Agent Services) discrepancy reports.
• Any intelligence of or indication that individuals, groups, or organizations are unlawfully
in possession of or attempting to acquire high-consequence human, animal, or plant
disease agents.
• Identification or seizure of literature pertaining to the production or dissemination of
threat agents affecting human, animal, or plant health.
• Any intelligence or field assessments that indicates that a credible threat exists against
food and agriculture infrastructure targets.
• Intelligence of or detection of a novel pathogen, chemical agent, or radiological material
suspected or known to be developed by or used by a state or non-state sponsored
adversary.
• FBI Hazardous Evidence Response Team or state/local hazmat investigations and crime
scene operations that involve the discovery of human, animal, or plant CBRN agents or
other hazardous contaminants (e.g., clandestine laboratory investigations) .
• Actions identified by intelligence sources, the recognition of operational planning and
development activities, or evidence of an attack through the detection and attribution of
human, animal, and plant diseases or other CBRN threat agents.
Phase 1b and 1c (Elevated Threat and Credible Threat)
Phase 1b and 1c (Elevated Threat and Credible Threat) involve employing preventive
capabilities to detect threat materials (to include CBRN and other hazardous contaminants) at the
point of manufacture, transportation, and use and to identify the nature of material through
adjudication or resolution of the detection alarm. The Department of Justice (DOJ), through the
FBI, is the lead agency during these two phases. HHS, USDA, or FDA would serve as the lead
agencies to advise and to support the crisis management activities of the DOJ/FBI in medical,
public health, and animal/plant health matters relevant to the use of CBRN materials and other
hazardous contaminants.
• Discovering and locating threats may be accomplished through active and passive
surveillance and search procedures, the use of systematic examinations and assessments,
and physical investigations and intelligence.
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 69
• Suspected intentional threats and incidents are immediately evaluated to determine
whether the threat is credible. Law enforcement personnel may be confronted with a
number of situations involving the actual or threatened use of a material as a weapon.
These can range from non-credible threats (hoaxes), announcements or indications that a
release of an agent has occurred (overt), or unannounced releases of an agent (covert)
• No single agency, department, or level of government can independently complete a
threat picture of all terrorism and national security threats.
o With this in mind, intentional threat intelligence and information sharing involves
engagement across SLTT, federal, private sector, and international partners to
facilitate the collection, analysis, and sharing of suspicious activity reports to
facilitate the identification and prevention of terrorist threats; enhance situational
awareness of threats, alerts, and warnings; and develop and disseminate risk
assessments and analysis of national intelligence to SLTT and private sector
partners and across mission areas as appropriate.
Figure 3 is an example of an operational construct that could be used in phases 1b through 1c.
Phase 1c begins with the determination of a credible threat, through the use of the Threat
Credibility Evaluation (TCE). All suspected terrorist threat information concerning the food and
agriculture infrastructure will be assessed through a timely TCE. The TCE is a real-time
interagency conference call between field level investigators, HQ –national level assets, and food
and agriculture SME’s to assess the credibility of the threat and associated adversarial intent,
operational practicability, and technical feasibility. The FBI may contact various federal and
SLTT subject matter experts (SMEs) to assist in assessing threat credibility. The TCE results
inform the Protection and Prevention response. After the threat has been deemed credible, the
FBI will determine courses of action such as how to best collect and analyze the evidence,
including CBRN environmental samples. Led by the FBI, the interagency Weapons of Mass
Destruction Strategic Group (WMDSG) provides a mechanism for information sharing support
to strategic decision making and coordination of operations during a suspected or intentional
incident requiring investigation into the incident’s association with an actual or potential terrorist
threat.
Notification of an Intentional Incident
Law enforcement personnel may be confronted with a number of situations involving the actual
or threatened use of a CBRN agent, explosive device, or other hazardous material as a weapon.
These can range from non-credible threats (hoaxes), announcements or indications that a release
of an agent has occurred (overt), or detections of previously unannounced releases of an agent
(covert). Notification of the triggers of a suspicious incident requires response personnel to
develop and initiate a number of communication channels including: interagency memorandums
of understanding (MOUs) and joint information sharing protocols, agroterrorism working
groups, development of agricultural threat tripwire initiatives, and participation in JTTFs,
Intelligence Fusion Centers, and the FBI INFRAGARD program. InfraGard is a partnership
between the FBI and members of the private sector. The InfraGard program provides a vehicle
for seamless public-private collaboration with government that expedites the timely exchange of
information and promotes mutual learning opportunities relevant to the protection of Critical
Infrastructure.
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 70
Conduct a Law Enforcement Investigation
The occurrence of an intentional food and agriculture incident may result in an emergency that
overwhelms SLTT capabilities and undoubtedly requires a whole community approach. Joint law
enforcement and epidemiological investigation responsibilities extend across the spectrum of
disease incident operations. The initial reporting and epidemiological investigation of a
suspicious or unusual incident involving food and agriculture production operations is potentially
the earliest indicator of a criminal/terrorist/espionage incident. Table 7 outlines key decisions for
intentional acts.
The activation of joint alert notification, information sharing, and investigation protocols is
critical to prevent, disrupt, or minimize the effects of an attack on the food and agriculture
infrastructure and is based upon the triggers and tripwire initiatives defined by agreements
between the lead departments and agencies. The delayed or failed consideration that the
detection of a suspicious or unusual incident (e.g., animal, plant, or zoonotic disease or other
hazardous contamination incident) is a potential developing or ongoing terrorist attack will
dramatically affect the size, scope, and consequence management requirements by the LFAs
responsible for food and agriculture incidents (FDA, HHS, USDA).
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 71
Table 7: Key Decisions for Intentional Acts
Support and Coordination Elements:
To facilitate federal interagency coordination and information sharing during an incident (Figure
14) several support and operational coordination elements are utilized. These elements,
combined with the additional critical response assets, resources, and teams, represent unique or
critical federal CBRNE capabilities that support federal, state, and local response and recovery
operations.
Domestic Emergency Support Team: The DEST is a specialized, rapidly deployable
interagency team that augments the FBI’s JOC. As part of its mission, the DEST supports the
FBI OSC and other officials to integrate and prioritize consequence management decisions
Topic
Decision Point
Conduct
Investigations
• All suspicious incidents are rapidly evaluated to determine if they involve the
nefarious use of CBRN agents and are possibly linked to terrorism.
• Perform a TCE conference call between key field and headquarters
investigations personnel initiated and led by the FBI WMD Operations
Response Unit. No other authority will be the lead to hold a TCE other than
the FBI.
• Determine at FBI Headquarters and/or FBI Field Offices the need to initiate
and conduct an official law enforcement investigation in conjunction with an
ongoing public, animal, and plant health epidemiological investigation.
Reporting and
Information
Sharing
• Report confirmed high consequence reportable human, animal, or plant
diseases or pests to appropriate international health organizations in
accordance with federal agency (USDA, HHS, or FDA) and international
regulations and protocols.
• Once the report of a criminal/epidemiological threat trigger of a potential
intentional incident is received, the FBI will perform an interagency TCE and
either initiate a law enforcement investigation if appropriate or continue to
monitor/evaluate the credibility of the potential threat in coordination with the
agencies performing the epidemiological investigation.
• Share information with the Federal LFAs (USDA, FDA, HHS, and EPA) and
SLTT in order to determine potential public, animal, and plant health and
environmental impacts. Early joint threat assessment and course of action
development is critical in cases of undetermined but suspicious threat agent
incidents.
Coordination
Support
• Determination at FBI Headquarters and/or FBI Field Offices to conduct a
counterterrorism response and the standup of the FBI Weapons of Mass
Destruction Strategy Group (WMDSG).
• Make recommendations concerning possible deployment and composition of
the Domestic Emergency Response Team (DEST).
• Notify FEMA and coordinate the Consequence Management Coordination
Unit (CMCU) support to the FBI WMDSG’s counterterrorism response to a
suspected or actual intentional incident.
• Determine the stand down of the DEST, WMDSG, and CMCU to transition to
long-term recovery operations.
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 72
within the operational space of the Prevention Mission. The team supports the FBI OSC through
a JOC WMD desk and maintains connectivity with the JOC Consequence Management Group
and the CMCU. The DEST also provides the FBI OSC with expert advice and guidance to shape
prevention operations in order to save lives and protect property. Team composition includes
FEMA, FBI, DOD, HHS Office for the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response,
DOE, EPA, and others as may be appropriate. Based upon the threat and requirements, the FBI
determines the composition of the DEST and maintains operational control throughout its
activation predicated upon an interagency developed and proposed composition. The FEMA
Administrator is responsible for policies and planning governing the team and for facilitating
approval for its deployment.
Weapons of Mass Destruction Strategic Group (WMDSG): The FBI-led interagency
WMDSG crisis action team is activated within the Strategic Information and Operations Center.
It supports information exchange and deconfliction of counterterrorism activities to resolve
imminent WMD terrorist threats while simultaneously coordinating with the nationwide effort to
save lives; minimize harm to public, animal, and plant health; and to protect the food and
agriculture sector. The WMDSG, through its collection of interagency representatives, facilitates
the application of real time investigative information, intelligence, and technical analysis to
WMD counterterrorism (WMD-CT) law enforcement operations; facilitates the identification
and acquisition of interagency assets that could support WMD-CT law enforcement operations;
and enhances WMD-CT investigative information/intelligence sharing and synchronization of
law enforcement operations with counterterrorism-related public health, homeland protection,
and consequence management activities. Counterterrorism and consequence management
activities may occur simultaneously.
Consequence Management Coordination Unit (CMCU): FEMA staffs and manages the
CMCU, which is the principal advisory unit for consequence management considerations within
the WMDSG and provides strategic recommended and integrated courses of action in light of
ongoing and evolving counterterrorism operations. The CMCU is supported by federal technical
capabilities provided through DOE/National Nuclear Security Administration, HHS, DOD, and
DHS. The CMCU responsibilities include:
• Coordination of the identification of potential threats to impacted populations and the
food and agriculture infrastructure,
• Identification of potential preparatory actions to reduce those risks to life and property
by lessening the impact of the event,
• Positioning the response community to be able to respond should the event occur.
Phase 2 (Response)
Phase 2 begins the implementation of the initial response whereby DOJ/FBI retains the lead in
crisis management (e.g., identify the scope and nature of the threat and conducting ongoing
investigative and intelligence activity), but HHS, USDA, or FDA in a large-scale incident may
establish a Unified Coordination Group with federal departments/agencies with equities in the
same core capabilities identified for naturally occurring/unintentional incidents. Implementation
of public, animal, and plant health response operations and delivery of critical operational
response services and materials (e.g., Strategic National Stockpile or National Veterinary
Stockpile) and the implementation of a Recovery Support Strategy for affected food and
agriculture industries, resources, production capability, and affected populations are consequence
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 73
management operations and the responsibility of the appropriate lead food and agriculture
agencies.
Figure 14: Operational Construct for Intentional Food and Agriculture Incident
Phase 2a (Immediate Response)
This phase is dominated by efforts to provide accurate and credible information to affected
individuals, food and agriculture entities, and state and federal public, animal, and plant health
agency partners. In addition, law enforcement and counterterrorism operations are now actively
underway.
The Prevention Mission will work to fully identify the scope and nature of the threat such as
previously unknown targets or attacks, threat network resources, additional threat agents, and
development/delivery systems. This will include conducting ongoing investigative and
intelligence activities to further identify and update information and intelligence of the threat,
associated networks, sites, and suspected or identified threat materials, etc. These actions may
also be taken to verify or characterize the threat of materials or weapons that have already been
located. Finally, the White House Director of Communications will coordinate risk
communication strategies by implementing the Domestic Communications Strategy.
Phase 2b (Deployment)
This phase begins with the implementation and deployment of law enforcement response-related
resources (Hazardous Evidence Response Team personnel, CBRNE response and contaminated
crime scene equipment, and operational criminal investigation command and control resources).
Phase 2c (Sustained Response)
As response operations transition to recovery, the law enforcement and counterterrorism
response will likely continue (assuming the threat has not been fully neutralized), and the overall
incident response begins to enter a sustained, long-term operation. The delivery of public,
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 74
animal, and plant health response will correspond to plans for the respective branch to this annex
(food, animal agriculture, or plant agriculture incidents). Branch planning will also guide Phase
3, especially in cases where a Federal Disaster Recovery Coordinator is appointed. A Mission
Scoping Assessment and Recovery Support Strategy will be developed as needed to address the
scope and complexity of the incident and subsequent short and long-term effects on the food and
agriculture sector.
Transition from Counterterrorism Response to Consequence
Management
The completion of the response to a possible or actual intentional incident will be determined by
the unique aspects and magnitude of each situation. The timeline required to neutralize the
criminal element will vary greatly. The criminal investigative end state will transition the
response efforts from counterterrorism activities into consequence management. The FBI, in
conjunction with FEMA, will use ongoing critical information sources to provide situational
awareness to facilitate the gradual stand down of several groups.
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 75
Appendix 1: Policy and Capability Development
Topics
This appendix presents some important areas that require additional attention of which
stakeholders should be aware. Attempts to address these issues early will likely mitigate potential
negative impacts.
Federal-to-Federal Support
Federal-to-federal support may not be mandatory under the National Response Framework
(NRF) during a non-Stafford Act Incident such as a food or agriculture incident. Memorandums
of Understanding (MOU), Memorandums of Agreement (MOA) and Interagency Agreements
(IAA) remain required and may cause delays in requested support to a lead federal department or
agency.
Waste and Carcass Management
9
In the event of a large-scale animal agriculture incident, sufficient waste and carcass
management resources will be required to manage large quantities of carcass, infectious biomass,
and other waste materials that result from ongoing response operations. These required resources
must be available to handle all waste management needs while minimizing the environmental
impacts and preventing further spread of the disease to non-infected or native animal
populations.
Several policy options will require further development or leadership action during an incident.
Waste Management Decision Support Tools and Training
• Responders should leverage the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) decision
support tool and the EPA’s All Hazards Waste Management Planning Tool
(www.epa.gov/homeland-security-waste)
o These tools help responders to understand and minimize the amount of protein
needing disposal, determine which of the available disposal options is best for the
current waste management needs, and leverage all available onsite disposal options
prior to initiating any infectious or contaminated biomass transport to an alternate
disposal site.
o USDA’s disposal options tool is established and well validated for use in determining
the best disposal method for biomass and other animal related waste.
o EPAs tool provides an integrated all hazards approach as part of a community
response.
o Both of these tools outline multiple options to support carcass management and
disposal issues. While these tools provide additional information to responders, they
do not fully resolve the bio management needs that will be required during a large-
scale animal agriculture incident.
9
In the case of a mass incident, resulting from suspected terrorism or other criminal activity, animal remains and
plant material may be deemed of evidentiary value. For suspected or actual terrorist incidents, the FBI On-
Scene Commander has primary responsibility to conduct, direct, oversee crime scenes, their security, and
evidence management; including fatalities management, through all phases of the response, managed through a
FBI Joint Operations Center.
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 76
• Tools and training programs need may be developed to support waste and carcass
management emergency response planning at the state local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT)
levels of government. Typically, SLTT emergency managers focus on the immediate
needs of response including disease management and animal or public health concerns.
o SLTT use of response tools and training programs for carcass management may help
to clearly outline and plan for the carcass and waste management resources that will
be required during an animal agriculture incident.
o The identification of available waste management sites throughout a state and
designate the appropriate regulations regarding waste management will allow the
emergency responders to identify appropriate disposal sites while minimizing the risk
of environmental contamination or further spread of disease or other threat agent from
transport.
o Continued USDA development of training for carcass and waste management issues
during response.
Waste Disposal Agreements
• Carcass and waste management practices require agreements with waste disposal sites
prior to disposing waste. During an incident, SLTT agencies may develop agreements to
allow for the disposal of carcass and other infectious or contaminated biomass and waste
products.
• Agreements in place prior to the incident are non-binding and may require renegotiation
during the incident.
• USDA coordination with national waste management associations may enable national
level agreements and issues unique to large animal agriculture incidents.
• USDA coordination of a national level outreach campaign with national waste
management associations, state and territorial solid waste management associations, and
waste management industry groups to ensure that waste management industries have the
necessary information regarding the safety and potential environmental impacts
associated with disposing carcass and other waste by-products from response operations.
Waste Disposal Sites
• The disposal sites required for carcass and waste management could exceed available
space for disposal within the state or in other nearby facilities regardless of the
agreements that are in place.
• Emergency responders and policy-makers performance of a real-time evaluation of
disposal policies to determine the best path forward for efficient and environmentally safe
disposal of waste from response operations with the goal to minimize the amount of
protein needing disposal or slowing the flow of waste to disposal sites.
• USDA coordination to ensure that SLTT agriculture and environmental officials have the
necessary information regarding the safety and potential environmental impacts
associated with disposing carcass and other waste by-products from response operations
within their region.
Coordination of Surge Veterinarians and Animal Health Technicians
Emergency response operations during a large-scale animal agriculture incident need sufficient
veterinarians and animal health technicians to manage the ongoing animal health and animal care
issues as well as the additional testing and diagnostics that support the detection of disease or
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 77
identification of the threat agent. Current licensing regulations are managed at the SLTT-level
and veterinarians and animal health technicians are licensed in states rather than regions or
nationally.
Surge Support Options
• During a large-scale animal agriculture incident, USDA may leverage external resources
they have developed to provide the necessary surge support to state assets already
available for response.
• USDA will use state assets first and provide federal support to SLTT response as
necessary
o These external resources are finite in numbers and may not provide sufficient
animal health response resources should the incident span multiple regions and
jurisdictions.
• USDA may request assistance from the HHS National Veterinary Response Team or
Department of the Interior (DOI).
• USDA may also request surge support from the DOD which may provide assistance
through general purpose forces or DOD Veterinary Services during the incident.
o However, expertise from these veterinarians may not be specific to the affected
livestock and poultry diseases and require pre-existing agreements to be in place
for a non-Stafford Act incident.
State Licensure Agreements and Waivers
State licensure boards require specific qualifications in order to practice veterinary medicine or
be a veterinary technician in each state, if the veterinarian or technician are not federally
employed. During a large-scale incident, an out-of-state veterinarian not employed by the
Federal Government may not be licensed to work in a state affected by the incident. The Federal
and State Governments may need to continue to work with state licensure boards for
veterinarians and technicians to allow responders to leverage out-of-state resources through the
Emergency Management Assistance Compact during an animal agriculture incident. Each state
must establish these agreements and blanket waivers to allow licensed veterinarians and
technicians from any state or federal agency to support incident response under emergency
conditions.
Recovery from an Intentional Act
In the event of a terrorist attack or intentional incident, law enforcement agencies may be unable
to identify and/or prosecute a responsible party or the perpetrator of the incident may be
financially unable to cover all losses from the incident. Under these circumstances, there are few
defined options to support recovery and additional policy decisions are required to facilitate
recovery from a large-scale food or agriculture incident.
Under normal circumstances, industry will coordinate the sanitization, decontamination, and
other remediation actions to resume normal business operations as well as reroute supply chains
to minimize the effects on demand for the affected commodity. Industry will be able to initiate
these actions immediately with a direct focus on maintaining business continuity and does not
immediately draw on government resources for support. However, given the cost of recovery and
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 78
the extent of contamination that is present from the incident, industry may opt to close a facility
or business instead of managing high remediation costs. These decisions may result in the
affected business or facility closing, localized economic hardship including job loss and
economic losses to associated businesses, and abandoned contaminated facilities that pose a
threat to human, animal, and environmental health.
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 79
Appendix 2: Wildlife Animal Interface
This appendix describes the support that can be provided by the U.S. Department of Agriculture
(USDA) and Department of the Interior (DOI) to the Lead Federal Agency for an agriculture
incident in which a disease is transmitted to wildlife. Many animal diseases are a threat to
multiple species including domestic animals and pets, commercial livestock and poultry, to
wildlife and other exotic and protected species. Of elevated concern is the threat of foreign
animal diseases that can be transmitted bi-directionally from commercial or domestic livestock
and wildlife, including but not limited to foot-and-mouth disease, classical swine fever, and
highly pathogenic avian influenza. In the event of a large-scale agriculture incident, responding
agencies will require strategies that minimize the risk of disease spread into wildlife populations
and strategies that reduce the impacts from pathogen transmission between wildlife and domestic
or commercial animals.
USDA and DOI, in coordination with other federal and state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT)
agencies have the jurisdictional authority and subject matter expertise to support response and
recovery operations should an agriculture incident extend to wildlife populations, including
marine mammals and sea turtles for which DOI shares jurisdiction with the Department of
Commerce (DOC). USDA works to prevent the introduction and transmission of disease from
domestic animals to wildlife. USDA administers the National Wildlife Disease Surveillance and
Emergency Response System that is responsible for conducting coordinated disease surveillance
on the wildlife diseases it manages and for responding to a variety of emergencies including
animal disease outbreaks. DOI works to promote early detection and rapid response to wildlife
diseases on federal lands. DOI also coordinates with SLTT and nongovernmental stakeholders
for national wildlife disease detection and response.
U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) supports DOI through aquatic and terrestrial wildlife disease
surveillance and research activities. USGS capabilities include disease mapping, modeling,
laboratory support, disease research, and decision analysis. USGS maintains aquatic and
terrestrial high-containment laboratories (Western
Fisheries Research Center and National Wildlife Health
Center (NWHC)) to support DOI land management
bureaus through disease diagnostic support and
research. The NWHC works with department bureaus,
as well as SLTT and other federal entities, on wildlife
disease investigations, providing the best available
science and technical support for issues related to
wildlife health and disease.
In the event of a zoonotic disease outbreak in wild animals, the NWHC works with federal and
state natural resource, animal health, and public health agencies to support timely and effective
one health-based response. The Bureau of Land Management (BLM) wildlife program
collaborates with the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) and state agency responses in relationship
to disease outbreaks and chronic disease issues. BLM wildlife specialists also provide technical
assistance. The Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) works with tribes, NWHC, and other federal
agencies along with SLTT governments to facilitate coordinate response to a wildlife disease.
BIA administers some of the agriculture leases/permits including business leases for agriculture
enterprises on Indian trust lands. The National Wildlife Refuge System has developed the
The National Wildlife Health
Center (NWHC) is a World
Organization for Animal
Health Collaborating Centre
for Research, Diagnosis, and
Surveillance.
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 80
Wildlife Health office to enhance the capabilities of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service in
monitoring and managing wildlife populations. The program conducts wildlife health and disease
surveillance, response, and management activities to address the impacts of environmental
changes on wild populations and to support the wildlife conservation, population monitoring, and
management goals of the Service. Wildlife Health office activities include establishing wildlife
health baselines; identifying existing and emerging wildlife health and disease risks; ensuring
disease preparedness and prevention; developing, guiding, and implementing management
actions; providing an early warning system for diseases that have the potential to impact humans
as well as poultry and livestock agri-businesses; and disease surveillance and investigations.
Actions unique to wildlife that can contribute to an effective federal response and recovery
strategy include the following:
• Awareness of wildlife’s role as reservoirs of disease requiring surveillance and
monitoring;
• Mapping capabilities to track disease in wildlife to protect domestic/commercial animals;
• Care of wildlife animals on federal lands and conservation lands present unique
challenges relating to mitigating disease impacts while addressing specific challenges,
such as preserving endangered species, conservation issues, animal migration, etc.;
• Care and housing of wildlife in quarantine for treatment prior to habitat reintroduction;
• MCMs distribution to wildlife in the wild and zoos or exhibits to minimize disease
spread;
• Capture, quarantine, humane depopulation, disposal, transport of infectious biomass
creates additional challenges for wildlife species affected by disease;
• Risk communications to animal industry (veterinarians, agriculture, zoos, licensed
exhibitors, etc.) relating to disease in wildlife populations and potential implications for
domestic and commercial animal exposure;
• Risk communications to recreational hunters, those visiting federal lands, and subsistence
and cultural hunters and gatherers about the disease and potential transmission risks (e.g.,
game hunters bringing infected carcass to a farm with susceptible animals); and
Mitigation to protect the economic and conservation value of hunting and hunted wildlife
populations.
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 81
Appendix 3: Authorities and References
This appendix provides a summary of specific authorities, in order of relevance, to a large-scale
food or agriculture incident. The National Response Framework, National Disaster Recovery
Framework, and the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans (FIOPs)
capture overarching authorities for disaster response and recovery activities.
Nothing in this annex alters or impedes the ability of federal agencies to carry out their
respective authorities and associated responsibilities under the law. This annex does not create
new authorities nor change existing ones.
Federal agencies may take appropriate independent emergency actions within the limits of their
own statutory authority to protect the public, mitigate immediate hazards, and gather information
concerning the emergency to avoid delays.
The Food and Agriculture Incident Annex may be used in conjunction with other incident-
specific annexes to the Response and Recovery FIOPs or other federal emergency operations
plans.
Table 8 below is not an exhaustive list of statutory and regulatory authorities. Lead federal
agencies are well versed in what statutory and regulatory authorities apply to their specific
incident responses.
Statutory and Regulatory Authorities
Table 8: Statutory and Regulatory Authorities
Title
Description
Public Health
Service Act 1944
Forms the foundation of U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)
legal authority for responding to public health emergencies. It authorizes the
Secretary of HHS to:
• Develop and take necessary steps to implement a plan to assist states and
localities to control epidemics and to meet other health emergencies or
problems,
• Assist and promote research and studies into the causes, diagnosis,
treatment, control, and prevention of diseases,
• Establish isolation and quarantine,
• Maintain the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS),
• Activate the U.S. Public Health Service Commissioned Corps and the
National Disaster Medical System, and deploy select members of the
Medical Reserve Corps;
• Maintain safety of food, drugs, biological products, and medical devices.
• Provide temporary assistance to needy families and respond to needs of “at-
risk” individuals
• Waive certain requirements for drugs covered by risk evaluation and
mitigation strategies
• Declare a public health emergency
• HHS may need supplemental appropriations to carry out incident
management activities consistent with this authority
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 82
Federal Food,
Drug, and
Cosmetic (FD&C)
Act (21 U.S.C. 301
et seq.)
• Food and Drug Administration (FDA) may order the detention of any article
of food that is found during an inspection, examination, or investigation if
the FDA has a reasonable belief that such article is adulterated or
misbranded.
• If FDA reasonably believes an article of food, and any other article of food
that the Secretary reasonably believes is likely to be affected in a similar
manner, is adulterated and presents a threat of serious adverse health
consequences or death to humans or animals, each person (excluding farms
and restaurants) who manufactures, processes, packs, distributes, receives,
holds, or imports such article must permit FDA to have access to and copy
certain records relating to such article and to any other article of food the
Secretary reasonably believes is likely to be affected in a similar manner.
• If FDA believes there is a reasonable probability that the use of or exposure
to an article of food, and any other article of food that the Secretary
reasonably believes is likely to be affected in a similar manner, will cause
serious adverse health consequences or death to humans or animals, each
person (excluding farms and restaurants) who manufactures, processes,
packs, distributes, receives, holds, or imports such article must permit FDA
to have access to and copy certain records relating to such article and to any
other article of food the Secretary reasonably believes is likely to be affected
in a similar manner. If FDA determines there is a reasonable probability that
an article of food (other than infant formula) is adulterated or misbranded
and the use of or exposure to such article will cause serious adverse health
consequences or death to humans or animals, the Secretary must provide the
responsible party with an opportunity to cease distribution and recall such
article. If the responsible party refuses to or does not voluntarily cease
distribution or recall such article within the time and in the manner
prescribed by the Secretary, the Secretary may, by order, require such person
to (a) immediately cease distribution of such article; and (b) as applicable,
immediately notify persons to immediately cease distribution of such article.
After providing an opportunity for an informal hearing, FDA may require a
recall of such article.
• Food facilities must report to FDA as soon as practicable, but in no case later
than 24 hours, within determining there is a reasonable probability that the
use of, or exposure to, an article of food (other than infant formula)
manufactured, processed, packed, or held by the facility will cause serious
adverse health consequences or death to humans or animals.
• If FDA determines that food manufactured, processed, packed, received, or
held by a facility has a reasonable probability of causing serious adverse
health consequences or death to humans or animals, FDA may suspend the
registration of a facility that was responsible for such reasonable probability
or knew, or had reason to know of, such reasonable probability and packed,
received, or held such food. If a facility’s registration is suspended, no
person can introduce food from such facility into interstate or intrastate
commerce in the United States.
• FDA must receive prior notice of imported food shipments before the food
arrives at any U.S. port, which, among other information, must include the
identity of the article of food, the manufacturer (if applicable), the grower (if
applicable and known), the country of origin, the country from which the
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 83
article is shipped, and any country to which the article has been refused
entry.
• FDA is authorized to conduct examinations and investigations through the
officers and employees of another federal department or agency, pursuant to
a memorandum of understanding (MOU), at facilities or other locations that
are jointly regulated by FDA and such department or agency.
Pandemic and All-
Hazards
Preparedness Act
(PAHPA) 2006
PAHPA amended the PHSA and designates the Secretary of HHS to lead all
federal public health and medical response to public health emergencies and
incidents. It authorizes the Secretary to establish an interagency agreement with
any federal agency to assume control of emergency public health and medical
response assets, as necessary, in the event of a public health emergency, except
members of the armed forces under the authority of the Secretary of Defense.
Pandemic and All-
Hazards
Preparedness
Reauthorization
Act
(PAHPRA)(2013)
PAHPRA amended the PHSA to reauthorize funding for public health and
medical preparedness programs and for the purchase of MCMs. The legislation
increases the flexibility of state health departments in dedicating staff resources
to meeting critical community needs in a disaster.
The Public Health
Security and
Bioterrorism
Preparedness and
Response Act of
2002 (Bioterrorism
Act) (P.L. 107-
188)
Under this act, FDA is responsible for carrying out certain provisions,
particularly, Subtitle A (Protection of Food Supply), which provides for the
following FDA authorizations: FDA is charged with providing for research on
tests and sampling methodologies designed to test food to detect adulteration
rapidly, particularly methodologies that detect intentional adulteration and tests
that are suitable for inspections of food at ports of entry to the U.S.
• FDA, in direct coordination with the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC) and USDA, is charged with coordinating the surveillance
of zoonotic diseases.
• FDA assists the Secretary, other HHS operating divisions, and federal and
state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) government partners in response to
bioterrorism and other public health emergencies.
Public Health
Emergency
Declaration 319 of
the Public Health
Service Act
Allows HHS to determine that (a) a disease or disorder presents a public health
emergency or (b) that a public health emergency, including significant outbreaks
of infectious disease or bioterrorist attack, otherwise exists.
Public Law No:
115-43 Securing
our Agriculture and
Food Act
To amend the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to make the Assistant Secretary of
Homeland Security for Health Affairs responsible for coordinating the efforts of
the Department of Homeland Security related to food, agriculture, and veterinary
defense against terrorism, and for other purposes
9 CFR 53
Foot and Mouth Disease, Pleuropneumonia, Rinderpest, and Certain Other
Communicable Diseases of Livestock or Poultry
9 CFR 71.2
Secretary of Agriculture rule governing quarantine and interstate movement of
diseased animals, including poultry
9 CFR 71.3
Interstate movement of diseased animals and poultry is generally prohibited
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 84
9 CFR Part 121
implements the provisions of the Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of
2002 setting forth the requirements for possession, use, and transfer of select
agents and toxins
7 CFR Part 331. 9
implements the provisions of the Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of
2002 setting forth the requirements for possession, use, and transfer of select
agents and toxins
32 CFR PART 185
Establishes policy and assigns responsibilities for Defense Support to Civil
Authorities (DSCA), also referred to as civil support
42 CFR Part 73
Implements the provisions of the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism
Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 setting forth the requirements for
possession, use, and transfer of select agents and toxins
Endangered
Species Act, 16
U.S.C 1531 et seq.
Discusses the USDA role in assisting in emergencies to protect natural, cultural,
and historic resources. Protects endangered and threatened species and their
habitats by prohibiting the “take” of listed animals, except under federal (U.S.
Fish and Wildlife Service) permit
Title 9 of the CFR
Provides detailed USDA Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS)
administrative regulations for the control and eradication of animal diseases,
including foreign animal diseases and emerging animal diseases
21 US Code
• 21 US Code §134a: USDA authorization for seizure, quarantine, and
disposal of livestock and poultry to guard against introduction or
dissemination of communicable disease.
• 21 US Code §113a: USDA authorization to establish research laboratories,
including the acquisition of necessary land, building, or facilities, and
technical experts or scientists
• 21 US Code §451 et seq.: Poultry Products Inspection Act: USDA
authorization to ensure the safety of the nation’s supply of poultry and
poultry products, to inspect and retain/seize/and/or detain adulterated poultry
and poultry products, to inspect and retain/seize/and/or detain adulterated
poultry and poultry products
• 21 US Code §601 et seq.: Federal Meat Inspection Act: USDA
authorization to ensure the safety of the nation’s supply of meat and meat
products
• 21 US Code §1031 et seq.: Egg Products Inspection Act: USDA
authorization to ensure the safety of egg products distributed in commerce,
to inspect and retain/seize/and/or detain adulterated egg products
Animal Health
Protection Act, 7
U.S. Code §8301 et
seq.
In instances when the Secretary of Agriculture determines that because of the
presence in the U.S. of a pest or disease of livestock and that the presence of the
pest or disease threatens the livestock of the U.S., the Secretary (may declare an)
“Extraordinary Emergency” and may take measures in a state to control or limit
the spread of such diseases or pests.
• Grants USDA APHIS permanent and general regulatory authority. Gives the
Secretary of Agriculture authority to prevent, detect control and eradicate
diseases and pests of animals, including foreign animal and emerging
diseases, in order to protect animal health, the health and welfare of people,
economic interests of livestock and related industries, the environment, and
interstate and foreign commerce in animals and other articles.
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 85
• 7 U.S. Code §8303-8305: Authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to
prohibit or restrict the importation, entry, or interstate movement of any
animal, article, or means of conveyance to prevent the introduction into, or
dissemination within the United States of any pest or disease of livestock.
• 7 U.S. Code §8308: Authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to carry out
operations and measures to detect, control, or eradicate any pest of disease of
livestock, including poultry.
• 7 U.S. Code §8315: Authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to promulgate
regulations and issue orders to carry out the Animal Health Protection Act.
Animal Welfare
Act
7 U.S.C. Chapter
54
• Emergency confiscation of animals under authority of the Animal Welfare
Act for certain egregious violations of the Act and accompanying
regulations.
• Monitor the health and welfare of animals at regulated facilities.
Plant Protection
Act, 7 U.S.C. 7701
et seq.:
If the Secretary of Agriculture determines that an extraordinary emergency exists
because of the presence of a plant pest/pathogen or noxious weed that is new to
or not known to be widely prevalent in or distributed within and throughout the
U.S. and that the presence of the plant pest/pathogen or noxious weed threatens
plants or plant products of the U.S., the Secretary may:
• Hold, seize, quarantine, treat, apply other remedial measures to, destroy or
otherwise dispose of any plant, biological control organism, plant product,
article, or means of conveyance that the Secretary has reason to believe is
infested with the plant pest or noxious weed.
• Quarantine, treat, or apply other remedial measures to any premises,
including any plants, biological control organisms, plant products, articles,
or means of conveyance on the premises that the Secretary has reason to
believe is infested with the plant pest or noxious weed.
• Quarantine any state or portion of a state in which the Secretary finds the
plant pest or noxious weed or any plant, biological control organism, plant
product, article, or means of conveyance that the Secretary has reason to
believe is infested with the plant pest or noxious weed.
• Prohibit or restrict the movement within a state of any plant, biological
control organism, plant product, article, or means of conveyance when the
Secretary determines that the prohibition or restriction is necessary to
prevent the dissemination of the plant pest or noxious weed or to eradicate
the plant.
• Authorizes USDA to take appropriate actions to guard against plant
pests/pathogens and noxious weeds and to promulgate or change
existing regulations to facilitate control or eradication. Authorizes
USDA to regulate the movement of plant pests/pathogens and noxious
weeds and their carriers into and through the U.S. and to take
emergency actions, issue quarantines, and modify or create
regulations to control the spread of a pest/pathogen.
Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act
(FIFRA) 7 U.S.C
§136 et seq. (1996)
• Provides for federal regulation of pesticide distribution, sale, and use. All
pesticides distributed or sold in the U.S. must be registered (licensed) by the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Before EPA may register a
pesticide under FIFRA, the applicant must show, among other things, that
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 86
using the pesticide according to specifications “will not generally cause
unreasonable adverse effects on the environment.”
• Defines the term “unreasonable adverse effects on the environment” to mean
“(1) any unreasonable risk to man or the environment, taking into account
the economic, social, and environmental costs and benefits of the use of any
pesticide, or (2) a human dietary risk from residues that result from a use of
a pesticide in or on any food inconsistent with the standard under section
408 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.”
Agricultural
Bioterrorism
Protection Act, 7
U.S.C. §8301 et
seq.
Authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to regulate the possession, use, and
transfer of biological agents and toxins that could have a severe impact on plants
or plant products.
Dairy Indemnity
Payment Program
Public Law 90-484
Section 3 as
amended by Public
Law 113-79, 7
U.S.C. 450j-l and 7
C.F.R. 760.1-
760.33
Under the Dairy Indemnity Payment Program (DIPP), the Farm Service Agency
is authorized to make payments to dairy farmers for milk and manufacturers of
dairy products who, through no fault of their own, have been directed by a public
agency to remove their milk or dairy products from commercial markets because
of the residues of certain chemicals. Under the DIPP, payments are also
authorized to be made to dairy producers when they are directed to remove their
raw milk from the commercial market because it has been contaminated by
nuclear radiation or fallout, or toxic substances and chemical residues other than
pesticides.
Emergency Loan
Program, under the
Consolidated Farm
and Rural
Development Act,
7 U.S.C. §1921, et
seq.
Under the Emergency Loan Program, the Farm Service Agency is authorized to
provide direct and guarantee loans to farms and ranchers who are U.S.
individuals and who operate family farms that have been substantially affected
by a quarantine imposed by the Secretary under the Plant Protection Act or the
animal quarantine laws, a natural disaster, or by a major disaster or emergency
designated by the President under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and
Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 5121 et seq.).
Health Insurance
Portability and
Accountability Act
Privacy Rule, 45
CFR Parts 160 and
164
Protecting public health, including through public health surveillance, program
evaluation, terrorism preparedness, outbreak investigations, and other public
health activities often requires access to or the reporting of individually
identifiable health information of individuals, referred to as protected health
information. This information is used to identify, monitor, and respond to
disease, death, and disability among populations.
The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act Privacy Rule
recognizes the legitimate need for public health authorities and certain others to
have access to protected health information for public health purposes and the
importance of public health reporting by covered entities to identify threats to
the public and individuals. Thus, the Privacy Rule permits covered entities to
disclose protected health information without authorization for specified public
health purposes.
Title 18, USC
(Sections 175, 176,
229, 831, 1038,
2332a and 2283)
Defines crimes and criminal procedure. Several sections within Title 18,
specifically section 175, 175a, b, and c; 176; and 2332a provide key
authorities for the FBI to implement its unique role as the lead law enforcement
entity of the Federal Government.
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 87
• Section 175 (Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act) and the associated
subparts make knowingly developing, producing, stockpiling, transferring,
acquiring, retaining, or possessing any biological agent, toxin, or delivery
system for use as a weapon, or knowingly assisting a foreign state or any
organization to do so, or attempting, threatening, or conspiring to do the
same a crime. There is extraterritorial federal jurisdiction over an offense
under this section committed by or against a national of the U.S.
• Section 176 and the associated subparts define the circumstances and
procedure under which the Attorney General may request the issuance of a
warrant authoring the seizure of any biological agent, toxin, or delivery
system that pertains to activities defined in section 175.
• Section 229 and the associated subparts makes it unlawful for any person
knowingly to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, transfer directly or
indirectly, receive, stockpile, retain, own, possess, or use, or threaten to use,
any chemical weapon or to assist or induce, in any way, any person to
violate paragraph (1), or to attempt or conspire to violate paragraph (1).
• Section 831 and the associated subparts makes whoever...without lawful
authority, intentionally receives, possesses, uses, transfers, alters, disposes
of, or disperses any nuclear material or nuclear byproduct material and—(a)
thereby knowingly causes the death of or serious bodily injury to any person
or substantial damage to property or to the environment or (b) circumstances
exist, or have been represented to the defendant to exist, that are likely to
cause the death or serious bodily injury to any person, or substantial damage
to property or to the environment...knowingly threatens to use nuclear
material or nuclear byproduct material to cause death or serious bodily
injury to any person or substantial damage to property or to the environment
under circumstances in which the threat may reasonably be understood as an
expression of serious purposes—a crime.
• Section 1038 makes whoever engages in any conduct with intent to convey
false or misleading information under circumstances where such information
may reasonably be believed and where such information indicates that an
activity has taken, is taking, or will take place a crime.
• Section 2332a defines the activities that constitute a crime using weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) including biological agents, toxins, or vectors.
• Section 2283 and the associated subparts makes it unlawful for whoever
knowingly transports aboard any vessel within the United States and on
waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States or any vessel outside
the United States and on the high seas or having United States nationality an
explosive or incendiary device, biological agent, chemical weapon, or
radioactive or nuclear material, knowing that any such item is intended to be
used to commit an offense listed in 2332(b).
The 9/11
Commission Act of
2007
The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act (9/11
Commission Act) established within DHS the National Biosurveillance
Integration Center. The Center is tasked with enhancing the capability of the
Federal Government to rapidly identify, characterize, localize, and track
biological incidents of national concern by integrating and analyzing data related
to human health, animal, plant, food, and environmental monitoring systems and
to disseminate alerts if any such incidents are detected. A central responsibility
is to develop and oversee the National Biosurveillance Integration System, a
federal interagency consortium and information management concept that was
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 88
established to integrate and analyze biosurveillance-relevant information to
achieve earlier detection and enhanced situational awareness.
Robert T. Stafford
Disaster Relief and
Emergency
Assistance Act
• The Stafford Act authorizes the programs and processes by which
the Federal Government provides disaster and emergency
assistance to SLTT governments, tribal nations, eligible private
nonprofit organizations, and individuals affected by a declared
major disaster or emergency.
• The Stafford Act covers all hazards, including natural disasters
and terrorist incidents.
• At the request of the Governor of an affected state, or a Chief
Executive of an affected Indian Tribe, the president may declare a
major disaster or emergency if an incident is beyond the combined
response capabilities of the state, tribal, and jurisdictional
governments. Among other things, this declaration allows federal
assistance to be mobilized and directed in support of state, tribal,
and jurisdictional response efforts. Under the Stafford Act (42
U.S.C. §5191), the president can also declare an emergency
without a gubernatorial request if primary responsibility for
response rests with the Federal Government because the
emergency involves a subject area for which the U.S. exercises
exclusive responsibility and authority. In addition, in the absence
of a specific request, the president may provide accelerated federal
assistance and federal support where necessary to save lives,
prevent human suffering, or mitigate severe damage and notify the
state of that activity.
Public Law 109-
308 (PETS Act)
The Pets Evacuation and Transportation Standards Act ensures that SLTT
emergency standards (PETS) Act of 2006 amend the Robert T. Stafford Disaster
Relief and Emergency Assistance Act preparedness operational plans address the
needs of individuals with household pets and serviceanimals following a major
disaster or emergency
33 U.S.C. Clean
Water Act
The Clean Water Act (CWA) establishes the basic structure for regulating
discharges of pollutants into the surface waters of the U.S. and establishing
quality standards for those waters. Under the CWA, EPA has implemented water
pollution control programs such as setting wastewater standards for industry.
EPA oversees water quality standards programs established by the States, and
where applicable, tribes. The CWA made it unlawful to discharge any pollutant
from a point source into waters of the U.S., unless authorized, for example,
through a permit.
National
Emergencies Act
Authorizes the president to declare a national emergency. A declaration under
National Emergencies Act triggers emergency authorities contained in other
federal statutes.
Occupational
Safety and Health
Act 1970
Passed to prevent workers from being killed or seriously harmed at work. This
law created the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), which
sets and enforces protective workplace safety and health standards. OSHA also
provides information, training, and assistance to employers and workers.
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 89
OSHA’s role primarily is to provide oversight and guidance for federal
departments and agencies: individual occupational safety and health programs
through the Designated Agency Safety and Health Official and agency safety
and health management staff.
Executive Order (EO) 12196, Occupational Safety and Health Programs for
Federal Employees (Feb. 26, 1980), as amended, extends protections provided
under OSHA to most private sector employees. Generally, federal employer
responsibilities under the EO and OSHA apply no matter where the federal
employee is located (e.g., outside the continental U.S.).
Economy Act, 31
U.S.C.
In the absence of, or in addition to, the Stafford Act, the Economy Act can be
used by lead federal agencies to request goods or services, on a reimbursable
basis, from other federal agencies. However, use of the Economy Act is limited
to circumstances in which the head of the requesting federal agency determines
that the support cannot be provided by contract as conveniently or cheaply by a
commercial enterprise.
Defense Production
Act of 1950 (DPA)
The DPA is the primary source of presidential authority to expedite and expand
the supply of critical resources from the U.S. industrial base to support the
national defense and homeland security. In addition to military, energy, and
space activities, the DPA definition of “national defense” includes emergency
preparedness activities conducted pursuant to Title VI of the Stafford Act,
protection and restoration of critical infrastructure, and efforts to prevent, reduce
vulnerability to, minimize damage from, and recover from acts of terrorism
within the U.S. The President’s DPA authorities are delegated to the heads of
various federal departments in Executive Order 13603. DPA, however, does not
necessarily increase the production of critical resources if those production lines
are already operating at a maximum capacity and the demand for such resources
are high resulting in significant national shortages.
Authority to require acceptance and priority performance of contracts and orders
to promote national defense. Defense Priorities and Allocations System,
administered by the Department of Commerce, governs use of Defense Production
Act priorities and allocations authority for most materials, services, and facilities
available from the U.S. industrial base. FEMA has been delegated authority to
place Defense Priorities and Allocations System priority ratings in contracts and
orders supporting most DHS/FEMA missions to ensure timely delivery of critical
resources.
• Through its priority procurement authority, private sector
contractors, vendors, suppliers are required to give preferential
treatment for contracts and orders. This authority can ensure
timely delivery of materials and services from private businesses
to restore power disruptions. Priority ratings can be placed on
either government (local, state, federal) or private sector contracts.
• The authority to allocate materials, services, and facilities, as
needed or appropriate to respond to or recover from a food or
agriculture incident.
• Voluntary agreements under the DPA could be used to facilitate
cooperation among business competitors to protect or restore
systems in connection with food or agriculture incidents.
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 90
Participants in a voluntary agreement are granted relief from
antitrust laws.
• The installation of government-owned equipment authority could
be used to expedite and prioritize restoration of both public and
private power infrastructure disrupted by either natural or man-
caused hazards.
Comprehensive
Environmental
Response,
Compensation, and
Liability Act,” 42
U.S.C. §9601 et
seq. (1980)
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(CERCLA), commonly referred to as Superfund, was enacted to provide
response authorities to actual or potential releases (1) of hazardous substances or
(2) of pollutants or contaminants that may present an imminent and substantial
danger to public health or welfare. An animal or plant pathogen may be
considered a “pollutant or contaminant” when it meets the definition in
CERCLA. CERCLA’s implementing regulation is the National Oil and
Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP) (40 CFR Part 300).
For an actual or threatened release to the environment, CERCLA provides the
EPA and the United States Coast Guard (USCG) with the authority to gather
information, collect samples, and take action to contain and mitigate the threat.
Executive Order 12580 (January 23, 1987) and the NCP also include
responsibilities for other federal agencies regarding releases on or from facilities
or vessels under their jurisdiction, custody or control. CERCLA also gives the
Federal Government the authority to compel responsible parties to respond to
releases of hazardous substances (but not to releases of pollutants or
contaminants).
Resource
Conservation and
Recovery Act
(RCRA)
• Under RCRA, EPA issues regulations and guidelines to properly manage
nonhazardous (Subtitle D) and hazardous (Subtitle C) solid wastes and
provides support and technical assistance to SLTT governments on how
these wastes can be best managed. The RCRA regulations generally define a
solid waste as hazardous waste if it: 1) is a listed waste (40 CFR §261.30-
261.33), or 2) exhibits specific characteristics (40 CFR §261.20-261.24).
States (except for Alaska and Iowa) have the primary responsibility to
implement the hazardous waste regulations and play the lead role in
implementing nonhazardous waste programs. They can impose more
stringent requirements than the federal program. All regulated hazardous
wastes should be managed in appropriate hazardous waste treatment,
storage, and disposal facilities that comply with federal, state, and local
regulations. For more information on the federal regulations that apply to
hazardous waste management (see https://www.epa.gov/hw).
• Nonhazardous solid waste management is primarily regulated at the state
level. EPA has established national regulations for nonhazardous solid waste
disposal facilities under RCRA (40 CFR § 257-258), and provides support
and technical assistance to SLTT governments on how nonhazardous wastes
can be best managed. All nonhazardous wastes should be managed in
appropriate facilities that comply with applicable federal, state, and local
regulations.
National
Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA)
NEPA requires federal agencies to assess the environmental effects of their
proposed actions prior to making decisions.
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 91
Clean Air Act
(CAA) 42 U.S.C.
§7401 et seq.
(1970)
The CAA is the comprehensive federal law that regulates air emissions from
stationary and mobile sources. Among other things, this law authorizes EPA to
establish National Ambient Air Quality Standards to protect public health and
public welfare and to regulate emissions of hazardous air pollutants
National Security
Act of 1947
This Act realigned and reorganized the U.S. Armed Forces, foreign policy, and
Intelligence Community apparatus and officially made the FBI a member of the
Intelligence Community. By having both law enforcement and intelligence
community responsibilities, the FBI plays as key role in investigations,
intelligence collection, and analysis
Title 28, CFR,
Section 0.85
Outlines the investigative and other responsibilities of the FBI. Specific
paragraphs within this section provide the FBI authorities in support of this
annex:
• Paragraph (a) directs the FBI to investigate violations of United
States law and collect evidence in cases in which the U.S. is or
may be a party of interest, except in cases where responsibility is
by statue or assigned to another investigative agency.
• Paragraph (d) directs the FBI to take charge of investigative work
in matters relating to espionage, sabotage, subversive activities,
and other related matters, including investigating any potential
violation of the Arms Export Control Act, the Export
Administration Act, the Trading with the Enemy Act, or the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act relating to any
foreign counterintelligence.
• Paragraph (e) directs the FBI to establish and conduct law
enforcement training programs to provide training for SLTT law
enforcement personnel and to develop new approaches, technique,
systems, equipment, and devices to improve and strengthen law
enforcement and assist in conducting SLTT training programs.
• Paragraph (g) directs the FBI to operate the FBI Laboratory to
serve not only the FBI, but also to provide, without costs,
technical and scientific assistance for all law enforcement
agencies, other organizational units of the DOJ, and other federal
agencies, which may desire to avail themselves of service
6 U.S. Code
Section 313
(2) Specific activities in support of the primary mission of the Federal
Emergency Management Agency, the Administrator shall—
(A) Lead the nation’s efforts to prepare for, protect against, respond to,
recover from, and mitigate against the risk of natural disasters, acts of
terrorism, and other man-made disasters, including catastrophic incidents.
(B) Partner with SLTT governments and emergency response providers, with
other federal agencies, with the private sector, and with nongovernmental
organizations to build a national system of emergency management that
can effectively and efficiently utilize the full measure of the nation’s
resources to respond to natural disasters, acts of terrorism, and other man-
made disasters, including catastrophic incidents.
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 92
Executive Orders and Presidential Directives
Table 9: Executive Orders and Presidential Directives
10
This does not include those activities that may interfere with the authority of the Attorney General or the FBI
Director as described in PPD-8.
Title
Description
Homeland Security
Presidential
Directive-5:
Management of
Domestic Incidents
• HSPD-5 enhances the ability of the U.S. to manage domestic
incidents by directing the establishment of a single,
comprehensive National Incident Management System. This
management system provides a consistent nationwide approach to
prepare for, respond to, and recover from domestic incidents. The
system allows all levels of government throughout the nation to
work together efficiently and effectively.
• In HSPD-5, the President designated the Secretary of Homeland
Security as the Principal Federal Official for domestic incident
management. As such, the DHS Secretary is responsible for coordinating
preparedness activities and operations within the U.S. to respond to and
recover from terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies. As
part of these responsibilities, the Secretary coordinates federal entities to
ensure federal unity of effort for domestic incident management.
10
The
DHS Secretary coordinates the Federal Government’s resources utilized
in response to or recovery from terrorist attacks, major disasters, or other
emergencies if and when any one of the following four conditions
applies: (1) a federal department or agency acting under its own
authority has requested the assistance of the Secretary, (2) the resources
of SLTT authorities are overwhelmed and federal assistance has been
requested by the appropriate SLTT authorities, (3) more than one federal
department or agency has become substantially involved in responding
to the incident, or (4) the Secretary has been directed to assume
responsibility for managing the domestic incident by the President.
• It is within the purview/at the discretion of the Secretary of Homeland
Security as to how he/she will execute their HSPD-5 responsibilities.
Presidential Policy
Directive (PPD)-2
Implementation of
the National
Strategy for
Countering
Biological Threats
2009
The strategy in PPD-2 will guide our efforts to prevent biological incidents by
reducing the risk that misuse of the life sciences or derivative materials,
techniques, or expertise will result in the use or intent to use biological agents to
cause harm. It also complements existing policies, plans, and preparations to
advance our ability to respond to public health crises of natural, accidental, or
deliberate origin.
Presidential Policy
Directive-8:
National
Preparedness 2011
PPD-8, signed in March of 2011 by President Barack Obama, directed the
systematic development of a series of policy and planning documents to enhance
national preparedness across five mission areas: Prevention, Protection,
Mitigation, Response, and Recovery. PPD-8 also called for the development of a
National Planning System to integrate planning across all levels of government
with the use of private and nonprofit sectors to deliver key capabilities.
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 93
Homeland Security
Presidential
Directive-9:
Defense of United
States Agriculture
and Food
HSPD-9 has been codified into law by Public Law No: 115-43. Establishes a
national policy to defend agriculture, food, and water systems. This directive
charges the Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the
Director of Central Intelligence with developing and enhancing intelligence
operations and analysis capabilities focusing on the agriculture, food, and water
sectors. The Secretary of Homeland Security and the Attorney General are
responsible for working with the heads of other appropriate departments and
agencies to prioritize, develop, and implement mitigation strategies to protect
vulnerable critical nodes of production or processing from the introduction of
diseases, pest, or poisonous agents. Assistant Secretary for Health Affairs, shall
carry out a program to coordinate the Department’s efforts related to defending
the food, agriculture, and veterinary systems of the United States against
terrorism and other high-consequence incidents that pose a high risk to homeland
security.
Presidential Policy
Directive-9
PPD-9 directs maintenance of the veterinary national stockpile.
Presidential
Memorandum on
the Support for
National
Biodefense
Section 1. Policy. (a) It is the policy of the United States to preserve our national
and economic security by protecting the Nation from biological threats. Acting
within the biodefense enterprise, the United States Government will undertake
actions at home and with partners abroad to reduce the risk of natural, accidental,
and deliberate biological threats to humans, animals, agriculture, and the
environment that have the potential to significantly affect the national and
economic security of the United States.
National Security
Policy Directive
(NSPD)-33/HSPD-
10: National Policy
for Biodefense
Defines a comprehensive framework for biodefense. This directive charges the
FBI, through the Attorney General, to coordinate domestic intelligence gathering
and counterterrorism activities of other members of the law enforcement
community to detect, preempt, and disrupt terrorist attacks against the U.S. using
WMD, including biological agents and toxins. The Directive directs the
establishment of the National Bioforensic Analysis Center (NBFAC) under DHS
to conduct and facilitate bioforensic analysis in support of the lead federal
agency (historically the role is given to the FBI to act as the lead agency for
investigating acts of terrorism; this support has been provide strictly to the FBI
in all but a few cases).
Presidential Policy
Directive-44
Enhances the ability of the Federal Government to respond to domestic incidents
by providing for the timely identification of a lead federal agency, when
appropriate and by ensuring that an appropriate incident management capability
is available to support Federal domestic incident response efforts.
Homeland Security
Presidential
Directive-21:
Public Health and
Medical
Preparedness 2007
HSPD-21 (October 2007) mandates the development of a national strategy for
public health and medical preparedness that built upon principles set forth in
HSPD-10. HSPD-21 identifies four critical components of public health and
medical preparedness—biosurveillance, countermeasure distribution, mass
casualty care, and community resilience—and establishes federal agency
planning requirements in each of these areas. The directives establish a formal
mechanism for an annual review of the SNS composition. The directives also
address planning in the areas of risk awareness, education and training, and
disaster health systems. The directive outlines the requirement for DHS, in
coordination with HHS, to communicate risks to public health posed by relevant
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 94
Waivers
Table 10: Waivers
threats and establishes a mechanism to provide up-to-date and specific public
health threat information to qualified heads of SLTT governments.
Executive Order
12333
Further defines the FBI’s role as the lead intelligence community component
charged with domestic intelligence collection related to espionage and other
threats and activities directed by foreign powers or their intelligence services
against the U.S. and its interests; threats to the U.S. and its interest from
terrorism.
MMPA 16 USC
1371
Discussion of subsistence use of marine mammals for food by native Alaskans
Lead
Agency
Description
FEMA
During an emergency, waivers can be offered on reporting requirements, enabling
responders to focus more fully on the restoration efforts.
FEMA
Waivers can be used to remove the need for State cost-share under the Stafford Act, in
order to accelerate the government components of the response.
FDA
Under an Emergency Use Authorization, the FDA Commissioner may allow emergency
use of an unapproved medical product (e.g., drug, vaccine, diagnostic) or an unapproved
emergency use of an approved medical product to diagnose, treat, or prevent a serious or
life-threatening disease or condition caused by a chemical, biological, radiological, or
nuclear threat agent, including an emerging infectious disease, when there is no
adequate, approved, and available alternatives, and when all other statutory criteria under
section 564 of the FD&C Act are met.
FDA
When certain determinations and declarations have been made concerning an emergency
or potential emergency, FDA may authorize the use of certain human drugs and devices,
and animal drugs, intended to address chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear
threats when that use has not otherwise been approved or cleared under the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act. The authorizations will specify conditions that will apply to the
uses authorized. In certain emergency circumstances, FDA may also permit the use of
certain approved or cleared drugs or devices for such uses that are to be used beyond
their labeled expiration dating, that deviate from current good manufacturing practices in
certain respects, that are dispensed without a prescription that would otherwise be
required, or that are sold with instruction for use, created by CDC that deviate somewhat
from FDA-approved labeling.
DOT
Toll waivers, which may be issued on a case-by-case basis by the state, local authority,
or private entity that owns the specific piece of tolled infrastructure, can be used in
certain emergency situations to expedite response processes.
EPA
Under FIFRA section 18, the EPA Administrator may exempt any federal or state agency
from any provision of FIFRA if it is determined that emergency conditions exist that
require such exemption. This provision may be applicable, for example, when a serious
pest problem jeopardizes production of agricultural goods or public health, but no
pesticides are currently registered for that situation.
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 95
Source Documents and References
The following tables provide some examples of source documents and references for federal
departments and agencies and industry stakeholders. These tables are not an exhaustive list but
provide some insight into the key resources used in a food or agriculture incident.
Table 11: Source Documents and References
Federal Department and Agency Source Documents and References
The Federal Anti-Tampering Act (FATA), 18 U.S.C. 1365, authorizes FDA to investigate
any tampering of FDA-regulated consumer products (Federal Anti-Tampering Act Website)
The Code of Federal Regulations - Title 21, Chapter I is the portion of the CFR that
governs FDA-regulated products within the U.S. for FDA. The regulations described within
Chapter I of CFR 21 are enforced by FDA, based on the Food Drug and Cosmetic Act and
other applicable laws (Code of Federal Regulations - Title 21)
Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 3025.18, Defense Support of Civil Authorities
(DSCA) December 29, 2010; Incorporating Change 2, Effecive March 19. 2018:
Establishes DOD policy and assisgns responsibilties for DSCA; provides guidance for the
execution and oversight of DSCA; authorizes the use of immediate response authority.
DOD Instruction (DODI) Public Health and Medical Services Support of Civil
Authorities", January 30, 2017
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 96
Appendix 4: Roles and Responsibilities for Response
and Recovery to a Large-Scale Food or agriculture
Incident
This section details the roles and responsibilities of federal departments and agencies that may be
involved in the response to and recovery from a large-scale food or agriculture incident. This list
represents the most prominent stakeholders and leaders and is not exhaustive; additional agencies
may be called upon to support these primary response and recovery agencies.
Federal and Regional Government Offices
Federal response and recovery support following a food and agriculture incident must be
coordinated closely with SLTT governments and jurisdictional federal agencies located in areas
affected by the incident. The following departments, agencies, and offices may play a role in
response and recovery:
• Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)
o Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR)
o Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
o Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
o Administration for Children and Families (ACF)
o Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA)
o National Institutes of Health (NIH)
o Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA)
o Indian Health Service (IHS)
• U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)
o Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS)
o Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS)
o U.S. Forest Service (FS)
o Agricultural Research Service (ARS)
o Foreign Agriculture Service (FAS)
o Office of Homeland Security (OHS)
o Farm Service Agency
o Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS)
o Rural Development (RD)
o Food and Nutrition Service (FNS)
o Office of Inspector General (OIG)
• Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
o Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
o Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA)
o Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
o Science and Technology Directorate (S&T)
o Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office (CWMD)
• Department of Justice (DOJ)
o Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 97
• Department of Defense (DOD)
o Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense & Global
Security
o Defense Health Agency
o Affected Combatant Commands
• Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
• General Services Administration (GSA)
• Department of State (DOS)
• Department of Transportation (DOT)
o Office of the Secretary/Office of Intelligence, Security, and Emergency Response
o National Highway and Traffic Safety Administration Pipeline and Hazardous
Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA)
• U.S. Department of the Interior (DOI)
o U.S. Geological Survey (USGS)
o Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS)
o National Parks Service (NPS)
o Bureau of Land Management (BLM)
o Bureau of Indian Affairs
• Department of Labor (DOL)
o Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)
• Department of Commerce (DOC)
o National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
▪ National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS)
• Office of Personnel Management (OPM)
• Department of Veterans Affairs (VA)
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)
HHS is the principal agency for protecting the health of all Americans and providing essential
human services, especially for those who are least able to help themselves. The mission of HHS
is to enhance the health and well-being of Americans by providing for effective health and
human services and by fostering sound, sustained advances in the sciences underlying medicine,
public health, and social services.
In addition to federal statutes, a number of national strategies and presidential directives establish
HHS as the lead federal department responsible for the protection of the health of the civilian
population against all health-related incidents including those in the food and agriculture sector.
HHS is also responsible for coordinating with other federal agencies and impacted state, local,
tribal, and territorial (SLTT); private sector; and nongovernmental partners, as appropriate, in
responding to food and agriculture incidents that negatively affect human health. The Secretary
of HHS leads all federal public health and medical response to public health and medical
emergencies covered by the National Response Framework (NRF).
Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR)
ASPR, created under Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act (PAHPA) after Hurricane
Katrina, leads the nation and its communities in preparing for, responding to, and recovering
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 98
from the adverse health effects relating to public health emergencies and disasters. ASPR focuses
on public health and medical preparedness planning and response; assisting locally led recovery
efforts in the restoration of the public health, health care, and social services networks of
impacted communities; building federal emergency medical operational capabilities; medical
countermeasures research; advanced development and acquisition; and grants to strengthen the
capabilities of hospitals and healthcare systems in public health emergencies and medical
disasters. ASPR leads the Public Health Emergency Medical Countermeasures Enterprise, which
comprises the CDC, NIH, FDA, and interagency partners DHS, DOD, VA, and USDA.
Additionally, ASPR, in collaboration with CDC, and in coordination with Secretary of DHS,
exercises the responsibilities and authorities of the HHS Secretary with respect to the Strategic
National Stockpile (SNS). The office provides federal support, including medical professionals
through ASPR’s National Disaster Medical System (NDMS), to augment SLTT capabilities
during an emergency or disaster.
HHS leads all federal public health and medical response to public health emergencies and
incidents. Consistent with provisions established in statutes under the PAHPA and Pandemic and
All-Hazards Preparedness Reauthorization Act (PAHPRA), the Secretary of HHS delegates to
ASPR the leadership role for all health and medical services support function in a health
emergency or public health incident and lead responsibility within the department for emergency
preparedness and response policy coordination and strategic direction. Additionally, HHS ASPR
manages the International Health Regulations (IHR National Focal Point (NFP), consisting of the
ASPR, the IHR program, and the HHS Secretary’s Operations Center, which serves as the
official pathway for notifications to the World Health Organization of incidents that may have
potential international impact.
ASPR serves as the principal advisor to the Secretary of HHS on all matters related to federal
public health and medical emergency management for public health emergency. ASPR supports
the Secretary of HHS in the execution of their responsibilities to lead the federal public health
and medical response to emergencies under ESF #8 of the National Response Framework in
support of federal and SLTT requests for assistance. ASPR also leads the Health and Social
Services Recovery Support Function (RSF) of the National Disaster Recovery Framework to
assist locally led recovery efforts in the restoration of the public health, health care, and social
services networks of affected individuals and communities.
ASPR manages a diverse portfolio of programs to ensure that ASPR has the plans, procedures,
logistical support, systems, and training to support emergency operations and response needs and
enhance readiness.
U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
The CDC is an operational component of HHS responsible for the nation’s health protection. The
CDC’s administration, scientists, and staff track diseases, research outbreaks, and respond to
emergencies to protect the nation from health, safety, and security threats, both foreign and in the
United States. The CDC performs many critical functions to effectively prepare for, respond to,
and recover from any incident that has significant human health impacts, including those relating
to a food or agriculture incident. The following list outlines some of the CDC’s functions in a
food or agriculture incident:
• Provide technical assistance to SLTT, federal, and industry partners to support public
health activities;
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 99
• Provide laboratory support for the identification, quantification, confirmation,
characterization, and drug susceptibility of biological, chemical and radiological agents
and pathogens of concern;
• Provide environmental assessment consultations and/or conduct environmental sampling
to support epidemiologic and surveillance activities and identify exposure pathways to
support implementation of intervention strategies;
• Provide guidance on identification, diagnosis, and clinical management of human cases;
• Distribute MCMs as required/directed;
• Provide guidance on use of MCMs (e.g., antimicrobials, vaccines, and
immunotherapeutics);
• Develop effective infection control practice recommendations for healthcare settings
when the incident involves a communicable disease;
• Provide guidance on non-pharmaceutical mitigation strategies to assist with the
containment and control of infectious agents;
• Provide expertise and technical support in the characterization and mitigation of
occupational safety and health hazards workers face during response and recovery;
• Coordinates the development and dissemination of key public health messaging to
provide timely, accurate, clear, consistent, credible, and easily accessible information
relevant to the information needs of all stakeholders, easily accessible information
includes information in alternate formats for persons with access and functional needs
and in languages other than English for persons with limited English proficiency, as
appropriate;
• Provide guidance in coordination with USDA on threats to human health from exposed
animals, their clinical management, and appropriate animal population control measures;
• Provide rapid and sustained public health assessment, leadership, expertise, and support
by deploying personnel both to the impacted area and to the CDC EOC (and other
emergency operation centers) for technical and administrative mission support; and
• Conduct epidemiologic and surveillance activities to define cases, identify the
populations at risk, and determine the source of exposure.
Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
FDA is responsible for protecting and promoting the public health by, among other things,
ensuring the safety and effectiveness of human and veterinary drugs, cosmetics, biological
products, medical devices, and tobacco products and ensuring the safety and security of the
nation’s food supply. FDA’s Medical Countermeasures Initiative (MCMsi) led by the Office of
Counterterrorism and Emerging Threats (OCET) provides strategic leadership and coordination
for FDA’s counterterrorism and emerging threat portfolios and works to identify and resolve
complex scientific and regulatory challenges facing medical countermeasure development,
approval, availability, and security. OCET coordinates FDA’s MCMsi, facilitates relevant intra-
and interagency counterterrorism communications, and coordinates MCMsi emergency use,
including Emergency Use Authorization, activities. The FDA has a number of authorities related
to providing access to investigational and/or unapproved, or unapproved uses of approved,
medical products for emergency use.
Office of Foods and Veterinary Medicine (OFVM)
The Office of Foods and Veterinary Medicine (OFVM) provides executive leadership and
strategic direction to the OFVM programs to protect and promote the health of humans and
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 100
animals by ensuring the safety of the U.S. food supply, food additives, and dietary supplements
as well as the safety of animal food and the safety and effectiveness of animal drugs. OFVM is
responsible for leading FDA’s efforts in responding to foodborne outbreaks and adulteration.
OFVM programs lead the implementation of FDA’s roles and responsibilities in the FSMA.
Office of Coordinated Outbreak Response and Evaluation Network (CORE)
The Office of Coordinated Outbreak Response and Evaluation (CORE) Network is a component
of CFSAN and is responsible for coordinating and managing response activities related to
incidents involving multiple illnesses linked to FDA-regulated human food, cosmetic, dietary
supplement, and infant formula products. In addition to responding to outbreaks, CORE includes
a signals and surveillance component to improve early detection of incidents in order to limit or
prevent illnesses, as well as a post-response component that looks to implement lessons learned
from outbreaks into preventive strategies to minimize future outbreaks. The CORE Network
includes not only the CORE staff but FDA’s field and headquarters staff from the Office of
Regulatory Affairs, the Rapid Response Teams that work with state partners, the Office of Crisis
Management at FDA, FDA’s Offices of Public Affairs and External Relations, and the subject
matter experts at CFSAN and CVM.
Center for Veterinary Medicine (CVM)
The Center for Veterinary Medicine (CVM) is a component of OFVM and is responsible for
surveillance, coordinating, response, recalls, and post-response activities related to animal
deaths, illness, and injury linked to FDA-regulated food, drugs, and devices for animals. CVM
has a dedicated response team (Complaint, Emergency, Recall Team) that is comprised of a
group of members at the FDA headquarters level that are assigned on a continuous, full-time
basis to multidisciplinary teams to coordinate efforts internally within FDA. These efforts
include CORE, Veterinary Laboratory Investigation and Response Network (Vet-LIRN), District
Offices, Regional Offices, and CVM subject matter experts as well as with external stakeholders,
including CDC, USDA, state departments of agriculture, and state-funded Rapid Response
Teams.
Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition (CFSAN)
The Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition (CFSAN) is another component to OFVM
and is responsible for ensuring the U.S. food supply is safe, sanitary, wholesome, and honestly
labeled to promote and protect public health. CFSAN has the authority to regulate
establishments that manufacture, process, pack, hold, or grow food, including manufacturers,
distributors, and warehouses. During a foodborne outbreak or incident, CFSAN collaborates
with public health agencies and industry regarding food adulterants; provides critical information
on food safety, food defense, and regulatory issues; and protects human health through
regulatory, legal, and other administrative actions.
U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)
USDA is responsible for developing and executing federal laws related to farming, agriculture,
forestry, and food with a primary focus to promote agricultural trade and production, to assure
food safety, to protect natural resources, to foster rural communities, and to end hunger in the
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 101
United States. USDA serves as the primary agency for the security and resilience in the
commercial production of food and consequence management of outbreaks and/or attacks that
may occur in animals and plant products used in the commercial production of food and other
commercial industries. USDA, HHS, DHS, and the FBI collaborate through surveillance systems
with states and private industries to protect the nation’s food supply and U.S. livestock and
poultry from terrorist threats and to prepare for and respond to catastrophic disasters, including
the natural or intentional introduction of a foreign animal disease (FAD) or plant pest or
pathogen of concern.
USDA has the federal authority to declare an emergency for food or agriculture disasters that are
separate from local or other federal disaster declarations. Included among these declarations, the
Secretary of Agriculture can declare an emergency, an extraordinary emergency, and an
agriculture disaster declaration.
Office of Homeland Security (OHS)
USDA OHS provides departmental executive leadership in government-wide initiatives and
leads security, preparedness, and response efforts through training, coordination, and the
development and execution of policies to ensure employees and stakeholders are prepared to
support the USDA mission. Within OHS, the Emergency Programs Division manages the
Operations Center and serves as the focal point for emergency management and coordination of
natural or man-made disasters within the scope of USDA’s mission. The Operations Center also
assists in the development and coordination of policies, capabilities, and procedures for reporting
and response to emergencies affecting the USDA mission or personnel. The Operations Center
receives, assesses, and analyzes emergency incidents or incidents, making internal and external
notifications as required.
Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS)
USDA APHIS is a multi-faceted agency with a broad mission that seeks to protect the health and
value of American agriculture and natural resources to ensure an abundant, high quality, and
varied food supply. In the event of the introduction of a pest or disease of concern, USDA
APHIS implements emergency protocols and collaborates with affected states to quickly address
the incident. USDA APHIS has six operational program units:
• Animal Care: Under the authority of the Animal Welfare Act, determines and promotes
standards for the humane care and treatment of regulated animals through inspections and
education.
• Biotechnology Regulatory Services: Protects agriculture resources by ensuring safe
development of genetically engineered organisms using a science-based regulatory
framework.
• International Services: Provides international animal and plant health expertise to
safeguard U.S. agriculture health and promote agriculture trade.
• Plant Protection and Quarantine: Safeguards agriculture and natural resources from
risks associated with the entry, establishment, or spread of pests, noxious weeds, and
pathogens.
• Veterinary Services: Protects and improves the health, quality, marketability of our
nation’s animals, animal products, and veterinary biologics by preventing, controlling,
and/or eliminating animal diseases, and monitoring and promoting animal health and
productivity.
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 102
• Wildlife Services: Provides leadership in managing conflicts with wildlife to protect
agriculture, natural resources, property, and human health and safety.
Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS)
FSIS is the public health regulatory agency within the USDA responsible for ensuring that the
nation’s commercial supply of meat, poultry, and processed egg products is safe, wholesome,
and correctly labeled and packaged. FSIS works to lower the incidence of pathogens that cause
foodborne illness and limit the occurrence of outbreaks in the products it regulates. FSIS
performs food safety inspection activities at more than 6,000 establishments nationwide,
maximizes domestic and international compliance with food safety policies, enhances public
education and outreach to increase safe food-handling practices, and strengthens collaboration
among internal and external stakeholders and other public and private sector partners to prevent
foodborne illness.
Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
The Secretary of DHS is the principal federal official for domestic incident management. The
Secretary is responsible for coordinating federal operations within the United States to prepare
for, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks; major disasters; and other emergencies. DHS
provides biosurveillance capabilities to detect intentional introduction of threat agents and
pathogens into the environment and to coordinate information sharing with federal partners on
health-related threats to humans, animals, and plants. The DHS Secretary coordinates the federal
response as provided in HSPD-5.
Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office (CWMD) serves as the department’s medical,
veterinary, and public health advisor to the Secretary of Homeland Security, the FEMA
Administrator, and all DHS components. Specifically, CWMD supports the food, agriculture,
and veterinary mission through the oversight and management of DHS’s implementation of
HSPD-9 in coordination with other federal departments and agencies, SLTT governments, and
the private sector.
DHS Science and Technology (S&T) serves as the research and development arm for DHS by
delivering effective and innovative insight, methods, and solutions for the critical needs of the
Homeland Security Enterprise. S&T leads DHS’s agriculture defense programs, which in
coordination with USDA and other federal partners and stakeholders, develops novel
countermeasures to support response and recovery from a large-scale FAD outbreak. S&T also
operates the Plum Island Animal Disease Center, a joint DHS and USDA laboratory that serves
as the nation’s premier defense against the introduction of foreign animal diseases. The
laboratory provides a host of high-impact, indispensable preparedness and response capabilities,
including vaccine research and development, diagnostics, training, and bioforensics.
S&T also operates the National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center (NBACC)
with laboratory capabilities that include the National Bioforensic Analysis Center (NBFAC).
NBFAC is designated by Presidential Directive as the lead federal facility to conduct and
facilitate the technical forensic analysis and interpretation of materials recovered following a
biological attack in support of the appropriate lead federal agency. The NBFAC component of
NBACC conducts bioforensic analysis of evidence from a biocrime or terrorist attack to attain a
"biological fingerprint" to help investigators identify perpetrators and determine the origin and
method of attack. The National Biological Threat Characterization Center (NBTCC) component
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 103
of NBACC conducts studies and laboratory experiments to fill in information gaps to understand
current and future biological threats, to assess vulnerabilities and conduct risk assessments, and
to determine potential impacts to guide the development and use of countermeasures such as
detectors, drugs, vaccines, and decontamination technology.
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
FEMA is an operational component of DHS that coordinates Emergency Support Functions
(ESFs) and RSFs and funding support to impacted areas during Stafford Act incidents. For food
or agriculture incidents, will provide operational support as requested from the lead federal
agencies (LFAs) managing the incident.
The FEMA Administrator is the principal advisor to the President, the Secretary of Homeland
Security, and the Homeland Security Council regarding emergency management. The FEMA
Administrator’s duties include assisting the President, through the DHS Secretary, in carrying
out the Stafford Act; operating the NRCC; supporting all ESFs and RSFs; and preparing for,
protecting against, responding to, and recovering from an all-hazards incident. A Federal
Coordinating Officer, appointed by the President in a Stafford Act declaration coordinates
federal activities in support of SLTT governments. Reporting to the DHS Secretary, the FEMA
Administrator is also responsible for managing the core DHS grant programs that support
homeland security activities.
FEMA develops DHS Surge Capacity Force personnel requirements with OPM and other federal
departments and agencies.
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA)
CISA works with partners at all levels of government and from the private and non-profit sectors
to share information and build greater trust to make secure critical infrastructure and key
resources. Protective Security Advisors forge strong relationships with federal and SLTT
government mission partners and private sector stakeholders to enhance public/private
collaborative efforts to protect critical infrastructure. The Private Security Advisors will remain
focused on contingency outreach to owners and operators of critical infrastructure regarding the
evolving food or agriculture incident. CISA will sustain communications with the respective
Sector Coordinating Councils and sector-specific Government Coordinating Councils on
appropriate information sharing related to the evolving food or agriculture incident through DHS
IP information summary to include the Critical Infrastructure Protection Advisory Council.
Department of Justice (DOJ)
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
The Attorney General, acting through the FBI Director, leads and coordinates the operational law
enforcement response, on-scene law enforcement, and related investigative and appropriate
intelligence activities related to terrorist threats and incidents. This includes the coordination of
the law enforcement activities to detect, prevent, preempt, and disrupt terrorist threats. The FBI,
acting primarily through its Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF), has lead responsibility for
investigative activities involving federal crimes of terrorism. This includes the receipt and
resolution of suspicious activity reporting of terrorist activities or acts in preparation of terrorist
activities.
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 104
The Attorney General, acting through the FBI Director, has primary responsibility for searching
for, finding, and neutralizing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) within the United States and
its territories. The FBI On-Scene Commander is responsible for leading and coordinating the
federal operational law enforcement response and investigative activities necessary to prevent or
resolve terrorist threats or incidents. The FBI On-Scene Commander retains the authority to take
appropriate law enforcement actions (tactical-response, render safe, and bomb-management
operations) at all times during the response. Additionally, the FBI On-Scene Commander has
primary responsibility to conduct, direct, and oversee crime scenes, to include those involving
WMD, their security, and evidence management through all phases of the response.
All WMD threat information having a potential impact on the United States will be immediately
passed to the FBI to conduct a timely Threat Credibility Evaluation to assess the credibility and
severity of the threat and consider initiation of appropriate WMD counterterrorism response
protocols. In the case of substantial credible threats or incidents, the FBI will notify appropriate
senior leaders of departments and agencies, to include the National Counterterrorism Center,
DHS, HHS, USDA, and DOD, and will stand up the interagency Weapons of Mass Destruction
Strategic Group (WMDSG). The WMDSG supports efforts to resolve imminent WMD terrorist
threats or incidents while simultaneously coordinating its information with the nationwide effort
to save lives and protect property.
The FBI has assigned a WMD Coordinator to each of its field offices who is responsible for
managing the office’s WMD program and serves as a point of contact for emergency responders
and public health at the SLTT level in a threat scenario or incident potentially involving WMD.
In such an incident, the WMD Coordinator serves as a conduit for obtaining federal assistance
for operational response direction and threat evaluation support.
Terrorist threat-related information collected domestically, including suspicious activity
reporting involving suspected federal crimes of terrorism, will be shared comprehensively and
immediately to the FBI JTTF so that threats can be investigated and resolved. Terrorist threat-
related information will also be shared promptly with National Counter-Terrorism Center and in
addition, as authorized by law, with the Terrorist Screening Center, DHS, and DOD. Specific
terrorism-related threat information and the collection and investigative activities related thereto
will be coordinated with and through the FBI JTTFs. The Laboratory Response Network (LRN),
in coordination with CDC, tests samples for the presence of specific threat agents for human
health. The National Animal Health Laboratory Network, in coordination with USDA, tests
samples for the presence of specific agents in animal populations. Any agency or organization
that identifies an unusual or suspicious test result should contact the FBI to ensure coordination
of appropriate testing at an LRN laboratory. The FBI, in coordination with HHS or USDA,
makes decisions on where to perform additional tests on evidence. All relevant threat and public
health assessments should be provided to the DHS National Operations Center as appropriate.
Test results on human samples from non-LRN facilities are a “first pass” or “screening” test.
Department of Defense (DOD)
DOD provides support, as able, to the Lead Federal Agencies in response to domestic
emergencies and, in the case of a food or agriculture incident, provides a spectrum of capabilities
that protect DOD and the public.
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 105
To ensure advanced warning of threats, the Defense Intelligence Agency/National Center for
Medical Intelligence (NCMI) provides intelligence assessments of foreign health threats,
including pandemic warning, to prevent strategic surprise across the broad threat spectrum.
NCMI’s products assess risk and project the impact of incidents to deliver decision advantage to
U.S. warfighters, defense planners, and DOD policymakers.
DOD, via the Services and the Defense Health Agency, Armed Forces Health Surveillance
Branch, conducts comprehensive health surveillance of DOD forces. DOD serves a key role in
biosurveillance to detect disease and to understand the threats from endemic and emerging
infectious diseases relevant to DOD forces. Though the focus is on infectious disease threats
relevant to DOD, DOD serves as a significant source of information to inform the larger U.S.
biosurveillance mission and to maintain situational awareness.
DOD is organized by geographical combatant commands (CCMD), each of which contains a
functional cell with the Command Surgeon that works on various aspects of the medical
capabilities for the DOD and engagement with other countries militaries and agencies. Each cell
includes force health protection staff that help facilitate preparedness and response to disease
incidents that may impact DOD force health and mission assurance, as well as international
health protection, to varying degrees based on available resources. During food and agricultural
incidents that may have significant impact on DOD missions or populations outside of the
continental United States (OCONUS), it is important that the LFA maintains adequate
communication through the appropriate DOD chain-of-command to ensure information-sharing
on the incident with the relevant force health protection teams in the potentially affected CCMD.
Some roles and responsibilities of the CCMD during a food and agricultural incident of
operational significance include the following:
• Disseminate DOD/Service guidance and clinical practice guidelines specific to the event.
• Collaborate with other DOD surveillance agencies (e.g. National Center for Medical
Intelligence (NCMI), AFHSB) to maintain visibility on disease surveillance information.
• Develop guidance for meeting movement requirements related to the containment and
control of a pathogen.
• Disseminate CCMD guidance and Force Health Protection (FHP) recommendations
related to movement across borders, travel, import/export criteria, etc.
The first priority for DOD is to ensure that DOD can continue its missions and protect DOD
personnel, installations, and other assets to provide mission assurance. Under immediate
response authority, DOD officials may, under imminently serious conditions and if time does not
permit higher authority approval, provide an immediate response, when requested, to save
human lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property damage. Normally, when
requested by an LFA and approved by the Secretary of Defense, DOD provides defense support
of civil authorities to the response to minimize the consequences of the incident. The Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense & Global Security is responsible for Defense
Support of Civil Authorities, and serves as DOD's Domestic Crisis Manager (DOD Directive
5111.13, March 23, 2018). DOD’s response capabilities may include specialized MCMs
research, diagnostics, emergency medical and lifesaving capabilities, veterinary capabilities,
epidemiology/outbreak investigation support, laboratory support, logistics, and transportation
support. Upon request, and depending on the size and scope of the incident, DOD may employ
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 106
additional command and control capabilities to facilitate the management of DOD assets and to
support the larger response effort.
DOD has limited medical services capabilities beyond those authorized for the DOD healthcare
system, which likely would be equally affected during a large-scale (regional epidemic/
pandemic) food or agriculture incident—but may be able to provide surge capabilities
(laboratory, emergency care, logistics, etc.) for more finite incidents. However, when requested,
DOD may provide medical logistic support and general support, such as transportation, to enable
civil responders.
DOD also has limited veterinary services capabilities to support a food or agriculture incident
similar to the surge capacity for other DOD medical assets. DOD veterinary services has both
animal and food safety/food defense capabilities. Personnel can work in teams or individually
augment agencies as needed. These resources would be requested only when all other federal
veterinary and food safety resources have been fully utilized.
The Posse Comitatus Act (18 U.S.C. §1385) generally prohibits DOD military forces from
conducting civilian law enforcement-type activities such as search, seizure, and arrest in the
absence of specific statutory authority to engage in such activities. One such authority, 10 U.S.C.
§282, permits DOD to provide support to the DOJ under certain circumstances in emergencies
involving WMD, including biological weapons and materials.
DOD may also support DOJ and/or other law enforcement agencies and/or other authorities with
logistical support such as sheltering and transportation. Upon a determination that a food or
agriculture incident was the result of an intentional attack, DOD emergency assistance may
include the operation of equipment to monitor, contain, disable, or dispose of adulterated
material involved or elements of any potential biological or chemical weapons.
DOD’s capabilities in biological and chemical forensics and technical analysis may be called
upon to support the FBI in determining whether an incident is natural, accidental, or intentional.
This forensic capability allows DOD to provide expert advice, technical assistance and, if
necessary, operational support to the attribution assessment process.
DOD may also provide assistance to USDA/APHIS for response to animal diseases and other all-
hazards incidents through the DOD-USDA Memorandum of Agreement (updated in 2016).
Areas of DOD support include epidemiology, surveillance and tracing; laboratory diagnostic
capability; training; transportation, logistics, and installation support; public
affairs/communication support; debris (animal) removal and disposal; decontamination and
disinfection of vehicles, facilities, or premises that housed or transported infected animals; and
personnel to support field operations. Through the MOA, DOD's assistance to USDA is provided
in accordance with the Economy Act of 1932 (31 U.S.C. §§ 1535-1536).
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
EPA has responsibilities and resources for response to domestic emergencies. EPA promulgates
regulations that implement various environmental laws enacted by Congress. In the case of food
or agriculture emergencies, EPA would likely provide support to the lead federal agencies on
issues related to facility decontamination, waste management and water security and resilience.
EPA responds to releases of hazardous substances to the environment, including substantial
threats of release of pollutants or contaminants that may present an imminent or substantial
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 107
danger to the public health or welfare (which may include animal or plant pathogens) (see App.
3, CERCLA). EPA also regulates the management of hazardous waste and disposal of
nonhazardous solid waste (see App. 3, RCRA). Under the Food Safety Modernization Act, EPA,
in coordination with HHS, DHS, and USDA, provides support for and technical assistance to
state, local, and tribal governments in preparing for, assessing, decontaminating, and recovering
from an agriculture or food emergency.
EPA also has the responsibility to register a pesticide before it can be sold or marketed in the
United States. A pesticide is a substance or a mixture of substances intended for preventing,
destroying, repelling, or mitigating any pest, including microorganisms, fungi, insects and other
invertebrates, or plants. The process of registering a pesticide is a scientific, legal, and
administrative procedure through which EPA examines a pesticide’s ingredients; sites or crops
where it will be used; the amount, frequency, and timing of its use; and storage and disposal
practices. In evaluating a pesticide registration application, EPA assesses a wide variety of
potential human health and environmental effects associated with use of the product. Individuals
or companies wanting to produce the pesticide must provide data from studies that comply with
EPA testing guidelines. EPA also evaluates and approves the language that appears on each
pesticide label to ensure the directions for use and safety measures are appropriate to any
potential risk. Following label directions is required by law and is necessary to avoid
unreasonable adverse effects. EPA can also grant time-limited emergency exemptions to state or
federal agencies for unregistered uses of a pesticides when a serious pest problem jeopardizes
production of agriculture goods or public health. (See App. 3, FIFRA.)
EPA serves as the federal lead (Sector-Specific Agency) for protecting the nation’s drinking
water and wastewater systems against all hazards—from terrorism to natural disasters.
As the Sector-Specific Agency, EPA is responsible for identifying, prioritizing, and coordinating
the protection of the nation’s drinking water and water treatment systems. EPA works with
tribes, states, drinking water and wastewater utilities, communities, and other partners to enhance
the security and resiliency of water and wastewater infrastructure in an all-hazards context.
Department of the Interior (DOI)
The primary DOI mission during disease outbreaks is to conduct regulatory and mission-critical
work in protection of their lands and resources. While DOI land and resource management
regulatory authorities are not superseded by USDA’s Animal Health Protection Act, DOI actions
may be carried out in coordination with USDA animal disease response activities. The skills and
expertise DOI employees utilize in their mission-critical work could also be utilized to support
interagency animal health authorities and response activities.
BIA enhances quality of life, promotes economic opportunity, and carries out responsibilities to
protect and improve trust assets of American Indians, Indian Tribes and Alaska Natives. BIA
supports the self-determination of tribes by supporting their natural resource programs and
providing technical support to include facilitating investigation of and response to wildlife
disease outbreaks on trust lands. BIA hosts the Federal Interagency Tribal Assistance
Coordination Group for emergency management support.
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 108
Bureau of Land Management (BLM)
BLM sustains health, diversity and productivity of public land for the use and enjoyment of
present and future generations as set forth in the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of
1976. This act mandates the management of public land resources for a variety of uses while
protecting a wide array of natural, cultural and historical resources. BLM manages more than
245 million acres of public lands. These lands include more wildlife and plant habitat than any
other Federal or state agency in the country. BLM’s wildlife management program maintains and
manages wildlife habitat to help ensure self-sustaining populations and a natural abundance and
diversity of wildlife on public lands. BLM emergency management resources include a
permitting system database that identifies public lands available for livestock grazing
(allotments) and the kind of livestock authorized to graze. The system provides contact
information for permit holders and BLM field offices, which would provide information on
numbers and locations of authorized livestock on BLM managed lands and credentialed incident
management teams.
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS)
FWS works to conserve, protect and enhance fish, wildlife and plants and their habitats for the
continuing benefit of the American people. FWS provides scientific and technical advice,
information and assistance for animal disease events. FWS assumes responsibility for managing
or coordinating emergency response on lands within its jurisdiction and assists other Federal and
state agencies on adjacent lands as requested. National Wildlife Refuge System law enforcement
and firefighting personnel maintain incident command expertise. FWS personnel provide
expertise on threatened and endangered species and migratory birds to include appropriate
response and recovery techniques. FWS provides all federal permitting activities for hazing,
collecting, rescuing, and holding threatened and endangered species. State to state differences in
wildlife management highlights the complex role of federal land and wildlife management
agencies in ensuring connectivity with state counterparts.
Department of Transportation (DOT)
The DOT Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) is responsible for
regulating and ensuring the safe and secure movement of hazardous materials to industry and
consumers by all modes of transportation, including pipelines. To minimize threats to life,
property, or the environment due to hazardous materials-related incidents, PHMSA’s Office of
Hazardous Materials Safety develops regulations and standards for the classifying, handling, and
packaging of over one million daily shipments of hazardous materials within the United States.
DOT regulations assign the responsibility to the shipper (e.g., hospital) for complying with the
proper packaging and transport of hazardous materials, including regulated medical waste.
However, there are individual states that may have additional rules, and, thus, appropriate state
regulations may apply in a biological incident response and recovery operation.
U.S. Department of Labor (DOL)
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)
OSHA assures safe and healthful working conditions by setting and enforcing standards and
providing training, outreach, education, and assistance. OSHA has the authority to provide
technical assistance and support to other federal and SLTT agencies, including states with their
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 109
own OSHA-approved occupational safety and health programs (State Plans), as requested.
OSHA leads implementation of the NRF Worker Safety and Health Support Annex preparedness
and response actions to protect response workers. OSHA can provide technical assistance and
support to protect response and recovery workers through the following: risk assessment and
management; identification, assessment, and control of health and safety hazards; development
and oversight of site health and safety plans; site safety monitoring; worker exposure monitoring,
sampling, and analysis; personal protective equipment (PPE), including PPE selection, use,
training, and decontamination and respirator fit-testing; and incident-specific worker safety and
health training. During a food or agriculture incident, CDC, through the National Institute for
Occupational Safety and Health, should consult OSHA when working with senior SLTT health
officials to protect first responders, first receivers, critical infrastructure/key resource workers,
public health workers, agricultural workers, and other workers involved in the incident.
State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial Governments (SLTT)
SLTT governments are primarily responsible for detecting and responding to food or agriculture
incidents and implementing measures to minimize the health, social, and economic consequences
of such an incident. These measures may include, but are not limited to dispensing MCMs,
laboratory services, implementation of quarantine and isolation measures, human, agriculture,
and facility decontamination, and public messaging. The primarily role of state governments is to
supplement and facilitate local efforts before, during, and after disasters. The state provides
direct and routine assistance, including human and veterinary public health, medical and
veterinary services, to its local jurisdictions. Tribes handle the affairs in the same manner on
tribal lands.
Private Sector
The private sector public health, animal health, plant health, and medical and veterinary service
organizations and infrastructure provide local response capabilities for all health impacts during
a food or agriculture incident. Hospitals; community clinics; animal hospitals and veterinary
offices; nurses and animal health technicians; and trained, certified, or other specialists in public,
veterinary, or academic institutions or agriculture health are all representatives of the public,
veterinary, and agriculture health infrastructure at the private sector level. Their services,
equipment, and advanced technologies assist with the delivery of local food or agriculture
incident response and recovery capabilities. Nongovernmental medical or disaster relief
organizations, as well as culture- and faith-based organizations, and industry resources can also
bolster and assist local response capabilities.
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 110
Appendix 5: Federal Response Capability Inventory –
Food and Agriculture Specific Assets, Resources,
and Teams
This appendix lists the resources that may be utilized in a large-scale food or agriculture incident.
It does not assign responsibility to any agency or organization; it solely provides insight into
potential resources available to assist with response and recovery operations. This is not an
exhaustive list as other departments, agencies, organizations, and private sector entities may have
resources that can be leveraged during the incident through coordination with the LFA or UCG.
Table 12: Food and Agriculture Specific Assets, Resources, and Teams
Organization
Resource Name
Description
USDA
Animal and Plant
Health Inspection
Service (APHIS)
Lead Federal Agency (LFA) for both animal and plant response. The
agency provides technical assistance and response capabilities for animal
and agriculture emergency management. APHIS coordinates with
nonprofit and private organizations, and other government agencies to
ensure an effective response
USDA (APHIS)
Veterinary Services
(VS)
VS is a program within APHIS that works to protect and improve the
health, quality, and marketability of our nation’s animals and supports
emergency response to high-consequence diseases in the livestock and
poultry populations.
USDA (APHIS)
VS National Veterinary
Services Laboratories
(NVSL)
NVSL are USDA laboratories that seek to safeguard animal health and
contribute to public health by ensuring that timely and accurate laboratory
support is provided in an emergency including providing diagnostic
services and reagents and supporting the NAHLN laboratories.
USDA (APHIS)
Emergency
Management
Response System
(EMRS)
A web-based application used for the reporting of routine investigations of
foreign animal disease (FAD), surveillance and control programs, state
specific disease outbreaks, and national animal health emergency
responses.
USDA (APHIS)
National Animal
Health Laboratory
Network (NAHLN)
The NAHLN is a nationally coordinated network and partnership of federal,
state, and university-associated laboratories that provide animal health
diagnostic testing to detect threats to the nation’s food animals and
support early detection, rapid response, and appropriate recovery from
high-consequence FAD.
USDA (APHIS)
Wildlife Services (WS)
WS provides surveillance and monitoring of diseases in wildlife and assists
with emergency response when requested.
USDA (APHIS)
Plant Protection and
Quarantine (PPQ)
PPQ is the program of APHIS whose mission is to safeguard U.S.
agriculture and natural resources against the entry, establishment, and
spread of economically and environmentally significant pests and facilitate
the safe international trade of agricultural products.
USDA National
Institute of Food and
Agriculture (NIFA)
National Plant
Diagnostic Network
National network of diagnostic laboratories that rapidly and accurately
detect and report pathogens that cause plant diseases of national interest.
USDA
Food Safety and
Inspection Service
(FSIS)
The USDA public health agency responsible for ensuring that the nation’s
commercial supply of meat, poultry, and processed egg products is safe,
wholesome, and correctly labeled and packaged.
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 111
USDA (FSIS)
FSIS Incident
Management System
(FIMS)
A web-based common operating platform that allows program managers to
rapidly identify, respond to, and track FSIS response to significant
incidents involving meat, poultry, and processed egg products and other
emergencies that affect FSIS-regulated products.
USDA Food and
Nutrition Service
(FNS)
USDA Foods
Disaster Household Distribution is a nutrition assistance option that States
may exercise with approval from FNS. In a Disaster Household
Distribution, FEMA, non-governmental feeding organizations, or other
partners may distribute household-sized products to individuals who
prepare and consume meals at home. These packages may be
supplemental and, under some conditions, may be designed to increase
particular nutrients.
USDA
Risk Management
Agency (RMA)
Crop Insurance protects agriculture producers against crop losses due to
natural perils. The program, administered by the U.S. Department of
Agriculture's Risk Management Agency (USDA RMA), offers several plans
for crops and livestock. Availability and plans vary by state and county.
USDA (APHIS)
National Veterinary
Stockpile (NVS)
During an animal disease incident, USDA APHIS may provide resources to
state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) governments to support response
efforts. The NVS is the repository of veterinary countermeasures, animal
vaccines, antivirals, therapeutic products, supplies, equipment, and
response support services for use in responding to animal disease
outbreaks.
USDA
Farm Service Agency
County offices provide direct service to producers to help them understand
available programs, eligibility and requirements, application processes and
deadlines, and business plan development assistance.
USDA
Rural Development
Technical assistance is targeted to help communities build capacity from
within thereby empowering them to develop and sustain their own
communities. Technical assistance includes strategic planning or
leadership development, developing and strengthening partnerships and
finding financial resources and bringing them to the table.
USDA
U.S. Forest Service
(FS)
A multi-faceted agency that manages and protects 154 national forests
and 20 grasslands in 43 states and Puerto Rico. The agency’s mission is
to sustain the health, diversity, and productivity of the nation’s forests and
grasslands to meet the needs of present and future generations.
USDA (FS)
Research &
Development
Consists of seven research stations and 81 experimental forests and
ranges. Forest Service R&D interacts with national forests in nine regions
and with the agency's State and Private Deputy Area throughout the
United States. Forest Service R&D is also allied with agencies in the
USDA Research, Education, and Economics mission area, including the
Agricultural Research Service (ARS), National Institute of Food and
Agriculture, National Agricultural Statistics Service, and ARS' National
Agricultural Library. Forest Service R&D also partners with other federal
agencies, non-governmental organizations, universities, and the private
sector.
USDA (FS)
Wood Products
Laboratory
Nation's only federally funded wood utilization research laboratory
USDA (FS)
Forest Health
Protection
Provides technical assistance on forest health-related matters, particularly
those related to disturbance agents such as native and non-native insects,
pathogens, and invasive plants.
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 112
USDA
Natural Resources
Conservation Service
County offices provide planning assistance for watershed protection
projects, water quality improvement projects, wetland preservation, and
management for agricultural and rural communities.
USDA
Extension Disaster
Education Network
(EDEN)
EDEN links Extension educators from across the U.S. and various
disciplines, enabling them to use and share resources to reduce the
impact of disasters. EDEN is supported by a grant from the USDA National
Institute of Food and Agriculture to Purdue University.
DHS
Domestic
Communication
Strategy
The Domestic Communication Strategy is a guidebook, which provides
options for public information strategies, complementing existing federal
plans and strategic guidance documents, which may be employed in a
domestic terrorist attack or a credible threat to the homeland.
DHS
Countering Weapons
of Mass Destruction
(CWMD)
Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office (CWMD) serves as the
department’s medical, veterinary, and public health advisor to the
Secretary of Homeland Security, the FEMA Administrator, and all DHS
components. Specifically, CWMD supports the food, agriculture, and
veterinary mission through the oversight and management of DHS’s
implementation of HSPD-9 in coordination with other federal departments
and agencies, SLTT governments, and the private sector.
DHS
Integrated Consortium
of Laboratories (ICLN)
ICLN provides for a federally coordinated and interoperable system of
laboratory networks that provide timely, credible, and interpretable data in
support of surveillance, early detection, and effective consequence
management for acts of terrorism and other major incidents requiring
laboratory response capabilities. The ICLN is a partnership between nine
federal agencies: Department of Defense (DOD), Department of
Agriculture, Department of Energy (DOE), Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS), Department of Homeland Security (DHS),
Department of the Interior (DOI), Department of Justice (DOJ), Department
of State (DOS), and Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The ICLN
includes thte following networks: DOD Laboratory Network, Environmental
Response Laboratory Network (ERLN), Food Emergency Response
Network (FERN), Laboratory Response Network (LRN), NAHLN, National
Plant Diagnostic Network (NPDN), and the Veterinary Laboratory
Investigation and Response Network.
DHS (S&T)
Office of National
Labs (ONL)
Plum Island Animal
Disease Center
(PIADC)
Plum Island Animal Disease Center, a joint DHS and USDA laboratory that
serves as the nation’s premier defense against the introduction of foreign
animal diseases. The laboratory provides a host of high impact,
indispensable preparedness and response capabilities, including vaccine
research and development, diagnostics, training, and bioforensics.
DHS
National Bioforensic
Analysis Center
(NBFAC)
Conducts bioforensic analysis of evidence from a biocrime or terrorist
attack to attain a “biological fingerprint” to help investigators identify
perpetrators and determine the origin and method of attack. NBFAC is
designated by Presidential Directive to be the lead federal facility to
conduct and facilitate the technical forensic analysis and interpretation of
materials recovered following a biological attack in support of the
appropriate lead federal agency.
DHS
National Biodefense
Analysis and
Countermeasures
Center (NBACC)
DHS S&T Laboratory with two component Centers: the National
Bioforensic Analysis Center (NBFAC) and the National Biological Threat
Characterization Center (NBTCC). NBACC is a 24x7 operational national
security capability operating at the highest level of biocontainment.
DHS
National Biological
Threat
Conduct studies to guide the development and use of countermeasures to
understand current and future biological threats, to assess vulnerabilities
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 113
Characterization
Center (NBTCC)
and conduct risk assessments, and to determine potential impacts to guide
the development of countermeasures such as detectors, drugs, vaccines,
and decontamination technology and use
DHS
National
Biosurveillance
Integration System
(NBIC)
The mission of NBIC is to enhance the capability of the Federal
Government to—
• Rapidly identify, characterize, localize, and track a biological incident
of national concern.
• Integrate and analyze data relating to human health, animal, plant,
food, water, and environmental domains.
• Disseminate alerts and pertinent information.
• Oversee development and operation of the National Biosurveillance
Integration System interagency community.
DHS
Surge Capacity Force
Organized into four tiers, for the purpose of prioritizing and providing for an
informed selection of deployable human assets:
• Tier 1 comprises FEMA Reservists with FEMA credentials
• Tier 2 comprises FEMA Permanent Full-Time Employees with FEMA
credentials
• Tier 3 comprises DHS full-time federal employees
• Tier 4 comprises full-time or part-time federal employees from other
federal departments and agencies
DHS (CBP
Laboratories and
Scientific Services)
Weapons of Mass
Destruction Response
Teams
Provide level “A” hazardous material technical response capabilities
DHS (CISA)
Sector-Specific
Agency
The Sector Outreach and Programs Division builds stakeholder capacity
and enhances critical infrastructure security and resilience through
voluntary partnerships that provide key tools, resources, and partnerships.
The division operates the council and stakeholder engagement
mechanisms for the critical infrastructure security and resilience
community. The division serves as the sector-specific agency for 6 of the
16 sectors and collaborates with the other 10.
DHS (CISA/Federal
Protective Service)
Hazardous Response
Program
This program Includes initial investigations of suspicious or threatening
chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosive
(CBRNE) incidents; conduction of CBRNE threat assessments;
confirmations of unauthorized presence of CBRNE agents and materials;
and the conduct of emergency operations. The Hazardous Response
Program also provides evacuation support during CBRNE incidents,
CBRNE mutual aid response through agreement and training assistance.
The program is compliant with OSHA and National Fire Protection
Association guidance and regulations.
DHS (FEMA)
Consequence
Management
Coordination Unit
(CMCU)
In response to notification of a terrorist threat or actual incident, FEMA will
activate the CMCU in support of FBI-led crisis management operations at
the Weapons of Mass Destruction Strategic Group (WMDSG). Within the
WMDSG, the FEMA staffs and manages the CMCU. This unit is supported
by federal technical capabilities provided through the DOE/National
Nuclear Security Administration, HHS, DOD, and DHS. As the principal
advisory unit for consequence management considerations within the
WMDSG, the CMCU provides recommended courses of action in light of
ongoing and evolving operations. The CMCU provides a link between FBI-
led crisis response and FEMA-coordinated consequence management
response operations.
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 114
DHS (FEMA), DOJ
(FBI), DOD, HHS,
EPA
Domestic Emergency
Support Team (DEST)
A rapidly deployable, interagency team responsible for providing expert
advice and support to the FBI Special Agent in Charge concerning the
Federal Government’s capabilities in resolving a terrorist threat or incident.
DHS (FEMA)
Federal National
Ambulance and Para-
transit Support
Services
The Federal National Ambulance and Para-transit Support Services is not
to be used to transport contagious patients.
DHS (FEMA)
National Incident
Management
Assistance Teams (N-
IMAT)
N-IMATs are trained on CBRN-related scenarios and will be FEMA’s lead
in the field to coordinate and integrate inter-jurisdictional response in
support of the affected state(s) or U.S. territory(s). N-IMATs provide initial
situational awareness for federal decision makers and support the initial
establishment of a unified command. IMATs provide for multi-disciplinary
needs of emergency management and may include members from the
inter-agency community.
DOD
Defense Intelligence
Agency/National
Center for Medical
Intelligence (NCMI)
NCMI provides intelligence assessments of foreign health threats,
including pandemic warning, to prevent strategic surprise across the broad
threat spectrum.
DOD
DOD Veterinary
Services
A formal memorandum of agreement exists between USDA APHIS and
DOD concerning the response to animal diseases and other all-hazards
incidents. Additionally, military veterinary and public health personnel may
be able to provide specific surge capabilities in a food or agriculture
incident in teams or as individual augmentees.
DOD
Defense Health
Agency, Public Health
Division, Armed
Forces Health
Surveillance Branch
(AFHSB)
DOD serves a key role in biosurveillance to detect disease and to
understand the threats from endemic and emerging infectious diseases
relevant to DOD forces; inform the larger U.S. biosurveillance mission to
maintain situational awareness.
DOE (NNSA)
Federal Radiological
Monitoring and
Assessment Center
Coordinates federal radiological monitoring and assessment activities with
those of state and local agencies.
DOI (USGS)
U.S. Geological
Survey (USGS)
Environmental Health
The USGS Environmental Health Mission Area has the capability to
develop models and tools for identifying, monitoring, and assessing
emerging environmental health threats and pathways for human and
animal exposure. These activities build upon USGS’s expertise in the
hydrologic, atmospheric, geologic, and ecologic processes that affect the
transport and fate of agents in the environment.
DOI (USGS)
USGS Ecosystems
The USGS Ecosystems Mission Area maintains core capabilities for early
detection and rapid response to invasive species and wildlife disease.
These include situational awareness mapping, mathematical modeling and
risk assessment, laboratory support for early detection of aquatic and
terrestrial wildlife diseases, and research and development of disease
management strategies and tools as well as decision analysis support.
DOI (USGS)
USGS National
Wildlife Health Center
(NWHC)
USGS and its NWHC serve as the federal lead for wildlife disease
emergencies including zoonotic diseases outbreaks under ESF #11.
Assists in responding to disease events involving free ranging fish and
wildlife populations including infectious diseases, biohazard events, and
toxicological diseases resulting from exposure to environmental
contaminants by providing wildlife emergency response teams, geospatial
assessment and mapping tools, assistance in the identification of new
emerging and resurging zoonotic diseases, diagnostic laboratory support
(up to and including biological safety Level 3 containment), assistance with
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 115
the prevention, control, and eradication of any disease involving wildlife,
and carcass disposal facilities, as appropriate.
DOI (FWS)
U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Services (FWS)
Health Office
The FWS Wildlife Health Office conducts critical work in wildlife health and
disease surveillance, response, and management. The Wildlife Health
Office comprises a network of wildlife health experts located across the
country supporting refuges, wetland management districts, and other
service programs by (a) providing technical advice about wildlife disease
issues, (b) providing guidance on adapting management strategies to
prevent wildlife diseases, (c) identifying health surveillance needs, (d)
conducting research projects to determine best practices in disease
prevention, (e) providing veterinary services for field activities, and (f)
supporting emergency response efforts.
DOI (NPS)
National Park Service
(NPS) Wildlife Health
Branch and Office of
Public Health
The NPS Wildlife Health Branch provide professional veterinary
consultation and technical assistance to aid parks in conserving wildlife,
identifying and responding to zoonotic diseases in wildlife populations, and
working closely with the NPS Office of Public Health and SLTT health
departments in zoonotic disease prevention and response. The NPS
Office of Public Health is staffed by public health service officers including
physicians, veterinarians, environmental health service officers and
engineers that oversee food, drinking water, and wastewater safety in
parks as well as assisting in zoonotic and vector-borne disease
surveillance and responses in parks.
DOJ (FBI)
Federal Bureau of
Investigation
The FBI is the lead Federal law enforcement agency to identify, detect,
deter and disrupt terrorist operations and threats from the use of weapons
of mass destruction (WMD) before they occur. The FBI has the primary
jurisdiction to investigate, collect intelligence, apprehend and prosecute
those responsible for WMD-related threats, incidents, and acts of
terrorism.
DOJ (FBI)
Weapons of Mass
Destruction Strategic
Group (WMDSG)
The WMDSG is an FBI-led interagency coordination mechanism to resolve
imminent WMD terrorist threats or incidents, to include food and
agriculture threats or incidents.
DOJ (FBI)
Strategic Information
and Operations Center
(SIOC)
SIOC is the command and communications center to support crisis
management, special event monitoring, and the capability for 24 hour
operations to provide situational awareness and as a clearinghouse to
collect, process, and disseminate information.
DOJ (FBI)
WMD Directorate
(WMDD)
WMDD coordinates all incidents related to the use of WMD or CBRN
materials (chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear) and to prevent
their intentional use for purposes and motivations by adversaries to the
U.S.
DOJ (FBI)
WMDD
Countermeasures
Operations Section
(COS)
COS integrates WMD preparedness programs and initiatives through a
multi-layered preparedness strategy to prepare for, identify, respond, and
disrupt WMD threats and incidents
WMDD Operations
Response Unit (ORU)
ORU coordinates, plans, and trains, and leads the response against the
use or threatened use of WMD against the United States. ORU is divided
by modality/program: Chemical, Biological, Radiological/Nuclear,
Response, and Support.
DOJ (FBI)
WMDD Chemical-
Biological
Countermeasures Unit
(CBCU)
CBCU works cooperatively with local, state, tribal, federal, private, and
academic partners to deter, detect, and disrupt the production, acquisition,
and intentional misuse of chemical and biological materials by developing
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 116
and executing foreign and domestic outreach, tripwire, and
countermeasure initiatives.
DOJ (FBI)
WMDD Chemical-
Biological Intelligence
Unit (CBIU)
CBIU provides timely and actionable intelligence analysis to identify,
understand, and mitigate current and emerging WMD threats and
vulnerabilities in collaboration with key stakeholders in the US Intelligence
Community (USIC), foreign and domestic law enforcement, the private
sector, and academic partners
DOJ (FBI)
Joint Terrorism Task
Force (JTTF)
JTTFs are teams of locally based investigators, analysts, linguists, SWAT
experts, and other specialists from state, local, tribal, and federal law
enforcement and intelligence agencies to share information regarding
terrorist activities and the intelligence base. There are 175 task forces with
at least one in each of 56 FBI field offices.
DOJ (FBI)
Critical Incident
Response Group
(CIRG)
CIRG integrates tactical, negotiations, behavioral analysis, and crisis
management resources for the rapid response to critical CBRNE incidents.
Consists of special agents and professional support SME’s to provide
expertise in crisis management, hostage rescue, surveillance and aviation,
hazardous devices analysis mitigation, crisis negotiations, behavioral
analysis, and tactical operations.
DOJ (FBI)
Laboratory Division
FBI Laboratory is the primary US forensic crime lab to support domestic
and foreign law enforcement, intelligence, military, and forensic science
partners for the scientific analysis of crime scene evidence including DNA,
latent print, crime scene documentation, evidence response team
operations, firearms-toolmarks, handwriting analysis, trace evidence, and
forensic chemistry.
DOJ (FBI)
Hazardous Evidence
Response Team
(HERT)
HERTs are field teams trained, equipped, and authorized to collect
CBRNE evidence in hazardous crime scene and other contaminated
environments. There 26 HERT teams regionally assigned to FBI Field
Offices
DOJ (FBI)
Field Office WMD
Coordinator (WMDC)
There is at least one WMDC in all 56 FBI Field Offices and 400 smaller
Resident Agencies (RA’s) that are tasked to respond to and investigate
potential threats or incidents with a nexus to CBRNE - WMD threats.
WMDCs act as a conduit to FBIHQ for technical information, advice,
intelligence and assistance with emphasis on pre-event planning and
prevention through the use of outreach and liaison efforts with Federal
regional counterparts and state, county and local
EPA
CBRN Consequence
Management Advisory
Team
This team is the lead EPA special team for provision of scientific and
technical support for all phases of environmental response to a CBRN
incident, including health and safety, site characterization, environmental
sampling and analysis, environmental monitoring, building, structure, and
outdoor decontamination, waste management, environmental cleanup,
and clearance; manages the EPA’s Airborne Spectral Photometric
Environmental Collection Technology fixed-wing aircraft, which provides
chemical/radiological data and deploys and operates mobile and fixed
chemical and biological laboratories.
EPA
Environmental
Response Laboratory
Network (ERLN)
ERLN provides capability to perform routine and emergency analysis of
environmental samples. ERLN is integrated into the ICLN organization.
EPA
Environmental
Response Team
This team provides scientific and technical expertise for response to
traditional chemicals and hazardous materials, including health and safety,
environmental sampling, air monitoring, toxicology, risk assessment, waste
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 117
management, contaminated water/scientific divers, and site
decontamination and cleanup and provides field-analytical and real-time
air monitoring for chemicals with the EPA mobile laboratories known as
Trace Atmospheric Gas Analyzers.
EPA
National Criminal
Enforcement
Response Team
This team provides technical, safety, hazardous evidence collection, and
other forensic support to law enforcement in the instance of a WMD
terrorist attack or environmental catastrophe.
EPA
National Response
Team (NRT)
NRT is a national-level multi-agency coordination entity comprised of 15
federal agencies that provides technical assistance and resource and
policy support to the federal On-Scene Coordinator during NCP and ESF
#10 responses to oil and hazardous materials.
EPA, DHS (USCG)
Regional Response
Team (RRT)
RRTs are co-chaired by the EPA and USCG. A regional-level multi-agency
coordination entity comprised of 15 federal agencies, state, and tribal
representatives that provide technical assistance and resource support to
the federal On-Scene Coordinator during NCP and ESF #10 responses to
oil and hazardous materials.
EPA, DHS (USCG)
On-Scene
Coordinators (OSC)
EPA/USCG OSCs coordinate the on-scene, tactical response to oil and
hazardous substances incidents. Actions include assessment of the extent
and nature of environmental contamination; assessment of environmental
cleanup options; and implementation of environmental cleanup, including
decontaminating buildings and structures and management of wastes. The
EPA generally provides the federal OSC for incidents in inland areas, while
the USCG provides the federal OSC for incidents in coastal areas.
HHS
Administration for
Children and Families
(ACF)
ACF promotes the self-sufficiency of individuals, families, and populations
with access and functional needs prior to, during, and after disasters;
Human Services Technical Assistance assets are utilized in the field to
provide these services. Persons with access and functional needs include
those who have disabilities, live in institutionalized settings, are elderly, are
children, are from diverse cultures, have limited English proficiency, are
transportaion disadvantaged, have chronic medical conditions, or have
pharmacological dependency.
HHS
Assistant Secretary for
Preparedness and
Response (ASPR)
ASPR leads the nation and its communities preparing for, responding to,
and recovering from the adverse health effects of public health
emergencies and disasters. ASPR focuses on preparedness, planning,
response, and recovery; provides federal support, including medical
professionals through the NDMS deployable teams, to augment SLTT
capabilities during an emergency or disaster; and leads the federal Health
and Social Services RSF of the National Disaster Recovery Framework to
assist locally led recovery efforts in the restoration of the public health,
health care and social services networks of impacted communities.
HHS
Assistant Secretary for
Public Affairs (ASPA)
The HHS ASPA assumes the lead in media response for public health,
coordinated with and through the Joint Information Center. HHS ASPA
coordinates the overall HHS Public Affairs planning, development, and
implementation of emergency incident communications strategies and
activities for the department.
HHS (ASPR)
At-Risk, Behavioral
Health and
Community Resilience
Provides subject matter expertise, education, and coordination to internal
and external partners to ensure that the functional needs of at-risk
individuals and behavioral health issues are integrated in the public health
and medical emergency preparedness, response, and recovery activities
of the nation to facilitate and promote community resilience and national
health security.
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 118
HHS (ASPR)
Biomedical Advanced
Research and
Development Authority
(BARDA)
BARDA, within the ASPR Office of HHS, provides an integrated,
systematic approach to the development and purchase of the necessary
vaccines, drugs, therapies, and diagnostic tools for public health medical
emergencies.
HHS
Crisis Counseling
Assistance and
Training Program
A state grant program administered by HHS Substance Abuse and Mental
Health Services Administration and funded by FEMA.
HHS (ASPR)
Disaster Medical
Assistance Team
(DMAT)
A DMAT is a group of professional and para-professional medical
personnel (supported by a cadre of logistical and administrative staff)
designed to provide medical care during a disaster or other incident.
DMATs are designed to be a rapid-response element to supplement local
medical care until other federal or contract resources can be mobilized, or
the situation is resolved.
HHS (ASPR)
Disaster Mortuary
Operational Response
Team (DMORT)
DMORTs are teams of subject matter experts that are activated in the
case of a disaster and directed by ASPR/Office of Emergency
Management (OEM). Teams are composed of funeral directors, medical
examiners, coroners, pathologists, forensic anthropologists, medical
records technicians and transcribers, finger print specialists, forensic
odonatologists, dental assistants, x-ray technicians, mental health
specialists, computer professionals, administrative support staff, and
security and investigative personnel.
HHS (ASPR)
Disaster Portable
Morgue Unit (DPMU)
DPMUs are staged on the East and West coasts for immediate
deployment in support of DMORT operations. The DPMU is a depository
of equipment and supplies for deployment to a disaster site. It contains a
complete morgue with designated workstations for each processing
element and prepackaged equipment and supplies.
HHS (ASPR)
Emergency
Management Group
(EMG)
The EMG is a scalable team that is utilized every day at some operational
level of intensity. Its organization is designed to be flexible and can expand
as needed. The EMG is the established structure through which
information and potential threats are received and decisions, including the
deployment of an Incident Response Coordination Team, are made. The
EMG operates within the principles of the Incident Command System and
National Incident Management System. The EMG effectively operates 24/7
but can reach its full capacity with associated liaisons within four hours.
HHS (ASPR)
Incident Response
Coordination Team
(IRCT)
The IRCT and the IRCT-Forward act as the HHS agents on-scene at
emergency sites under the direction of the EMG. The IRCT directs and
coordinates the activities of all HHS personnel deployed to the emergency
site and assists SLTT and other federal departments and agencies as
applicable.
HHS, DOD, VA, and
DHS
National Disaster
Medical System
(NDMS)
ASPR Office of Emergency Management (OEM) provides deployable
medical response teams through the NDMS to augment the nation’s
medical response capabilty and support SLTT authorities. In addition,
NDMS, a federal partnership between HHS, DOD, Veterans Administration
(VA), and DHS provides (1) patient evacuation from the affected area or a
location near the affected area to medcial care locations remote from the
affected areas and (2) definitive medical care at NDMS civilian member
hospitals.
HHS
National Public Health
Information Coalition
HHS will leverage a network of SLTT health public health communicators
to exchange information and increase the likelihood of consistent
messaging and communication activities between federal and SLTT
governments regarding the emergency and its impact on health.
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 119
HHS (ASPR)
National Veterinary
Response Team
(NVRT)
HHS’s cadre of individuals within the NDMS who have professional
expertise in areas of veterinary medicine, public health, and research. It is
the primary HHS resource for the treatment of injured or ill animals
affected by disasters.
HHS (ASPR)
Regional Emergency
Coordinators
ASPR’s primary representatives throughout the country at the regional
level; coordinates preparedness and response activities for public health
and medical emergencies.
HHS (ASPR)
Secretary’s
Operations Center
(SOC)
The SOC operates 24/7/365. The mission of the SOC is to serve as the
focal point for synthesis of critical public health and medical information on
behalf of the U.S. Government.
HHS (CDC)
CDC Emergency
Operations Center
(CDC-EOC)
The CDC EOC coordinates the deployment of CDC staff and the
procurement and management of all equipment and supplies that CDC
responders may need during their deployment. When activated for a
response, the CDC EOC can accommodate up to 230 personnel per 8-
hour shift to handle situations ranging from local interests to worldwide
incidents.
HHS (CDC)
Epidemic Information
Exchange
CDC’s secure, web-based communications network that serves as a
powerful communications exchange between CDC, state, and local health
departments, poison control centers, and other public health professionals.
The system provides rapid reporting, immediate notification, editorial
support, and coordination of health investigations for public health
professionals.
HHS (CDC)
Epidemic Intelligence
Service (EIS) Officers
EIS officers work in many health departments in the U.S. or at the CDC
through the CDC’s Center of Surveillance, Epidemiology, and Laboratory
Services and are dispatched to investigate possible epidemics, due to both
natural and artificial causes, including Bacillus anthracis, hantavirus, West
Nile virus, and the Ebola virus .
HHS (CDC)
Health Alert Network
CDC’s primary method of sharing cleared information about urgent public
health incidents with public information officers, federal, state, territorial,
and local public health practitioners; clinicians and public health
laboratories.
HHS (CDC)
National Institute for
Occupational Safety
and Health (NIOSH)
NIOSH is the U.S. federal agency that conducts research and makes
recommendations to prevent worker injury and illness. NIOSH provides
technical support and expertise in the characterization of complex,
unknown, and multiple-contaminant worker exposures. NIOSH can deploy
a multidiscipline team to provide guidance and technical assistance on
responder and worker safety and health.
HHS (CDC)
Laboratory Response
Network (LRN)
The LRN and its partners maintain an integrated national and international
network of laboratories that are fully equipped to respond quickly to acts of
chemical or biological threats, emerging infectious diseases, and other
public health threats and emergencies.
HHS (ASPR)
Strategic National
Stockpile (SNS)
The U.S. national repository of antibiotics, vaccines, chemical antidotes,
antitoxins, and other critical medical supplies for use in a public health
emergency upon request from SLTT responders.
HHS FDA
Regulated
Products/Commodity
Response Teams
Provides assistance to SLTT health authorities or in the absence of SLTT
health investigators, assumes primary responsibility for evaluation and
recovery of food service establishments and pharmacies.
HHS FDA
Medical
Countermeasures
Initiative (MCMsi)
This office coordinates FDA’s MCMs development, availability,
preparedness, and response. FDA ensures that MCMs—including drugs,
vaccines, and diagnostic tests—to counter CBRN and emerging disease
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 120
Office of
Counterterrorism and
Emerging Threats
(OCET)
threats are safe, effective, and secure. This includes coordinating
research, setting deployment and use strategies, and facilitating access to
MCMs.
HHS FDA
Office of Foods and
Veterinary Medicine
(OFVM)
Includes the Center for Food Safety and Nutrition and the Center for
Veterinary Medicine and provides executive leadership and strategic
direction to the OFVM programs to protect and promote the health of
humans and animals by ensuring the safety of the U.S. food supply, food
additives, and dietary supplements as well as the safety of animal food
and the safety and effectiveness of animal drugs.
HHS FDA
Office of Coordinated
Outbreak Response
and Evaluation
Network (CORE)
FDA CORE is a component of CFSAN that ensures in-depth signal,
trending and surveillance; streamlined decision making and quicker
response time during an outbreak; seamless coordination and enhanced
communication; and ultimately, increased public health protection leading
to effective preventive food safety practices and policies.
HHS (FDA) and
USDA (FSIS)
Food Emergency
Respond Network
(FERN)
Network of food testing laboratories to detect, to identify, to respond, and
recover from emergencies and outbreaks in the U.S. food supply.
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 121
Appendix 6: Acronym List
Table 13: Acronym List
Acronym
Term
ACF
Administration for Children and
Families
AFHSB
Armed Forces Health Surveillance
Branch
AHPA
Animal Health Protection Act
APHIS
Animal and Plant Health
Inspection Service
ARS
Agricultural Research Service
ASPA
Assistant Secretary for Public
Affairs
ASPR
Assistant Secretary for
Preparedness and Response
BARDA
Biomedical Advanced Research
and Development Authority
BIA
Biological Incident Annex
BLM
Bureau of Land Management
CAA
Clean Air Act
CBP
Customs and Border Protection
CBRN
Chemical, Biological, Radiological,
Nuclear
CBRNE
Chemical, Biological, Radiological,
Nuclear, and High-Yield
Explosives
CCC
Commodity Credit Corporation
CCMD
Combatant Command
CDC
Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention
CERCLA
Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act
CFSAN
Center for Food Safety and
Applied Nutrition
CISA
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure
Security Agency
CMCU
Consequence Management
Coordination Unit
COG
Continuity of Government
Acronym
Term
COOP
Continuity of Operations Plan
CORE
Office of Coordinated Outbreak
Response and Evaluation Network
CVM
Center for Veterinary Medicine
CWA
Clean Water Act
CWMD
Countering Weapons of Mass
Destruction Office
DEST
Domestic Emergency Support
Team
DHS
Department of Homeland Security
DIPP
Dairy Indemnity Payment Program
DMAT
Disaster Medical Assistance Team
DMORT
Disaster Mortuary Operational
Response Team
DOC
Department of Commerce
DOD
Department of Defense
DOE
Department of Energy
DOI
Department of the Interior
DOJ
Department of Justice
DOL
Department of Labor
DOS
Department of State
DOT
Department of Transportation
DPA
Defense Production Act
DPMU
Disaster Portable Morgue Unit
DRG
Domestic Resilience Group
DSCA
Defense Support of Civil
Authorities
D-SNAP
Disaster Supplemental Nutrition
Assistance Program
EDEN
Extension Disaster Education
Network
EIS
Epidemic Intelligence Service
EMC
Emergency Management
Committee
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 122
Acronym
Term
EMRS
Emergency Management
Response System
EO
Executive Order
EOC
Emergency Operations Center
EPA
Environmental Protection Agency
ERLN
Environmental Response
Laboratory Network
ESF
Emergency Support Function
FAD
Foreign Animal Disease
FAIA
Food and Agriculture Incident
Annex
FBI
Federal Bureau of Investigation
FD&C Act
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act
FDA
Food and Drug Administration
FEMA
Federal Emergency Management
Agency
FERN
Food Emergency Response
Network
FIFRA
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide,
and Rodenticide Act
FIMS
FSIS Incident Management
System
FIOP
Federal Interagency Operational
Plan
FS
U.S. Forest Service
FSIS
Food Safety and Inspection
Service
FSMA
The Food Safety Modernization
Act of 2011
FWS
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
HHS
Department of Health and Human
Services
HRSA
Health Resources and Services
Administration
HSPD
Homeland Security Presidential
Directive
HVE
Homegrown Violent Extremist
IAA
Interagency Agreement
Acronym
Term
ICLN
Integrated Consortium of
Laboratory Networks
IHR
International Health Regulations
IP
Infrastructure Protection
IRCT
Incident Response Coordination
Team
JIC
Joint Information Center
JOC
Joint Operations Center
JTTF
Joint Terrorism Task Force
LFA
Lead Federal Agency
LRN
Laboratory Response Network
MAC
Multi-Agency Coordination
MCMs
Medical Countermeasures
MCMsi
Medical Countermeasures
Initiative
MOA
Memorandum of Agreement
MOU
Memorandum of Understanding
NAHERC
National Animal Health
Emergency Response Corps
NAHLN
National Animal Health Laboratory
Network
NAP
Noninsured Crop Disaster
Assistance Program
NBACC
National Biodefense Analysis and
Countermeasures Center
NBFAC
National Bioforensic Analysis
Center
NBIC
National Biosurveillance
Integration Center
NBIS
National Biosurveillance
Integration System
NCP
National Contingency Plan
NCMI
National Center for Medical
Intelligence
NDMS
National Disaster Medical System
NDRF
National Disaster Recovery
Framework
NEA
National Emergencies Act
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 123
Acronym
Term
NEPA
National Environmental Protection
Act
NFP
National Focal Point (IHR)
NIH
National Institutes of Health
N-IMAT
National Incident Management
Assistance Teams
NIOSH
National Institute for Occupational
Safety and Health
NPDN
National Plant Diagnostic Network
NPI
Non-pharmaceutical Intervention
NPS
National Park Service
NRCC
National Response Coordination
Center
NRCS
Natural Resources Conservation
Service
NRF
National Response Framework
NRT
National Response Team
NSPD
National Security Policy Directive
NVRT
National Veterinary Response
Team
NVS
National Veterinary Stockpile
NVSL
National Veterinary Services
Laboratories
NWHC
National Wildlife Health Center
OSEC
Office of the Secretary
OCET
Office of Counterterrorism and
Emerging Threats
OCI
Office of Criminal Investigation
OCONUS
Outside the Continental United
States
OFVM
Office of Foods and Veterinary
Medicine
OHS
Office of Homeland Security
OIG
Office of the Inspector General
OPM
Office of Personnel Management
OSC
(EPA/USCG)
On-Scene Coordinator
OSC (FBI)
On-Scene Commander
Acronym
Term
OSHA
Occupational Safety and Health
Administration
PAHPA
Pandemic and All-Hazards
Preparedness Act
PAHPRA
Pandemic and All-Hazards
Preparedness Reauthorization Act
PETS
Pets Evacuation and
Transportation Standards Act
PHE
Public Health Emergency
PHEF
Public Health Emergency Fund
PHEIC
Public Health Emergency of
International Concern
PHMSA
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials
Administration
PHSA
Public Health Service Act
PIADC
Plum Island Animal Disease
Center
PIO
Public Information Officer
PPD
Presidential Policy Directive
PPQ
Plant Protection and Quarantine
PReP
Preparedness and Response Plan
RCRA
Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act
RD
Rural Development
REC
Regional Emergency Coordinator
R/N
Radiological/nuclear
RRCC
Regional Response Coordination
Center
RRT
Regional Response Team
RSF
Recovery Support Function
SAMHSA
Substance Abuse and Medical
Health Services Administration
S&T
Science & Technology (DHS)
SBA
Small Business Administration
SLTT
State, local, tribal, territorial
SME
Subject Matter Expert
SNS
Strategic National Stockpile
SOC
Secretary’s Operation Center
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 124
Acronym
Term
TCE
Threat Credibility Evaluation
UCG
Unified Coordination Group
USCG
U.S. Coast Guard
USDA
U.S. Department of Agriculture
USGS
U.S. Geological Survey
VA
Department of Veterans Affairs
VS
Veterinary Services
WMD
Weapons of Mass Destruction
WMDSG
Weapons of Mass Destruction
Strategic Group
WMD-CT
Weapons of Mass Destruction
Counterterrorism
WS
Wildlife Services
Food and Agricultural Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
August 2019 125
